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Abstract 
 
This study examined the role of cultural and contextual factors in the critical thinking processes 
of bilingual Lebanese undergraduate students. In addition, it investigated whether bilingual 
students used comparable processes to answer equivalent critical thinking questions in Arabic 
and English. A purposive sample of 24 upper division undergraduate students enrolled in a 
Lebanese university completed the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (CCTT) as well as 10 
questions from the Sample Reasoning Mindset Test (SRMT). Participants were divided into two 
similar procedural groups. Group A completed the CCTT and SRMT in Arabic. Group B 
completed the assessments in English. A think-aloud protocol was used to collect verbal data of 
the thinking processes of the participants on select items from each test. Participant responses on 
the CCTT were coded using the consensus descriptions of the core critical thinking skills and 
sub-skills of interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation, and self-regulation 
outlined in the APA Delphi Report (Facione, 1990a). Responses on the SRMT were coded based 
on whether statements were framed in moral terms, pragmatic terms, logical terms, religious 
terms, social/relational terms, or ideological terms. Additional patterns that emerged in the 
verbal data were labelled and utilized as appropriate. An exploratory quantitative analysis 
indicated no significant difference in overall scores based on demographic and linguistic 
variables. The mean and median scores on the CCTT were generally lower than scores from 
equally leveled participant scores in other studies. The results of the qualitative analysis of the 
verbal data demonstrated participant weaknesses in comparing options; considering multiple 
points of view; reasoning neutrally; engaging in global reasoning; identifying the credibility of 
sources; and the use of best-explanation criteria. The results also indicated that the majority of 
participants did not understand the concepts of equivocation; propositional logic; and the proper 
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use of the scientific method in evaluating and planning experiments. In addition, the verbal data 
revealed an instrumental view of education; a general disposition of self-confidence; and a lack 
of self-regulation and self-reflection. A cross-linguistic comparison of verbal processes did not 
reveal significant differences in reasoning processes based on language. The results of the study 
support the claim that Lebanon’s sectarian and authoritarian educational contexts impact the 
critical thinking processes of Lebanese undergraduate students. The results also highlight the 
need to include an awareness of cultural location in understanding, developing, and assessing 
critical thinking.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
The question of what constitutes the goals and purposes of an educational model is varied 
and controversial, but in spite of the variety of different underlying theories or methodological 
approaches to education, there is at least one consistent variable; education is concerned at some 
level with the development of the human capacity to think. Philosophers of education and 
organizations such as the National Research Council stress the importance of critical thinking as 
a primary output of a successful education (Barnett, 1997; Pellegrino, Hilton, & National 
Research Council, 2012; Pithers & Soden, 2000; Siegel, 1989). Some educators bemoan the 
general lack of critical thinking among students (Browne & Keeley, 1988). Others claim that as 
educational systems become more oriented towards passing standardized tests that this approach 
comes at the expense of developing students who engage information critically (Alexander & 
Laboratory, 2012). Still others argue that the educational method of rote memorization that is 
practiced in certain cultures is unable to produce students capable of meeting the demands of 
critical thinking in the Western university (Davies, 2007). 
  In parallel a variety of programs, curriculum proposals, and instruments have emerged 
that claim to develop or assess critical thinking (De Bono, 2006; Ennis, 1993; Follman, 2003). 
Some of these approaches emphasize the importance of critical thinking for economic success 
(Kamens, 2013; Soh, 2014) while others discuss the role of critical thinking in creating good 
citizens (ten Dam & Volman, 2004). Certain critics argue that critical thinking neither creates 
good citizens nor economically successful individuals (Weissberg, 2013) and that critical 
thinking may actually deconstruct the importance of conviction (Ritola, 2012). Although most of 
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the debate is centered on how to strengthen and improve critical thinking, there is not always 
conceptual clarity concerning the definition of the term itself. Is critical thinking primarily a set 
of skills, a disposition, or both (Facione, 1990a; Siegel, 1989)? Is it nonconformist, 
individualistic, and creative (Elder & Paul, 2007)? Is critical thinking reducible to logical 
deconstruction or to an act of self-reflection (Johanson, 1987; McNiff, 2011)? Does critical 
thinking include a moral component (Kwak, 2009)? Is critical thinking possible across 
disciplines, or does it require discipline-specific knowledge (Bailin, 1992; McPeck, 1981)?  
In addition, there is also confusion concerning the impact of culture on critical thinking. 
Does critical thinking mean the same thing in different cultural contexts (Chan & Yan, 2009)? 
Do humans engage in reasoning in similar ways across cultures (Evers, 2007)? How do different 
cultural and epistemological starting points influence the conceptualization of critical thinking 
(Siegel, 2007)? Is critical thinking a Western convention (Tian & Low, 2011)?   
A growing body of research indicates that there is a significant relationship between 
culture and thinking. Studies in the neuroscience of culture contend that evidence supports a 
physiological relationship between thinking and culture (Ambady & Bharucha, 2009). 
Behavioral researchers such as Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan (2001) review quantitative, 
empirical studies to argue that the cognitive processes triggered by a specific cultural situation 
cannot be separated from their context. These researchers claim that even if humans in different 
cultures use similar cognitive process, “the circumstances that prompt the use of one process 
versus another will differ substantially across cultures, the frequencies with which the very most 
basic cognitive processes are used will differ greatly, consequently, the degree and nature of 
expertise in the use of particular cognitive processes will differ; and tacit or even explicit 
normative standards for thought will differ across cultures” (Nisbett et al., 2001, p. 306). Studies 
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such as these suggest that if social, ecological, linguistic, physiological, and cultural differences 
affect the way that humans interpret the world, a re-evaluation of certain cognitive theories and 
methodological approaches to the development of critical thinking is needed.  
As long as the development of the human capacity to think critically continues to be one 
of the primary goals of education, it is important to examine how particular social/ 
cultural/political contexts influence the conceptualization, teaching, and assessment of critical 
thinking. It is also instructive to explore the particular cultural and/or educational assumptions 
that are used to define the conceptual boundaries of what qualifies as critical thinking. This type 
of discussion can increase awareness of the dangers of epistemic imperialism as well as the 
limitations inherent in mono-cultural perspectives and definitions of critical thinking.  
Critical Thinking Assessment  
A number of tests have been developed to measure critical thinking. Assessments, such 
as the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test (1989), evaluate production responses to 
questions. In a production response, a test-taker is asked to generate and evaluate arguments in 
response to specific questions and then the test-taker’s responses are scored by trained evaluators 
using established criteria. Tests like the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests (Millman, Tomko, & 
Ennis, 2005), Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser, 2002), and 
California Critical Thinking Skills Test (P. Facione & N. Facione, 2002) employ a selection 
response format. In a selection response, a test-taker is asked to read a short passages and then 
choose the correct answer from among a selection of choices (Frisby & Traffanstedt, 2003). 
Selection response questions are designed to measure specific skills associated with critical 
thinking such as deduction, induction, analysis, interpretation, making inferences, assessing 
credibility, assumption identification, etc. A third approach, as seen in the Halpern Critical 
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Thinking Assessment using Everyday Situations (Halpern, 2007), uses both production responses 
and selections responses. In addition, tests like the California Critical Thinking Dispositions 
Inventory (CCTDI) have been developed to specifically measure critical thinking dispositions (P. 
Facione, N. Facione, & Giancarlo, 2001). The CCTDI employs a Likert scale questionnaire 
designed to measure self-reported perceptions towards truth-seeking, open-mindedness, 
analyticity, systematicity, critical thinking self-confidence, inquisitiveness, and maturity (Facione 
et al., 2001).  
Although there is an ongoing debate about how best to conceptualize critical thinking, the 
operational definitions used to measure critical thinking in most critical thinking assessments are 
largely similar (Ennis, 2016; Possin, 2008). In 1990, the American Philosophical Association 
(APA) published the Delphi Consensus Definition of Critical Thinking (Facione, 1990a). The 
APA Delphi Report presents a broad definition of critical thinking that includes critical thinking 
skills, the purpose of critical thinking, the nature of critical thinking, and the characteristics of 
the ideal critical thinker. In specific, the report outlines the need for critical thinking skills in 
interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation, and self-regulation. It also articulates 
critical thinking dispositions of being “habitually inquisitive, well informed, trustful of reason, 
open-minded, flexible, fair minded in evaluation, honest in facing personal biases, prudent in 
making judgments, willing to reconsider, clear about issues, orderly in complex matters, diligent 
in seeking relevant information, reasonable in the selection of criteria, focused in inquiry, and 
persistent in seeking results which are as precise as the subject and the circumstances of inquiry 
permit” (Facione, 1990, p. 3). The report provides a detailed discussion of the meaning of each 
of these terms and states that the critical thinker must be able to explain the “evidential, 
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conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” upon which a 
judgment is based (p. 3).  
Although there are 33 references to context in the Delphi document, there is no specific 
reference to culture. The report discusses context in the terms of domain-specific, not culture-
specific, knowledge. In addition, the 46 scholars who participated in the production of the Delphi 
Report all work as part of institutions located in the United States and none work within fields 
explicitly associated with the study of culture, such as sociology or anthropology. One of the 
questions that will be explored in this study is whether Lebanese students use distinct cultural 
processes to frame and solve critical thinking questions and, if so, the implications of these 
findings for understanding the teaching and assessment of critical thinking in divergent cultural 
contexts.  
Local Context 
  Lebanon presents an interesting test case for examining the nexus of culture and critical 
thinking. In an area of 4,036 square miles (slightly smaller than the US state of Connecticut) 
Lebanon contains eighteen different religious sects each vying to preserve its own distinctive 
identity and presence while participating in the shared aspects of a Lebanese national and 
cultural identity. Lebanon’s politics reflect this diversity. In 1942, the government was 
established as a confessional democracy where each religious community is entitled to particular 
political offices in relation to its population demographic. There has not been an official census 
in Lebanon since 1932 based on the rationale that it is best to avoid the possibility that officially 
recorded demographic shifts will disrupt the balance of power. Religious identity is a matter of 
public record with each child inheriting the religious affiliation of his or her father. This religious 
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affiliation is recorded on the child’s birth certificate and is included on a number of public 
documents.  
Lebanon also has a long history of political instability. Its geographical location between 
Israel and Syria has led to its role as a type of playground for regional power struggles. From 
1975 until 1990 Lebanon was embroiled in a sectarian civil war tied to regional events (Fisk, 
1990). In 2005, the former prime minister Rafic Hariri was assassinated. Since 2005 there have 
been more than twelve political assassinations, a regular turnover in government, and a number 
of extended periods where the government has only existed in a caretaker role (“Timeline: 
Lebanon assassinations,” 2008). From 2014 to 2016, the country functioned without a president 
for a period of 29 months (Nakoul & Perry, 2016). The political instability in Lebanon has 
elevated the importance of ethnoreligious affiliations for survival and vocational opportunities. 
The culture is commonly described as collectivist (McCabe, Feghali, & Abdallah, 2008) wherein 
the needs of the individual are generally met through the community of origin instead of the 
political entity.  
Lebanon’s long litany of conflicts has also destroyed its economic infrastructure. 
Lebanon’s instability has resulted in a remittance-based economy where a large number of 
Lebanese citizens survive by depending on remittances sent by family members living and 
working in different countries. In 2010, Lebanon received 8.2 billion dollars in remittances with 
an estimated population of 4.3 million people, which constituted 22.4% of the country’s GDP, 
the highest in the Middle East/North Africa region (World Bank, 2011). A steady emigration of 
Lebanese citizens, who rely on education as a means to gain employment opportunities in more 
prosperous societies, has been one consequence of Lebanon’s failed economy. 
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 Lebanon places a high value on privatized, formal education. In 2011, a World Bank 
report stated that approximately 61.3% of the secondary school population is enrolled in private 
schools (World Bank, 2011). These schools are generally under the oversight of a particular 
ethnoreligious community (Frayha, 2010). The curriculum is distributed between Arabic and 
English, or Arabic and French. Math, sciences, and language and literature courses are taught in 
either English or French while history, geography, and civics are taught in Arabic. As a result of 
the French and English language instruction, Lebanese students are functionally bilingual and 
often trilingual by the time they enter high school (Zakharia, 2010). The Lebanese educational 
system is built on a high-stakes test model that requires students to pass a nationally 
administered test after primary school (the Brevet) in order to move on to secondary school and a 
nationally administered test after secondary school (either the Lebanese Baccalaureate or the 
French Baccalaureate) in order to move on to tertiary education. 
In addition, Lebanon has a tradition of Western influences on educational theory and 
practice (Sbaiti, 2008). French Jesuit Priests and British and American Protestant missionaries 
established a number of schools in Lebanon in the late 1800s. Because of the French and English 
language instruction, Lebanese private schools often import Western curriculums. The top 
university in Lebanon promotes itself as being built upon the American liberal arts education 
model (“Best Arab Region Universities Rankings,” 2017; About Us, n.d. para 1).  
Interestingly, the mission statement of the general education program at this university 
presents an instrumentalist view of knowledge and a definition of critical thinking that equates 
critical thinking with developing problem-solving skills. More specifically, the mission statement 
conveys the idea that what makes knowledge valuable is the ability to use it to solve problems 
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(About General Education, n.d., para 1). This description of knowledge is consistent with the 
Lebanese emphasis on education as a means towards an improved economic outcome. 
As referenced above, instability, collectivism, Western curriculum borrowing, bi-lingual 
instruction, high-stakes testing, and an instrumental/economic view of education characterize the 
social/cultural/political/educational context of Lebanon. These context-specific issues should 
strengthen reasoning patterns that emphasize the value of interdependent thought (Varnum, 
Grossmann, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2010), conformity (Salloukh, Barakat, Al-Habbal, Khattab, & 
Mikaelian, 2015), and an understanding of critical thinking that emphasizes problem solving for 
the purpose of economic benefit. In addition, these issues should work against critical thinking 
dispositions such as open-mindedness, flexibility in considering stereotypes and socio-centric 
tendencies, seeking to understand the opinions of others, honesty in facing one’s own biases, and 
a willingness to reconsider and revise convictions (Abrami et al., 2015).  
The Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to examine the role of cultural and contextual factors in the 
critical thinking processes of bilingual Lebanese undergraduate students. Using selected items 
from the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z, the study explored how Lebanese students 
employ culturally informed processes to frame and interpret critical thinking questions designed 
to measure deduction, induction, observation and credibility of sources, assumptions 
identification, and meaning. It also explored how Lebanese students framed and self-reported on 
questions taken from Insight Assessment’s Sample Reasoning Mindset Test designed to assess 
dispositions of truth-seeking, open-mindedness, inquisitiveness, critical thinking self-confidence, 
and maturity.  
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A secondary purpose was to examine whether bilingual students used comparable 
processes to answer critical thinking questions in Arabic and English. Participants completed the 
Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z and Sample Reasoning Mindset Test in Arabic and 
English. Using a think-aloud protocol on select items from each test, the Arabic and English 
critical thinking processes of students were compared.  
Significance of the Study 
This study addresses the dearth of empirical studies that discuss the relationship between 
culture and critical thinking. If critical thinking is adopted as an educational ideal rooted in a 
teacher’s respect for students (Siegel, 1980), it becomes imperative to better understand the 
relationship between culture and the goals of critical thinking instruction. The study highlights 
potential cultural variables that may contribute to a misunderstanding of how students perform in 
critical thinking assessments and provides evidence that contributes to the contemporary 
discussion about the uses and limitations of critical thinking assessments across cultures. It also 
touches on the question of the extent to which critical thinking should be accepted as a trans-
cultural concept. 
The study provides data on whether or not contemporary conceptualizations of critical 
thinking are disadvantageous to non-Western cultures. The results of the study address the 
question of whether one of the goals of developing critical thinking is to move students away 
from culturally constructed values such as interdependent thinking and whether normative 
critical thinking skills and dispositions should be developed regardless of context. The results 
also serve as a basis for exploring culturally-sensitive approaches to critical thinking and 
contextual approaches to the development of critical thinking.  
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Finally, this research project encourages a re-evaluation of the APA Delphi Definition of 
critical thinking in light of the impact of culture and context-specific epistemological 
assumptions. It also contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how to assess and develop 
critical thinking cross-culturally.  
Research Questions 
1. What reasoning processes do Lebanese undergraduate students utilize to frame, interpret, 
and answer critical thinking questions from the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z 
designed to measure skills of deduction, induction, observation and credibility of sources, 
assumption identification, and meaning? 
2. How do undergraduate Lebanese students frame and self-report on critical thinking 
questions from Insight Assessment’s Sample Reasoning Mindset Test designed to assess 
dispositions of inquisitiveness, open-mindedness, truth-seeking, critical thinking self-
confidence, and maturity? 
3. Do undergraduate Lebanese students employ culturally-specific reasoning processes in 
responding to questions on the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z and the Sample 
Reasoning Mindset Test? 
4. Do bilingual students use comparable reasoning processes in answering equivalent 
questions in Arabic and English from the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z and the 
Sample Reasoning Mindset Test? 
Theoretical Framework 
This study is built on a framework based on two central assumptions. First, that the 
formal process of education is associated with advancing human understanding, promoting 
human flourishing, and embracing the breadth of cultural, historical, and philosophical diversity 
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within the human experience. From this assumption, it can be argued that the relationship 
between thinking and making choices based on the supposed coherency of our thoughts is a 
central and distinguishing aspect of our shared humanity. In the spirit of promoting human 
flourishing it follows that the development of the human capacity to think should occupy a 
central place in the role of education (Siegel, 1989) 
Second, the framework accepts the idea that ways of thinking, in some sense, are shared 
across cultures (Evers, 2007; Siegel, 1999, 2007; Wong & Evers, 2001). As a result, as humans 
navigate their lives in different cultures and contexts, they use similar cognitive capacities to 
make sense of similar types of choices that are intrinsic to a shared human experience. The 
contention is that in spite of a multitude of rational discourses that exist, it is possible to make 
evaluative statements that attempt to transcend a specific local context (Siegel, 2007). In relation 
to the question of critical thinking, within this framework it is possible to understand the 
epistemological and cultural assumptions of a different explanatory paradigm and still make a 
judgment concerning the validity of that paradigm or correctness of its claims.  
Correctness in this case is different than reasonableness. It may be argued that a 
reasonable explanation is consistent with its own assumptions but does not accurately represent 
the way the world operates; thus, this framework cautiously adopts a critical realist ontology 
with the belief that accurate knowledge reflects how the world operates independent of human 
constructs and beliefs (Archer et al., 2016). The framework also roots the justification for 
education in the value of promoting human flourishing. It may be argued that an 
epistemologically consistent worldview does not promote values that are consistent with the 
educational goal of promoting human flourishing. This argument assumes that independent 
criteria which transcend historical and cultural context exist upon which actions can be judged as 
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promoting or working against human flourishing (Archer et al., 2016). There is an acceptance of 
the claim that intellectual fields contain an inner logic by which they are governed (Manzon, 
2011). The adoption of this framework makes it possible to conceptualize and frame an 
intellectual field such as the study of critical thinking in a way that can be productively 
communicated and assessed across cultural and societal boundaries. As a result, this study of 
critical thinking works toward a more accurate understanding of how humans in different 
cultural contexts can develop the capacity to think in a particular way.  
That being said, the adoption of a critical realist approach includes the recognition of the 
fallibility of human knowledge and the potential dangers of explanatory metanarratives. As such, 
this framework adopts many aspects of an interpretivist view of the social world. It accepts that 
actors in different social contexts create sets of meanings, rules, and norms that make social 
interaction possible and help them to make sense of their own social worlds (Manzon, 2011; 
Wittgenstein & Kenny, 1994). It also acknowledges that the question of critical thinking is 
generally concerned with which beliefs are considered justified (a justified belief is built on a 
good reason) and how a culture defines what constitutes a good reason varies across contexts 
(Ichikawa, Jenkins, & Steup, 2017; Shweder, 1986; Stich & Nisbett, 2012; Weinberg, Nichols, & 
Stich, 2001). The framework recognizes that there are a variety of interpretative frameworks that 
make good sense of the world but are based on different sets of assumptions. These facets of the 
interpretivist perspective create a number of challenges in evaluating and exploring what it 
means to develop and assess critical thinking across cultural contexts.  
In general, the approach adopted in this study to the question of critical thinking and 
culture is best summarized using the model in Figure 1 adapted from a model presented by Chan 
and Yan (2009).  
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this model, region 1 represents general reasoning patterns that are shared across 
cultures. For example, the general pattern of moving from observation to inference to 
interpretation to action based on implicit assumptions constitutes a shared reasoning pattern. 
Evidence that lends credence to the claim that there are some shared patterns of reasoning that 
cross cultural divides can be seen in the advent of similar types of inventions created to address 
similar types of problems independently in a variety of times, places, and cultures (Evers, 2007).  
Region 2 represents general patterns of assumptions or interpretation that are shared by 
some cultures but not all cultures. Consider the decision concerning whether a husband should 
leave his family and move to another county in order to find a better income with which to 
support his family. In such a scenario, particular cultural assumptions and values can lead to 
different sets of priorities that are used to make a decision that is considered reasonably justified 
(Wong, 2001). Cultural values can be conceptualized in the form of systematic differences or 
similarities that represent particular cultural patterns of reasoning (Evers, 2007). Region 2, 
therefore, represents the interpretivist aspect of this theoretical framework. The concepts of 
independent versus interdependent thinking outlined in the Social Orientation Hypothesis fall 
within this category (Varnum, Grossman, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2010).  
1 
2 3 
3 
3 
Figure 1 Bounded Rationality 
1. Shared reasoning patterns. 
2. Patterns shared by some by not all cultures. 
3. Patterns unique to a single culture. 
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Region 3 represents the idea that on some level different cultural frameworks have 
unique patterns of thinking that are specific to their own cultural contexts. As such, certain 
culturally embedded logical inferences can only make sense in the context of a specific culturally 
coherent mental scheme (Gellatly, Rogers, & Sloboda, 1989; Hutchins, 2005). This region is 
consistent with the philosophical critique that shared patterns of thinking break down at some 
point and become individualistic patterns of interpretation (Stich, 1993).  
The model’s commitment to the tenets of a critical realism enables an evaluation of how 
culturally informed thinking patterns are aligned with the educational goals of advancing human 
understanding and promoting human flourishing. It also allows for an examination of whether 
cultural patterns of reasoning are consistent with specific definitions and values of critical 
thinking. At the same time, the framework’s recognition of the fallibility of human knowledge 
and the limitations of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) creates the necessary space to 
acknowledge and embrace the breadth of cultural, historical, and philosophical diversity within 
the human experience. This space is meant to help mitigate the danger of educational 
imperialism and mandates a closer evaluation of the limitations of normative critical thinking 
frameworks.  
Limitations and Delimitations 
 This study has a number of limitations. The study used a think-aloud protocol (TAP) to 
collect verbal data for the purpose of analyzing and comparing thinking processes (Someren, 
Barnard, & Sandberg, 1994). TAPs are designed to capture the immediate, naturally occurring 
cognitive processes that occur in reasoning during problem analysis. As such, this study did not 
primarily address aspects of critical thinking that involve the use of long-term memory for 
retrospective reflection or the justification and interpretation of particular reasoning patterns. It 
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was focused on exploring the immediate processes that students use in working memory while 
solving critical thinking problems. However, in the final section of the protocol participants were 
asked to verbalize rationales for choosing whether they agreed or disagreed with questions 
designed to measure critical thinking dispositions. This final section of the TAP introduced long-
term memory and reflection into the data. As such, the verbal data collected in the final section 
of the TAP was analyzed separately from the verbal data collected in the previous sections.  
Another limitation of the TAP method is that it may result in incomplete or incoherent 
cognitive data resulting in gaps in the verbal record of reasoning. Post-protocol interviews 
provide supplemental information to help account for these gaps. Whereas TAPs attempt to 
capture information that appears in working memory, the post-protocol interview may introduce 
information retrieved from long-term memory into the data. In addition, Ericsson and Simon 
(1998) state that there are significant differences in the ease with which people verbalize their 
thoughts. Although training and post-protocol interviews can help reduce these differences, the 
impact of this variable cannot be altogether eliminated. These limitations require that a TAP is 
designed to assess particular cognitive processes among a specific population. It also necessitates 
the use of proper training for participants and a clear data collecting and transcription strategy. 
Think-aloud protocols are often used to evaluate test items for understanding and 
comprehension. This project used a TAP to evaluate thinking processes, not test items. As such, 
the researcher accepts the evidence presented in the CCTT manual that supports the standard-
condition situational validity and overall construct validity of the Level Z test for measuring 
critical thinking skills among undergraduate students. Since the CCTT Level Z was designed for 
a set of standard conditions that differ from those in the study, the reader will have to determine 
the extent to which the test presents a valid measure of critical thinking skills in the Lebanese 
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context based on the information provided. In addition, the researcher was unable to acquire 
permission to use the California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI) since Insight 
Assessment will not release any proprietary information for research purposes. As a result, the 
questions from Insight Assessment’s Sample Reasoning Mindset Test have not undergone 
psychometric testing.  
The Arabic translations of the test instruments were provided by Insight Assessment for 
the Sample Reasoning Mindset Test and the Debono Center for Teaching Thinking in Amman, 
Jordan for the CCTT Level Z. A back-translation and examination of the test items used in the 
CCTT TAP was performed using standard translation practices (Davies, 2007; Gokhan Iskifoglu 
& Agazade, 2013). Minor changes to the Debono Center for Teaching Thinking translation were 
made based on the results of back-translation. Since Insight Assessment claims that all of their 
products go through an extensive translation process, a back-translation was not performed on 
the Sample Reasoning Mindset Test. During the TAP a few mistakes in the SRMT translation 
became evident and changes were made and reported as appropriate. A full evaluation of the 
translations used in this study is beyond the scope of this project. It is therefore possible that 
differences in student understanding of questions could be traced to problems of translation. In 
addition, the Arabic translations of these tests have not been psychometrically tested. 
Researchers working on culture and thinking have often attempted to make broad 
comparisons of thinking patterns on the basis of culture. Even so, Knight and Nisbett (2007) 
have shown that it is possible that individuals from geographically similar regions may think in 
different ways. Similarly, Varnum, Grossman, Kitayama, and Nisbett (2010) argue that empirical 
studies generally support the broader correlation between social orientation and thought but these 
correlations may break down on the individual level such that modes of thought are expressed in 
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different ways for different individuals within each group. The small sample size in this study 
makes it possible that the participants may interpret and perform critical thinking tasks in ways 
that differ from other Lebanese undergraduate students.  
 This project also has a number of delimitations. There are many ways to categorize and 
evaluate cognitive thinking processes. For example, Benjamin Bloom's taxonomy of cognitive 
educational objectives is widely cited in education. His higher-order thinking skills are often 
seen as equivalent to critical thinking. As Ennis (1985) points out, Bloom’s taxonomy is too 
vague to be useful for conceptualizing or evaluating critical thinking. Similarly, critical thinking 
has often been used as a catch-all term to describe various types of thinking such as creative 
thinking or problem-solving, or used too narrowly as skepticism or logical thinking. Although 
critical thinking has many connections with other types of thinking, this study has chosen to 
explore critical thinking processes using the categories of critical thinking outlined in the APA 
Delphi Definition of critical thinking (Facione, 1990). As such, the interpretation of the results 
should not be employed to evaluate other types of thinking.  
 There is a breadth of approaches used to examine critical thinking. This project 
specifically focused on the role of cultural and contextual factors in the critical thinking 
processes of bilingual Lebanese undergraduate students. The study does not address ways to 
teach critical thinking and does not assess the critical thinking ability or dispositions of 
participants. As mentioned above, the project also does not primarily address meta-cognitive 
reflection or the reasons or evidence that participants provide to justify particular reasoning 
patterns. These delimitations align with the central aim of the study to examine the role of 
culture and language in the critical thinking processes of students while performing on a critical 
thinking test.  
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 The think-aloud protocol is a labor-intensive methodology that yields a large response 
data set (Johnstone et al., 2006). As a result, the sample size used in TAP research is generally 
small and purposeful. Nielsen (1994) suggests that a sample size of 5 participants is sufficient for 
most TAP research. Leighton (2017) contends that the labor-intensive nature of TAP research is 
not a valid justification for small samples sizes. Instead, she argues that sample sizes must be 
appropriately aligned with project goals. Leighton presents research to suggest that sample sizes 
should range from between 15-50 participants. In qualitative TAP research, participants are 
generally chosen to represent demographics relevant to a particular set of research questions 
(Johnstone et al., 2006). This project has chosen to use a purposive sample of 24 undergraduate 
students. The sample size is too small to generate randomly and the researcher chose to limit the 
research to one university. The researcher worked with junior and senior students according to 
the CCTT Level Z test target level. These delimitations limit the ability to generalize the research 
results to a broader population.  
Another delimitation is related to the choice of the CCTT Level Z test and the Sample 
Reasoning Mindset Test as instruments in the project. There are a variety of critical thinking 
skills assessment instruments available on the market. The criteria that were used to select the 
CCTT were (1) it has a long history of being used to assess critical thinking, (2) it has received a 
positive, academic third-party review (Possin, 2008), (3) the items in the assessment were 
considered sufficient for the project goals, (4) the company that owns the instrument granted 
permission to reproduce its items for academic research, and (5) an Arabic translation of the 
instrument was available. Although individual test scores from the CCTT are compared with 
verbal data gathered from the TAP for quality control, the researcher did not use test score 
comparisons by language or ability with any intention of equivalence testing.  
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In contrast to the plurality of critical thinking skills tests, there is a dearth of critical 
thinking dispositions inventories. The researcher attempted to get permission to use the 
California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI) for the study. After a lengthy 
dialogue, Insight Assessment made it clear that it will not allow items from its instruments to be 
published in academic research. In addition, Insight will not share the item-scale information that 
is used to score the test. As a second option, Insight suggested that the researcher use their free 
Sample Reasoning Mindset Test which is available in English and Arabic. After evaluating the 
instrument and comparing its questions with academic research on critical thinking dispositions 
(P. Facione, N. Facione, Sanchez, & Gainen, 1995), the researcher determined that the Sample 
Reasoning Mindset Test would function as an acceptable alternative to the CCTDI.  
Finally, the length of the two tests, the amount of verbal data that would need to be 
collected, and the potential for cognitive and psychological fatigue for participants if asked to 
verbally process 76 questions, led the researcher to choose specific questions from each section 
of the CCTT Level Z and the Sample Reasoning Mindset Test to be used in the TAP. In sum, 
participants were asked to verbally articulate their cognitive processes for 34 out of 76 questions. 
The questions that were chosen were not selected randomly; they were chosen by the researcher 
based on his experience and understanding of the Lebanese context and the goals of the project. 
The content of questions were not altered for the purpose of the study.   
Background of the Researcher 
  The researcher’s interest in these questions stems back to his experience of living cross-
culturally for the past sixteen years and to his experience of teaching in the Civilization Studies 
program at the American University of Beirut. When he moved to Lebanon, the researcher 
discovered a world with a different conception of history, different cultural norms and 
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expectations, a different language, and different patterns of thinking. In the process of learning 
the Arabic language and studying Arab history and culture, he developed an interest in 
understanding different ways of perceiving the world. He also became interested in how different 
perceptions of the world impact the choices that people make. He began to better understand how 
his cultural upbringing has influenced his own patterns of thinking. From 2010-2014 the 
researcher taught in an academic program whose mission statement includes the mandate to 
develop critical skills and creative, flexible thinking. By using primary texts of thinkers from 
ancient civilizations the program attempted to develop a student’s critical ability to comprehend, 
analyze, and assess different worldviews. The majority of Lebanese students he encountered in 
his classes were either uninterested or ill-equipped to think about their own worldviews or the 
worldviews of others in accordance with his definition of critical thinking at that time. The 
researcher also observed that even though students from different ethnoreligious groups share the 
same geographic space they were generally unaware of how their neighbors reason. This 
experience challenged him to re-evaluate what it means to develop critical thinking as well as 
how both macro and micro cultures influence what it means to think critically.  
Key Terms 
Objectivist school of critical thinking: Views of critical thinking that emphasize the importance 
of objective, logical principles that serve as criteria for evaluating and justifying belief across 
intellectual disciplines.  
Subjectivist school of critical thinking: Views of critical thinking that move away from 
objectivist, trans-cultural and trans-domain criteria for evaluating and justifying belief and 
ground critical thinking in domain-specific, socially-located epistemic communities of discourse. 
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Culture: Taken in its broad sense, culture is the complex and dynamic pattern of socially 
transmitted assumptions, knowledge, values, feelings, beliefs, morals, and customs through 
which humans interpret their experience; develop strategies for living; attempt to answer 
questions of meaning and purpose; locate their belonging; and grow in their understanding of 
their intellectual and social worlds (Geertz, 1973; Rynkiewich, 2011; Tylor, 1970). 
Critical Realism: A post positivist philosophy situated between naïve realism and 
constructivism. Critical realism includes a series of philosophical positions united by a shared 
commitment to ontological realism, epistemic relativism, judgment rationality, and a cautious 
ethical naturalism (Archer et al., 2016).  
Ethnoreligious group: A category used to distinguish social groups on the basis of a shared, 
communal identity as well as a sense of belonging to a historical and/or cultural religious 
community.  
Sectarianism: A sociopolitical system where power is divided among religious communities 
according to established quotas and where ethnoreligious groups are empowered by the state to 
create and manage their own religious courts and personal status and family laws (Nassar, 1995; 
Salloukh, Barakat, Al-Habbal, Khattab, & Mikaelian, 2015). 
Social Orientation Hypothesis: The hypothesis that it is social practice and not geographic or 
ethnic differences that primarily impacts thinking patterns (Varnum, Grossman, Kitayama, & 
Nisbett, 2010).  
Linguistic Relativity: The hypothesis that the languages humans speak are intricately related to 
the way that people think about and interpret reality (Dirven & Niemeier, 2000; Dragos, 2012; 
Goddard, 2003). 
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Dialectical Reasoning: A pattern of reasoning that emphasizes social cohesion and seeks to 
avoid confrontation and debate. Dialectical reasoning recognizes and accepts contradiction and 
highlights the importance of multiple perspectives in a search for the “Middle Way” between 
opposing propositions (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). 
Weak sense critical thinking: The ability to use the intellectual skills of critical thinking 
selectively to identify and refute flaws in the reasoning of others and defend personal beliefs 
(Paul, 1992). 
Strong sense critical thinking: The ability to question deeply a personal framework of thought; 
an ability to reconstruct sympathetically and imaginatively the strongest versions of oppositional 
frameworks of thought; and an ability to reason through dialogue in order to determine when 
one's own point of view is at its weakest and when an opposing point of view is at its strongest 
(Paul, 1992). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review 
 
Conceptualizations of critical thinking 
The study of critical thinking’s role in formal education is a growing and nascent field of 
inquiry. There is no shortage of theories, conceptualizations, arguments, and counter-arguments 
about what it means to promote and develop critical thinking. In a qualitative study, Moore 
(2011) explores ideas about and approaches to critical thinking as held by 17 academics working 
in the three disciplines of history, philosophy and cultural studies at an Australian University. He 
asked professors whether they found the term critical thinking relevant to their practice as a 
teacher, and, if they do, how they understand the term in relation to the qualities and attributes 
they seek to encourage in their students. Among these 17 academics, Moore identifies seven 
different definitional strands of critical thinking, namely critical thinking: as judgment; as 
skepticism; as a simple originality; as sensitive readings; as rationality; as an activist engagement 
with knowledge; and as self-reflexivity. His study demonstrates the multiplicity of meanings 
given to the term critical thinking and shows that although educators generally agree on the 
importance of critical thinking, the term means different things to different university educators.  
Some of the main areas of disagreement among the better known positions in the field of 
critical thinking concern whether critical thinking is primarily a cross-disciplinary skill, such as 
the ability to assess reasons properly, to weigh relevant evidence, or to identify fallacious 
arguments; a critical attitude or disposition, such as the tendency to ask probing questions, a 
critical orientation, or dispositional knowledge in the sense of a moral perspective or set of 
values that motivate a particular way of thinking; or a deep and wide knowledge of a particular 
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discipline and its epistemological structure, in which case a person can only be a critical thinker 
within a particular discipline (Mason, 2008).  
This chapter will address some of the central differences and main tenets of the 
objectivist and subjectivist approaches to critical thinking within the critical thinking literature. 
More specifically, it will look at the epistemological frameworks and values upon which these 
conceptualizations are built. It will then explore the way that critical thinking scholars address 
the accusations of bias that have been leveled against the critical thinking movement. Examining 
the conceptual contours of the critical thinking debate and the question of bias will help establish 
a framework for understanding approaches to critical thinking assessment. After laying this 
foundation, the chapter will address the strengths and weaknesses of methods used to assess 
critical thinking. It will then explore studies that highlight the physiological, sociological, and 
linguistic relationship between culture and thinking. The chapter will conclude with a discussion 
of the historical, cultural, and social factors that impact critical thinking in the Lebanese context. 
These different elements in the critical thinking literature, woven together, will lay the 
foundation for addressing the research questions articulated above. 
Objectivist conceptualizations of critical thinking 
In a series of reflections on the critical thinking movement in the United States, Ennis 
(2011) outlines a history of the political-social factors that have influenced the critical thinking 
discussion in the US over the last seventy years. Ennis argues that World War II and the 
subsequent race with Russia to launch a satellite resulted in a swing from progressive education 
to an emphasis on subject matter. He contends that these events decreased concerns about critical 
thinking, but that the protest movements of the 1970s sparked a renewed interest in critical 
thinking because it “provided the rigor, reflection, and reasonableness that both the anti- and pro-
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war forces had ignored” (p. 7). He then traces the increase in interest about critical thinking in 
the 1980s. During that time, a number of educational policy decisions were adopted to promote 
the development of critical thinking and a multitude of critical thinking institutions and 
foundations were established.  
In this brief survey of history, Ennis links the importance of contextual factors to an 
increase or decrease in the development of critical thinking. He also sets up a distinction between 
an emphasis in education on subject matter or critical thinking. As such, he contends that the 
contemporary US context has allowed an interest in critical thinking to grow over the past twenty 
years which has resulted in a litany of controversies about the nature, assessment, and teaching 
of critical thinking as a part of formal education. In reflecting on his over fifty years in the field, 
Ennis advocates for more research to be done to address this vital area of study and claims that, 
“critical thinking in the schools and colleges is still in a state of infancy” (p. 17).  
Some of the contours of the contemporary debate over the role of critical thinking in 
education can be traced to Ennis (1962). In his 1962 article, Ennis discussed the conception of 
critical thinking presented in John Dewey’s How We Think (1933) and stated that Dewey, 
“suggests that the problem is solved when the solver thinks it is solved, thus providing a 
psychological instead of logical criterion for the solution of a problem” (Ennis, 1962, p. 82). 
Ennis then presents a definition of critical thinking as “a correct assessing of statements” (p. 83). 
This definition is meant to move the question of critical thinking from the realm of psychology to 
the realm of logic and to establish criteria from which it is possible to develop and assess critical 
thinking. Nearly fifty years later Ennis presents his current definition of critical thinking as, 
“reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis, 2011b, p. 5). 
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In this definition, he exchanges the concept of correctness for reasonableness and adds the 
practical dimension of action and belief.  
One of the key components of Ennis’ conceptualization of critical thinking is the 
importance of identifying assumptions in the process of thinking critically. Similarly, a number 
of authors place assumption identification at the center of the critical thinking process (Bailin, 
Case, Coombs, & Daniels, 1999; Brookfield, 2011; Paul, 1985). Ennis defends the concept of an 
argument-to-best explanation which involves “the principle that a hypothesis should not be 
endorsed if there is a plausible alternative explanation, and the principle that, before a hypothesis 
is endorsed, a competent sincere effort should have been made to find supporting and opposing 
data and to seek alternative hypotheses” (Ennis, 2011b, p. 11). In doing so Ennis maintains a 
conceptualization of critical thinking that focuses on critical thinking as a cross-disciplinary skill 
that requires withholding judgment until enough data have been gathered to develop a reasonable 
belief that one’s assessments are correct.  
In his current definition Ennis also adds the recognition of critical thinking dispositions 
such as caring that beliefs are true, caring to present a position honestly, caring about other 
people, and being concerned about their welfare. He also includes value judgments in the scope 
of critical thinking (Ennis, 2011b). In doing so he moves critical thinking from being constrained 
to the realm of logic and brings it, at least partially, back into the realm of values and 
psychology. Ennis accounts for this move by making a distinction between constitutive and 
correlative critical thinking. Constitutive critical thinking involves the skills of collecting and 
evaluating evidence, the logical dimension. “Constitutive features of critical thinking are tools 
that can be used for good or bad purposes” (Ennis, 1998, p. 25). Correlative critical thinking 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  27 
includes the dispositions and values that accompany the use of critical thinking skills; the ethical 
or moral dimension of the critical thinking process.  
A commitment to some degree of fallibilism is shared across critical thinking scholarship. 
In general terms, fallibilism is the belief that every claim is open to revision (Brookfield, 2011; 
Lam, 2009; Siegel, 2008; Thayer-Bacon, 1998). It also acknowledges imprecision in the process 
of making judgments. As a result, Ennis argues for the need to attend to the credibility of 
sources. He contends that the credibility of a source “tends to be weakened if the source has a 
conflict of interest, and if it does not have experience in the field” (Ennis, 2011b, p. 11). In 
teasing out what he means by a conflict of interest, Ennis introduces a scenario where a doctoral 
chair’s strong opinions potentially impact a doctoral student’s empirical research claims. In such 
a case, there may be evidence that draws the credibility of the claims into question. Although this 
is a relatively straight-forward example, Ennis does not delve into the more complicated 
contention that all knowledge claims are influenced by power dynamics and are inherently 
impacted by conflicts of interest (Stich, 1993). Ennis does not provide a clear set of criteria upon 
which to gauge the extent to which a conflict of interest impacts credibility. In addition, he does 
not address the extent to which claims that purportedly have no or little conflict of interest are 
valuable. His discussion of critical thinking dispositions and caring that beliefs are true admits of 
an environment where all choices are charged with potential conflicts of interest but he does not 
specifically address the challenges of applying critical thinking in high-stakes situations that are 
rife with conflicts of interest and social implications. Ennis focuses on rational processes without 
a nuanced discussion of the impact of social location. In spite of these limitations, Ennis’ clear 
delineation of critical thinking skills and dispositions is one of his main contributions to the field.  
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In contrast, Paul (1985) contends that “the logical systems of the schools have little to do 
with the logic we live. We are largely controlled and confused, and consequently have never 
consciously assented to, the inner logic we ourselves create in our concrete forms of life” (p. 17). 
In his writings, Paul argues that humans are deeply irrational and that this creates the greatest 
challenge for teaching critical thinking. He outlines what he calls the four dimensions of 
background logic that influence decision making. He creates the category of preductive logic, 
which he contrasts with inductive and deductive logic. Paul argues that preductive logic is the 
reasoning humans use consciously or unconsciously to shape a goal or issue before actually 
thinking about the issue. The infra-logical dimension of background logic is how humans 
interpret an issue; how they categorize its subject matter; and the tacit assumptions and relevant 
background facts that they use in the process. The extra-logical dimension is the unexpressed 
implications and collateral consequences of choices. Finally, the dialectical dimension is the 
capacity of the reasoning to be developed in such a way as to meet specific objections put to it 
from another point of view. Building on these categorizations, he argues that “every 
interpretation of language usage is a complex act of decoding in which we are responding to cues 
that reflect three variously-related background logics, that of the egocentric individual, that of 
the social group, and that of the natural language of the user” (Paul, 1985, p. 14).  
Paul also discusses different degrees of critical thinking. In particular, he develops a 
distinction between what he calls strong sense critical thinking and weak sense critical thinking 
(Paul, 1992). Weak or sophistic critical thinking is the use of critical thinking skills to serve the 
interest of a particular group of individuals without taking others into account. In weak sense 
critical thinking, the thinker uses the critical thinking process ego-centrically. Weak sense critical 
thinkers are “those who use the intellectual skills of critical thinking selectively and self-
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deceptively to foster and serve their vested interests (at the expense of truth)” and are “able to 
identify flaws in the reasoning of others and refute them; (and) able to shore up their own beliefs 
with reasons” (Paul, 1992, p. 41). Weak sense critical thinking lacks a critical self-awareness. In 
contrast, strong sense critical thinking entails, “an ability to question deeply one's own 
framework of thought; an ability to reconstruct sympathetically and imaginatively the strongest 
versions of points of view and frameworks of thought opposed to one's own; and an ability to 
reason dialectically (multilogically) in such a way as to determine when one's own point of view 
is at its weakest and when an opposing point of view is at its strongest. Strong sense critical 
thinkers are not routinely blinded by their own points of view” (Paul, 1992, p. 41).  
According to Paul, the goal of developing critical thinking, to be a strong sense critical 
thinker, is to provide the skills necessary to identify and correct the irrational logics that humans 
use to make choices. This process involves moving away from egocentric and socio-centric 
modes of thinking to the pursuit of rational convictions and the ability to appraise the convictions 
of others regardless of personal consequences or the social context (Paul, 1985). Paul also argues 
that all human inferences are based on assumptions; therefore, critical thinking, as he 
conceptualizes it, involves tracing inferences to assumptions and then rationally evaluating those 
assumptions as either good or bad (Elder & Paul, 2002). As such, Paul, himself, begins with the 
assumption that independent thinking uninfluenced by possible social consequences is valuable 
or good. His work focuses largely on the development of informal logic and rationality and the 
distinction between critical thinking as a skill, weak sense, and as a skill and disposition, strong 
sense. In addition, he also emphasizes the importance of developing a deep knowledge of the 
psychological dimensions and influences that affect the decision-making process.  
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Siegel (1980) most clearly addresses the philosophical justification for the adoption of the 
objectivist, rationalistic conceptualization of critical thinking found in Paul and Ennis. He 
grounds critical thinking in the dual concepts of rationality and a critical spirit or attitude. 
Critical thinking is rational thinking. To be rational is to understand and accept the importance 
and convicting force of evidence and reasons on which to base assessment, evaluation, or 
judgment. It also entails a commitment to guiding principles such as impartiality, consistency, 
and non-arbitrary judgment that govern the rational process (1989). Finally, it requires the 
necessary skills to collect and evaluate evidence. A critical spirit is a combination of attitudes, 
dispositions, habits, and character traits such as a willingness to conform judgment to principle, a 
commitment to fairness, a habit of inquiry, a readiness to forego self-interest, a caring about 
reason and its use, a respect for others, etc. (1980). A critical spirit also involves valuing good 
reasoning and a disposition to believe and act on the basis of good reasoning. For Siegel, good 
reasoning is reasoning that is subject to the criteria outlined above. A critical thinker is a person 
who both thinks critically and possesses a critical spirit or critical attitude. Therefore, he makes a 
distinction between critical thinking and being a critical thinker. It is possible to think critically 
without being a critical thinker, but not possible to be a critical thinker without the ability to 
think critically. In this description, Siegel agrees with Ennis’ and Paul’s distinction between the 
skills of critical thinking and the disposition of being a critical thinker. Where he differs is that 
Siegel argues that a critical spirit is a constitutive, not correlative feature of critical thinking. His 
interest is not in the skills of critical thinking per se, but in the development of the critical 
thinker.  
In highlighting the importance of a critical attitude, Siegel wants to avoid the impression 
that critical thinking is a logical and passionless enterprise. He contends that critical thinking is 
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full of passion and it is for this reason that a critical thinker requires a psychological as well as 
intellectual capacity. “A person who is to be a critical thinker must be, to the greatest extent 
possible, emotionally secure, self-confident, and capable of distinguishing between having faulty 
beliefs and having faulty character. A positive self-image, and traditionally-conceived 
psychological health, are important features of the psychology of the critical thinker, for their 
absence may well present practical obstacles to the execution of critical thinking” (Siegel, 1989, 
p. 27) He sets up both rationality and a critical attitude as ideals in order to demonstrate that 
these are fluid and evolving skills and characteristics, not fixed traits.  
What is particularly significant to this study is the argument Siegel uses to justify why his 
conceptualization of critical thinking should be adopted as an educational ideal. He grounds his 
first argument in a moral imperative. He claims “it would be immoral to teach in any other way” 
(Siegel, 1980, p. 13). The argument he makes is that morality entails that human beings respect 
one another. Teachers demonstrate a respect for students by “recognizing the student’s right to 
question, to challenge, and to demand reasons and justifications for what is being taught” (p. 14). 
According to Siegel, to respect a student’s personhood is to respect his or her right to exercise 
independent judgment. It is by grounding critical thinking in this moral imperative that Siegel 
makes a critical spirit constitutive, not correlative, of critical thinking as an ideal. As such, the 
teaching of critical thinking skills without a critical spirit is at best, uninteresting, and at worst, 
educationally irresponsible. The second justification he provides for critical thinking is that one 
goal of education is to produce self-sufficient adults who have the power and ability to control 
their own lives. Siegel argues that it is the self-sufficient person who is the liberated person, “free 
from the unwarranted control of unjustified beliefs, unsupportable attitudes, and paucity of 
abilities which can prevent that person from competently taking charge of his or her own life” (p. 
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16). Finally, he contends that critical thinking initiates students into the central human traditions 
of science, literature, history, the arts, mathematics, and so on.  
It is clear from a review of Siegel’s works that he builds his conception of the critical 
thinker on specific values such as autonomy, independence, self-sufficiency, emotional security, 
a democratic spirit, egalitarian power relationships, and liberation. He attaches moral force to 
these values by arguing that they are a necessary demonstration of respect for persons. At the 
same time, he tempers his emphasis on independence by maintaining that critical thinking 
initiates students into intellectual traditions guided by principles and criteria. As such, individual 
passions and commitments are mitigated by accountability to the epistemic community in which 
an individual is located as well as the intellectual history of a particular field of inquiry. He does 
not address the fact that the intellectual traditions he mentions are largely dominated by the 
Western world. Most significantly, he does not simply state that critical thinking should inculcate 
these values but that the goal of critical thinking, and education in general, is to produce a certain 
type of person, the critical thinker (Siegel, 1989, p. 28). In making these claims, Siegel puts a 
stake in the ground and commits the process of education to the pursuit of the particular end of 
developing critical thinkers infused with values such as autonomy, independence, democracy, 
etc., which some scholars would describe as Western values (Bell, 2000; Cuypers, 2004; Franck, 
1997; Heine & Norenzayan, 2006; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Hofstede, 1997; 
Nisbett, 2003). 
Ennis, Paul, and Siegel all represent a similar school of thought in the critical thinking 
debate. They argue that at the heart of critical thinking is a commitment to evidence as a basis for 
justified belief. They each highlight the importance of objective, logical principles such as 
impartiality, consistency, and non-arbitrary judgment that can serve as criteria for evaluating 
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beliefs across intellectual disciplines. They are also committed to concepts such as those found in 
withholding judgment, gathering data, questioning potential biases, and identifying assumptions 
until enough data have been gathered to justify beliefs. They each highlight the importance of a 
dispositional willingness to act based on evidence. In addition, they make a distinction between 
critical thinking skills and critical thinking dispositions while acknowledging the importance of 
both. To varying degrees, they emphasize the value of independence and autonomy as inherent 
values of critical thinking and believe that the exercise of critical thinking should occur 
independent of the entanglements and pressures of a particular social context.  
Whereas Ennis primarily focuses on the articulation of critical thinking skills and 
dispositions, Paul engages with the psychological dimensions of social context, and Siegel 
attempts to ground and philosophically defend his conceptualization of critical thinking against 
its critics. Although the three authors do not agree on all aspects of critical thinking, they 
represent an approach to critical thinking that locates critical thinking in objectivist, rationalist, 
processes. In doing so, they highlight what they believe are transcultural and transdisciplinary 
skills that can be developed to facilitate a linear critical thinking process and attempt to establish 
normative criteria upon which claims can be assessed as being reasonable or unreasonable as 
well as good or bad. Because of their commitment to separating critical thinking from its social 
context, they fail to adequately address the social and affective complexities of justified belief. 
Subjectivist conceptualizations of critical thinking 
A second general approach or school of thought in the critical thinking debate moves 
away from a focus on generalizable and transcultural critical thinking skills and instead 
emphasizes domain-specific and context sensitive critical thinking. Many of the thinkers that 
adopt this approach base their arguments for domain-specific critical thinking on the 
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Wittgensteinian idea that logic is located within language and speech acts themselves 
(Wittgenstein & Kenny, 1994). As such, the criteria of logic and reasoning are located within a 
language and set of rules of reasoning that are agreed upon by a specific epistemic community. 
On this basis, McPeck challenges the view of critical thinking as a cross-disciplinary skill and 
argues that critical thinking requires knowledge of the field in question as well as knowledge of 
the epistemic foundations of that field. He defines epistemology as “the study of the foundations 
of various types of belief” (McPeck, 1981, p. 153) and claims that each field of research has its 
own internal logic and is governed by the authority of its specific epistemic community. He 
challenges the idea that critical thinking is equivalent to informal and/or formal logic and argues 
that critical thinking is compatible with rationality but that they are not equivalent terms. Instead, 
he claims that critical thinking is the facet of rationality that involves both the disposition and 
skill to identify difficulties in reasoning and construct possible solutions, again, within a specific 
field and set of epistemological presuppositions.  
To illustrate his point, McPeck gives the example of alcoholism and explains that what 
one desires to know about alcoholism is dependent on the type of question that is asked and the 
field that is used to answer it. “If one is interested in how widespread it is, or in which age-group, 
then it is a sociological question. If one wants to know if it is right or wrong, then it is a moral 
question. If one wants to know why people become alcoholics, then it is a psychological 
question. If one wants to know whether it is sinful, then I supposes this is a religious question” 
(Mcpeck, 1985, p. 51). “To become rational, one must come to understand the different logical, 
conceptual, and epistemic differences that obtain between the different kinds of questions and 
problems there are” (Mcpeck, 1985, p. 46). He points out two distinguishable dimensions of 
justified belief. The first is to “assess the veracity and internal validity of the evidence as 
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presented,” and the second is to “judge whether the belief, together with its supporting evidence, 
is compatible with an existing belief system” (McPeck, 1981, p. 35). In his approach to critical 
thinking, McPeck argues that the pragmatic dimensions of critical thinking assure that it includes 
value judgments on almost every level and that scholars such as Ennis over-emphasize a sort of 
value-free rationality as an untenable goal of critical thinking. He thus proposes that if there is 
genuine interest in promoting critical thinking, any conceptualization of critical thinking must 
include relevant background knowledge and the epistemology of a subject along with its 
corresponding value judgments an integral part of the subject-matter.  
 Similarly, Blatz (1989) addresses the question of context in critical thinking. He does not 
completely agree with McPeck’s limitation of critical thinking to domain-specific fields, but 
instead attempts to clarify a taxonomy of critical thinking levels. Blatz discusses the different 
aims and uses of reason as well as the importance of identifying the shared assumptions in what 
he calls communities of discussion, similar to McPeck’s epistemic communities. For example, 
like McPeck, he compares the ways that scientists, Christian theologians, ethicists, and 
legislators all employ reason for different purposes and, therefore, use different standards for 
evaluating and weighing evidence. The standards adopted are based on a shared set of basic 
assumptions or epistemologies that correlate with the purposes of the reasoning activity and the 
nature of questions being asked. The background assumptions and purposes of different 
questions within communities of discussion set limits on the way that critical reasoning is able to 
be used within that community.  
 To illustrate his point, he presents the example of an ornithologist suffering from liver 
failure who asks to be treated by both medical doctors from New York and South American 
shamans. After the man dies, the question is raised as to what killed him. Blatz writes, “The 
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proper or true account of what killed him depends, of course, upon which community of 
discussion you take up to understand and approach his illness. It is not as though we have two 
explanations competing on equal terms and open to judgment by the same standard. The two 
explanations belong to different communities defined by different assumptions and procedures 
for finding the truth” (Blatz, 1989, p. 111). In this description, Blatz disagrees with Siegel’s 
defense of normative, transcultural criteria. He contends that “the internal question of what is 
good reasoning is to be answered differently according to different sets of problem-framing 
assumptions and question-addressing procedures that are present in the two communities” (p. 
111).  
 The key move made by Blatz, which differentiates his argument from McPeck’s, is to 
distinguish between the internal and external question of good reasoning. The internal question is 
limited by the accepted assumptions of a particular community. He argues that whether or not a 
particular community’s set of assumptions represents reality cannot be answered without 
begging the question. Consequentially, what can be done is to ask the external question of which 
set of assumptions and procedures will best fulfill the aim of the question; in this case, which 
will most likely result in healing the ornithologist. The guidelines that are used to answer the 
external question of good reasoning are, at least, partly pragmatic and evaluated based on which 
set of assumptions is best able to achieve the stated or unstated purpose of the problem or 
question addressed. In this approach there is a return to the psychological aspect of Dewey’s 
pragmatism questioned by Ennis. Critical thinking involves the evaluation of a solution based on 
how satisfactorily it addresses the articulated question or problem.  
 According to Blatz, there are four levels of critical thinking. On the broadest level, 
critical thinking involves clarifying and defending beliefs through the avoidance of fallacies and 
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the adoption of a framework for valid and inductively cogent patterns of reasoning. At this level, 
critical thinking is concerned with consistency in tracing assumptions to beliefs to actions and 
the interpretation of events. The second level entails testing the alignment of reasons for belief 
with their rational, moral, aesthetic, legal, or prudential goals. Thus, levels one and two enable 
the critical thinker to trace sets of assumptions and beliefs and then to evaluate the extent to 
which they successfully accomplish their specific aims. Level three involves reasoning within a 
particular domain or subject-specific reasoning. In level three, subject matter specifics restrict the 
proper use of logic according to the accepted norms of the field in question. Level four relates to 
reasoning within the restrictions of a specific case that exists within a particular domain. “Thus 
by seeing critical thinking in terms of reasoning within and in accordance with, or else outside 
and about, the guidelines of communities of discussion, we can understand the contexts of 
critical thinking, where it occurs, how it is guided and, very broadly, to what standards of 
conduct critical thinkers are accountable” (p. 112). 
 For example, consider the plight of our ornithologist. For the medical doctors from New 
York, level four might involve accepting the standards of Western medical models, its 
epistemological criteria, and then thinking critically about how to use the tools of the model to 
effectively treat his specific case. Discerning treatment would be based on a medical history of 
the ornithologist and his unique symptoms; specific background knowledge. Level three would 
entail accepting the standards of Western medical models and then thinking critically about how 
general cases have been treated within the field of liver related diseases. Level two would consist 
of evaluating the efficacy of Western medical models for treating liver related diseases against 
other models. Level one would be centered on logically defending the consistency of naturalistic 
views of disease with the practices employed by Western medical models. According to Blatz, 
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the expertise of a critical thinker is not related to the level at which she engages in critical 
thinking, but the autonomy with which she is able to address issues external and internal to the 
relevant communities of discussion (p. 115). Thus, the central characteristic of the expert critical 
thinker is that of autonomy.  
 Papastephanou and Angeli (2007) take a different approach and argue that skilling or 
purpose-oriented conceptualizations of critical thinking are embedded in a “goal-oriented, 
purposive rationality…that inevitably remains silent about pupils’ ability to critique the task 
itself, and take a reflective distance from their own involvement in it” (p. 608). As such, they 
critique the conceptualizations of critical thinking in the works of Ennis, Paul, and Blatz. Skills 
involve the ability to perform a task well. A skills approach to critical thinking accepts as 
normative a particular set of tasks and a particular set of values by which these tasks can be 
evaluated as having been done well. It adopts a means-ends rationality where the end of justified 
belief is evaluated based on the means of achieving it. This contention is supported by Norris’ 
claim that much of the assessment done in critical thinking is centered on testing which type of 
skills people should be able to do well (Norris, 1985). 
 Papastephanou and Angeli believe that the skills paradigm falls short in its inability to be 
self-critical of its own set of means-ends values. For example, Paspastephanou and Angeli argue 
that the individualism reflected in the skilling perspective is ethnocentric. The skills perspective 
uncritically accepts the value of independence and its noticeable lack of reference to the Other 
within the society. As a result, the skills perspective involves the initiation into a particular, 
positivist, empiricist, epistemic community that has adopted certain values, such as autonomy 
and independence, and has agreed upon a certain set of criteria for evaluating the skills needed to 
achieve these values. In quoting Hinchliffe, Papastephanou and Angeli argue that “skills are 
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learnt in a context and are deployed in a context. The context, or background, gives the skill its 
purpose or point. Thus, whether a skill is performed more or less well depends not only on 
whether particular techniques have been mastered, but also on whether the particular context has 
been appropriately understood. It follows, therefore, that there are not necessarily 
straightforward, simple objective criteria for what counts as successful performance, since 
interpretations of context may vary, and what counts as a successful performance in one context 
may not do so in another” (Papastephanou & Angeli, 2007, p. 617). 
 Paspastephanou and Angeli also adopt Smith’s (2001) discourse on effective thinking and 
contend that much of the discussion in the field of critical thinking should actually be 
characterized as effective thinking. They define effective thinking as the process of thinking that 
is oriented toward achieving a purpose. Paspastephanou and Angeli argue that in adopting a 
means-ends rationality, many critical thinking scholars have confused the effective use of 
evidence to justify belief within the values framework of empiricism as critical thinking whereas 
it is simply the effective use of a particular type of thinking within the value framework of a 
positivist epistemic community. “Despite its claiming objectivity, the paradigm of effectiveness 
is biased right from the start, i.e. from its basic assumption that critical thinking is reducible to a 
small (or large) set of skills. It takes a particular mode of rationality, purposive and/or strategic, 
and elevates it to a universal normative standard and, in turn, to an educational ideal” (p. 613). 
Paspastephanous and Angeli contend that an over-emphasis on effective thinking is, in fact, a 
Western value. “The exaggeration and hegemony of effectiveness constitutes an absolutization 
and universalization of the specific western context and an effacement of complementary or 
alternative spaces” (p. 613). 
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 Instead of critical thinking as purposive rationality, Paspastephanous and Angeli claim 
that it is principally related to “the scrutiny of purpose” (p. 611). “It is the very ‘system of 
values’ in which the decisions as to the desirability of outcomes are embedded that should be 
placed under scrutiny by the critical self in all spheres of action, the private, the professional, and 
the public” (p. 608). In quoting Benn, they write “to be a chooser is not enough for autonomy, 
for a competent chooser may still be a slave to convention, choosing by standards he has 
accepted quite uncritically from his milieu” (Benn, as cited in Paspastephanous & Angeli, 2007, 
p. 612). In making this argument, Paspastephanous and Angeli principally locate critical thinking 
in the realm of reflection on morality, dialogue, and meta-cognitive meaningfulness. “Critical 
thinking and its teaching cannot be solely concerned with the achievement of goals, but with the 
ability to think over and argue for or against their meaningfulness or moral pertinence” (p. 609). 
As a result, critical thinking should orient reason toward mutual understanding, not successful 
action. Again, this is predicated on the Wittensteinian claim that rationality is contextual. “The 
rationality of a mode of thinking is not something necessarily intrinsic to it, but the result of a 
characterization we make according to criteria of what counts as rational, criteria that vary in 
virtue of context and cultural values” (p. 610).  
 According to Paspastephanous and Angeli, the essence of critical thinking is aporetic or 
question raising. It involves the ability to evaluate systems of means and ends with regards to its 
own set of assumptions and then to consider alternatives. It locates criteriology in separate 
communities of fallible thinkers. As a result, it delegates the practice of critical thinking to the 
sphere of questioning that which is taken for granted and exploring alternate possibilities.  
 Bailin (1998) attempts to navigate the difference between thinkers who emphasize skills 
and those who focus on context. She contends that any reference to good thinking makes critical 
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thinking a normative concept, including criteria upon which to differentiate critical from 
uncritical thought. Bailin critiques the skilling approach’s implication that critical thinking is a 
possessed, mental ability. She argues that adherence to the use of principles, reasons, and 
arguments in line with criteria is not a skill, but rather it involves the mastery of public norms 
and conventions, which she calls intellectual resources. Intellectual resources include 
“background knowledge, knowledge of critical thinking standards, possession of critical 
concepts, knowledge of strategies or heuristics useful in thinking critically, and certain habits of 
mind” (Bailin, Case, Combs, & Daniels, 1999, p. 286). “The problem becomes one of 
determining the range of use and application of the principles and criteria which inhabit our 
public tradition of inquiry rather than looking for general skills in the inner world of individuals” 
(Bailin, 1998, p. 4). As a result, the central question in critical thinking is whether it is possible 
to generalize principles, reasons, and arguments across different contexts as well as the range in 
which intellectual resources, such as the rules of logic, apply. In this way, the intellectual 
resources approach focuses on understanding “the principles, concepts, and criteria which 
constitute our critical practices and are inherent in our traditions of inquiry” (p. 5). Bailin’s 
traditions of inquiry are Siegel’s intellectual traditions, McPeck’s epistemic communities, and 
Blatz’s communities of discussion. Bailin admits that the conceptualization of critical thinking 
includes a certain level of vagueness. As such, she does not specifically address which normative 
criteria in critical thinking are generalizable across different domains though she does indicate 
that the rules of logic are used across a number of disciplines.  
 Finally, Thayer-Bacon (1998; 1999) challenges the objectification of knowledge and the 
distinction between knowledge and the knower that characterizes much of the discussion in the 
field of critical thinking. She traces this distinction from Plato and Aristotle throughout the 
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history of Euro-Western philosophical thinking and argues that it is this tradition which has 
elevated reason, and its corresponding tool of logic, to a place of pre-eminence at the expense of 
other tools for knowing such as imagination, intuition, and emotional feelings. She contends that 
the critical thinking movement has grounded its arguments and corresponding criteria on the 
unsubstantiated belief that knowers can be separated from what is known. It is our experience 
that shapes our conceptual knowing and our conceptual knowing that, in turn, shapes our 
experience. This is an ongoing reciprocal relationship that cannot be objectified in the terms of 
knower and known. “To look at the practice of critically thinking without examining at the same 
time what critical thinking means creates a situation where any description of that practice will 
be shaped by how the unexamined concept ‘critical thinking’ is being used” (Thayer-Bacon, 
1998, p. 132).  
 In the place of critical thinking, a term that she argues is beyond repair, Thayer-Bacon 
offers the substitute of constructive thinking. In constructive thinking, reason takes its place 
alongside of other ways of knowing as a fallible tool that helps in the construction of meaning 
and inquiry. Instead of critical thinking’s aiming for agreement and consensus, one final answer 
based on normative criteria, constructive thinking values coexistence. Instead of universal 
essences and individual epistemic agency, Thayer-Bacon emphasizes relativity and social 
connectivity. Instead of conceptualizing social location as a hindrance to good critical thinking, 
Thayer-Bacon contends that social location is an inherent description of the human condition. 
Constructive thinking emphasizes that humans are not able to be objective, neutral beings, but, 
instead, bring contextuality into all thinking. Contextuality cannot be set aside and examined 
from outside itself, as suggested by thinkers such as Ennis, Paul, McPeck, Blatz, 
Paspastephanous and Angeli, etc., it is a constitutive aspect of the human condition. That being 
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said, contextuality does not require a jettison of reason or criteria. It is reasoning, which many 
define as the essence of critical thinking, that helps us straighten, order, clarify, and examine our 
ideas. It helps us make judgment calls, but it is in not objective. Although Thayer-Bacon is a 
relativist, she does not believe that relativism or the cultural location of critical thinking requires 
that we “embrace all theories as being true or that we have no way of measuring one theory 
against another to determine which one is better (depending on one’s criteria). What it does mean 
is that we must acknowledge that we do not know the absolute truth, what is right. We continue 
to inquire, and we try to support our understandings with as much “evidence” as we can socially 
construct, qualified by the best criteria upon which we can agree” (Thayer-Bacon, 1998,p. 145).  
 The second general approach or school of thought in the critical thinking debate, as seen 
in the writings of McPeck, Blatz, Paspastephanous and Angeli, Bailin, Thayer-Bacon, and others, 
moves away from the objectivist, trans-cultural and trans-domain skills model of critical thinking 
and, instead, grounds critical thinking in domain-specific and socially located contexts. McPeck 
focuses on domain-specific critical thinking as, at the very least, the primary locus of critical 
thinking practice. As a result, domain-specific epistemologies, skills, questions, and background 
knowledge are essential in the development, discussion, and assessment of critical thinking 
(Battersby & Bailin, 2011). Blatz adds the criteria of effectiveness of purpose in answering a 
particular question as a means for evaluating critical thinking. Paspastephanous and Angeli 
exchange the concept of critical thinking skills with that of effective thinking skills within a 
particular epistemic community. In doing so, they move away from a means-end purposive 
rationality and delegate critical thinking to an aporetic orientation concerned with 
meaningfulness and morality. Bailin argues for viewing critical thinking through the lens of the 
appropriate use of intellectual resources that are located in specific traditions of inquiry. Thayer-
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Bacon removes critical thinking from its Euro-Western pedestal and places it alongside of other 
tools of knowing such as intuition and emotion. She removes critical thinking as an educational 
ideal and assigns it a modest role as an organizing, evaluating, and clarifying tool in the process 
of constructing meaning. 
 In a move away from more normative conceptualizations of critical thinking, the question 
of what constitutes the values of critical thinking becomes more fluid. McPeck and Blatz agree 
with the objectivist school in stating that autonomy is a central value in critical thinking. They 
also grant a certain level of authority to different epistemic communities of discourse. Blatz and 
Paspastephanous and Angeli emphasize the reflective value of comprehending a broad 
perspective of various systems of thought. As such, they include the mutual understanding as 
constitutive value of critical thinking. Blatz adds the criteria of effectiveness of purpose to that of 
understanding, a move specifically rejected by Paspastephanous and Angeli. In spite of these 
differences, there seems to be a tacit agreement by authors in both schools of thought that 
autonomy is a central value in critical thinking. To develop the critical thinker is to develop the 
autonomous thinker. The exception appears to be Thayer-Bacon who locates values in agreed 
upon criteria of particular social communities, and, at the same time, argues for the importance 
of connectivity, not autonomy, as a primary value of the thinking process.  
 This review of conceptualizations of critical thinking raises a number of important 
questions. Is it appropriate to talk of critical thinking as an educational ideal? Does it move 
humanity towards truth and understanding? Does it primarily lead to respect and tolerance? Is its 
function to help solve the world’s problems? The central issue in the critical thinking debate 
revolves around the question of purpose. If the goal of critical thinking is to develop autonomous 
thinkers able to justify their beliefs with trans-cultural evidence using normative, positivist 
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criteria and, as a result, make independent choices irrespective of their social context (Ennis, 
Paul, Siegel), then it will challenge and seek to transform the values of collectivist cultures; 
establish the criteria of positivism as normative across cultures; privilege rationalism as the 
preeminent strategy for making decisions; and move humans toward a monolithic conception of 
truth. If the goal of critical thinking is to develop responsible and consistent thinkers that adhere 
to the standards of their various epistemic communities (McPeck, Bailin, Blatz), then it is 
constrained by the epistemologies of different intellectual and culture traditions and must 
acknowledge the possibility of different standards and criteria for evaluating evidence and 
making judgements. Conceptualized this way, critical thinking entails an initiation into the way 
that particular domains use intellectual resources within divergent communities. It also loses its 
transcultural, normative weight. If the goal of critical thinking is to promote multicultural 
understanding and tolerance (Papastephanou and Angeli), it is primarily concerned with meta-
cognitive reflection, questioning, and dialogue between differing meta-narratives and 
interpretations of the world. Finally, if critical thinking is simply a context-dependent tool that is 
used, along with other tools, to construct meaning (Thayer-Bacon), then it should not be 
allocated a disproportional emphasis in education. 
 Other questions in the critical thinking discussion relate to criteria, morality, and the use 
of critical thinking. Is the criterion of critical thinking primarily logical, practical, or 
psychological? If it is logical, then critical thinking is primarily concerned with the right way to 
deal with a problem. If it is practical, then critical thinking is concerned with the most effective 
way of dealing with an issue. If it is psychological, then critical thinking evaluates the most 
satisfying answer to a problem. Is critical thinking a moral or an amoral activity? If amoral, then 
its skills and resources can be used towards positive, neutral, or nefarious ends. If moral, then a 
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normative set of moral critical thinking criteria must be established, such as is present in the 
discussion of critical thinking dispositions. Finally, is critical thinking primarily procedural or 
aporetic? If procedural, then critical thinking must be assessed using the epistemological criteria 
of particular communities or accepted normative, trans-cultural criterion of reasoning. If critical 
thinking is meta-cognitive, then it is unable to be assessed.  
 The foundations upon which a particular conceptualization of critical thinking is built 
have significant ramifications for how it is understood, implemented, and assessed in different 
cultural contexts. These foundations also impact whether or not critical thinking is culpable of 
cultural bias.  
Critical thinking and bias 
Regardless of which school of thought one sides with in the critical thinking debate, the 
articulation of a particular set of values as constitutive of critical thinking raises the question of 
whether critical thinking is inherently biased. Bailin (1995) outlines a number of the accusations 
of bias that have been leveled against critical thinking such as the following: critical thinking 
neglects or downplays emotions; critical thinking privileges rational, linear, deductive thought 
over intuition; critical thinking is aggressive and confrontational rather than collegial and 
collaborative; critical thinking is individualistic and privileges personal autonomy over the sense 
of community and relationship; and critical thinking presupposes the possibility of objectivity 
and thus does not recognize one’s situatedness. Similarly, Norris (1995) raises the criticism that 
the implementation of critical thinking in certain cultures seeks to challenge or change a 
particular culture’s way of life.  
Ennis (1998) addresses Norris’ critique by describing how critical thinking may function 
differently in cultural groups characterized by group think, authoritarian structures, and a 
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disinterest in answering the artificial, suppositional, questions such as those often used in the 
assessment of critical thinking. He contends that the critical thinking practices of seeking reasons 
and alternatives and the dispositions of caring to get it right and to represent a position clearly 
and honestly are relevant across cultures; they exist as transcultural principles of critical 
thinking. At the same time, he acknowledges the potential bias in the methods used to teach how 
these principles should be implemented and assessed. For example, in response to the claim that 
critical thinking is aggressive, Ennis argues that a confrontational methodology is a cultural by-
product; that it is not intrinsic to critical thinking. He contends that a critical thinking 
methodology may be biased and should be accommodated to the context. He also states that it is 
not necessary in a collective culture with an authoritarian structure to encourage everyone to 
critically think. Instead, it is possible to only require the decision makers to engage in critical 
thinking in particular instances.  
In a culture where individuals refuse to answer artificial questions divorced from 
practical contexts, Ennis argues that such questions should not be used to measure critical 
thinking. The issue in this case is the bias in the tool, the use of artificial logic problems to 
deduct logical ability, not the concept of critical thinking itself. In cultures where it is perceived 
as offensive to ask for reasons, such as a shame-honor culture, a direct approach can be avoided. 
Students should not be expected to question their teachers. An “alternative would be to promote 
the reason-seeking disposition and the disposition to seek and be open to alternatives in such a 
way that reasons are sought with great discretion – with no apparent challenge to authorities” 
(Ennis, 1998, p. 20). He completes his argument by responding to the claim that critical thinking 
can be used as a tool of exploitation. He argues that if respect for others is constitutive of critical 
thinking, such as in Siegel’s approach, then the use of critical thinking skills as a tool of 
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exploitation is not, in fact, critical thinking. If respect for others is a correlative of critical 
thinking, such as in his own approach, then the use of critical thinking skills as a tool of 
exploitation is simply a bad use of critical thinking and can be evaluated as such. 
In his attempt to accommodate for cultural differences, Ennis does not sufficiently 
address the complexities of cultural bias. He assumes that preserving cultural norms is good and, 
thus, critical thinking methodology should be accommodated to preserve particular culture 
patterns. He fails, perhaps intentionally, to present a rationale, argument, or evidence for why the 
preservation of cultural norms, such as collectivism and face-saving, are worthwhile. More 
importantly, he does not clearly distinguish critical thinking methodology from critical thinking 
values. For example, he does not offer a justification as to why it is reasonable to only require 
critical thinking from decision makers in a collectivist culture. He fails to address how it is 
possible to explore other alternatives in a way that does not challenge authority. If questioning 
the status quo or empowering individuals are values of critical thinking, then changing the 
critical thinking methodology does not circumvent the problem of cultural bias. Ennis attempts to 
defend critical thinking against the charge that it threatens culture. In doing so, he raises some 
important issues about contextualizing methodology but fails to provide a justification for his 
primary contention that critical thinking methods or instruction may be biased, but that the 
underlying values of critical thinking, itself, are not biased.  
Siegel, on the other hand, does not shy away from critics (Shweder, 1986; Stich, 1993; 
Thayer-Bacon, 1999) who question whether his conceptualization of critical thinking can 
withstand challenges posed by postmodernism and multiculturalism. He argues that his view of 
multiculturalism is built on “the ‘supracultural universal’ of coherence” (Siegel, 2007, p. 210) in 
that “all cultures should be valued and regarded as worthy only if they extend that value and 
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regard to other cultures, i.e. that ‘all cultures must accept the legitimacy of all other cultures 
living in accordance with their own culturally-specific ideals, insofar as those culturally-specific 
ideals and attendant practices are consistent with the moral imperatives of multiculturalism 
itself” (p. 208). He contends that what makes his view of multiculturalism coherent is its 
commitment to the value of respect for others as intrinsic to the concept of multiculturalism 
itself. It is therefore this value of coherence, not tolerance, that is universal and subject to 
evaluation, reasons, and evidence. Although the specifics of Siegel’s debate with postmodernism 
are beyond the scope of this work, there are aspects of his discussion that are relevant to this 
project.  
Siegel addresses the Wittensteinian claim that rationality varies from culture to culture, 
what Shweder labels divergent rationalities (Shweder, 1986). According to Shweder, divergent 
rationalities have a bounded quality including rational processes that are not universal, similar to 
Blatz’s internal questions. Shweder gives the example of “presuppositions and premises from 
which a person reasons; the metaphors, analogies, and models used for generating explanations; 
the categories or classifications used for partitioning objects and events into kinds; and the types 
of evidence that are viewed as authoritative – intuition, introspection, external observation, 
meditation, scriptural evidence, evidence from seers, monks, prophets, or elders” (p. 181). 
Shweder argues that “the version of reality we construct is a product of both the universal and 
the non-universal rational processes, but it is because not all rational processes are universal that 
we need a concept of divergent rationality” (p. 181). The concept of divergent rationalities fits 
within the second school of thought described above. 
Siegel rejects Shweder’s argument for divergent rationalities on the basis that rational 
dialogue between parties is able to transcend divergent ideologies. For example, the existence of 
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meaningful, academic dialogue is evidence of a normative view of rationality. He also argues 
that rationality is not about the process but about the use of evidence to justify belief. As such, 
evidential criteria can be established to evaluate divergent beliefs irrespective of the processes 
employed. In addition, he contends that processes themselves admit of rational evaluation and 
therefore premises and presuppositions may be shown to be irrational. He concludes by arguing 
that “cultures are diverse and divergent, but rationality is not” (Siegel, 2007, p. 218).  
Siegel’s argument against divergent rationalities, although clear, is incomplete. He 
attempts to establish the universality of rationality by distancing it from cultural processes and 
describing it as using evidence to justify belief. Taken in this broad sense, it is difficult to 
disagree with his description of rationality as a universal or, at least a shared, concept but such a 
concession is not particularly helpful. He sidesteps the heart of the issue. He does not address the 
claim that cultural groups judge evidential criteria differently, and that judgments of rationality 
are culturally specific (Nisbett, 2003; Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001). He also does not 
discuss the basis upon which evidential criteria can be judged across cultural divides, although 
his other writings indicate positivism and logic as his criteriological standard. As a result, he 
simply moves the question from divergent rationalities to divergent standards of evaluating 
evidence used to justify belief.  
Siegel attempts to counter this objection by arguing that the quality of an argument is 
normative and independent of its cultural location and the perspectives of its evaluators (Siegel, 
1999). He disagrees with the contention that the evaluation of “the goodness of an argument 
depends on the cultural identities and commitments of its evaluators, and the cultural 
circumstances in which the evaluation takes place” (p. 186). Although Siegel admits that it is 
impossible to transcend one’s cultural perspective, “we can nevertheless ‘transcend’ such 
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perspectives in judging argument quality” (p. 189). Examples from science, such as 
heliocentrism, demonstrate that an argument can be both locally situated (in fact all arguments 
are) and universal. “All that is required for argumentative principles and criteria to be, in the 
relevant sense, transcultural, is that it is possible that reasons offered for particular conclusions 
be such that a fair-minded contemplation of those reasons will result in such conclusions being 
deemed worthy of acceptance on the basis of that contemplation, independently of the cultural 
heritage and commitments of those doing the contemplating” (p. 195).  
Siegel’s argument is clear. It is difficult to counter his contention that certain arguments 
carry a normative force that transcend their cultural location. That being the case, a number of 
questions remain. It is unclear which arguments carry the normative force he describes. Perhaps 
normative arguments are those that are justified by evidence, but this begs the question of the 
divergent ways that different cultural paradigms approach the interpretation of evidence. It is 
also unclear to what extent the fallibility of the human condition and unequal power relationships 
present a hindrance to grasping, and, therefore, evaluating, the normative nature of particular 
arguments. Siegel (2008) acknowledges the context-dependent nature of historically and 
culturally situated arguments, but does not parse out the possible differences between an ethical 
argument, a culturally situated course of action, and a scientific theorem. To claim that 
normative arguments exist is one thing, but to convincingly argue that values, such as autonomy, 
are transcultural is another. As discussed above, Siegel attempts to ground his view of the 
normative nature of critical thinking in the moral imperative of respecting others. As such, he 
correlates values such as autonomy, self-determination, and independence with the concept of 
respect. This line of reasoning makes his view of critical thinking coherent but possibly 
unconvincing within cultural frameworks that do not accept his normative description of respect. 
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As outlined above, if Siegel’s argument is accepted, critical thinking is culturally biased but will 
also carry the normative force to change existing cultural norms that contradict the values that 
imbue his conceptualization of critical thinking.  
Brookfield (2011) discusses the critique that critical thinking represents an approach to 
knowledge that emphasizes doubt and springs from a Eurocentric intellectual heritage. He 
references Lee’s (2011) study on how East Asian learners focus on knowledge applied under the 
strict supervision of a teacher. Lee claims that the expectation for a good East Asian student is to 
accept and apply knowledge exactly how a teacher wishes. As a result, learning does not entail 
doubting; it is centered on the acquisition and practice of received knowledge. If an East Asian 
student is asked to question an instructor’s reasoning, he is being asked to do something deeply 
disrespectful to his own culture. Brookfield responds to Lee’s study by acknowledging that the 
tenets of critical thinking must continually be reinvented and reshaped to fit alternative times and 
places. Unfortunately, he does not specifically discuss the nature of these tenets and what it 
means to reshape critical thinking to fit within a different culture. If doubting or challenging 
authority is removed from many conceptualizations of critical thinking, it conceptually dissolves. 
Similar to Ennis’ argument, Brookfield’s discussion is noticeably vague.  
Brookfield also addresses the claim that critical thinking is individualistic and privileges 
personal autonomy over relationship. He argues that students learn how to think critically most 
effectively in the social context of community. In his research, derived from over 1,500 Critical 
Incident Questionnaires completed by students over 30 years, Brookfield describes that “students 
report that critical thinking is best learned in groups in which peers serve as critical mirrors 
allowing students to see parts of their thinking that would otherwise remain obscured” 
(Brookfield, 2011, p. 216). As such, he argues that social learning is an important aspect of 
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critical thinking. Again, Brookfield does not move beyond a cursory discussion of the role of 
community in critical thinking and fails to address the more complicated questions of 
individualism and collectivism. He presents social learning as a value-added activity and does 
not specifically address whether this means that knowledge is constructed by consensus through 
social learning or that community primarily helps the autonomous learner unearth assumptions. 
It appears to be the later. If this is the case, Brookfield’s response may encourage the value of 
social learning and help temper an overemphasis on individualism, but does not answer the 
charge the critical thinking privileges autonomy over the sense of community and relationship. 
Finally, Brookfield raises the question of whether critical thinking may lead to cultural 
suicide. Cultural suicide occurs when a student feels his identity shattered and finds himself 
psychologically adrift as a result of his engagement in critical thinking (Casey, 2005). If a 
student begins to critically question conventional assumptions and beliefs shared by her peers, 
the student risks being excluded from the group. For thinkers such as Paul, this type of cultural 
risk should not impact critical thinking. In fact, critical thinking is meant to enable an individual 
to develop convictions regardless of the risks involved (Paul, 1985). Brookfield implies that 
some aspect of critical thinking includes a responsibility to mitigate the risk of cultural suicide or 
must, in some way, factor in the importance of social belonging as part of the critical reasoning 
process. Although Brookfield raises a number of important questions, he does not offer 
substantial answers. 
Bailin and Battersby (2009) acknowledge that the confidence resulting from the success 
of western science has “led, implicitly and explicitly, to the boundaries of investigation being set 
at the boundaries of western civilization, and frequently at the boundaries of current research 
within local disciplinary traditions” (p. 190). They argue that although the boundaries set by 
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Western scholarly research have many practical advantages, they do not have epistemic 
justification. As a result, Bailin and Battersby admit to the charge that critical thinking is largely 
situated within boundaries set by Western civilization. According to their argument, in so far as 
critical thinking adheres to boundaries established by western civilizations, critical thinking is 
biased. Where does this leave critical thinking? For Bailin and Battersby, it is it necessary for 
critical thinkers to think critically about critical thinking. This process involves an honest 
consideration of alternative solutions to human problems as well as alternative sources of 
knowledge. That being said, Bailin and Battersby argue that their approach does not necessitate a 
relativism where all views of other cultures are equally acceptable or should be given equal 
weight. What it does require is a broadening of traditional, established boundaries and criteria for 
what is accepted as knowledge. In spite of their admission of bias in critical thinking, Bailin and 
Battersby reject the idea that different cultures employ radically different standards. They believe 
that the overlap in human experiences across cultures provides a ground for engaging in cross-
cultural understanding and comparison. As a result, they contend that differences across culture 
“reflect differences of emphasis rather than radically different standards” (p. 191).  
To illustrate the possible epistemic advantages of considering alternative cultural 
perspectives, Bailin and Battersby provide examples from art, justice, and medicine. Art, a 
shared human experience, is conceptualized in western societies as an objectified activity that is 
set apart from life and observed with disinterested contemplation. In contrast, traditional 
societies incorporate art into daily life such that everyone engages in art-making. Which is truly 
art? Bailin and Battersby contend that “looking at art phenomena cross-culturally can cause one 
to look critically at one’s prevailing conceptions, revealing unexamined normative claims, and 
possibly supplying grounds for revision of those conceptions, or at least putting appropriate 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  55 
limitations on them” (p. 193). Similarly, they compare the justice system in the North American 
system of courts with that of native systems of justice. Whereas in North America justice is 
based on a view of fairness through impartiality and due process, native systems of justice 
resolve cases of criminal behavior through working together with perpetrators and victims with 
the goal of reintegration and restitution within the community. Is justice built on fairness, 
impartiality, retribution, deterrence, and an adversarial structure or is it restorative and built on 
the values of healing, reconciliation, and prevention? According to Bailin and Battersby, critical 
thinking requires the consideration of both. In looking at medicine, they compare prevailing 
Western medical models that approach illness naturalistically to Chinese medicine that see 
illness as bodily processes being out of balance. Contemporary western medicine’s theory of 
illness is incompatible with that of traditional Chinese medicine because “TCW (traditional 
Chinese medicine) is not reductionist, is non-microbial and provides explanations that refer to 
entities and bodily ‘parts’ that have no physical manifestations” (p. 195). Yet, certain 
applications of traditional Chinese medicine have met western empirical standards used to 
evaluate efficacy. As a result, Bailin and Battersby conclude “it does not seem epistemically 
justified to presume a priori that the explanatory paradigm of CWM (contemporary western 
medicine) is the only model worthy of consideration” (p. 196). 
Bailin and Battersby’s discussion of critical thinking and different cultural perspectives 
admits of bias in Western conceptualizations of critical thinking but also sees the development of 
critical thinking dispositions as the solution. “Given a history of Eurocentric arrogance, it is 
especially important to be wary of the possibility of prejudice in treating views and practices 
from other cultures. An attitude of open-mindedness and fair-mindedness seems the most 
appropriate way to proceed – an approach of looking to see what wisdom might be gleaned, what 
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we might be missing, and what we might learn. We may come away with our original views 
intact, or the interaction may result in the re-evaluation of our own paradigms by holding them 
up against those of others, or the incorporation of new knowledge and insights, or both. 
Whatever the outcome, the epistemological benefits are clear” (p. 200). 
Finally, Elder (1997) responds to the charge that critical thinking neglects emotion and 
privileges reason over intuition by arguing that it is actually critical thinking which leads to a 
high emotional intelligence. She claims that “if we want to change a feeling, we must identify the 
thinking which ultimately leads to that feeling. If we want to change a desire, again it is the 
thinking underlying the drive which must be identified and altered if our behavior is to alter” (p. 
42). As a result, it is critical thinking that helps align human emotions and intuitions with 
intelligence and justified action. Similarly, Arslan and Demirtas (2016) present research to 
support Elder’s claim that there is a positive correlation between social emotional learning and 
critical thinking. Elder bases her argument on Plato’s hierarchy of thoughts, feelings, and desires. 
In this taxonomy, it is thought or reason which exists to help correct feelings and direct desires. 
Thus, critical thinking is not meant to be an emotional activity and the claim of critical thinking’s 
bias against emotion is a misunderstanding of the relationship between reason, emotion, and will.  
 At the heart of the issue of bias is once again the question of normativity, values, and the 
role of critical thinking in the life of an individual and society. If it is conceptualized as rational 
thought, and if reason is elevated above emotion, then critical thinking is not biased against 
emotions or non-linear thought, it exists separate from these ways of knowing. If critical thinking 
is grounded in a moral imperative (Siegel) and has as its goal the creation of normative, 
criteriological standards by which to evaluate autonomous, independent, egalitarian, linear-
thinking, logical, democratic, and authority-questioning individuals, then critical thinking 
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instruction is only biased against those who do not share these values. If critical thinking is a set 
of amoral skills that can be used for good or bad ends to evaluate a particular type of evidence 
(Ennis), then bias is only present once these skills are used in a particular way that is measured 
and qualified as good. If critical thinking is primarily a disposition of questioning and exploring 
alternative explanations (Papastephanou), then bias is related to how alternative explanations are 
subsequently evaluated. If critical thinking is an organizing tool used among many to help make 
sense of and construct belief within a particular social context, then it is inherently biased 
because it is a tool always employed by humans in a particular intellectual and cultural location 
(Thayer-Bacon). Although contextually inappropriate critical thinking methodology, tools, or 
approaches may be altered, they can only change in ways consistent with the values upon which 
critical thinking is built.  
It should also be noted here that the charge of bias is not inherently negative. As both 
Thayer-Bacon and Siegel point out, all knowledge is situated and therefore includes bias. The 
issue is whether or not the biases of critical thinking are good. If critical thinking is biased but 
good, then it should be implemented based on its value. Therefore, the central question is not that 
of bias, but whether critical thinking is a good, moral, or educationally valuable endeavor either 
generally or within a particular context and, if so, how it can be assessed.  
Critical thinking assessment  
 The central point of disagreement between the school of thought represented by Ennis, 
Paul, and Siegel, and that of McPeck and Blatz is, in some sense, a practical and procedural 
question. It is a question of how critical thinking should be taught and if critical thinking can be 
broadly assessed. To date, there is no consensus over how critical thinking should be measured. 
In large part, this lack of consensus is the result of the ongoing debate over how critical thinking 
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should be conceptualized. The first school of thought emphasizes a particular set of rational 
skills and dispositions that can be taught, extended, and assessed across disciplines. The second 
school locates rationality within specific fields and epistemologies and contends that critical 
thinking skills only exist within the boundaries of a specific epistemic community. For the 
second school, critical thinking can be assessed, but only within a particular field among 
individuals that have a shared background knowledge of the field in question and a facility in 
using the domain-specific skills in question. Construct validity for critical thinking assessment 
requires an agreed upon, explicit operationalization of the domain critical thinking. As Ku (2009) 
points out “the conceptualization and assessment of critical thinking are interdependent issues 
that must be discussed together: how critical thinking is defined determines how it is best 
measured” (p. 71). 
 Norris (1989) points out that most critical thinking tests claim to be valid measures of 
process-oriented activities, such as evaluation, analysis, and interpretation, but that these tests 
only measure the product, not process, of thinking. As a result, these assessments actually test 
whether a test taker is aligned with the extra-critical-thinking assumptions of the test maker. “To 
decide on the correct answers for a credibility judgement test, the test maker must take into 
account factors other than criteria for judging credibility, including background beliefs and 
political and religious ideologies that reasonably could be expected to be held by examinees, and 
assumptions that examinees would likely make. This means that test makers’ judgements are 
based on extra-critical-thinking factors that can differ from those on which test takers base their 
judgments. But examinees should not be penalized on critical thinking tests for taking into 
account different, but reasonable, extra-critical-thinking factors, nor rewarded merely for taking 
into account the same factors as the test maker” (p. 24). In a multiple-choice test it is difficult to 
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ascertain whether a chosen answer is incorrect because of uncritical reasoning or the use of 
reasonable inferences that differ from those assumed by the test makers. Similarly, Halpern 
contends that multiple-choice critical thinking tests “are basically tests of verbal and quantitative 
knowledge, since test-takers are not free to determine their own evaluative criteria nor generate 
their own solutions to problems” (Ku, 2009, p. 73). 
  McPeck attempts to expose the shortcomings of multiple choice critical thinking 
assessments by arguing that any assessment of critical thinking must at least meet the following 
conditions:  
1. That the test be subject-specific in an area (or areas) of the test taker’s experience or 
preparation. This is required because knowledge and information are necessary 
ingredients of critical thinking,  
2. That the answer format permits more than one justifiable answer.  
3. That good answers are not predicated on being right, in the sense of true, but on the 
quality of the justification given for a response.  
4. That the test results should not be used as a measure of one’s capacity or innate ability, 
but as a learned accomplishment – which is usually the result of specific training or 
experience (McPeck, 1981, p. 149). 
McPeck challenges critical thinking assessments that equate critical thinking with correct 
thinking and instead introduces the idea of critical thinking as consistent thinking. He argues that 
critical thinking can only be assessed when a test taker has a wide knowledge of a discipline 
including its content, epistemology, truth premises, as well as what constitutes a valid argument 
within the discipline.  
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Another point of contention in the discussion of critical thinking assessment is the extent 
to which test scores are an accurate measure of the ability to critically think in unprompted 
contexts (Ennis & Norris, 1990; Halpern, 2003; Norris, 2003). Krupat et al. (2011) explored 
whether the theoretical definitions of critical thinking adopted by doctors was consistent with 
their descriptions of critical thinking in clinical practice. In a qualitative content analysis of 
surveys collected from 95 medical educators at 5 medical schools, these researchers discovered 
that although critical thinking was consistently defined as a process employing abilities or skills, 
the examples provided of critical thinking in clinical practice emphasized the priority of critical 
thinking dispositions. Medical educators were asked to define critical thinking and then 
“describe a challenging clinical scenario, real or imagined, in which critical thinking would make 
a crucial difference to the way the situation is handled” (p. 627). Particularly informative were 
the descriptions of doctors in these scenarios that were seen as not demonstrating critical 
thinking. A failure to think critically was not primarily attributed to a lack of critical thinking 
skills, but to factors such as a desire to take mental shortcuts, disinterest in going through the 
steps needed to make a good decision, and an insensitivity or lack of awareness to the value of 
gaining additional information. This study highlights the potential disconnect and lack of transfer 
between the way that critical thinking is approached in prompted scenarios, such as critical 
thinking assessments, as opposed to real-life situations.  
 In a similar fashion, Chan and Yan (2009) build on a number of empirical studies and 
present the concepts of adaptive and critical rationalities. They argue that adaptive rationalities 
require humans to simplify tasks in order to make them manageable, and that this is not 
irrationality, but it is the result of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). They then construct a 
geography of thinking styles with the claim that judging critical thinking by abstract reasoning, 
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as implemented in many critical thinking assessment tools, fails to adequately address that 
critical thinking involves putting logical thinking into practice. Chan and Yan also highlight the 
need for students to be taught to be more aware of the cultural contexts in which their thinking 
patterns are embedded so that they can become more sensitive to their own ways of thinking and 
less likely to misapply them. Their research combines Paul’s emphasis on being aware of 
background logics, Krupat’s discovery of the disconnect between theory and practice, and 
McPeck’s claim that critical thinking is bounded by knowledge of a particular discipline.  
 In spite of these challenges, most commercially marketed critical thinking tests purport to 
provide a reliable assessment of cross-disciplinary critical thinking skills (Ennis & Weir, 1985; 
Facione, 2002; Halpern, 2007; Ennis & Millman, 2005; Watson & Glaser, 2002). Cross-
discipline assessments of critical thinking generally utilize what Black (2012) calls a top-down 
approach to construct validity. In a top-down model, a definition and taxonomy of critical 
thinking is adopted and then assessment questions and evaluative criteria are developed to test 
for proficiencies that line up with the outlined taxonomy. These types of tests generally adopt 
one of three approaches. Assessments, such as the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test 
(1989), evaluate production responses to questions. In a production response, a test-taker is asked 
to generate and evaluate arguments in response to specific questions and then the test-taker’s 
responses are scored by trained evaluators using established criteria. The Watson-Glaser Critical 
Thinking Appraisal (2002) and California Critical Thinking Skills Test (2002) employ a 
selection response format. In a selection response, a test-taker is asked to read a short passages 
and then choose the correct answer from among a selection of choices (Frisby & Traffanstedt, 
2003). A third approach, as seen in the Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment using Everyday 
Situations (2007), uses both production responses and selections responses. Cross-discipline tests 
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claim they are designed so that specific content knowledge is not a factor in the measurement of 
critical thinking proficiency (Frisby & Traffanstedt, 2003).  
 In general, cross-discipline assessments attempt to measure the skills of informal logic 
and the ability to apply rules of scientific inquiry to postulated scenarios. Taube (1997) suggests 
that production response formats are also able to capture some of the dispositional aspects of 
critical thinking. Insight Assessment has attempted to account for the limitations of its selection 
response test, the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST), by developing a 
complementary test to measure critical thinking dispositions, the California Critical Thinking 
Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI). The tests, taken together, are meant to provide a holistic 
measure of the skills and dispositions of a critical thinker. Possin (2008) points out that self-
assessments do not measure actual dispositions, “but rather the students’ self-reported beliefs 
about their dispositions – beliefs that can be wildly wrong” (p. 208). His argument is supported 
by the weak correlation reported by P. Facione, N. Facione, and Giancarlo (2001) between scores 
on the CCTDI and demonstrated CT skills (Possin, 2008). Whether or not Insight’s dichotomous 
approach is an effective measure of assessing the critical thinker is contested (Ku, 2009).  
 Critical thinking test manuals include a section discussing the validity and reliability of 
the instrument in question. For example, the supplement to the manual of the Ennis-Weir Critical 
Thinking Essay Test presents data from twenty-four studies to demonstrate “a record of good 
inter-rate reliabilities for high school and college, and for gifted younger students” (Ennis & 
Weir, 1989, p. 11). This manual also states that it is necessary to “situationalize test validity, that 
is, focus on the extent to which in the situation the test assesses what it is supposed to assess” (p. 
12). By situating test validity with a set of standard conditions the instrument can account for 
challenges to validity that may result from cultural and language differences. As such, the Ennis-
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Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test claims to have standard-condition situational validity; in 
standard situations the test assesses what it is supposed to assess. No evidence is presented to 
support concurrent or predictive validity but the manual asserts a strong content validity in that 
“the situation that the test presents to examinees is a common type of situation in which skills at 
appraising and formulating arguments is manifested, and the problems presented provide 
opportunities for assessing the important areas of critical thinking competence” (Ennis & Weir, 
1989, p. 3). Additionally, the manual presents the argument that use of an internal consistency 
index like a Kuder-Richardson or Cronback alpha is inappropriate for the measuring the 
reliability of the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test because the test attempts to measure a 
multidimensionality concept of critical thinking, not isolated skills. 
 The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (CCTT) is a selection response test that 
evaluates critical thinking skills related to deduction, meaning and fallacy, observation and 
credibility of sources, induction, definition, and assumption identification. Ennis contributed to 
the development of the CCTT and it is based upon his definition of critical thinking (Ennis, 
2015). The Level Z test is specifically designed for advanced and gifted high school students, 
college students, graduate students, and other adults. The CCTT manual makes the same 
argument presented in the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test manual; namely that using 
the Kuder-Richardson to evaluate internal consistency is not justified because of the 
heterogeneous nature of critical thinking. Even so, the manual presents reliability estimates based 
on studies using the Kuder-Richardson and Spearman-Brown methods ranging from .49-.87.  
 The manual is critical of the idea that “a test is valid to the extent that it measures what it 
is supposed to measure” (Millman et al., 2005). It argues that tests themselves are not valid but 
validity relates to the inferences drawn from tests or the validity of interpretations of test scores. 
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Although it makes this point, the manual accepts “the context-dependence of validity together 
with the basic idea of measuring what the test is supposed to measure. Accordingly, in a 
particular set of circumstances, a test is valid to the extent that it assesses what it is supposed to 
assess in that set of circumstances” (p. 19). As such it states that “to the extent that Level X and 
Level Z are valid in a certain situation, one can use them as a basis for inferences about the 
degree of presence of critical thinking ability and for interpretation of scores received on the 
test” (p. 20). In explaining test validity this way, the CCTT locates the question of validity in the 
interpretation of the test scores, not in the test itself.  
 The manual rejects the idea that there are three kinds of validity, content, criterion, and 
construct validity. Instead, it argues that there is only construct validity and that criterion and 
content are types of evidence to support construct validity. The manual states that “a great deal 
of information about a test must be available before a construct validity judgment can be made 
with justified confidence. After forty years of use in various ways, there is still not enough 
evidence to declare unequivocally that these are valid tests” (p. 20). With this admission, it 
proceeds to present eleven sorts of criterion and content evidence to support the construct 
validity of the CCTT Level Z.  
 Content evidence for construct validity is presented in a variety of ways. The CCTT 
attempts to account for the impact of different auxiliary assumptions on induction decisions by 
adopting a score of 85% agreement to indicate mastery of the skill; individual items were chosen 
through a collaborate process by members of the Illinois Critical Thinking Project; the test does 
not claim to represent a real or imaginary sampling of a universe of test items; and a detailed 
discussion of each answer is included. Criterion-related evidence is presented through a series of 
studies. The manual presents seven correlations between the Level Z test and other critical 
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thinking instruments ranging around .50; six studies that conclude that gender is not significantly 
related to test results; nine studies demonstrating low to moderate correlations with grade point 
average; six studies that indicate an expected progression of critical thinking scores with grade 
level; and three studies that indicate correlations with personality such as a positive correlation 
between independence and CCTT scores and a moderate consistent negative relationship 
between dogmatism and critical thinking (pp. 32-38). The manual also presents low/moderate 
correlations between CCTT scores as an indicator of graduate school success and a moderate/low 
relationship between CCTT scores and subject matter prowess. Four experimental studies found 
that the more time was spent on critical thinking the better the CCTT scores. Based on this 
evidence, the manual claims that “there is strong support for the substantial validity of Level Z, 
given standard conditions” (p. 41). In keeping with Ennis’ conceptualization of critical thinking, 
the manual also states that these items are evidence but the user must decide whether the 
information provided justifies a claim of construct validity.  
 Frisby (1992) questioned the CCTT’s claim that the heterogeneity of critical thinking 
naturally reduces the internal reliability of test items. He contended that although this argument 
may explain low internal consistency across all items, that it is still possible, and desirable, to 
test the psychometric properties of each test section. In a study conducted at a major research 
university and a two-year community college, he found that “support for the heterogeneity 
hypothesis was mixed and inconclusive” (p. 301). He concludes that “this finding casts doubts on 
the view that Form Z sections measure coherent and conceptually distinct thinking skills” (p. 
301). In his field-guide to critical thinking assessments, Possin (2008) gives the CCTT a positive 
review and states that it is “well-constructed and has a well-documented history” (p. 218) but 
points out some minor concerns such as that the test gives a disproportion emphasis on inductive 
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reasoning (33% of the questions) and that its use of a three-answer format may lead to a higher 
percentage of correct guesses. He also argues that a handful of questions have more than one 
reasonable answer.  
 In evaluation of the reliability and validity of the CCTT performed 34 years ago, 
Modjeski and Michael (1983) collected data from 11 panelists who were asked rate the CCTT 
using “10 statements representing the ten ESSENTIAL validity standards and for each of five 
statements portraying the five ESSENTIAL reliability and measurement error standards to the 
degree to which the standard was met” (p. 1189). The findings showed interrater reliability 
estimates between .84 and .88, relatively high ratings on two aspects of criterion validity, and 
unfavorable evaluations of test bias. In terms of reliability and measurement error, the test was 
judged favorably “with respect to (a) a description of procedures and samples used to determine 
reliability coefficients or standard errors of measurement and (b) use of acceptable ways of 
reporting reliability data” (pp. 1195-1195). At the same time, the test received negative 
judgements regarding the reporting of stability of scores. Verburgh, François, Elen, and Janssen 
(2013) engaged in a comparative evaluation of validity and reliability of a Dutch translation of 
the Halpern Critical Thinking Assessment and the CCTT. The participants in the study were 154 
mostly freshman women majoring in educational sciences at the KU Leuven in Flanders, 
Belgium. On both tests they discovered good interrater reliability, low internal consistencies, and 
sufficient content validity. Based on the data collected, they argue that neither instrument has 
sufficient overall reliability and validity for the student population that was tested. 
 Insight Assessment claims to use a validation procedure for their instruments that 
includes items/scales that are piloted in target samples and validated through replication studies 
(Facione, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1990d). The CCTST manual (P. Facione & N. Facione, 2002) 
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reports “high correlations with standardized tests of college-level preparedness in higher-order 
reasoning” (p. 46), predictive value to “measure higher-order thinking ability and predict success 
in educational programs and workplace positions” (p. 47), internal consistency estimates ranging 
from .68-.80 (p. 48), and KR-20 estimates ranging from .70-.82. Unfortunately, Insight 
Assessment does not allow access to its items/scales or scoring procedures making it difficult to 
evaluate the veracity of these claims. 
 Bondy, Koenigseder, Ishee, & Williams (2001) challenge the reliability estimates of the 
CCTST presented by Facione. In two studies of undergraduate students, they found “relative and 
absolute reliability estimates for the subscales ranged from .24 to .61. The total score test-retest 
estimates were .58 for relative and .54 for absolute reliability” (p. 317). They suggest that the 
combining of multiple skills taken from Delphi study into the subscales used in the CCTST may 
contribute to difficulties of measurement. In addition, they contend that student complaints about 
the difficult of the vocabulary and structure used in test questions may contribute to test score 
inconsistencies. Similarly, Leppa’s (1997) study of 70 nursing students reported a low internal 
consistency in the CCTST. In this study, students were given the CCTST on the first day of the 
nursing program and then retested 10 months later. After the second administration, Leppa 
analyzed the reliability of the five subscales. The results revealed KR-20 alpha statistics for the 
test instrument scales varying from .21 to .51. In addition to low KR-20 alpha statistics, the 
change in the inference sub-score on a paired score t test showed, on average, a decrease from 
6.56 to 5.74. This score, if accurate, indicates the counterintuitive idea that nurses’ inferences 
skills were negatively impacted as a result of a 10-month course of nursing studies.  
 In two large-scale studies Jacobs (1995; 1999) challenged the construct validity of the 
CCTST by demonstrating a lack of equivalence between CCTST Forms A and B. In a 1994 
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study of 1,383 freshmen at a large Eastern private university, Jacob divided students into 
matched groups and compared scores on the CCTST Form A and Form B. In a replication study 
in 1999, he examined the scores of 1,461 freshmen students using the same procedures. The 
results of both studies revealed that the modifications made on 28 question items from Form A in 
order to transform them into equivalent questions on Form B resulted in the items becoming 
more difficult. “Almost 40% (13 of 34) of the means for “equivalent” Form A-Form B items 
differed by 20% or more” (Jacobs, 1999, p. 211) In addition, the differences in relative item 
difficulty within forms were shown to vary from item to item. A principal components analysis 
produced two dissimilar groups of items, neither of which corresponded to the suggested 
categorizations of items. The study also indicated that certain subtests, such as deduction, were 
more homogenous than others, such as analysis, and that the relationship between CCTST scores 
and SAT verbal scores raises questions about how unique a contribution the CCTST makes to 
understanding student thinking. Based on these results, Jacobs argued that context effects and 
format effects, such as minor changes in item wording, had a significant impact on student 
responses and that “the resulting measures reveal how little is known about how much a 
difference in a stimulus (i.e. the item) is required to produce a significant effect on the response” 
(Jacobs, 1995, p. 106). In conclusion, Jacob argues that in the CCTST “neither total test score 
nor subtest scores should be regarded as measuring unitary constructs” (p. 105) and that “the 
technical quality of many CCTST items and scales makes it inadvisable to attempt to interpret 
between-scale and between-form score differences, particularly at the individual level” (Jacobs, 
1999, p. 211) In addition, Fischer, Spiker, & Riedel (2009) point out that “because the test is 
short, its factors are not orthogonal as each item contributes to multiple facts (i.e., inference, 
interpretation, etc.)” and that “it is impossible to evaluate the CCTST because the answer keys 
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are not made available by the publisher” (p. 18). Insight’s CCTDI has also received a series of 
mixed reviews (Bondy, Koenigseder, Ishee, & Williams, 2001; P. Facione, Sanchez, N. Facione, 
& Gainen, 1995; Giancarlo & Facione, 2001; Iskifoglu, 2014; Leppa, 1997; Spelic et al., 2001; 
Sulaiman, Rahman, & Dzulkifli, 2010; Yeh, 2002). 
 As the above discussion demonstrates, the debate around critical thinking assessment is 
rooted in different conceptualizations of critical thinking. Although different assessment tools 
have been developed, they primarily assess logical skills such as assumption identification, 
interpretation, analysis, and argument construction, or focus on the assessment of a normative 
set of critical thinking dispositions. The psychometric properties of these instruments are limited. 
In addition, the proprietary and commercial nature of many of these tests makes it difficult to 
find third-party reliability and validation studies. As of yet, little empirical research has 
attempted to identify the role of cultural values that undergird the development, assessment, and 
process of critical thinking. One variable that is noticeably scarce in the literature on critical 
thinking is a discussion of the relationship between culture and critical reasoning. 
The Social Orientation Hypothesis and Cultural Context  
There is a growing body of research which includes physiological studies, culture 
specific case studies, and comparative studies addressing the question of culture and thinking. 
For example, Ambady and Bharucha (2009) explore how culture is related to physiology. They 
present a framework for neuro culture-mapping, which is the mapping of neural patterns that 
characterize culture, and source analysis, which is the attempt to determine physiological sources 
of observed cultural commonalities and differences. They also present empirical studies such as a 
study that monitored the brain activity of native English and native Chinese speakers while 
performing similar intellectual tasks (culture-mapping). The results showed that the two cultural 
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groups use different brain regions during similar intellectual tasks, which indicates a 
physiological difference between the ways people of different cultural groups think about similar 
problems. The researchers acknowledge that this does not address the question of whether neural 
differences are learned or innate but argue that this demonstrates that there is a physiological 
relationship between thinking and culture. The neuroscience of culture is still in its infancy. 
Future work needs to be done to explore how or if the use of different areas of the brain for 
similar tasks can be related to cultural values and expressions, how different cultural 
environments and learning strategies affect brain activity, and whether there are universal 
cognitive processes that are shared across cultures. 
 Behavioral researchers such as Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan (2001) suggest that 
the social, ecological, and cultural differences that affect the way that humans interpret the world 
require a reevaluation of certain cognitive theories and methodological approaches to developing 
thinking. Specifically, they argue that East Asians think holistically, attend to the entire field and 
assign causality to it, make relatively little use of categories and formal logic, and rely on 
dialectical reasoning. Dialectical reasoning is presented as reasoning that has “an emphasis on 
change, a recognition of contradiction and of the need for multiple perspectives, and a search for 
the ‘Middle Way’ between opposing propositions” (Nisbett et al., 2001, p. 293). The goal of 
dialectical reasoning is a social cohesion based on harmony and an avoidance of confrontation 
and debate. In contrast, these researchers state that Westerners are more analytic; pay attention 
primarily to the object and the categories to which it belongs; and use rules, including formal 
logic, to understand its behavior. They argue that “people who are free to contend with their 
fellows might be expected to develop rules for the conduct of debate, including the principle of 
noncontradiction and formal logic” (Nisbett et al., 2001, p. 295). 
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 Building on this hypothesis Gutchess, Welsh, Boduroglu, and Park (2006) make use of an 
event related fMRI to test if there is a neural basis for the object/context distinction between 
Western and Asian thinkers. They theorized that these proposed cultural behavioral norms 
should correlate with differences in neural activity and that Americans should engage more 
object-based neural structures, whereas East Asians should engage those specialized for 
contextual processing. They discovered that Americans did activate more object-specific regions 
than did East Asians but that cultural differences with background-processing were less 
pronounced. Based on their results, they challenge behavioral studies that argue that the 
additional processing of context on the part of East Asians drives cultural difference. Instead, 
they suggest that cultural differences in the encoding of complex scenes result predominantly 
from additional processing of objects by Westerners and that cultural differences could occur at 
an earlier stage of object-based processing rather than a later stage of integrating objects with 
elaborated contexts. This means that differences in object processing may contribute to cultural 
differences in picture encoding but that encoding processes may then converge across cultures.  
 Addressing a similar question from a different perspective, Davies (2007) looks at the 
cultural influences on inference-making and discusses their implications for the teaching and 
understanding of critical thinking. Citing empirical research Davies suggests that Asians and 
Westerners to some degree use different patterns of reasoning and make different inferential 
connections but that these culturally modulated thinking patterns are marginal and that, for all 
practical purposes, humans share the same system of what constitutes reasonable inferences. He 
argues that evidence indicates that it is the basic principles of western critical reasoning that are 
not understood, or at least, are not well-deployed, by Asians, and not necessarily a lack of critical 
thinking skills. Davies’ research also suggests that teachers must learn to identify and respect 
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alternative ways of making inferential connections and that the use of different patterns of 
reasoning does not indicate a lack of shared understanding concerning what constitutes a 
reasonable inference. Similarly, Lun, Fischer, and Ward (2010) empirically test whether there is 
a difference in critical thinking between Asian and Western students in a large New Zealand 
university. Their findings indicate that differences, as measured by critical thinking assessments, 
are less about critical thinking and more about language acquisition and background knowledge. 
In regards to the relationship between language and culture, the linguistic relativity 
hypothesis proposes that the languages humans speak are intricately related to the way that 
people think about reality (Dirven & Niemeier, 2000; Dragos, 2012; Goddard, 2003; Hussein, 
2012; Tohidian, 2009). Whereas linguistic diversity acknowledges that language patterns are 
different, proponents of linguistic relativity contend that these linguistic differences shape the 
way that humans interpret the world. In general, empirical studies of linguistic relativity are 
approached in three ways. “Structure-centered approaches begin with language differences and 
ask about their implications for thought. Domain-centered approaches begin with experienced 
reality and ask how different languages encode it. And behavior-centered approaches begin with 
some practical concern and seek an explanation in language's effect on thought” (Lucy, 1997, p. 
291). 
 Györi (2000) explores the cognitive processes of linguistic relativity by tracing the 
history of lexical-semantic change. He argues that “when cognitive processes take on a linguistic 
form, thought becomes propositional thought” (p. 72). Thus, languages impose particular 
categorizations of the world onto non-propositional experiences. In addition, social, cultural, 
historical environments impact the way that language is developed and used. It therefore follows 
that socio-cultural contexts shape propositional thinking. At the same time, he acknowledges that 
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the flexibility of language is evidence that perceptions of the world do not always fit into 
linguistic categories. As a result, the relationship between perception and language is reciprocal 
and dynamic. “The study of linguistic change is effectively the study of cognitive change” 
(Dirven & Niemeier, 2000, p. xv).  
Slobin (2000) presents a series of studies in which he examined descriptions of manner of 
motion in a wide range of languages using the categories of verb-framed languages, (V-
languages), and satellite-framed languages, (S-languages). In one study, he presented participants 
a 24-page children’s storybook with pictures and no words. He then recorded the types of words 
that were used to describe the manner of motion in the book. In a second study, he and his 
colleagues did a literary analysis of motion words by looking at novels in languages of the two 
types. A third study evaluated the verbal use of manner of motion words in preschool children 
aged 2-4. A final study looked at the extent to which one language can accommodate manner of 
motion words into a second language through translation. Reflecting on the results of these 
studies he argued “that that users of V-languages build mental images of physical scenes with 
minimal focus on manner of movement, and with rather different conceptualizations of manner 
when it is in focus. Thus, when they hear or read stories, or newspaper reports, or gossip, they 
might end up with quite different mental representations than users of S-languages. These 
differences are exceptionally difficult to pin down, but the considerable range of evidence 
examined here is at least suggestive of rather divergent mental worlds of speakers of the two 
language types” (p. 133). 
Scholars remain divided over the extent to which language influences world-view 
patterns or cultural practices (Gumperz & Levinson, 1991; Keesing, 1994). As Goddard (2003) 
points out, the key question for linguistic relativity is not how much language influences 
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thinking, but rather “in what ways does the process of linguistic thinking differ from language to 
language” (p. 397).  
 Another way to examine the relationship between culture and thinking is to explore the 
correlation between independent cultures and analytic thinking and interdependent cultures and 
holistic thought. This approach, known as the Social Orientation Hypothesis, contends that it is 
social practice that primarily affects thinking not geographical or ethnic differences. Varnum, 
Grossman, Kitayama, and Nisbett (2010) argue that empirical studies generally support the 
broader correlation between social orientation and thought but that there remain a number of 
questions. For example, they present a study which indicates that these correlations break down 
on the individual level such that the independence/interdependence or analytic/holistic modes of 
thought are expressed in different ways for different individuals within each group. They also 
highlight a study that indicates that primes of social orientation can produce corresponding shifts 
in cognition. If social orientation can be shown to be easily influenced by priming, this raises the 
question of how accurately this reflects a consistent pattern of thought. Similarly, if social 
orientation is a conditioned way of answering problems and does not represent individual 
thought this may call into questions the effectiveness of current methods used for measuring 
differences in ways of thinking. 
 Using the Social Orientation Hypothesis, Knight and Nisbett (2007) test the way students 
think in relatively independent regions in northern Italy and in relatively interdependent regions 
in southern Italy. The results of their study showed that southern Italians reason in a more 
holistic fashion than northern Italians and also indicated that lower socio-economic status 
resulted in more holistic reasoning among southern Italians. The implications of the study, if 
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supported by further research, indicate that the influence of culture on thinking is more related to 
local values and possibly socio-economic status instead of geographical or national identities. 
 There are a number of themes that emerge in this review of studies on culture and 
thinking. There is an indication that there are physiological differences in how different cultural 
groups use their brains to address questions but that there is no definitive indication as to whether 
neural differences are learned or innate. There is a broad consensus regarding the influence of 
culture on patterns of reasoning but little consensus regarding if there is actually a cultural 
difference in critical thinking ability or if these apparent differences are more related to language 
proficiency and background knowledge. There is the recognition that language and thought are 
intricately related, but an ongoing debate over the extent to which linguistic thinking varies from 
culture to culture. There is some indication that the categories of independent and interdependent 
cultures can provide a useful framework for understanding different reasoning patterns, but there 
are also questions about whether the Social Orientation Hypothesis adequately accounts for other 
potentially influential variables. The above discussion makes it clear that there is an ongoing 
need for research to explore the relationship between cultural context and the process of critical 
thinking.  
The Lebanese context 
 As outlined in chapter 1, Lebanon presents an interesting test case for examining the 
relationship between cultural, political, and religious influences on critical thinking. On one 
hand, Lebanon is defined by a sectarian system that reinforces collective identity, uniformity, 
submission to authority, fear of the other, and interdependent thinking within the in-group. At the 
same time, the majority of sects in Lebanon are rooted in the intellectual histories of Islam and 
Christianity; traditions heavily influenced by Aristotelian analytic reasoning. (D’Ancona, 2005; 
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Hall, 2004; Inglis, 2003; Merrifield, 2012). It is Aristotelian analytic reasoning that Nisbett 
(2003) argues undergirds Western patterns of independent, object-oriented thinking.  
Over the past 200 years, education has served as an arena where Lebanese students have 
had to navigate the complexities of culture, language, foreign influence, loyalty, and self-
identity. Factors such as imperialism, decentralized education, political instability, and the 
influence of sectarianism in both the public and private sectors have created challenging 
environments that work against a number of the values promoted by the critical thinking 
movement. For example, it becomes more difficult to withhold judgment or consider other points 
of view when these are construed as high-stakes activities with significant social consequences. 
In order to interpret the critical thinking process of Lebanese students, it is important to develop 
an informed understanding of the Lebanese social, intellectual, and educational context.  
Under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, religious communities in the region of Lebanon 
were permitted to open their own schools in the arts, sciences, and industry (Bahous and 
Nahbani, 2011). In the late 1800s, foreign missionaries began establishing schools in the region. 
By the advent of World War I, American Protestant missionaries had opened one hundred thirty-
two schools; British Protestant missionaries had established forty schools; and French Jesuits had 
founded a number of schools as well (Frayha, 2004). As an Islamic alternative to the mission 
schools, Beirut's Sunni Muslim community founded the Maqasid (Sbaiti, 2008). By 1919, nearly 
every religious sect in the region of Lebanon had established its owns set of schools with 
different educational systems, many of which were tied to foreign powers (Bahous and Nahbani, 
2011). At that time, 88.6% of Lebanese schools were private. Of these schools, 39.2% were 
foreign schools and 49.4% were local private schools (Kobeissy, 1999). In the years leading up 
to World War I, the dynamic between schooling, the backing of foreign powers, and the 
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oversight of religious sects created an environment where education became enmeshed in the 
complexities of competing loyalties and political-cultural agendas. 
 After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the State of Greater Lebanon was created in 1920 
under the colonial rule of the French Mandate (Entelis, 1985). During the Mandate, from 1920-
1943, sectarianism was indelibly woven into the fabric of Lebanese politics and public life while 
language and education were established as key arenas where national, religious identities, 
allegiances, and cultural outlooks could be carefully constructed.  
The Mandate Charter of June 24, 1922 made French-language education compulsory and 
established French and Arabic as the official languages of Lebanon (Sbati, 2010). As Sbati 
(2010) points out, “the French inherited a rather mottled educational landscape in Lebanon, 
comprised of former Ottoman public schools, those schools that self-defined as ‘secular 
nationalist,’ as well as a great many schools belonging to various foreign missions: American, 
British, Scottish, Russian, German, Italian, and Swiss. This was in addition to French mission 
schools operating in Syria and Lebanon since the late eighteenth century” (p. 63). Article 10 of 
the 1926 constitution of the Republic of Lebanon officially granted each religious sect the 
permission to establish and run its own schools (Farha, 2012). To help manage the varied 
educational landscape, the French relied on a network of 1,341 private schools scattered 
throughout the region (Farha, 2012).  
 One consequence of the creation of the Republic of Lebanon was the binding together of 
various religious sects with no natural connection or affinity under the imported concept of the 
nation-state. In 1932, the French took a census to determine the population and religious 
distribution in the newly established republic. On March 13, 1936 the French officially 
recognized 18 different sects in Lebanon and empowered each sect with the right to “create and 
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manage their own religious courts and to follow their own personal status and family laws” 
(Salloukh, Barakat, Al-Habbal, Khattab, & Mikaelian, 2015, p. 32). Based on the 1932 census, 
all political and administrative seats in the state were distributed according to a six-to-five ratio 
of Christians and Muslims. This arrangement was renegotiated as a five-to-five ratio after the 
Lebanese civil war (Nagle, 2015). The establishment of ethnoreligious quotas in government and 
a dependence on religious courts institutionalized the influence of sectarianism in both the 
private and public sphere (Barakat et al., 2015). 
During the Mandate period, the language used in education emerged as a distinguishing 
characteristic of social class as well as religious and confessional identity (Zakaria, 2010). 
Personal language choices began to carry political meanings and either opened or shut access to 
resources from competing foreign powers. In addition, languages themselves began to carry 
certain connotations. Arabic instruction was assigned to the teaching of the arts and religious 
studies while foreign languages were seen as languages of progress (Zakaria, 2010). By many, 
Arabic was seen as inherently incapable of being used to teach math, science, and technology 
(Sbati, 2010). As a result, foreign languages were tasked with teaching of the “rational” sciences, 
a division still present in the current Lebanese educational system.  
  After the Republic of Lebanon achieved independence in 1943, the realm of education 
was once again subject to significant shifts in policy and implementation. As a response to the 
colonization efforts of the French, the Lebanese government established Arabic as the only 
official language of instruction (Jarrar & Massialas, 1991) and the only compulsory language for 
official exams (Wheeler, 1966). The decentralization and privatized structure of a majority of 
schools made it difficult to implement government-issued educational decrees. By the 1950s, 
private schools were exempt from the requirement to teach in Arabic and the official 
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examinations were offered in Arabic, English, and French (Zakaria, 2010). Political tensions 
over national identities and foreign allegiances erupted in a 1958 civil war (Entelis, 1985). 
Although the conflict only lasted three months, it once again highlighted the instability created 
by political sectarianism and the strength of the confessional fault lines running throughout the 
country.  
 The 1960s and the first part of the 1970s were dominated by tensions over the influx of 
Palestinians fleeing from the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Varying ideologies concerning the Western 
backing of Israel further fractured an already weak Lebanese nationalism. Attempts at nation-
building were mired in regional conflicts, and in 1975, Lebanon erupted. From 1975-1990, 
Lebanon was engulfed in a civil war divided among sectarian lines (Fisk, 1990). The collapse of 
the government led to the collapse of any national public school agenda. The supervision of the 
Ministry of Education was reduced to oversight of nationally administered exams (Zakaria, 
2010). Identity, ideological loyalties, and security were heightened as primary factors dictating 
school choice. The deterioration of the role of an already weak Ministry of Education 
corresponded to a strengthening of a private, largely sectarian, school system (Farha, 2012).  
The civil war began drawing to an end in 1989 with the signing of the Taif agreement 
(Fisk, 1990). Up until this time, Lebanon’s educational history had been characterized by 
instability, decentralization, wide-ranging shifts in educational policy, and the reinforcement of 
sectarian identities and divisions. After the war, there was a recognition that both sectarianism 
and a failed national educational policy had contributed to the bloody conflict. The Taif 
agreement included a number of statements about national education. Two of the key ideas 
agreed upon were that the curricula should be revised to inculcate national belonging and 
integration and that the history and civic education textbooks should be unified (Frayha, 2010). 
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The post-Taif government tasked the Ministry of Education with the development of broad-scale 
educational reform. “The Educational Reform Plan (CERD 1994) was prepared by the 
Educational Center for Research and Development (ECRD) and approved by the Lebanese 
cabinet on 17 August 1994” (Abou Assali, 2012, p. 86). 
Abou Assali (2012), the first director of the Education Center for Research and 
Development (1993-1999), and Frayha (2010), the head of the ECRD from 1999-2002, both 
provide accounts of the development, attempted implementation, and failure of the Post-Taif 
Educational Reform Plan. The first national reform project spanned 52 months, included 
participants from the majority of Lebanese factions, and was centered on eight themes designed 
to promote social cohesion. The project focused on developing the subject areas of civics, 
history, and religious education. The final stage of the project included curriculum objectives 
centered on “promoting critical thinking, debate, dialogue, human rights, and respect for others’ 
opinions” (Abou Assali, 2012, p. 93). Although there was broad agreement on the plan, as of 
2012 none of the educational reforms developed to promote social cohesion are functioning. 
Abou Assali lays the blame for this failure on the influence of the “confessional, religious, 
clientelist system” (p. 99). She contends that sectarianism is a formidable obstacle to achieving 
national and civic goals and states that the failure of the project mandates a careful examination 
of the complicated social and cultural Lebanese context.  
Similarly, Frayha (2010) provides an account of his experience of religious pressure and 
lack of accountability in areas of education in Lebanon. He details events that occurred during 
his tenure as the head of the ECRD to support the claim that it is religious groups that are the 
most influential in education policy and practice. Frayha catalogues how, although supported by 
political leaders, religious leaders rejected the removal of religion from the national curriculum 
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and rejected the development of a pluralist curriculum designed to encourage respect and 
understanding of different religious traditions (Abouchedid & Nasser, 2002). Instead, Lebanon’s 
religious communities pushed for separate, didactic religious instruction based on ethnoreligious 
identity and indoctrination (Frayha 2004; 2010). Frayha was eventually dismissed from his 
position and, in reflecting on his experience, discussed how the politicized nature of education in 
Lebanon is affected by even the hint of controversy. Because religious groups elevate sectarian 
interests above the public good, Frayha argues that this jeopardizes sound curriculum and 
educational practice.  
Abou Assali and Frayha’s accounts of failed educational reform demonstrate the 
protectionist mentality that is bread by Lebanese sectarianism and an unwillingness to promote 
thinking beyond the boundaries of sectarian self-interest. Hage (1996) echoes this theme in his 
exploration of the psychological aspects of Lebanese religious identities that create oppositional 
communities as a strategy for survival. Through a content analysis of historical statements from 
different Lebanese religious communities about specific events in the Lebanese civil war, Hage 
argues that “nationalists and communalists in general cannot perceive their community without 
an otherness of some sort standing between them and ‘it’” (Hage, 1996, p. 122). Hage adopts a 
psychoanalytical approach and contends that the oppositional nature of sectarianism is used by 
religious communities in the affective realm to create communal identity and a specifically 
located ethnoreligious social existence.  
Similarly, Wedeen (1999) traces the role of rhetoric and symbols as tools of allegiance 
building in Syria through archival research, anthropological fieldwork, and open-ended 
interviews. One of her arguments is that rhetoric is used as a vehicle in the Middle East to create 
a sense of belonging; even in the absence of individual belief or conviction in a sectarian 
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ideology. It is rhetoric that provides guidelines for public speech and conduct where “people are 
not required to believe the cult’s fictions, and they do not, but they are required to act as if they 
did” (p. 30). Wedeen’s account of the use of rhetoric aligns with a long history of polemics in the 
Arab world. In the polemical discourse between Islam and Christianity, the “other” has often 
been grossly misrepresented as a means of strengthening commitment to a particular religious 
ideology (H. Goddard, 2000; Sahas, 1972). The defensive orientation of religious identity 
politics and the use of emotionally charged rhetoric to garner support stand in sharp contrast to 
principles in the critical thinking movement such as examining multiple points of view (Facione, 
1990a), suspending judgment (Neiman & Siegel, 1993), and the pursuit of rational convictions 
regardless of personal consequences, emotional connections, or the social context (Paul, 1985). 
Akl (2007) offers a survey of literature in an attempt to trace the influence of Lebanon's 
politico-religious history on national and cultural identity. She argues that the absence of a 
national Lebanese identity to promote within schools results in an educational system where each 
faction tends to reproduce its own culture through sectarian educational institutions. Similarly, 
though examining educational policy decisions and Lebanon’s civic education curriculum, Al-
Habbal (2015) contends that the private school network in Lebanon provides students a sectarian 
education and a civic education that “lacks the methodological instruments and empirical design 
to foster a critical consciousness, a culture of citizenship, tolerance of the sectarian ‘other,’ 
respect for the rule of law, and the accountability essential to produce citizens who are free from 
sectarian shackles and affiliations” (Salloukh et al., 2015, p. 49). 
The research of Abouchedid and Nassar (2002) provides support for Al-Habbal’s 
contention. In a study of seven, privately-run confessional schools in Lebanon, Abouchedid and 
Nassar attempted to identify whether the policies and practices of the schools promoted multi-
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cultural understanding. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with 14 
educational decision-makers of Lebanese confessional schools, 5 decision makers from CERD, 
and 7 history teachers. The schools chosen consisted of a Maronite Catholic, Protestant, 
Orthodox, Armenian, Sunni, Shiite, and Druze school. Abouchedid and Nassar relate that 
schools were chosen based on their willingness to respond to questions about their instructional 
practices in religion and history because of the sensitive nature of the topic. What was discovered 
were conflicting interpretations of history which generally reinforced existing sectarian 
narratives. In addition, the schools lacked multi-faith understanding policies. Although 
approaches to religious instruction were diverse, many teachers attributed a lack of multi-faith 
policies to an unspoken policy based on conflict avoidance. None of the schools accommodated 
for the religious practices of students from different backgrounds. In general, religious 
instruction reinforced segmentation based on ethnoreligious identity.  
Abouchedid and Nassar also explored the extent that students think they know about the 
beliefs and cultures of religious groups different than their own. Questionnaires were collected 
from 236 students enrolled in secondary education at these schools and semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with 26 students. The questionnaires collected demographic 
information such as religion, parent’s educational background, and gender. The questionnaire 
focused on student perceptions of their knowledge of the beliefs and lifestyles of people from 
other religious groups as well as their perceptions of how much other students knew about them. 
The small, non-representative sample of Lebanese students preclude the ability to generalize the 
results, but it does present a small picture of student perspectives. Most applicable to this 
dissertation, students attributed their lack of knowledge of others to the failure of the schools to 
promote mutual understanding.  
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Similarly, Shuayb (2012) explores the role of education in promoting social cohesion in 
Lebanon. She engaged in semi-structured interviews with 26 principals and 62 teachers of civic 
education, social studies, history and religion in ten public schools and 14 private schools across 
Lebanon’s eight provinces. The interviews covered topics such as school philosophies, priorities, 
aims and values, management structures, pedagogies, school environment and extra-curricular 
activities, and school-community relationships. The data from the interviews was analyzed to 
identify different approaches to social cohesion in Lebanese schools. In addition, Shuayb 
administered a questionnaire to 900 grade 11 students using the framework of the CivEd survey 
focusing on students’ civic knowledge, values, attitude, and skills. The responses from the 
student questionnaires were used to help verify the data collected from the qualitative interviews.  
In spite of certain limitations, what is informative in Shuayb’s discussion is that only 
three of the 24 schools surveyed considered cross-sectarian social cohesion as a goal of the 
educational institution. Particularly interesting was the perception that avoidance of controversial 
topics was the official approach of the Ministry of Education. In one area of Lebanon, public 
schools were physically divided based on sectarian affiliation in order to create homogenous 
environments. Teachers also reported being asked to avoid discussions that might lead to 
conflict. Within the nine schools adopting what Shuayb characterized as the passive approach, 
the two main priorities were completing the curriculum and achieving a high success rate in the 
official exams (Shuayb, 2012). A weakness in Shuayb’s study is that she does not provide 
detailed statistics across the discussion or a clear rationale for the labels she utilizes. The study 
also attempts to cover a broad range of topics and, from these discussions, create clear bounded-
set descriptions of what is happening in Lebanese schools.  
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  85 
The data from student questionnaires was used to compare student responses from 
schools using the labels constructed by Shuayb. The presentation of the data makes it difficult to 
get a more general picture of student perceptions of sectarianism. Even so, a few useful patterns 
emerge. A high percentage of students, ranging from 53% to 78%, stated that they trusted people 
from their sect. In contrast, a low percentage of students, ranging from 27% to 42%, claimed to 
trust people from other religions. In addition, a high percentage of students, ranging from 40% to 
83%, agreed that opinions of religious leaders should be considered as most important when 
deciding on crucial state matters. Shuayb concludes that the prevailing school environments in 
Lebanon “hinder students’ ability to develop critical thinking skills which can help them 
challenge some of the prejudices inherited from their social and religious background” (Shuayb, 
2012, p. 152). More specifically, she presents a portrait of school environments in Lebanon that 
are characterized by the avoidance of controversy and a failure or fear of promoting engagement 
with diverse worldviews.  
Shuayb’s conclusions are supported by research on the complex relationship between 
ethnoreligious identity and the fear of discussion of what are seen as sensitive topics. Ommering 
(2011) examined the relationship between education and violent conflict using an ethnographic, 
child-centered research approach among elementary schools in Lebanon. Whereas elementary 
students naturally incorporated discussion of sectarian conflict in their peer interactions after the 
2006 Lebanese war, school administrators adopted strict policies forbidding the discussion of 
politics and religion in school. Students demonstrated a willingness to engage in discussion of 
conflict and identity, but educators generally resorted to banning such discussions. The rationales 
given by school leaders were centered on the importance of defusing tension and preventing 
conflict. As one principal stated “talking about problems is the ultimate way to reach agreement. 
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At this time, however, talking only results in conflict. It is simply too early to start thinking about 
that. Divisions are at their max right now. And we don’t need another war!” (p. 551).  
Nagle (2015) analyzes secondary interview data from leading representatives of Lebanese 
political parties and non-sectarian civil society movements to explore the relationship between 
ethnic identity, politics, and views of political reform. One point Nagle draws out is how “any 
attempt to introduce legislative change, no matter how minimal or incremental, designed to 
weaken political sectarianism is framed, tout court, by some political elites as an issue that 
threatens security” (p. 15). In addition, in al-Habbal’s (2011) discussion of the failures of the 
post-Taif reforms, she presents research on educational policy decisions and religious-based 
personal status laws that demonstrate how sectarian leaders use political and educational systems 
to preserve their own power and interests. Al-Habbal contends that the sectarian educational and 
judicial systems do not allow a space for discussing what may be perceived as sensitive or 
threatening issues.  
Similarly, Mattar (2012) presents a cross-sectional study of 10 Lebanese public schools, 
five high-achieving and five low-achieving, in order to address the question of which factors 
affect the level of performance in Lebanese public schools. Mattar chose the schools based on 
Lebanon’s Centre of Education for Research and Development (CERD) school ratings which 
utilize criteria such as percentage of student successes in official examinations over the past five 
years and the quality of teachers. The research consisted of semi-structured interviews with two 
teachers from each school as well as informal discussions with each of the school principals. The 
research was based on a convenience sample of teachers who expressed a willingness to 
participate. As a result, the feedback of the interviewees cannot claim to represent prevailing 
views of teachers in public schools across Lebanon.  
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For the purpose of this dissertation, a few relevant observations can be drawn from 
Mattar’s research. She discusses the fear that teachers expressed that participation in research 
would threaten their jobs, lives, or reputations. This observation is supported by the research of 
Karami-Akkary (2014) indicating a belief among teachers in the Arab context that “taking 
initiative and bringing new ideas is too risky as it might upset people in critical positions and 
trigger retaliations” (p. 184). Mattar also highlights how politicians place pressure on schools to 
appoint certain teachers, irrespective of whether or not these teachers are qualified for the post, 
another indication of the role of political sectarianism in Lebanese education. This aligns with 
Joseph’s (1997) study of the way that Lebanese have transported the structures of patriarchal 
kinship into public institutions whereby political leaders employ kinship to privilege their 
relatives and kin expect special resources and services from relatives in positions of power. 
Finally, Mattar presents a hierarchical, authoritarian structure of school leadership that is 
consistent across high-achieving and low-achieving schools. This aligns with the conclusions of 
Bashsur (2005) and Jurdak and El-Amine (2005) that the structure of schools in the Arab world 
are generally characterized by a hierarchy where teachers are expected to be “mere executers and 
uncritical followers” (Karami Akkary, 2014, p. 187). 
A final set of characteristics in the Lebanese educational context that are relevant to the 
discussion of critical thinking are the cultural concepts of collectivism, shame, and authority. The 
individualism-collectivism spectrum is a construct that has been utilized in a range of disciplines 
(Buda & Elsayed-Elkhouly, 1998; Charters, Shweder, Minow, Markus, & Bledsoe, 2004; 
Fessler, 2004; Ha & Tangney, 1995; Hofstede, 1997; Ibrahim & Howe, 2011; S. Khalaf & R. 
Khalaf, 2009; McCabe, Feghali, & Abdallah, 2008; Nisbett & Norenzayan, 2002; Tian & Low, 
2011). The construct consists of cultural orientations that represent patterns of shared attitudes, 
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values, and beliefs (Hofstede, 1997; Triandis, Mccusker, & Hui, 1990). In general terms, 
individualism is characterized by the subordination of the goals of the group or collective to 
those of the individual. In contrast, collectivism involves the subordination of individual goals to 
those of the group (Ayyash-Abdo, 2001). Hofstede (1997) argues that individualists think in 
terms of “I” and perceive themselves as separate from their social group whereas collectivists 
think in terms of “We” and are “integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout 
people’s lifetimes continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (p. 76). Arab 
societies have generally been described as collectivist (Ali, Krishnan, & Camp, 2006; Buda & 
Elsayed-Elkhouly, 1998; Hofstede, 1997; Ibrahim & Howe, 2011; S. Khalaf & R. Khalaf, 2009; 
McCabe et al., 2008; Wikan, 1984). In her anthropological research, Joseph (1993) traces the 
social connectivity of the collectivist Lebanese society which is characterized by “the primacy of 
the family over the person….the sense of responsibility for and to others, (and) the experience of 
one’s self as an extension of others and others as an extension of one’s self” (p. 479). The 
collective-individualist paradigm mirrors that of the interdependent-independent categories 
outlined in the Social Orientation Hypothesis.  
  Ayyash-Abdo (2001) is interested in the correlation between an individualistic-
collectivistic orientation and language, gender, and religious affiliation in the Lebanese student 
population. She used the Twenty Statement Test, Traidis’ attitude items, and Schwatz’s 56 
values items, instruments designed to identify collectivistic-individualist orientations, to survey 
517 students across five Lebanese universities. The data revealed that 67.3% of the population 
could be categorized as collectivistic as opposed to 27.9% individualistic. Within the group of 
those who scores as collectivists, 48% responded in Arabic whereas in the individualist 
population, 47.2% used English and 42.4% answered in French. Ayyash-Abdo points out that her 
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data corroborate findings in other research that indicate that countries that use a language which 
allows pronouns to be dropped show a lower level of individualism. Unfortunately, the data are 
potentially skewed since the researcher included 51 students from non-Lebanese backgrounds, 
the majority of her participants were females (380 to 137) and all the participants were studying 
psychology. In spite of the limitations of the study, the research places Lebanon in the category 
of a collectivist society and raises the question of how language impacts cultural identity. In 
comparing Lebanese and US students, McCabe, Fenghali, and Abdallah (2008) also use the 
individual-collective paradigm to explain the differences in perspectives on academic dishonesty. 
Their research discovered collectivist behavior among Lebanese students where students 
perceive cheating using a collectivist lens of working together to navigate a difficult task. 
Ayyash-Abdo and McCabe, Fenghali, and Abdallah highlight the collective nature of the 
Lebanese educational environment. 
A second important concept for understanding the Lebanese context is that of shame. 
Anthropological, psychological, and cognitive-science researchers debate how best to articulate 
the meaning of shame (Fessler, 2004; Gilbert, 1998; Greenwald & Harder, 1998; Shweder, 
2003). Shame is considered a moral emotion (Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 
2007) that involves the complex dynamic between emotions, cognition, behavior, and 
interpersonal relationships (Gilbert, 1998). In simple terms it is “the deeply felt and highly 
motivating experience of the fear of being judged defective” (Shweder, 2003, p. 1115). Wong 
and Tsai (2007) trace differences in the experience of shame in individualistic and collectivist 
cultures. Whereas in individualist cultures shame is related to how one feels about oneself, in 
collectivist cultures shame is a group experience. Collectivist shame is the emotional response to 
how an individual action impacts an extensive network of connected relationships (Camras & 
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Fatani, 2004). Thus, the social consequences for shameful behavior are greater in a collectivist 
society.  
Herrera (2010) presents school-based, ethnographical research from Egypt to draw a 
broader picture of an Arab educational environment that promotes the use of shame as the 
predominant pedagogical practice used to maintain control and ensure high academic 
performance. Shaming is used to encourage conformity and to communicate that an academic or 
behavioral misstep dishonors the family and community. Similarly, Wikan (1984) describes how 
all actions are viewed through the lens of shame among the poor in the backstreets of Cairo. 
People are primarily concerned with what others will say and how their actions will be evaluated 
and judged. “Mediterranean people do not, in their daily lives, speak of their own and each 
other’s honour. But they do speak of shame” (p. 638). The result is that “no one has any freedom 
of action” (p. 636). Building on her research from the school-based reform program Tammam, 
Karami-Akkary (2014) echoes this point in her discussion of Arab pride, the flip-side of shame. 
She writes “an intense sense of pride among the people of the Arab world causes discomfort 
when it comes to acknowledging mistakes, and becomes a barrier to any attempt at evidence-
driven evaluation, self-reflection, and critical thinking. Maintaining good relationships with 
others and protecting personal feelings take precedence over seeking evidence/data as the basis 
for constructive criticism and action towards the achievement of goals” (p. 187). 
 Similarly, the Lebanese educational context is built on authoritarianism. As mentioned 
above, schools in the Arab world are characterized by a steep hierarchy (Jurdak & El-Amine, 
2005) where decision are made in a top-down manner. The school setting reflects the larger 
societal culture of patriarchal kinship. Patriarchy in the Lebanese Arab context refers to “the 
dominance of males over females and elders over juniors (males and females) and the 
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mobilization of kinship structures, morality, and idioms to institutionalize and legitimate these 
forms of powers” (Joseph, 1993, p. 460). Top-down, male-centered patriarchy is enmeshed in 
Lebanon’s state institutions, ideologies, and processes. “Given the weakness of the state, 
Lebanese citizens have experienced kin as the anchor of their security, acting as the central 
metaphor for social relationships” (Joseph, 1997, p. 79). Elders, both male and female, are 
accorded a respected place in the social hierarchy where the patriarch speaks for the collective 
whole and “conflates his will with the will of the family” (p. 461). Authority and shame are 
interrelated in patriarchal systems where it is perceived as shameful to question a person in 
authority. In the shame-based Chinese educational system, Li and Wegerif (2014) discuss how 
Chinese students often fail to ask challenging questions because of their desire to avoid shaming 
a person in authority.  
 Research regarding the history of Lebanese education and the current educational context 
raise important questions that potentially impact the assessment and identification of patterns of 
critical thinking. Lebanon’s educational and political history is characterized by instability and 
the reinforcement of sectarian identity with schools largely divided along sectarian lines. The 
privatized and ethnoreligious nature of schooling reinforces sectarian agendas. Religious 
communities, not the state, provide for the needs of Lebanese sectarian groups in a patron-client 
relationship. Religious communities wield significant power over educational policy and 
curriculum choices and have resisted national initiatives aimed at promoting pluralism and social 
cohesion. Teachers are often asked to avoid controversial topics, lack training, and fear the 
consequences of presenting new ideas or taking initiative. The threat of conflict, perceived or 
real, is used by those in power to maintain the status quo. Polemical and rhetorical discourse is 
utilized to reinforce communal identity; often at the expense of thoughtful reflection. The 
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prevailing educational atmosphere is characterized by fear, a lack of trust, conflict avoidance, 
and protectionism. In addition, the perceived consequences of failure embedded in Lebanon’s 
collectivist, shame-oriented, and authority-based culture, are prominent considerations that 
influence choice.  
Factors such as those articulated above create an environment where approaches typically 
associated with critical thinking such as withholding judgment, gathering multiple points of 
view, etc., become high-stakes or threatening activities. The freedom to explore alternative 
points of view concerning taboo topics may be seen as threatening to social position. In this 
context, it can be expected that it would be difficult to promote the exploration of divergent 
solutions, the constructive use of failure as a means to improve, and an educational spirit of 
exploration and knowledge construction; all values of the critical thinking movement. It may be 
that students will be more concerned with choosing what is perceived as the right answer 
(understood as the answer which aligns with a particular sectarian ideology) than providing a 
well-reasoned and reflective argument. It may also be that Lebanese students prove proficient in 
what Paul labels weak-sense critical thinking and deficient in strong-sense critical thinking. They 
may be able to use evidence to support and defend already existing beliefs, but unable to 
critically reflect on their own assumptions and consider alternative points of view.  
Conclusion 
The prevailing definitions of critical thinking emphasize the role of critical thinking in 
determining what to believe and do (Ennis, 2016). As seen in this review, there is an on-going 
debate over objectivist and subjectivist conceptualizations of critical thinking. At the heart of this 
debate is a disagreement over the purpose of critical thinking, the nature of the standards used for 
evaluating evidence and making judgements, and whether critical thinking epistemologies are 
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domain-specific and socially located or extend across intellectual domains and cultures. Studies 
on the relationship between culture, language, and thinking support the contention that different 
patterns of reasoning exist. As a result, critical thinking scholars must address the broader 
question of how the goals of critical thinking instruction interact with the norms and values of 
divergent cultural contexts. In particular, they must address whether or not seeking to transform 
culturally specific patterns of reasoning through critical thinking instruction is justified.  
In addition, a number of critical thinking tests have been designed to evaluate specific 
critical thinking skills and dispositions. The scope of the validity and reliability of these 
assessments remains unclear. Questions have been raised about the effectiveness of these tests 
such as whether selection response tests are able to provide an accurate picture of critical 
thinking reasoning processes; whether the critical thinking skills these tests measure are 
transferable; and, whether these tests require specific background knowledge or test for 
alignment with the extra-critical-thinking assumptions of the test makers.  
Finally, if the ability to question beliefs or take alternative actions is significantly shaped 
by a particular cultural context, it raises the question of whether or how contemporary 
conceptualizations of critical thinking can be successfully developed in a country like Lebanon. 
It also raises the question of whether the concept of critical thinking needs to be altogether re-
conceptualized and re-aligned with the thinking processes used in the context in which it is 
embedded or whether critical thinking should be promoted as a specifically Western educational 
ideal.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the role of culture, context, and language in the 
critical thinking processes of bilingual Lebanese students. Someren, Barnard, & Sandberg (1994) 
state that “in order to define an experiment to obtain data about a cognitive process you need to 
define, beside the cognitive process, the following set of elements: a set of problems, a 
verbalization procedure and subjects” (p. 170). This chapter describes the methods that were 
utilized to answer the following questions.  
1. What reasoning processes do Lebanese undergraduate students utilize to frame, interpret, 
and answer critical thinking questions from the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z 
designed to measure skills of deduction, induction, observation and credibility of sources, 
assumption identification, and meaning? 
2. How do undergraduate Lebanese students frame and self-report on critical thinking 
questions from Insight Assessment’s Sample Reasoning Mindset Test designed to assess 
dispositions of inquisitiveness, open-mindedness, truth-seeking, critical thinking self-
confidence, and maturity? 
3. Do undergraduate Lebanese students employ culturally-specific reasoning processes in 
responding to questions on the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z and the Sample 
Reasoning Mindset Test? 
4. Do bilingual students use comparable reasoning processes in answering equivalent 
questions in Arabic and English from the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z and the 
Sample Reasoning Mindset Test? 
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The chapter begins with a description of how and why think-aloud protocols (TAPs) have been 
utilized to collect data on cognitive processes. It then addresses the rationale for selecting 
participants and describes the instrumentation and procedures that were used to collect and 
analyze data. It concludes with a discussion of the steps that were taken to ensure a high ethical 
standard throughout the research process.  
Research Design 
 Think-aloud protocol analysis (TAP) has been used in a variety of domains to explore 
human cognitive processes (Ericsson & Simon, 1998; Nisbett, & Wilson, 1977; Johnstone et al., 
2006; Nielsen, Clemmensen, & Yssing, 2002; Norris, 1990; Someren, Barnard, & Sandberg, 
1994). Nisbett and Wilson (1977) demonstrated that when humans were asked to describe post 
hoc their thinking about a problem, that the activity of retrospection did not always result in an 
accurate description of what actually occurred. TAP’s goal is to capture the immediate, natural 
occurring thinking processes that are used in reasoning while avoiding confounding variables 
such as confirmation bias, choice-supportive bias, consistency bias, social desirability bias, and 
egocentric bias. In retrospection, information is retrieved from long-term memory whereas TAP 
focuses on information that appears in working memory during problem analysis. As such, TAPs 
aim to present a clear picture of how participants think during a specific activity. TAPs treat 
recorded verbal processes as objective data. The method is generally used to “obtain a model of 
the cognitive processes that take place during problem solving or to test the validity of a model 
that is derived from a psychological theory” (Someren et al., 1994, p. 8). Ericsson and Simon 
(1992) argue that think-aloud protocols are a valid method for the research of cognitive processes 
as long as data are carefully collected and interpreted properly. Someren et al. (1994) contend 
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that TAP is “one of the few techniques that give direct data about the reasoning processes” (p. 
11).  
The collection and recording of students’ thought processes provides a rich source of data 
for comparing thinking across different groups and languages. For example, Ercikan, Simon, and 
Oliveri (2010) used the TAP to examine and confirm sources of differential item functioning for 
test items in different languages. The use of a TAP uncovered that “for nine out of 20 DIF items, 
student verbalizations did not provide supporting evidence for the differences identified by the 
bilingual experts as being the sources of DIF” (p. 32). Ercikan and her colleagues concluded that 
TAPs provide vital data missed by expert reviewers about how linguistic differences impact 
student cognitive processes and performances in multilingual assessments. Similarly, Someren et 
al. (1994) state that TAPs are an effective means of demonstrating global differences between 
two groups of subjects solving a certain type of problem. Baxter and Glaser (1998) consider the 
use of TAPs critical for the empirically testing of cognitive processes, constructs, and validity.  
In TAPs, participants are asked to verbally articulate whatever thoughts come to mind 
while engaged in a specific task (Gass & Mackey, 2016). TAPs avoid external interruptions, 
suggestive prompts, and questions. The only acceptable interjection in a TAP is to remind a 
participant to continue talking out loud in the event that he or she forgets to verbally process. 
Participants are also asked to refrain from interpreting or explaining why they are thinking in a 
particular way. The recommended procedures for collecting think-aloud data include providing 
clear instructions, pre-task training, and practice (Barkhuizen & Ellis, 2005). Because the 
challenge of thinking aloud may result in incoherent or incomplete utterances, researchers often 
use a post-protocol interview to collect supplemental information to help interpret and 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  97 
understand the verbal data (Branch, 2000; Johnstone et al., 2006). Structuring the data is the 
work of the researcher responsible for analyzing the protocol.  
One question that has been raised about TAPs is whether the task of thinking aloud 
changes the cognitive process. Norris (1990) presents research to support the claim that verbal 
processing does not impact reasoning or test scores. In a study of 343 tenth, eleventh, and twelfth 
grade students he concluded that “the elicitation of verbal reports of thinking did not alter 
subjects' performance and, by inference, did not alter their thinking; and the different procedures 
for eliciting verbal reports yielded essentially the same information of the quality of subjects' 
think” (p. 47). Ericsson and Simon (1998) present similar research to support the idea that 
thinking aloud does not systemically or significantly impact the outcome or process of thinking. 
In spite of the advantages of using TAPs, think-aloud protocols have a number of 
limitations. According to Ericsson and Simon (1998), there are significant differences in the ease 
with which people verbalize their thoughts. Although training and post-protocol interviews can 
help reduce these differences, the impact of this variable cannot be altogether eliminated. As 
mentioned above, the TAP method may also result in incomplete or incoherent cognitive data. 
“A cognitive process takes longer when the think-aloud method is used. This means that people 
are able to slow down the normal process to synchronize it with verbalization. However, subjects 
frequently report that sometimes verbalization does not keep up with the cognitive process and 
their report is incomplete. This is consistent with the observation that occasionally protocols 
contain ‘holes’ of which it is almost necessary to assume that an intermediate thought occurred 
here” (Someren et al., 1994, p. 33). The use of a post-protocol interview is intended to help 
mitigate this limitation. In addition, Leighton (2004; 2017) highlights the importance of using 
appropriately leveled material in TAPs in order to collect meaningful data. She discusses studies 
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that indicate that overly simple items are processed immediately without a detailed cognitive 
process whereas items that are too difficult create a cognitive load that overload the capacity 
limits of human working memory with the additional demand for verbal processing. It is 
important to state that TAPs capture the contents of working memory and do not claim to 
represent the entire cognitive process. These limitations require that an effective TAP makes sure 
that the level of difficulty of the task is appropriately matched to the sample population and that 
the instrument used in a TAP is designed to assess particular cognitive processes. It also 
necessitates the use of proper training for participants and a clear data-collecting strategy. 
 Critical thinking is by definition a process-oriented activity. One weakness of selection 
response critical thinking assessments is that these tests are designed to measure the product of 
reasoning instead of the processes of reasoning (Norris, 1989). In addition, Norris (1988) argues 
that such tests “cannot be used to distinguish variance in scores due to differences in those 
background beliefs of examinees which are not part of ability to think critically from variance 
due to differences in critical thinking ability” (p. 2). The goal of the TAP in this study is to 
collect data on the direct critical thinking processes employed by Lebanese undergraduate 
students as they solve appropriately leveled critical thinking questions in Arabic and English. 
Sampling and Participants 
The think-aloud protocol is a labor-intensive methodology that yields a large response 
data set (Johnstone et al., 2006). As a result, the sample size used in TAP research is small and 
purposeful. Nielsen (1994) suggests that a sample size of 5 participants is sufficient for most 
TAP research. Leighton (2017) contends that the labor-intensive nature of TAP research is not a 
valid justification for small samples sizes. Instead, she argues that sample sizes must be 
appropriately aligned with project goals. Leighton presents research to suggest that sample sizes 
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should range from between 15-50 participants. In qualitative TAP research, participants are 
generally chosen to represent demographics relevant to a particular set of research questions 
(Johnstone et al., 2006). The participants in this study were chosen using a purposive sample of 
24 students going into their junior or senior years at a Lebanese university. The university was 
selected because it consists of a student body with a diverse ethnoreligious background and has a 
price point that represents a middle-class socio-economic status. It has 35 undergraduate 
programs and 8 graduate programs with a total enrollment of approximately 700 students. 
Anecdotally, the university is considered a second-tier academic university in Lebanon and has 
less rigorous academic programs than first-tier universities. It is unranked locally and 
internationally and has faculty who are actively engaged in critical thinking research.  
The purposive sample of students was selected using the following criteria. The Cornell 
Critical Thinking Test Level Z has been designed for undergraduate, graduate, and adult level 
students. As such, students going into their junior or senior year were recruited to participate in 
the study in an effort to match the test level with student proficiencies. It aimed to include an 
equal number of male and female students. The sample also consists of a similar number of 
participants from Sunni, Shiite, Arminian Orthodox, and either Maronite or Druze ethnoreligious 
backgrounds.  
The purpose of selecting students from different ethnoreligious backgrounds and genders 
was to create a student sample that generally reflects Lebanon’s diverse population. Participants 
indicated that they had a college-level proficiency in Arabic and English. Since the university is 
an English-language university it was assumed that students had demonstrated proficiency in 
English by their junior year. Arabic-language proficiency was determined by student self-reports 
of their language abilities. 
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Table 1    
Demographics of Student Population at Research Project University – Spring 2017 
Demographic  Count Percentage 
Gender   
 Male 204 37 
 Female 350 63 
Ethnoreligious Background   
 Armenian 236 43 
 Non-Armenian 318 57 
Senior Student Population 174 100 
Gender   
 Male 50 29 
 Female 124 71 
Ethnoreligious Background   
 Armenian 79 45 
 Non-Armenian 95 55 
Junior Student Population 139 100 
Gender   
 Male 49 35 
 Female 90 65 
Ethnoreligious Background   
 Armenian 66 47 
 Non-Armenian 73 53 
Total Undergraduate 554 100 
*The university only records sectarian background in terms of Armenian and non-Armenian. 
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Table 2    
Demographic Characteristics of Participants (N=24) 
Demographic characteristic Count of sample Percent of sample 
Grade   
 Seniors 14 58 
 Juniors 10 42 
Gender   
 Females 17 71 
 Males 7 29 
Ethnoreligious Background   
 Sunni 8 33 
 Shiite 9 38 
 Druze 3 13 
 Armenian Orthodox 1 4 
 Greek Orthodox 1 4 
 Armenian Catholic 1 4 
 Maronite 1 4 
Major   
 Psychology 4 17 
 Bus Admin 7 29 
 Biology 2 8 
 Education 5 21 
 Social Work 2 8 
 Nutrition Science 2 8 
 English Language 1 4 
 Computer Science 1 4 
Education in Lebanon    
 All education in Lebanon 21 88 
 Grades 9-12 in Lebanon 2 8 
 Grades 2-3, 5-12 in Lebanon 1 4 
Previously taken a CT Class   
 Yes 9 38 
 No 15 63 
Total  24 100 
 
Instrumentation and Administration 
 The two instruments that were used in this study are the Cornell Critical Thinking Test 
Level Z and the Sample Reasoning Mindset Test. The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z 
(CCTT) is a selection response test that evaluates critical thinking skills related to deduction, 
induction, observation and credibility of sources, assumption identification, and meaning. The 
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Level Z test is specifically designed for advanced and gifted high school students, college 
students, graduate students, and other adults. The CCTT manual presents reliability estimates 
ranging from .49-.87 based on studies that used the Kuder-Richardson and Spearman-Brown 
methods. It also states that the Kuder-Richardson is not a justified way to evaluate the CCTT’s 
internal consistency because of the heterogeneous nature of critical thinking. As articulated in the 
literature review, the CCTT manual provides evidence to support the context-dependent 
construct validity of the Level Z test and its use as a basis for assessing critical thinking ability.  
 The CCTT Level Z consists of 52 selection-response items designed to be finished in 50 
minutes. It is divided into seven sections. The first two sections present a series of debates 
between two participants. Section one includes ten questions that test deduction where student 
must determine whether particular conclusions follow necessarily from the statements given, 
contradicts the statements given, or neither follow necessarily or contradict the statements. 
Section two consists of eleven questions that test verbal and linguistic aspects of argument 
where students are asked to pick the best reason why some of the thinking presented is faulty. 
Sections three, four, and five require students to reflect on an experiment. Four questions test 
observations and the ability to evaluate the credibility of sources by asking students to determine 
which of three statements is most believable. Eight questions evaluate induction in hypothesis 
testing by asking if the information presented supports, goes against, or is neutral to the 
conclusion. Four questions examine induction by asking students to make predictions in planning 
an experiment. The final two sections address definition and assumption identification. Eight 
questions have been designed to test the criterion a student uses to fill a gap in reasoning. 
 The CCTT attempts to account for the impact of different auxiliary assumptions on 
induction decisions by adopting a score of 85% agreement to indicate mastery of the skill. 
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Individual items were chosen through a collaborative process by members of the Illinois Critical 
Thinking Project. The test does not claim to represent a real or imaginary sampling of a universe 
of test items and a detailed discussion of each answer is included (Millman, Tomko, & Ennis, 
2005). The CCTT is an English language assessment. The Critical Thinking Co. granted 
permission to the researcher to translate or use a translation of the test in Arabic. An Arabic 
version of the CCTT Level Z produced by the Debono Center for Teaching Thinking in Amman, 
Jordan was located and the center granted the researcher the rights to use this translation for the 
study. See Appendix B for stipulated agreements. See Appendix C and D for CCTT Level Z 
items in English and Arabic. 
 The Sample Reasoning Mindset Test is free application available in English and Arabic 
that has been developed by Insight Assessment to measure critical thinking dispositions. It 
consists of 24 questions designed to measure self-reported perceptions towards truth-seeking, 
open-mindedness, analyticity, systematicity, critical thinking self-confidence, inquisitiveness, and 
maturity. The items in the Sample Reasoning Mindset Test have not been psychometrically 
tested. Thus, the Sample Reasoning Mindset Test does not claim to be a reliable or valid 
instrument. The sample items are intended to provide an idea of what type of questions can be 
asked to evaluate critical thinking dispositions. See Appendix E and F for the Sample Reasoning 
Mindset items in English and Arabic.  
The length of the two tests, the amount of verbal data that would need to be collected, 
and the potential for cognitive and psychological fatigue for participants if asked to verbally 
process 76 questions, led the researcher to choose specific questions from each section of the 
CCTT Level Z and the Sample Reasoning Mindset Test to be used in the TAP. Five out of 10 
questions were used from the CCTT Level Z Section 1; 5 out of 11 questions from Section 2; 2 
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out of 4 questions from Section 3; 5 out of 13 questions from Section 4; 2 out of 4 from Section 
5; 2 out of 4 from Section 6; and 3 out of 6 from Section 7. In addition, 10 out of 24 questions 
were selected from the Sample Reasoning Mindset Test. In sum, participants were asked to 
verbally articulate their cognitive processes for 34 out of 76 questions. The researcher chose 
specific questions for the TAP based on three criteria, (1) his personal judgement as to which of 
the item pool of questions would best achieve the goals of the project, (2) a desire to comparably 
represent each section of the CCTT, and (3) the decision to target the five critical thinking 
dispositions of inquisitiveness, open-mindedness, truth-seeking, critical thinking self-confidence, 
and maturity. The content of the questions was not altered for the purpose of the study. 
 The procedures for this project’s TAP methodology are well-informed by Someren et 
al.’s (1994) work on modeling cognitive processes. Participants were recruited through an email 
that generally explained the project and a survey to determine whether students who responded 
met the project criteria. Students that indicated an interest in the project and met the project 
criteria were subsequently contacted. At this point, the researcher explained the details of the 
project with potential participants either verbally or through a follow-up email. Participants were 
divided into two procedural groups based on the test language. A similar number of 
ethnoreligious backgrounds and genders were represented within these procedural groups. An 
incentive of a $10 gift card was offered to encourage student participation. Participants from 
group A took the TAP in Arabic. Participants in group B completed the TAP in English. 
 Participants were contacted through a recruitment email and in-class presentations about 
the project. The researcher invited participants to meet him at a specified location on campus. 
Given that TAPs require high-level cognitive functioning to be applied in the verbal protocol and 
on the test items, a quiet place was selected so that the participant would not be easily distracted. 
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The researcher administered the IRB-approval consent form and asked the participant to take his 
or her time in reviewing the forms together with the researcher. The researcher explicitly went 
over each IRB item in detail and reassured the participant that only cognitive problem-solving 
processes and reasoning mindset dispositions were under investigation; i.e., neither the problem 
solution, nor non-cognitive domains (such as affect) would be critiqued. After the IRB consent 
form was signed, the researcher: 
1. Provided a brief description of the CCTT Level Z and Insight Assessment Sample 
Reasoning Mindset Test and test-items. 
2. Provided a brief description of the TAP methodology as well as a simple example of the 
TAP process. 
3. Explained that if the participant began to mutter under his breath or exhibit non think-
aloud behaviors to problem solving or verbalizes in a language different than the test 
language, he would be prompted to “speak louder” or “think aloud” or “keep talking” or 
“speak in English” or “speak in Arabic.” 
4. Described the order of the TAP which was divided into eight sections. In each section the 
participant was asked to think aloud on selected items from the CCTT Level Z or Sample 
Reasoning Mindset test and then was asked to complete the rest of the questions in the 
section non-verbally.  
5. Explained that the participant would be offered a break between each section of the test, 
that snacks and juice would be available during breaks, and that the total test time would 
not exceed 120 minutes. 
6. Explained that at the end of the TAP a post-protocol interview may be conducted to 
gather information to help understand and interpret TAP data.  
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If no further questions, hesitation, or refusal to sign the consent form were expressed, the 
TAP study began and the researcher turned on the video and tape recorders. The researcher 
double-checked that the recorders were working intermittently throughout the procedure, but 
also took hand-written notes during the session. 
7. Once the TAP session and post-protocol interviews were completed, the research thanked 
the participant and turned off the recorder. At this point, the student was given a $10 gift 
card and no further TAP study questions were discussed. 
Analytical Procedures 
 The English-language TAP files were transcribed by the researcher. The Arabic-language 
TAP files were transcribed by a professional translator and then reviewed in detail by the 
researcher.  After transcription, the raw data was divided into segments using boundary phrases 
or pauses as markers (Ericsson & Simon, 1992). Segments were coded as statements of 
interpretation, analysis, evaluation, inference, or self-regulation based on the descriptions 
outlined in the APA Delphi consensus definition of critical thinking (Facione, 1990). One 
additional category was included in the coding scheme; a category for personal opinion. 
Statements which were not directly related to critical thinking processes such as personal 
comments (‘I am thirsty’), non-task related comments (‘I need to talk to my mother after this’), 
evaluation of the protocol (‘It is tiring to talk so much’), silent periods, actions (for example, 
writing a note), etc., were not coded.(Someren et al., 1994).  
A process analysis of the content data was conducted after transcribing and coding 
participant verbalizations. English-language responses from each coding category and each stage 
of the protocol were compared looking for evidence of ways that participants consistently framed 
critical thinking questions; consistently used divergent, potentially culturally specific, patterns of 
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reasoning; and consistently provided similar types of responses or justifications to questions 
designed to identify critical thinking dispositions. Arabic-language responses were transcribed, 
coded, and compared using the same criteria. Once this process was completed in each language, 
a cross-linguistic comparison was made to see if participants used comparable reasoning 
processes and patterns of justification in answering equivalent questions in Arabic and English. 
Finally, the verbal data collected from each participant was compared to his or her overall score 
on the CCTT Level Z to evaluate whether the verbal data generally reflected the overall 
reasoning processes used throughout the test. In addition, overall scores from the English and 
Arabic versions of the CCTT Level Z were examined to see if the overall scores were 
comparable. 
The researcher used the process analysis data to identify thematic patterns in the critical 
thinking processes of Lebanese students. There are a number of patterns that the researcher 
anticipated would emerge. The researcher anticipated that questions would be consistently 
framed in moral, religious, or collectivist terms. The researcher predicted that for select items 
there might be a consistent pattern where the assumptions, inferences, and justification used by 
students would lead to the same wrong answer. The researcher expected to see evidence of 
shame-based and possibly collectivist/sectarian influences in statements of interpretation, 
analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation, and self-regulation. In general, the researcher 
expected negative responses to questions designed to measure dispositions of truth-seeking, 
open-mindedness, and maturity. The researcher hypothesized that differences would emerge in 
Arabic and English reasoning patterns. 
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Research Ethics 
 To ensure the protection of the participants in this study and to comply with university 
policy and procedure, the researcher submitted the appropriate IRB form to the George Fox 
University IRB committee for review and approval prior to data collection. In addition, the 
appropriate form or forms were submitted to the participating university and IRB approval was 
granted before collecting data. Because the project required the collection of recorded audio and 
video data, the researcher took steps to ensure that student confidentiality and anonymity was 
protected. Audio data was collected using a dedicated device. Video data was stored on an SD 
card dedicated exclusively to data collection for the research project. Audio and video data were 
transferred and stored on a password protected external hard drive that is being kept in a locked 
safe on the researcher’s premises for a period of three years after the completion of the study, at 
which time it will be securely deleted. The transcription of audio and video data has been stored 
on a password protected external hard drive that is being kept in a locked safe on the researcher’s 
premises for a period of three years after the completion of the study, at which time it will be 
securely deleted. Signed informed consent forms have been collected and are being stored for 5 
years in a locked safe on the researcher's premises for a period of five years after the completion 
of the study, at which time the forms will be shredded. Only demographic data relevant to the 
study was collected. Pseudonyms were assigned to participants and the transcription of verbal 
protocols. Scores from the CCTT Level Z and Sample Reasoning Mindset Test do not include 
student names or descriptions. After the collection of all data, all participant names were securely 
deleted. 
 Steps were taken to make sure that the project did not subject participants to physical, 
social, psychological, legal, or economic risks. The TAP protocol did not involve physical 
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activity. Social, legal, and economic risks were avoided through the steps outline above to 
protect the anonymity of the participants. Participants were assured that the researcher would not 
use, discuss, or benefit from the data gathered from the research without informed consent. Since 
the study required participants to intellectually and verbally perform on two critical thinking 
assessment instruments, it is possible that the TAP session could result in psychological stress. 
This psychological stress did not exceed anything greater than the stress typically induced by a 
classroom test of subject-matter knowledge. To help reduce potential stress, the researcher 
verbally explained the measures that would be taken to safeguard student anonymity. In addition, 
the researcher made it clear that individual participant performance would not be critiqued and 
that only cognitive problem-solving processes and reasoning mindset dispositions were under 
investigation. In addition, participants were informed that their participation was voluntary and 
that they were free to stop at any time without coercion to continue or risk of penalty. 
Participants were also allowed to complete the TAP at their own pace within the time limit of 
120 minutes and were offered a break with snacks and juice at the end of each test section. Given 
that TAPs require high-level cognitive functioning to be applied in the verbal protocol and on the 
test items, a quiet place with comfortable conditions was selected for the administration of the 
protocol to ensure that the participants were at ease.  
 The researcher is not aware of any potential conflicts-of-interests related to this project. 
Even so, the researcher does have an interest in seeking employment at a university in Lebanon 
in the future and may apply for a position at the participating university. The topics and 
questions for this study have arisen out of the researcher’s experience of living cross-culturally in 
Lebanon for 16 years. This experience includes his learning of Arabic, his marriage to a 
Lebanese national, six years of teaching cross-culturally, and his children’s participation in 
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Lebanese schools. As such, the researcher has a vested interest in the development of critical 
thinking in the Lebanese context.  
 A non-exclusive license agreement was entered into with The Critical Thinking Co. for 
the use of the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X and Z granting the researcher the right to 
(1) translate the material into Arabic, (2) administer 40 tests maximum via paper and pencil 
forma or via a test distribution and management system such as Qualtrics, (3) reformat, or use a 
portion thereof, or modify the Material for use in the Licensee’s version of the hardcopy or 
digital test, (4) publish the test results of the Material for use with a thesis and subsequent articles 
and/or papers. Permission to use the Arabic translation of the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests 
Level X and Z was obtained from the Debono Center for Teaching Thinking. The Sample 
Reasoning Mindset Test is a free application and Insight Assessment confirmed that no 
proprietary rights are required to use these questions as long as the application is cited (see 
Appendix B for stipulated agreements). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Results 
 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the reasoning processes used by bilingual 
Lebanese undergraduate students on assessments designed to evaluate critical thinking skills and 
dispositions. Using data collected through a Think-Aloud Protocol, I performed a qualitative 
analysis of participant verbal responses on 24 of 52 questions from the Cornell Critical Thinking 
Test (CCTT) designed to test skills in deduction, induction, observation and credibility of 
sources, assumption identification, and meaning. I examined verbal data from participant 
responses to 10 questions from the Sample Reasoning Mindset Test (SRMT) designed to assess 
dispositions toward inquisitiveness, open-mindedness, truth-seeking, critical thinking self-
confidence, and maturity. The three main objectives of the analyses were to identify specific 
reasoning processes employed by bilingual Lebanese undergraduate participants, evaluate the 
extent to which patterns in the reasoning processes could be described as culturally specific, and 
to analyze whether participants used comparable reasoning processes in answering equivalent 
questions in Arabic and English. Participant responses on the CCTT were coded using the 
consensus descriptions of the core critical thinking skills and sub-skills of interpretation, 
analysis, evaluation, inference, explanation, and self-regulation outlined in the APA Delphi 
Report (Facione, 1990a). Participant opinion was added to the coding key as an additional 
category. Responses on the SRMT were coded based on whether statements were framed in 
moral terms, pragmatic terms, logical terms, religious terms, social/relational terms, or 
ideological terms. Additional patterns that emerged in the verbal data were labelled and utilized 
as appropriate. 
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In addition to the qualitative analyses of verbal data, I ran a quantitative analysis of 
selection response choices on the CCTT and Likert-scale responses on the SRMT. Participant 
overall scores were compared to user norms presented in the CCTT manual. Independent t-tests 
were run to identify differences in test scores by the variables of language, gender, and grade 
level. One-way ANOVAs were run to examine differences in scores by ethnoreligious 
background and major. Independent t-tests and frequencies tables were used to compare Arabic 
and English responses on the section and item levels. Results from the quantitative operations 
were also used to help direct and enhance the qualitative analyses. All quantitative data were 
coded using the Critical Thinking and Culture Project Codebook in Appendix H. 
This chapter begins with a description of the TAP data collection process, the 
demographics of the participant population, and selected results from the quantitative analyses. It 
will then present the section and item-level verbal data collected from the CCTT and SRMT. In 
addition, it will trace patterns of reasoning that emerged in the verbal data. It will conclude with 
a comparison of quantitative and qualitative results that examined participant responses to 
equivalent item-level questions in Arabic and English.  
TAP Data collection process 
 Participants were recruited through the distribution of a mass email and an in-class 
presentation. The presentation was given to approximately 100 junior and senior students 
enrolled in six summer classes and one fall semester class. All together, 52 students completed 
the initial online recruitment survey. Twenty-four students who met the stipulated criteria agreed 
to participate in the study. These 24 students were divided into two similar groups based on 
gender, class, major, and ethnoreligious background. Group A was given the Arabic translation 
of the CCTT and SRMT and asked to think-aloud in Arabic (Lebanese dialect). Group B was 
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given the English version of the CCTT and SRMT and asked to think-aloud in English. Four of 
the 24 students agreed to participate in both an English and Arabic TAP session. A total of 28 
TAP interviews were conducted between July 19-September 22, 2017. Participants were allowed 
to complete the CCTT and SRMT at their own pace. Sessions were recorded on audio and video 
for subsequent transcription and examination. The researcher attempted to minimize the impact 
of moderator presence by sitting out of sight of the participants although he was available to 
clarify questions and directions when asked. Moderator input was included in the transcription 
documents.  
 In total, participants provided verbal data on 34 out of 62 questions from the CCTT and 
SRMT. During the TAP sessions, there were occasional verbal gaps in the reasoning processes 
where it was evident that a non-verbalized, intermediate thought had occurred (Someren et al., 
1994). The difficulty of certain items appeared to limit the verbal processes of select participants. 
In addition, it was evident that it was easier for some participants to verbalize their thoughts than 
others (Ericsson & Simon, 1998). Given the length of the session, the number and difficulty level 
of questions, and that TAPs require high-level cognitive functioning to be applied in the verbal 
protocol, the decision was made to not conduct an extended post-protocol interview. After each 
session, participants were asked to give their general impressions of the experience and to share 
which section they found most difficult. The supplemental information collected in the post-
protocol interviews was not useful for interpreting and clarifying the verbal data. 
 After the first TAP Arabic session, the wording of question 6 was changed from the 
Sample Reasoning Mindset Test. Participant one’s response made it clear that the question did 
not communicated the same meaning as its English equivalent. After the third Arabic TAP 
session, I discovered an error in the translation of question 4 from the SRMT. As stated in 
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chapter 3, I did not do a back-translation of the SRMT based on Insight’s claim that all of its 
products have been properly evaluated. As a result, participants 3, 4, and 5 did not have an 
accurate written translation of question 4. I clarified the meaning of question 4 for participants 4 
and 5 upon their request.  
 The content of the two TAP practice problems taken from Leighton (2017) were 
problematic. The first question required students to name 10 items that they would find in a 
supermarket. A number of participants found this task difficult and commented that they do not 
regularly visit the supermarket. The second question asked students to name the sixth letter after 
the letter C in English and the sixth letter after the letter ت in Arabic. Participants did not have 
difficulty with the English version of this question but only one of the 12 Arabic session 
participants was able to recite the order of the Arabic alphabet. A few of the participants 
commented that they do not learn the order of the Arabic alphabet as part of their education. 
Although the content of the practice questions was not contextually appropriate, the purpose of 
the practice problems, to give participants the opportunity to practice verbally articulating their 
thinking processes, was achieved.  
Participant Demographics 
 The aim in this study was to recruit a purposive sample of upper-level undergraduate 
students that represent the broader Lebanese demographics. Of the 24 total participants, 58% 
were seniors and 42% were juniors. Seventy-one percent of the participants were female and 
29% were male. Ethnoreligious backgrounds were represented as follows: 38% from a Shiite 
background, 33% from a Sunni background, 16% from a Christian background (Orthodox, 
Catholic, Maronite), and 13% from a Druze background. Students from eight different majors 
participated in the study. Twenty-one of the 24 participants (87.5%) received all of their 
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education in Lebanon with the remaining three (12.5%) receiving at least their grade 9-12 
education in Lebanon. In comparison to country-wide demographics, the sample had a higher 
female to male ratio (“Lebanon Population 2018” n.d.), a lower percentage of Christian 
background participants and a higher percentage of Muslim background participants (Salloukh, 
et al., 2015). In spite of these discrepancies, the participant demographics can be said to 
generally reflect the diversity of Lebanon’s population. Table 3 provides a summary of the 
demographic characteristics of participants. 
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Table 3    
Demographic Characteristics of Participants (N=24) 
Demographic characteristic Count of sample Percent of sample 
Grade   
 Seniors 14 58 
 Juniors 10 42 
Gender   
 Females 17 71 
 Males 7 29 
Ethnoreligious Background   
 Sunni 8 33 
 Shiite 9 38 
 Druze 3 13 
 Armenian Orthodox 1 4 
 Greek Orthodox 1 4 
 Armenian Catholic 1 4 
 Maronite 1 4 
Major   
 Psychology 4 17 
 Bus Admin 7 29 
 Biology 2 8 
 Education 5 21 
 Social Work 2 8 
 Nutrition Science 2 8 
 English Language 1 4 
 Computer Science 1 4 
Education in Lebanon    
 All education in Lebanon 21 88 
 Grades 9-12 in Lebanon 2 8 
 Grades 2-3, 5-12 in Lebanon 1 4 
Previously taken a CT Class   
 Yes 9 38 
 No 15 63 
Total  24 100 
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Table 4 shows the distribution of participants in the Arabic-language procedural group A. 
Table 4    
Demographic Characteristics of Procedural Group A: TAP Arabic (N=12) 
Demographic characteristic Count of sample Percent of sample 
Grade   
 Seniors 6 50 
 Juniors 6 50 
Gender   
 Females 9 75 
 Males 3 25 
Ethnoreligious Background   
 Sunni    4 33 
 Shiite    5 42 
 Druze    2 17 
 Armenian Orthodox    1 8 
Major   
 Psychology 3 25 
 Bus Admin 3 25 
 Biology 2 17 
 Education 2 17 
 Social Work 1 8 
 Nutrition Science 1 8 
Education in Lebanon    
 All education in Lebanon 11 92 
 Grades 9-12 in Lebanon 1 8 
Previously taken a CT Class   
 Yes 5 42 
 No 7 58 
Total  12 100 
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Table 5 shows the distribution of participants in the English-language procedural group B. 
Table 5    
Demographic Characteristics of Procedural Group B: TAP English (N=12) 
Demographic characteristic Count of sample Percent of sample 
Grade   
 Seniors 8 67 
 Juniors 4 33 
Gender   
 Females 8 67 
 Males 4 33 
Ethnoreligious Background   
 Sunni 4 33 
 Shiite 4 33 
 Druze 1 8 
 Greek Orthodox  1 8 
 Armenian Catholic  1 8 
 Maronite 1 8 
Major   
 Psychology 1 8 
 Bus Admin 4 33 
 Education 3 25 
 Social Work 1 8 
 Nutrition Science  1 8 
 English Language  1 8 
 Computer Science 1 8 
Education in Lebanon    
 All education in Lebanon 10 83 
 Grades 9-12 in Lebanon 1 8 
 Grades 2-3 , 5-12 in Lebanon  
 
1 8 
Previously taken a CT Class   
 Yes 4 33 
 No 8 67 
Total  12 100 
 
Quantitative Analysis 
 The participant sample size was not large enough to produce significant quantitative 
results. Even so, a series of quantitative operations were run for exploratory purposes. The 
quantitative analyses were used to evaluate participants scores against user norms provided in the 
CCTT manual; to examine the relationships between select variables and participant scores; and 
to help direct the qualitative analysis. Participant responses were coded according to variables of 
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gender, ethnoreligious background, grade level, major, test language, overall and test specific 
times, TAP and non-TAP questions, correct or incorrect answers, and question specific answers 
(see Appendix H). Analysis of the verbal data and video recording demonstrated that one 
participant (E23) mismarked her answer sheet in CCTT section 2 resulting in a five-point 
difference between her actual score and the reported score in the quantitative data. Quantitative 
operations were not rerun since the difference in scores did not significantly impact results. 
 The mean score on the CCTT using Rights-Only scoring was 21.96 (SD = 3.14). The 
mean score using the Rights-Minus One-Half Wrongs scoring was 6.94 (SD = 4.76). Participant 
scores were lower than those of similarly leveled students provided in the CCTT Manual as seen 
in Table 6.   
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Table 6 
CCTT Comparative Population User Norms  
Group 
Rights Only Scoring 
N Mean Std. Dev. 
Participant Scores 
Z3 
Z4 
Z7 
Z13 
Z26 
Z33 
24 
128 
52 
224 
100 
153 
24 
 
22.0 
30.3 
29.8 
29.4 
28.5 
27.1 
22.6 
3.1 
5.0 
5.3 
5.1 
5.0 
4.8 
4.9 
Group 
Rights Minus One Half Wrong Scoring 
N Mean Std. Dev. 
Participant Scores 
Z2 
Z5 
Z6 
 
24 
261 
234 
231 
6.94 
17.0 
19.5 
20.4 
4.8 
7.0 
6.9 
6.2 
Z2:  Students at community colleges in a Pacific Cost state (N=261) 
Z3:  Undergraduates at a Midwestern state university (N = 128) 
Z4:  Undergraduate elementary education majors in a philosophy of education course at a  
  New England college (N = 52) 
Z5:  Undergraduate at a Pacific Coast state university (N=234) 
Z6:  Undergraduates at another Pacific Coast state university (N=231) 
Z7:  Undergraduate students in a junior-level educational psychology at a Midwestern state 
university (N = 224) 
Z13: Undergraduates in a small state university in upstate New York (N = 100) 
Z26: Upper-division students in sections of a course in educational media and technology at a 
Southern mid-size university (N  =63), (Luckett, R., 1991) 
Z33: Undergraduates in an interdisciplinary course on ethical reflection focused on ethical issues 
in psychology (N = 24), (Allegrette & Frederick, 1995). 
 
 A series of independent t-tests were run to determine if there were differences in CCTT 
scores based on gender, grade level, and test language. The results showed no statistical 
differences in the CCTT test scores of males (22.14 ± 2.79) and females (21.75 ± 3.36); t(21) = 
0.270, p = 0.789; juniors (21.7 ± 2.79) and seniors (22 ± 3.49); t(21) = -0.222, p = 0.826, and 
Arabic-language (22 ± 2.89) and English-language (21.72 ± 3.52); t(21) = 0.204, p = 0.841 
participants. 
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Table 7 
T-Test for Equality of Means Results for CCTT Scores by Multiple Variables 
Variables  F Sig. t df Sig 2 MD Std. ED 95% CI 
         Lower Upper 
Gender EVA 0.49 0.49 0.27 21.0 0.79 0.39 1.45 -2.63 3.41 
 EVNA   0.29 13.8 0.78 0.39 1.35 -2.51 3.29 
           
Grade Level EVA 0.63 0.44 -0.22 21.0 0.83 -0.30 1.35 -3.11 2.51 
 EVNA 0.63 0.44 -0.22 21.0 0.83 -0.30 1.35 -3.11 2.51 
           
Language EVA 0.94 0.34 0.20 21.0 0.84 0.27 1.34 -2.51 3.06 
 EVNA    19.4 0.84 0.27 1.35 -2.55 3.10 
Note: EVA = Equal variance assumed; EVNA = Equal variance not assumed;  
Sig 2 = Sig (2-tailed); MD = Mean Difference; Std. ED = Std. Error Diff;  
CI = Confidence Interval 
 
A series of one-way ANOVA operations examined possible correlations between CCTT 
scores and specific and general ethnoreligious backgrounds as well as CCTT scores and major. 
There were no statistically significant differences between CCTT scores and specific 
ethnoreligious backgrounds (F(5,17) = 1.797, p = 0.167), CCTT scores and general 
ethnoreligious backgrounds (F(2,20) = 2.771, p = 0.087), and CCTT scores and major (F(7,15) = 
1.018, p = 0.457). 
Table 8 
ANOVA Results for CCTT Scores by Specific and General Ethnoreligious Backgrounds and 
Majors 
Variables CCTT Total Sum of Sq df Mean Sq F Sig. 
Specific 
Ethnoreligious 
Backgrounds 
Between 74.886 5 14.977 1.797 0.167 
Within 141.722 17 8.337     
Total 216.609 22       
       
General 
Ethnoreligious 
Backgrounds 
Between 47.001 2 23.500 2.771 0.087 
Within 169.608 20 8.480   
Total 216.609 22    
       
Majors Between 69.785 7 9.969 1.018 0.457 
Within 146.824 15 9.788   
Total 216.609 22    
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Research Question 1 
 The CCTT is divided into seven sections. Each section is designed to measure a test-
taker’s ability in a particular critical thinking skill or combination of skills. Participants in this 
study were asked to verbally express their thinking processes using a Think-aloud Protocol on 24 
out of 52 CCTT questions. The verbal data were collected and organized to address the following 
research question. 
1. What reasoning processes do bilingual Lebanese undergraduate students utilize to frame, 
interpret, and answer critical thinking questions from the Cornell Critical Thinking Test 
Level Z designed to measure skills of deduction, induction, observation and credibility of 
sources, assumption identification, and meaning? 
Section 1: Deduction 
 CCTT section 1 is designed to measure deductive skills, specifically, “the importance of 
being able to reason neutrally with suggestive content” and the ability to analyze the 
relationships between statements (Millman et al., 2005, p.45). Section 1 is divided into parts A 
and B. Questions are presented in the context of a debate between two men. Section 1A involves 
a debate about voting by eighteen-year-olds. Section 1B is a debate on immigration. Each item 
presents a set of statements and an underlined conclusion. The test-taker is instructed to choose 
whether the conclusion follows necessarily from the statements given, contradicts the statements 
given, or neither follows necessarily nor contradicts the statements given. The instructions also 
state that the test-taker should not be concerned with whether or not the conclusions or 
statements are true and to consider each item independent of the others. Participants were asked 
to verbally process 5 out of 10 questions. Participants received their second highest aggregate 
section level score in section 1 with a mean score of 5.09/10 (SD = 1.35).  
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 Two of the 24 participants (E15, E18) provided either limited or no verbal processing. 
E15 immediately answered each question after reading the question. E18 struggled with 
understanding the questions. Her lack of verbal processing could have been related to the 
difficulty level of the task (Leighton, 2017).  
Six of the 22 participants (E1, A4, A7, E12, E19, A21) who provided verbal data 
demonstrated the ability to reason neutrally and use analytical reasoning to identify the 
relationship between the statements and the conclusion. For example, E1 stated, “Ok, that's (a) 
contradiction because at first he agreed and then the conclusion says that they’re a bad group.” 
E1, A7, E12, and A21 correctly answered all five TAP questions. E1, A7, and E12 scored 7/10 
on the overall section. A4 misread question 1 and E19 misunderstood question 2. A4, E19, and 
A21 scored 6/10 on the section. All 6 participants missed non-TAP question 4. Five out of 6 
missed non-TAP question 10 
Twelve of the 22 participants (E2, A3, A5, E6, A8, E9, A11, E13, A14, A17, E23, A25) 
who provided verbal data evaluated each question based on his or her personal opinion of the 
conclusion and/or overall argument. For example, the majority of the verbal processing of E2 
was centered on explaining his point of view regarding the underlined conclusions. E9 equated 
“necessarily follows” with “I agree” and “contradicts” with “I disagree.” She never selected 
option C, neither follows nor contradicts. E23 stated, “I contradict this” because the statements 
did not make sense to her. She also chose C on question 1 because she “didn’t know if it’s true or 
not.” Two of these 12 participants (A5, A25) scored 7/10 on the selection-response choices 
although they did not use analytical skills to reason neutrally or deduce the relationships between 
statements and conclusions. For example, question 1 states   
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Mr. Wilstings says that eighteen-year-olds haven’t faced the problems of the world, 
 and that anyone who hasn’t faced these problems should not be able to vote. What he 
 says is correct, but eighteen-year-olds still should be able to vote. They’re mature  human 
beings, aren’t they? 
A5 responded, “No one 18 or even 21 has faced all the world’s problems.” She disagreed with 
the overall argument and chose B, the conclusion contradicts the statements given, based on her 
person opinion. Similarly, although A25 presented limited verbal processing, she stated that the 
basis of her choices on questions 3 and 7 was that she agreed with the argument. Although these 
lines of reasoning were not related to the relationship between statements or reasoning neutrally, 
they led participants to choose the correct answers.  
 Three of the 22 participants (E10, A16, E22) produced a mixture of evaluative reasoning 
based on opinion and analytic analysis of the relationship between statements. For example, E10 
responded to the questions in section 1A about voting by evaluating the statements against his 
opinion, but on the questions in 1B about immigration, he analyzed the relationship between the 
statements and the conclusion. A16 was able to analyze the relationship of statements when she 
was convinced that the overall argument was relevant. For example, on question 7 she concluded 
that the 19th century has nothing to do with whether a country should open its door to immigrants 
in the present and, therefore, she determined that the conclusion neither follows necessarily nor 
contradicts. She failed to analyze the relationship between statements because she determined 
that the overall argument was irrelevant. E22 responded to questions 1,2,3, and 6 based on 
whether she agreed or disagreed with the idea, but on question 7, she accurately analyzed the 
relationships between statements even though she disagreed with the conclusion.  
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 One of the 22 participants (A20) answered the questions based on her analysis of how the 
different speakers’ opinions were related to each other and the subject matter. For example, on 
question 1 she determined that Mr. Khoury both agrees and disagrees with Mr. Kanaan. As a 
result, she chose option C, the conclusion neither follows necessarily, nor contradicts, meaning 
Mr. Kanaan neither agrees, nor disagrees. On question 2, she determined that Mr. Khoury 
disagrees with Mr. Kanaan’s argument and on question 3, Mr. Khoury agrees with Mr. Kanaan’s 
argument. On question 6 she determined that although Mr. Khoury is generally in opposition to 
Mr. Kanaan, that he does not contradict Mr. Kanaan because he agrees on some areas and 
disagrees on others. On question 7, she stated that the conclusion definitely follows because Mr. 
Kannan is the originator of the idea. Table 9 presents the results of the analysis of the verbal data 
in section 1.  
Table 9  
Analyses of TAP Processes in CCTT Section 1: Deduction 
Description of Participant Responses Participants 
Demonstrated use of good analytic 
 reasoning 
E1*, A4, A7*, E12*, E19, A21 
Evaluative response based on personal 
 opinion 
E2**, A3, A5*, E6, A8**, E9, A11, E13, A14, 
A17, E23, A25* 
Mixture of analytic reasoning and 
 evaluative responses based on personal 
 opinion 
E10*, A16, E22 
Analysis based on perception of speakers’ 
 opinions 
A20** 
No or limited verbal processing E15, E18 
*Scored at least 7/10 
**Scored a maximum of 3/10 
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Section 2: Meaning & Fallacies 
 In section 2, participants were asked to verbally process 5 out of 11 questions. Section 2 
is designed to assess the verbal and linguistic aspects of argument, including fallacy. Participants 
received their lowest aggregate section level score on section 2 with a mean score of 2.96/11. 
The section presents a series of verbal exchanges between two individuals over the issue of the 
chlorination of water supplies. The test-taker is instructed to pick the one best reason why the 
thinking is faulty in each item and is provided three possible choices. The instructions also 
indicate that the test-taker need not know anything about the chlorination of water supplies to 
correctly answer each question.  
There were three types of answers in section 2. Type 1 answers involve equivocation, the 
use of a word in more than one way. Examples of type 1 answer choices are “Dobert is using a 
word in two ways” or, “Algan is not using ‘know’ in its ordinary sense, yet he is expecting the 
effect that follows for its being used in the ordinary sense.” Type 2 answers involve an error in 
thinking. Examples of type 2 answer choices are, “Dobert is mistakenly assuming that there are 
only two alternatives,” or, “There is a serious mistake in the thinking in this part.” Type 3 
answers involve the misuse of emotional language or evidence to support an argument. Examples 
of type 3 answer choices are, “Dobert is using emotional language that doesn’t help to make his 
argument reasonable,” or, “Dobert, in using secret evidence, is not being fair, since this evidence 
is not available to everyone for inspection.” Of the three possible choices on each question, one 
answer is a type 1 response, one answer is a type 2 response, and one answer is a type 3 
response. Type 1 is the correct choice on 7 of 11 questions. Type 2 is the correct choice on 3 of 
11 questions. Type 3 is the correct choice on 1 of 11 questions.  
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  127 
TAP Reasoning Responses 
 I divided the verbal reasoning responses used in section 2 into four categories. Two 
participants (A8, A17) did not provide verbal data that was informative. Seven participants (E1, 
A3, A5, E9, A11, A14, E23) evaluated and verbally responded to only one of the three answer 
choices on at least 4 out of 5 TAP questions. Six participants (E6, E10, A16, E19, A20, A21) 
considered more than one option and arrived at their answer through the process of elimination 
on at least 4 out of 5 questions. Nine participants (E2, A4, A7, E12, E13, E15, E18, E22, A25) 
used a mixture of either evaluating only one answer or using the process of elimination (a 3/2 
split).  
Table 10  
Categories of Responses on TAP questions in CCTT Section 2: Meaning & Fallacies 
Description of Participant Responses Participants 
Evaluated and responded to only one answer 
 on at least 4 out of 5 TAP questions 
E1*, A3*, A5*, E9*, A11*, A14*, E23 
Considered more than one option and arrived 
 at their answer through the process of 
 elimination on at least 4 out of 5  questions. 
E6*, E10*, A16*, E19*, A20*, A21 
Used a mixture of evaluating either only one 
 answer or using the  
E2*, A4*, A7*, E12*, E13, E15*, E18**, E22*, 
A25 
 
Did not provide meaningful verbal data A8*, A17* 
 
Equivocation 
The combination of results from selection responses and verbal data indicated that 22 out 
of 24 participants did not understand the concept of equivocation, type 1 answers. Verbal data 
from 14 participants (E1 A4, E6, E9, E10, A11, E12, E13, E15, A14, A16, E19, A20, E22) 
demonstrated a misunderstanding of the use of the same word differently. For example, E1 and 
E6 both asked themselves, “What do they mean by a word in two ways?” and never considered a 
type 1 answer. On question 15, E6 said, “I’m guessing they’re referring to the word medication 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  128 
and they are not exactly using it differently, they simply interpret it differently.” In reference to 
the answer “Algan is using the same word in two ways,” E19 stated, “I don’t get what this 
statement means, like it’s used several times and it’s not being processed in my mind.” Two 
participants (A7, A21) produced selection patterns that indicate a general misunderstanding of 
equivocation, although they identified the correct answer on question 15. Three participants (A8, 
A17, A25) provided limited or no verbal processing although their patterns of answers indicate a 
misunderstanding or lack of consideration of type 1 choices. Three participants (E2, A3, A5) 
never verbally assessed or considered the choices related to using a word in two ways. Two 
participants (E18, E23) asked the moderator to explain the meaning of using a word in two ways 
and then correctly chose multiple type 1 answers.  
Table 11  
Analysis of Verbal Responses on Section 2 Questions involving Equivocation 
Description of Participant Response Participants 
Did not understand the concept of 
 equivocation, a word being used in two 
 ways 
A4*, E6*, E10*, A11*, A14*, A16*, E19*, 
A20*, E22* 
Misunderstood or ignored the concept of 
 equivocation or arrived at the correct 
 answer through the process of elimination 
E1*, A7*, E9*, E12*, E13, E15*, A21 
Limited or no verbal processing. Patterns of 
 answers indicated a misunderstanding or 
 lack of consideration of type 1 choices 
A8*, A17*, A25 
Did not verbally assessed or considered type 1 
 answers related to using a word in two 
 ways 
E2*, A3*, A5* 
 
Asked the moderator to explain the meaning 
 of using a word in two ways and then 
 correctly chose multiple type 1 answers 
E18**, E23 
*Scored a maximum of 2/7 
**Scored 5/7 
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In total, 19 out of 24 participants scored a total of 0, 1, or 2 answers correct on the 7 
questions with correct type 1 answer. Four participants score 3 out of 7 correct and only 
participant (18E) answered 5 out of 7 type 1 questions correctly. Table 12 shows the mean scores 
of correct answers on questions with correct type 1 answers. 
Table 12 
Means Scores of Correct Answers on Type 1 Equivocation Questions 
Section 2: Type 1 Answers N Mean Correct Std. Dev. Variance 
Question 12* 
Question 13* 
Question 15* 
Question 16 
Question 18 
Question 19 
Question 21 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
.17 
.17 
.42 
.04 
.17 
.29 
.17 
.381 
.381 
.504 
.204 
.381 
.464 
.381 
.145 
.145 
.254 
.042 
.145 
.216 
.145 
*TAP questions 
Item level responses on TAP questions 12 and 13  
On question 12, the speaker, Dobert, uses the term health in two different ways. Five 
participants (A16, E18, A21, E23, A25) selected the correct answer C. The verbal data indicated 
that only 1 of the 5 participants (E23) who selected C chose the answer based on an accurate 
understanding of a word being used in two ways. A16, E18, and A25 arrived at the answer by the 
process of elimination. For example, E18 stated “he’s not thinking wrong, so it’s not B, and it’s 
not emotional language, it’s more scientific, so it’s not…A.” A21 misunderstood the meaning of 
the type 1 choice and stated “it is C because he is trying to compare healthy living with how it 
should be.”  
On question 13, the speaker, Algan, uses the term know in two ways. Five participants 
A3, E12, E13, E18, E23) selected the correct answer A. The verbal data indicated that only 1 of 
the 5 participants (E23) who selected A chose the answer based on an accurate understanding of 
equivocation. Three participants (A3, E18, E23) selected A using the criteria that neither speaker 
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can know what they are claiming; Algan can’t know that an error was made in the investigation 
and Dobert can’t know that the water is pure. For example, A3 said, “First thing, Algan 
definitely can’t know if an error was made in the test and Dobert also can’t know for sure that 
the water is pure if he doesn’t have proof and evidence.” P18 expressed, “Algan can’t know that 
an error was made in the investigation but neither can Dobert know that…it’s…pure water.” E23 
stated, “You never know if the water is pure and the other way is true, so (it also) goes for the 
investigation.” Two participants (E12, E13) used the process of elimination to arrive at the 
correct conclusion. They concluded that options B and C were accurate statements and therefore 
A was inaccurate. For example, E13 expressed, “Algan, yes, can’t know there is an error made in 
this investigation and the secret evidence is not being available to everyone for inspection…so 
question A is right.” 
Item level responses on TAP question 15 
 Twelve participants (E1, A5, A7, E9, E12, E13, A14, E15, A17, E18, A21, E23) 
uncharacteristically selected the type 1 answer on question 15. Three participants (A17, E18, 
E23) provided no relevant verbal data.  
Five of the 9 participants (E1, E9, E12, E13, E15) who provided verbal data agreed with 
Dobert’s argument which eliminated options A and B and left C as the only possible choice. For 
example, E9 stated, “I think it is medication because Algan is trying to kill the germs, like 
they’re just…fighting each other.” E13 expressed, “Chlorinating the water or medicating the 
water would affect us…his way of thinking is reasonable.” Two participants (A5, A14) 
misunderstood the meaning of the type 1 choice. A5 chose the type 1 selection because “what is 
different is what their plan is (to kill germs).” A14 stated, “Algan is trying to have healthier 
water and Dobert is getting into a lot of details so he is tying things together. Each one is 
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speaking his perspective and each one is thinking of something different.” Only A21 selected the 
correct choice for the right reasons stating, “It’s C because both of them are using the same word 
in different ways.” 
Table 13  
Analysis of Verbal Responses on TAP Question 11 
Description of Participant Response Participants 
Agreed with Dobert’s argument and therefore 
 automatically eliminated options A and B 
E1, E9, E12, E13, E15 
Misunderstood the meaning of C A5, A14 
Provided no relevant verbal data A17, E18, E23 
Selected C for the right reasons A21 
 
Similar responses on TAP questions 11 and 14 
 Questions 11 and 14 are framed similarly but have different correct answers. On both 
questions, the speakers state that there are two alternatives and use what might be considered 
emotionally charged language such as crackpots and fool on question 11 and bad-smelling and 
disease-ridden, on question 14. The answer options on both questions are either “is mistakenly 
assuming or hasn’t shown that there are two alternatives,” “is using a word in two ways,” or “is 
using emotional language that doesn’t help to make the argument reasonable.” On question 11, 
the correct choice is “using emotional language that doesn’t help to make the argument 
reasonable.” On question 14 it is “hasn’t show that there are two alternatives.”  
 Twelve of out 24 participants (E1, E2, A4, A5, E10, A11, E12, E13, A14, A17, A20, 
A25) provided the same answer on both questions, either considering both sets of statements to 
mistakenly assume two alternatives (E1, E2, A5, A11, A14, A20), to misuse emotional language 
(A4, E12, E13, A17), or to use a word in two ways (E10, A25). Five participants (A3, E6, A8, 
E18, E23) flipped the correct answers and selected “mistakenly assumes two alternatives” when 
the correct answer was “using emotional language” and “using emotional language” when the 
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correct answer was “mistakenly assumes two alternatives.” Five participants (E9, E15, A16, E19, 
A21) chose the correct answer, “using emotional language” on question 11, and the wrong 
answer, “using the same word in two ways” on question 14. One participant (E22) chose 
“mistakenly assuming two alternatives” on question 11 and “using the same word in two ways” 
on question 14. Only one participant (A7) chose the correct answer on both questions. Five of the 
6 participants (E1, E2, A5, A11, A14) who selected “mistakenly assumes two alternatives” only 
verbally considered one option on both questions.  
Table 14  
Same Types of Answers on TAP Questions 11 and 14 
Description of Selection Participants 
Selected “mistakenly assumes two 
 alternatives” on both questions 
E1, E2, A5, A11, A14, A20 
Selected “is using emotional language that 
 doesn’t help to make his argument 
 reasonable” on both questions 
A4, E12, E13, A17 
Selected “is using a word in two ways” on 
 both questions 
E10, A25 
Flipped the correct answers and chose 
 “mistakenly assumes two alternatives” on 
 #11 and “uses emotional language” on #14  
A3, E6, A8, E18, E23 
Chose “uses emotional language” on question 
 11 and “uses the same word in two ways” 
 on #14. 
E9, E15, A16, E19, A21 
Chose “mistakenly assumes two alternatives” 
 on #11 and “uses the same word in two 
 ways” on #14 
E22 
Selected the correct answers on #11 and #14 A7 
 
Item level responses on TAP question 11  
On question 11, seven participants of the 24 participants (A8, A11, A14, E15, A16, A17, 
E18) did not provide meaningful verbal data. 
Eight of the 17 participants (E1, E2, A3, A5, E6, A20, E22, E23) who provided verbal 
data chose the incorrect answer A, “Dobert is mistakenly assuming two alternatives.” Six 
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participants (E1, E2, A3, A5, E6, E23) selected A using the criteria that there are other possible 
ways to clean water. For example, E1 stated, “Since he only thought of two options, he didn’t 
think of any other alternatives.” E2 said, “I think Dobert is…mistakenly assuming, there are 
other ways to make or clean (water).” A3 expressed, “I don’t think Dobert knows a lot about this 
issue.” A5 stated, “There should be more than two options because both options are wrong.” E6 
expressed, “There might be other alternatives to whatever reason he wants to chlorinate the water 
for which I’m guessing is probably hygienic reasons.” E23 said, “There is never only two 
alternatives.” Two of the 8 participants (A20, E22) arrived at their choice through the process of 
elimination. A20 stated, “He did not use a word in two ways if he explained the idea.” E22 
concluded, “It’s not about emotional language.” 
Two of the 17 participants (E10, A25) who provided verbal data selected the incorrect 
option B, Dobert uses a word in two ways. Both participants arrived at their answer through the 
process of elimination. Neither participant considered fool or crackpot emotional language. For 
example, E10 stated, “He didn’t mention two alternatives. Ah, yea he did, he said that we should 
and we shouldn’t. Dobert used crackpots, I don’t think that’s just emotional way to put it, so I’m 
gonna go with B.” 
Seven of the 17 participants (A4, A7, E9, E12, E13, E19, A21) who provided verbal data 
chose the correct answer C, “Dobert is using emotional language that doesn’t help to make his 
argument reasonable.” Five of the 7 participants (A7, E12, E13, E19, A21) arrived at their choice 
through the process of elimination. For example, A7 stated, “There is no choice other than that 
he is saying crackpots and fool.” E12 said, “They have two ways, either to chlorinate or not, so 
its C.” E13 stated, “Yes there are only two alternatives, it is to chlorinate the water or not 
chlorinating it…so the answer is C.” E19 said, “Is mistakenly assuming that there are only two 
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alternatives, no he’s not…I think he is kind of being dramatic.” Two of the 7 participants (A4, 
E9) only considered the correct option. A4 stated, “Because he uses very emotional 
language…this doesn’t allow him to think in a logical way.” E9 expressed, “They did not 
convince me in his reasons honestly, I think yes he’s using emotional language.” 
Table 15  
Reasons for Answer Selections on TAP Question 11 
Description of TAP Process Participants 
Used the criteria that there are other possible 
 ways to clean water to select A 
E1, E2, A3, A5, E6, E23 
Arrived at A through the process of 
 elimination 
A20, E22 
Arrived at B through the process of 
 elimination 
E10, A25 
Arrived at C through the process of 
 elimination 
A7, E12, E13, E19, A21 
Only considered correct option C A4, E9 
Did not provide relevant verbal data A8, A11, A14, E15, A16, A17, E18 
 
Item level responses on TAP question 14 
On question 14, four of the 24 participants (A8, A17, E18, A25) did not provide 
meaningful verbal data.  
Thirteen of the 20 participants (A3, A4, E6, E9, E10, E12, E13, E15, A16, E19, A21, 
E22, E23) who provided verbal data selected the incorrect answers B or C. Ten of the 13 
participants (A4, E6, E10, E13, E15, A16, E19, A21, E22, E23) who provided verbal data and 
selected B or C expressed that they understood the correct answer A, “hasn’t shown that there 
are only two alternatives,” to mean hasn’t presented two alternatives. For example, A4 
commented, “He said that there are two alternatives.” E6 stated, “I guess he is using emotional 
language…aside from stating only two alternatives which he did really show actually.” E10 
expressed, “He didn’t mention two alternatives, ah, yea he did, he said that we should and we 
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shouldn’t.” E13 said, “Algan showed that there are only two alternatives…but there are other 
alternatives.” E15 stated, “Allan hasn’t shown there are…actually he has shown.” E19 expressed, 
“Algan hasn’t shown that there are only two alternatives, yes he did.” A21 said, “Actually he has 
shown there are two alternatives.” P22 expressed, “Actually he shows that there are only two 
alternatives…it’s obvious that he only have these two alternatives in mind and of course they’re 
gonna be more other solutions.” 
Three of the 13 participants (A3, E9, E12) who provided verbal data only considered 
option B, “Algan is using emotional language that doesn’t help to make the argument 
reasonable.” For example, A3 stated, “I think Algan is using a bit of emotional language because 
when he talks about disease-ridden…this is something that is sensitive to the world.” E9 said, 
“obviously no one wants to drink bad-smelling or diseased water.” 
Seven of the 20 participants (E1, E2, A5, A7, A11, A14 A20) who provided verbal data 
chose the correct answer A, “Algan hasn’t shown that there are only two alternatives.” One of 
the 7 participants (A7) selected the correct answer on both questions 11 and 14. Six of the 7 
participants (E1, E2, A5, A11, A14 A20) selected the same incorrect answer on question 11. The 
verbal data indicated similar reasons for the choice of A on question 14 as the choice of A on 
question 11, other possible ways to clean water. For example, E1 stated, “I guess because maybe 
there are other options than chlorination or just leaving the water as it is so he can’t just think 
that way.” E2 said, “There are other ways to like clean water such as having a plant.” A5 
expressed, “Same thing, Algan is giving two options which are very limited.” A14 said, “These 
are definitely not the only two possible answers. Adding chlorine doesn’t make water 
clean…more chlorine is harmful to people.”  
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Table 16  
Verbal Reasons for Answer Selections on TAP Question 14 
Description of TAP Process Participants 
Understood the statement “hasn’t shown that 
 there are only two alternatives” to mean hasn’t 
 presented two alternatives 
A4, E6, E10, E13, E15, A16, E19, A21, 
E22, E23 
Only verbally considered B, uses emotional 
 language 
A3, E9, E12 
Used the criteria that there are other possible 
 ways to clean water to select A 
E1, E2, A5, A11, A14 A20 
Selected the correct answer on questions 11 and 14 A7 
Did not provide relevant verbal data A8, A17, E18, A25 
 
Section 3: Observation & Credibility of Sources 
In sections 3, 4, and 5 of the CCTT, test-takers are required to read about an experiment 
that tested what happens to ducklings that eat cabbage worms. They are provided a description of 
the experiment, a chart of the data collected, and the conclusion that cabbage worms are 
poisonous to ducklings. The information from this experiment serves as the basis for how test-
takers are supposed to respond to the questions in these three sections. 
Section 3 is designed to assess skills in observation and judgments about credibility. On 
each question, the test-taker reads two underlined statements related to the ducklings experiment 
with information in parentheses after each statement. The test-taker is asked to use the 
information provided and the information in parentheses to determine which statement is more 
believable or to select that neither statement is more believable than the other. Participants 
received their second lowest aggregate section level score on section 3 with a mean score of 
1.25/4 (SD = .94). Six participants (A7, E13, A17, E18, A21, A25) missed all 4 questions. Nine 
participants (E1, E2, E6, A8, E9, A11, E19, E22, E23) scored 1 out of 4 correct. Eight 
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participants (A3, A5, E10, E12, A14, E15, A16, A20) scored 2 out of 4 correct. One participant 
(A4) scored 3 out of 4 correct. 
Table 17 
Participant Scores on CCTT Section 3: Observation & Credibility of Sources 
Participants Score 
A7, E13, A17, E18, A21, A25 
E1, E2, E6, A8, E9, A11, E19, E22, E23 
A3, A5, E10, E12, A14, E15, A16, A20 
A4 
0/4 
1/4 
2/4 
3/4 
 
Table 18 
Means Scores of Correct Answers in Section 3: Observation & Credibility of Sources 
Section 3 Questions N Mean Correct Std. Dev. Variance 
Question 22* 
Question 23* 
Question 24 
Question 25 
24 
24 
24 
24 
.08 
.58 
.42 
.17 
.282 
.504 
.504 
.381 
.080 
.254 
.254 
.145 
*TAP questions 
Similar responses on TAP questions 22 and 23 
 Participants were asked to verbally process on 2 out of 4 questions. Six participants (A8, 
E9, A11, E15, A17, A25) did not provide relevant verbal data on both questions. A16 provided 
relevant verbal data on question 22, but not question 23.  
One of the 17 participants (A4) who provided verbal data on both questions attempted to 
assess which statement was more believable using the criteria outlined in the CCTT answer key. 
On question 22 she concluded that observation is more precise than inference. On question 23 
she recognized that a firsthand source is more credible and authoritative than a second-hand 
source. For example, on question 22 she stated, “I feel like the second one is more correct 
because this is what the experiment says.” On question 23 she expressed, “I feel like the second 
one is more accurate because they (the doctors) wrote the report…the second one is directly from 
the source.”  
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Ten out of the 17 participants (E2, A3, A5, A7, E10, E13, A14, A20, A21, E23) who 
provided verbal data on both questions attempted to determine which statement was correct or 
incorrect instead of evaluating which of the two statements was more believable. For example, 
A5 stated, “The first statement is the one that should be true.” A7 expressed, “(Option A) true, 
(option B) false.” A14 said, “Definitely, the first week all of the ducklings died is wrong.” A21 
stated, “It is definitely C because the ill ducklings didn’t die.” 
Four of the 17 participants (E1, E6, E12, E22) used the criteria outlined in the CCTT 
answer key on only one of the two TAP questions. Two of the 17 participants (E18, E19) 
provided verbal data that were unclear as to whether questions were being framed as 
correct/incorrect or more/less believable.  
Table 19  
Participants Approaches to TAP Questions 22 and 23 in Section 3 
Description of Approach Participants 
Answered using criteria of correct or incorrect 
 instead of evaluating which statements 
 was more believable 
E2, A3, A5, A7, E10, E13, A14, A20, A21, E23 
Answered both questions using criteria 
 outlined in the CCTT answer key 
A4 
Answered one of two questions using criteria 
 outlined in the CCTT answer key 
E1, E6, E12, E22 
Provided unclear verbal data E18, E19 
Did not provide relevant verbal data on both 
 questions 
A8, E9, A11, E15, A16, A17, A25 
 
Item-level responses on TAP question 22 
 Participants achieved the lowest item-level score on question 22 with only 2 of the 24 
participants choosing the correct answer B. Eighteen of the 24 participants selected option A as 
more believable. Four of the 24 participants chose option C, that neither statement was more 
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believable. Six of the 24 participants (A8, E9, A11, E15, A17, A25) did not provide meaningful 
verbal data. 
Two of the 18 participants (A4, E12) who provided verbal data selected the correct 
answer B and demonstrated evaluative reasoning using the criteria of precision. A4 expressed, 
“The second one is more correct because this is what the experiment says.” E12 stated, “B, let’s 
be more precise.”  
Eight of the 18 participants (E1, A3, A7, E10, E13, E18, A20, A21) who provided verbal 
data selected the incorrect options of A or C and made a mistake in reading the experiment data 
chart. For example, E1 stated, “Six Canvasbacks died during the week of the experiment, ok, we 
have only three dead, so basically A is the answer because it reflects the conclusion.” A3 said, “It 
is wrong (options B) because only 3 died who ate worms.” E10 expressed, “Six canvasbacks 
died during the first week of the experiment, I don’t think so.” A20 said, “If it was during the 
week, more than six (died).” A21 stated, “No, 3 Canvasbacks (died) not 6.” E13 concluded that 
both statements were not believable, although he did not express his reasons for rejecting A. 
Five of the 18 participants (E2, A5, A14, E22, E23) who provided verbal data selected 
option A as correct or more believable and did not check the chart to determine if six 
Canvasbacks died. Four (E2, A5, A14, E23) selected option A because it was a restatement of 
the experiment’s conclusion. For example, A5 stated, “It was evident that more of the ducklings 
who ate the worms died meaning the problem is with the worms the ducklings are eating.” A14 
expressed, “According to the information here, cabbage worms aren’t good for ducks, when you 
know that a lot ducks died as a result (of cabbage worms). Definitely A.” E23 said, “Since the 
conclusion was cabbage worms are poisonous to ducklings, then 22, A is correct.” One 
participant (E22) selected A and expressed, “B is a derivative actually of A…so I guess A.”  
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 Three of the 18 participants (E6, A16, E19) who provided verbal data selected option C, 
neither statement is more believable than the other for other reasons. A16 and E19 expressed that 
both statements were believable whereas E6 doubted the source on both options because, “I 
don’t know if its necessarily said by Dr. Kolter…I really don’t know who said what.” 
Table 20  
Item-level Verbal Data on TAP Question 22 
Description of Response Participants 
Selected A: Misread data chart and concluded 
 that B was in error 
E1, A3, A7, E10, E13, E18, A20, A21 
Selected A: Did not the check data chart to 
 evaluate B 
E2, A5, A14, E22, E23 
Selected B: Used evaluative reasoning using 
 the criteria of precision 
A4, E12 
Selected C: Concluded both statements were 
 believable 
A16, E19 
Selected C: Questioned the credibility of the 
 source 
E6 
Did not provide meaningful verbal data A8, E9, A11, E15, A17, A25 
 
Item-level responses on TAP question 23 
Question 23 produced the highest percentage of correct answers in section 3, 58.3%.  
The question provides two statements. Statement A reads “During the week following the 
experiment, all of the ill ducklings died. (From an article in a magazine that can be found on 
almost every newsstand. The author, a popular international writer, stated that he obtained his 
information from Drs. Brown and Kolter.)” Statement B reads “During the week following the 
experiment, the rest of the worm-fed ducklings died (from the report written by Drs. Brown and 
Kolter).” Choice C is “Neither statement is more believable.” According to the CCTT manual, 
the correct choice is B because “although both statements are observation statements, statement 
B is firsthand and offered by a source that is more authoritative” (Millman et al., 2005, p. 46).  
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 Five of the 24 participants (9E, A11, 16A, A17, A25) provided no meaningful verbal 
data. Fourteen of the 19 participants (E2, A5, A7, A8, E10, E12, E13, A14, E15, E18, E19, A20, 
A21, E23) who provided verbal data paid no attention to the information in the parentheses and 
attempted to answer the question with reference to the italicized statements alone. Five of the 19 
participants (E1, A3, A4, E6, E22) who provided verbal data evaluated the credibility of the 
source in the parentheses as the criteria for selecting the correct answer.  
Ten of the participants (A7, A8, E12, E13, E18, A14, E15, E19, A20, A21) verbally 
expressed confusion over the statements that all of the ill or worm-fed ducklings died. These 
participants failed to recognize that the question statements reference the week after the 
experiment and, therefore, are not concerned with the details provided in the original experiment. 
Table 21  
Participant Approaches to TAP Question 23 
Description of Approach Participants 
Attempted to answer #23 with reference to the 
 italicized statements alone 
E2, A5, A7, A8, E10, E12, E13, A14, E15, A17, 
E18, E19, A20, A21, E23, A25 
Evaluated the credibility of the source in the 
 parentheses as the criteria for selecting the 
 correct answer 
E1, A3, A4, E6, E22 
Provided no meaningful verbal data 9E, A11, 16A 
 
One participant (A5) who provided verbal data only considered the incorrect option A. 
She concluded A was correct because worms will make ducklings sick and then they will die. 
She stated, “Like we said, worms are poisonous to ducklings, so they are causing the ducks who 
get ill to immediately die. They aren’t allowing the ducklings to live.” 
Twelve of the 19 participants (E1, E2, A3, A4, E6, E10, A14, E15, E19, A20, E22, E23) 
who provided verbal data selected the correct answer B. Five of the 12 participants (E1, A3, A4, 
E6, E22) who selected B evaluated the credibility of the source in the parentheses as the criteria 
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for selecting the correct answer. For example, E22 stated “It’s more credible if the report is 
actually written and the result is actually mentioned by the people who did the experiment.” A4 
expressed, “I feel like the second one is more accurate because they wrote the report.” E6 said, 
“The report…was written by the doctors who actually did the experiment rather than being 
reported by a third party, so I believe statement B is more believable.” Seven of the 12 
participants (E2, E10, A14, E15, E19, A20, E23) only evaluated the italicized statements. These 
participants used the conclusion that cabbage worms are poisonous to ducklings as the criterion 
for their choice that it was more likely that worm-fed ducklings would die than ill ducklings. As 
such, these participants chose the correct answer but did not evaluate the credibility of the 
source. For example, E10 stated, “The ill ducklings did die in the worm diet, during the regular 
diet out of three ill ducks, only one died…so I’m gonna go with B.” E19 expressed,“I don’t 
know if they died or not, can I believe it? During the week following the experiment the rest of 
the worm-fed ducklings died, second is more believable.” E23 said, “B is more believable since 
again the conclusion was that they (the worms) are poisonous.”  
 Six of the 19 participants (A7, A8, E12, E13, E18, A21,) who provided verbal data chose 
option C, neither statement is more believable, because the information included in the 
statements was not explicitly mentioned in the experiment. For example, A8 expressed, “We 
don’t know if they died or not…this is not written here…ok C.” E12 stated, “No one said that the 
ill ducklings were dead.” E13 said, “Well, referring to the table during the week following the 
experiment the rest of the worm-fed ducklings didn’t die all, and nothing is stated about the 
magazine’s…that all the ill-ducklings died…so neither statement is more believable.” E18 
expressed, “We don’t have the results after…what happened, we don’t have the result…after one 
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week, so neither statement is more believable.” A21 said, “All the ducklings didn’t die (after 
option B)…it is definitely C because the ill ducklings didn’t die.”  
Table 22  
Item-level Verbal Data on TAP Question 23 
Description of Response Participants 
Selected A: Only evaluated option A A5 
Selected B: Evaluated the credibility of the 
 source in the parentheses as criteria for 
 selecting B 
E1, A3, A4, E6, E22 
Selected B: Used the conclusion that cabbage 
 worms are poisonous to ducklings as 
 criteria for selecting B 
E2, E10, A14, E15, E19, A20, E23 
Selected C: Selected C because information in 
 the statements was not mentioned in the 
 experiment 
A7, A8, E12, E13, E18, A21 
Provided no meaningful verbal data E9, A11, A16, A17, A25 
 
Section 4: Induction (Hypothesis Testing) 
Section 4 is designed to assess skills in induction. The material provided with the CCTT 
describe induction as “given a specific hypothesis or observation, one combines observation and 
prior knowledge to reach a general conclusion.” The CCTT answer key states “best-explanation 
criteria apply to judging these induction items. A hypothesis is supported by its ability to explain 
facts, by the inconsistency of competitors with facts, by its not being itself inconsistent with 
facts, and by its plausibility” (p. 46).  
In section 4, the test-taker is reminded of the conclusion “cabbage worms are poisonous 
to ducklings” from the experiment they used to answer questions in section 3. Section 4 includes 
13 questions. Each question consists of a series of statements that either provide additional 
information about the original experiment, information from repeat experiments, or information 
from similar kinds of experiments. The test-taker is instructed to select option A if the 
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information in the question supports the conclusion of the original experiment, option B if the 
information goes against the conclusion, and option C if the information does neither. 
Participants received their highest aggregate section level score on section 4 with a mean score 
of 7.25/13 (SD = 1.48).  
Six questions in section 4 present a replication study with different results and/or 
different variables. For example, question 36 states “the experiment is repeated in Canada with 
three different varieties of ducklings. All of the ducklings die, whether worm-fed or not.” Over 
60% of the participants selected the correct choice on 4 of the 6 replication study questions. 
Table 23 
Means Scores of Correct Answers on Replication Study Questions in Section 4: Induction  
Replication Study Questions N Mean Correct Std. Dev. Variance 
Question 26* 
Question 31 
Question 32 
Question 34 
Question 36 
Question 37 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
24 
.63 
.83 
.92 
.25 
.21 
.88 
.495 
.381 
.282 
.442 
.415 
.338 
.245 
.145 
.080 
.196 
.172 
.114 
*TAP question 
Four questions present variables from the original experiment that were discovered after 
the original experiment concluded. For example, question 27 reads “it is discovered that during 
the original experiment the regular-fed ducklings had less sunlight than the worm-fed ducklings. 
It is not known whether or not the difference in the amount of sunlight would have an effect on 
the health of ducklings.” On questions where the discovered variable did not impact the 
conclusion, over 70% of participants selected the correct answer. On questions where the 
discovered variable had an effect on the conclusion, 17% of the participants selected the correct 
answer.  
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Table 24 
Means Scores of Correct Answers on Additional Variables Questions in Section 4: Induction  
Replication Study Questions N Mean Correct Std. Dev. Variance 
Question 27* 
Question 29* 
Question 33 
Question 38 
24 
24 
24 
24 
.17 
.83 
.71 
.17 
.381 
.381 
.464 
.381 
.145 
.145 
.216 
.145 
*TAP questions 
Three questions involve reports about similar types of experiments that are not directly 
related to the original experiment. For example, question 30 states “a similar experiment is 
performed with young dogs. Another is performed with young turtles. In both cases the results 
are similar to those of the original duckling experiment.” Over 66% of the participants selected 
the correct choice on 2 out of 3 similar experiment questions. 
Table 25 
Means Scores of Correct Answers on Similar Type Questions in Section 4: Induction  
Replication Study Questions N Mean Correct Std. Dev. Variance 
Question 28* 
Question 30* 
Question 35 
24 
24 
24 
.79 
.67 
.21 
.415 
.482 
.415 
.172 
.232 
.172 
*TAP questions 
Item-level responses on TAP question 26: Repeat experiments 
 Question 26 reads, “The experiment is repeated in Canada with twice as many ducklings. 
None of the ducklings die. At the end of the week, two of the regular-diet ducklings are ill, and 
three of the worm-diet ducklings are ill.” Five of the 24 participants (A8, E15, A16, A17, A25) 
provided no meaningful verbal data. 
Three of the 19 participants (E9, A14, A21) who provided verbal data selected the 
incorrect choice A, if true, this information supports the conclusion. One of the 3 participants 
(A14) did not consider the results and selected A because the experiment was a similar 
experiment. She stated, “Ok, it is almost the same as the one done by Drs. Brown and, what’s his 
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name, it’s about the same, so true, they are like each other.” One of the 3 participants (A21) only 
compared the number of ill duckling who ate the regular diet in both experiments and, since 
these numbers were similar, selected A. She said, “Here two were ill and there 3 were ill, so this 
information, it seems here they also died and got sick, the ones who ate the regular-diet…this 
information supports the conclusion.” One of the 3 participants (E9) misunderstood the 
statement. She expressed, “But after they did the diet, yes three were ill and two were healthy.” 
 Three of the 19 participants (E1, A3, E6) who provided verbal data selected the incorrect 
choice C, this information does neither. These participants selected C because the information 
did not confirm the conclusion of the original experiment and did not produce a conclusion that 
contradicted the original experiment. For example, E1 stated, “It doesn’t necessarily support nor 
goes against because there is no proof why they are dying.” E6 said, “It doesn’t necessarily go 
against because the number of ill ducklings who were given the worms diet was more than the 
regular diet ducklings which were ill, but I don’t think it’s really significant because it’s only 
one, the difference is only one.”  
 Thirteen of the 19 participants (E2, A4, A5, A7, E10, A11, E12, E13, E18, E19, A20, 
E22, E23) who provided verbal data selected the correct answer B, this information goes against 
the conclusion and used analytical reasoning to arrive at the correct conclusion. For example, 
A11 stated, “This goes against the conclusion because it (the conclusion) was are poisonous, so 
more than this would need to die.” E12 said, “It goes against because it’s the same experiment 
and different results.”  
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Table 26  
Item-level Verbal Data on TAP Question 26: Repeat Experiments 
Description of Response Participants 
Selected A: Because it was a similar type of 
 experiment  
A14 
Selected A: Because there was a similar 
 number of ill ducklings 
A21 
Selected A: Misunderstood the statement  E9 
Selected B: Used analytic reasoning to select 
 correct answer 
E2, A4, A5, A7, E10, A11, E12, E13, E18, E19, 
A20, E22, E23 
Selected C: Repeat experiment did not 
 produce a conclusion that supported  
E1, A3, E6 
Provided no meaningful verbal data A8, E15, A16, A17, A25 
 
Item-level responses on TAP questions 27 and 29: Additional variables 
 Questions 27 and 29 present statements about additional variables from the original 
experiment that were discovered after the experiment concluded. Five of the 24 participants 
(E13, A16, E15, A17, A25) did not provide meaningful verbal data. 
Two of the 19 participants (E9, A11) who provided verbal data chose the correct answers, 
B on question 27, and, C on question 29. E9’s verbal processes indicated that she misunderstood 
what she was supposed to evaluate on both questions. On 27 she stated, “(In) the experiment they 
did not say anything about sunlight, they only mentioned warmth.” On 29 she expressed, “Ok, 
but nothing about that was mentioned in the paragraph I read.” She selected the correct answers 
for the wrong reasons and thought that the questions were testing her ability to remember what 
was in the original experiment. A11 analyzed the statements in question 27 and concluded, 
“They don’t know (if the sunlight has an effect), so this supports the conclusion, goes against the 
conclusion.” Although he did not provide additional verbal processing, he focused on the 
variable of sunlight and chose the correct answer. A11 did not provide meaningful verbal data on 
question 29.  
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Thirteen of the 19 participants (E1, E2, A4, E6, A7, E12, A14, E18, E19, A20, A21, E22, 
E23) who provided verbal data selected C on both questions, the additional information neither 
supported nor went against the conclusion. Nine of the 13 participants (E2, A7, A14, E18, E19, 
A20, A21, E22, E23) expressed that the discovery of an additional variable had nothing to do 
with the experiment, therefore it neither supports nor goes against the conclusion. For example, 
question 27 includes the variable of sunlight on only one group of ducklings. E2 said, “This 
doesn’t prove anything about the cabbage worms.” A14 stated, “What does sunlight have to do 
with it…sunlight is good.” E19 said, “It is not known whether or not the difference in amount of 
sunshine would have an effect, ok, so, doesn’t really affect much.” E22 stated, “It’s not…a big 
deal whether there are sunlight or not, so I guess it’s neither.” E23 expressed, “The amount of 
sunshine wouldn’t have that big of an effect, so C I guess.” Using the same logic, these 
participants concluded that the water in question 29 had nothing to do with whether or not 
cabbage worms are poisonous. For example, E2 said, “Well it does not say if this (water) was 
contaminated by worms or not or anything so this information does neither.” E18 expressed, 
“Neither…supports nor goes against, it’s (a) different idea.” Four of the 13 participants (E1, A4, 
E6, E12) who selected C on both questions expressed that because the impact of the variable is 
unknown, the information neither supports nor contradicts the conclusion. On question 27, A4 
stated, “From this information we can’t know if cabbage worms are poisonous or not, so it 
doesn’t affect the conclusion.” P6 said, “Well since it’s not really known (if) the amount of 
sunlight would have an effect, I guess this doesn’t really go against or support anything.” E12 
expressed, “This information does neither because it doesn’t show that sunlight affects the health 
of ducklings, it’s neither.” On question 29, E1 said, “We cannot say.” A4 stated, “What does this 
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have to do with anything, how is the pan of water related.” P12 E expressed, “What does this 
have to do with anything…this is not related to the experiment.”  
 Four of the 19 participants (A3, A5, A8, E10) who provided verbal data did not produce a 
consistent selection pattern. One of these 4 participants (E10) provided verbal data on question 
27 that added information to the statement. He concluded, “If they discovered it and obviously 
the difference in sunshine would have an effect on the ducklings, so because they found it out 
and it does have an effect on ducklings, (I) will go with A.” On question 29, E10 determined that 
the water “has nothing to do with the worms, at all…so I’m gonna go with C.” Two of the 4 
participants (A3, A8) selected C on question 27 and B on question 29. On question 27, A3 
evaluated the statement accurately and concluded that the conditions should be the same in both 
experiments. She said, “First thing in an experiment is that both of them have the same set of 
conditions…so because of this, this information goes against the conclusion.” She then changed 
her mind and selected C because it is possible that the information could support the conclusion, 
“No, not necessarily goes against. This information could support the conclusion” On question 
27, A8 simply stated “what does this have to do with anything” and selected C. On question 29, 
it was unclear why A3 and A8 selected B. One of the 4 participants (A5) selected C on question 
27 and A on question 29. On question 27, she stated, “They should both be the same so we can 
make sure if the problem is with cabbage worms.” It is unclear why she then selected C. On 
question 29, she reasoned that since the ducklings both drank the same water, water could be 
removed as a possible reason why the ducks died, leaving only sunlight or worms as the possible 
cause. Based on this conclusion, she selected A, the information supports the conclusion.  
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Table 27  
Item-level Verbal Data on TAP Questions 27 and 29: Additional Variables 
Description of Response Participants 
Inconsistent selection pattern: A and C E10 
Inconsistent selection pattern: C and A A5 
Inconsistent selection pattern: C and B A3, A8 
Selected B and C*: Misunderstood what was 
 required 
E9 
Selected C and C:Additional variable had 
 nothing to do with the experiment 
E2, A7, A14, E18, E19, A20, A21, E22, E23 
Selected C and C: Impact of additional 
 variable unknown 
E1, A4, E6, E12 
Did not provide meaningful verbal data A11, E13, A16, E15, A17, A25 
*Correct answers 
 
 
Item-level responses on TAP questions 28 and 30: Similar experiments 
 Questions 28 and 30 involve reports about similar types of experiments that are not 
directly related to the original experiment. Four of the 24 participants (A8, E9, A17, A25) did not 
provide meaningful verbal data on questions 28 and 30.  
Fourteen of the 20 participants (E1, E2, A4, A5, E6, A7, E10, A11, A14, A16, E18, E19, 
A20, E23) who provided verbal data correctly selected A on questions 28 and 30 and 
demonstrated the skill of analysis, the ability to accurately determine that the information in the 
reports/experiments supported the conclusion of the original experiment. For example, E1 said, 
“Ok, that supports the conclusion since the cabbage worms are poisonous and (it) states that they 
cannot be in a cabbage environment.” E2 stated, “This experiment will show that cabbage worms 
are poisonous not only to ducklings but also to other young animals.” A4 expressed, “This 
strengthens the idea that cabbage worms are poisonous if the same thing happened with dogs and 
turtles.” E6 stated, “Usually when experiments…can be generalized (to a) broader population…I 
think it will make the conclusion more credible.” E10 said, “Duck breeders…should have 
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information about this…so I guess it is dangerous for them to run in the cabbage patch because 
of the worms.” A11 expressed, “This supports because the cabbage patch is the source of 
poisonous worms.” E23 stated, “True, maybe because cabbage worms are poisonous to all 
animals” E23. One of the 13 participants (A5) used analytical reasoning, but her verbal processes 
indicated that she did not think that dogs and turtles could be compared to ducks even though she 
selected that the information supported the conclusion. A20 mismarked question 28. Although 
she selected B, she stated, “It supports more than it being neutral.” On question 30, she 
expressed, “As long as (the results) are similar, it supports.” 
 Three of the 20 participants (A3, E12, A21) who provided verbal data selected the correct 
option A on question 28 and option C, this information does neither, on question 30. These 
participants used analytical reasoning to choose the correct answer on question 28. On question 
30, these participants did not show the ability to generalize the results of the experiment. A3 
stated, “This information supports, but not necessarily, it is not necessarily the same thing for 
dogs and turtles.” E12 expressed, “They (the dogs and turtles) were exposed to different 
things…other than the ducklings so…it’s neither nor because it doesn’t show evidence.” A21 
said, The conclusion that they arrived at here was that cabbage worms are poisonous to 
ducklings, here we are talking about dogs. What does that have to do with it, we are talking 
about dogs and turtles.” 
 One of the 20 participants (E13) who provided verbal data incorrectly chose B on 
question 28, goes against the conclusion, and corrected selected A on question 30, supports the 
conclusion. E13 concluded that the information in question 28 was too vague to support the 
specific conclusion that cabbage worms are poisonous to ducklings. He said, “They didn’t say 
(running in a cabbage patch) might lead to death and they didn’t specify…what might happen 
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exactly in the cabbage patch that would harm these ducklings.” On question 30 he accurately 
reasoned, “Since cabbage worm(s) may cause illness then it would support it.”  
 Two of the 20 participants (E15, E22) who provided verbal data chose the correct answer 
A on question 28 and the incorrect answer B on question 30. On question 28, both participants 
used analytic reasoning to select the correct answer. E22 stated, “The main conclusion is that 
cabbage worms are poisonous and as those breeders found out …the running (in) the cabbage 
patch is causing harm for ducklings, so it supports the main idea.” On question 30, both 
participants did not show the ability to generalize the results of the experiment. E22 said, 
“Because the word duckling is mentioned in the main conclusion…and the study is replicated on 
dogs and turtles, I guess that even though they reach the same conclusion…it’s not for 
ducklings.” E15 simply stated, “These are two other different kind(s) of animals, it’s not 
related.” 
Table 28  
Item-level Verbal Data on TAP Questions 28 and 30: Similar Experiments 
Description of Response Participants 
Selected A and A*: Accurately analyzed the 
 relationship between the reports and 
 original experiment 
 
E1, E2, A4, A5, E6, A7, E10, A11, A14, A16, 
E18, E19, A20, E23 
Selected A and C: Accurately analyzed #28  but 
 failed to generalize the results of the 
 experiment on #30 
A3, E12, A21 
Selected A and B: Accurately analyzed #28  but 
 failed to generalize the results of the 
 experiment on #30 
E15, E22 
Selected B and A: #28 too vague. Accurately 
 analyzed #30 
E13 
Did not provide meaningful verbal data A8, E9, A17, A25 
*Correct answers 
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Section 5: Induction (Planning Experiments) 
Section 5 is designed to assess skills of induction and deduction. Four questions are 
designed to identify the ability to plan and evaluate a scientific experiment. The CCTT answer 
key states the following criteria for scoring each item. “In planning an experiment it is desirable 
to have a control group (especially with random assignment to experimental and control groups), 
to generate results that could be in conflict with the hypothesis (by virtue of the hypothesis’ 
implying the opposite, give acceptable assumptions), and to be fairly specific” (p. 47). 
Participants were asked to think out loud on 2 of 4 questions. The aggregate section level score 
on section 5 was a mean of 1.38/4 (SD = 0.77). Less than 40% of participants selected the correct 
answer on each item from 39-42. 
Table 29 
Means Scores of Correct Answers on Section 5: Induction (Planning Experiments) 
Section 5 Questions N Mean Correct Std. Dev. Variance 
Question 39* 
Question 40* 
Question 41 
Question 42 
24 
24 
24 
24 
.25 
.38 
.38 
.38 
.442 
.495 
.495 
.495 
.196 
.245 
.245 
.245 
*TAP questions 
The instructions read “a researcher sets out to test the truth of the statement: If any 
duckling eats a cabbage worm, the duckling will die within six hours. The researcher has 
developed an accurate, painless, and non-injurious stomach-testing method for telling whether a 
duckling has eaten a cabbage worm during the previous twelve hours. The method can be used 
both with dead ducks and live ducks. In planning his experiments, he needs to make some 
predictions from the above statement.” The instructions then provide the following two 
statements about predictions “Predictions tell what would be true, if the statement were true,” 
and, “Predictions should be useful in guiding an actual experiment.” Using these two statements, 
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the test-taker is asked to evaluate seven possible predictions labelled J-P. On each question, the 
test-taker is required to identify the best prediction from three choices, J-K-L on question 39, N-
O-P on question 40, K-L-M on question 41, and M-N-O on question 42. 
Eight participants (A3, A5, E9, E13, E15, A16, A17, A25) demonstrated contradictory 
selection patterns. For example, test-takers are instructed to choose the best prediction from J-K-
L on question 39 and the best prediction from K-L-M on question 41. Four participants (A5, 
E13, A17, A25) selected K on question 39 and L on question 41. If K is a better prediction than 
L on 39, it is also necessarily a better prediction than L on 41. Similarly, test-takers must choose 
between N-O-P on question 40 and M-N-O on question 42. Three participants (A3, E9, E15) 
selected O on question 40 and N on question 42. One participants (A16) selected N on question 
40 and O on question 42. 
On questions 39 and 41, nine of the 24 participants (A4, A8, E9, E10, A11, E12, E15, 
A21, E23) selected the same possible prediction on both questions. Four of the 9 participants 
(A4, A11, A21, E23) selected the correct prediction, letter L, on both questions. Five of the 9 
participants (A8, E9, E10, E15, A21) selected the incorrect prediction, letter K, on both 
questions. On questions 40 and 42, seven of the 24 participants (E2, A3, A5, A11, E12, A16, 
E23) selected the same incorrect answer, either N or O, on both questions.  
Table 30  
Selection Patterns on Section 5 Questions 
Selection Patterns Participants 
Contradictory selection patterns on #39/#41  A5, E13, A17, A25 
Contradictory selection patterns on #40/#42 A3*, E9*, E15*, A16* 
Selected same letter, correct answer, #39/#41 A4, A11, E12*, E23* 
Selected same letter, incorrect answer, #39/#41 A8, E9*, E10, E15*, A21 
Selected same letter, incorrect answer, #40/#42 E2, A3*, A5, A11, E12*, A16*, E23* 
*Two categories  
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Item-level responses on TAP question 39  
 On question 39 there are three statements. Option A (letter J) is a restatement of the 
hypothesis and testing procedure. Option B (letter K) is a restatement of the hypothesis using the 
opposite terms “if any duckling does not die within six hours after a given period, then it did not 
eat any cabbage worms during that period.” Option C (letter L) describes an experiment that 
involves putting hungry ducklings in a cabbage patch for an hour and then in a clean cage for six 
hours with the hypothesis “if any do not die during that period, the results of the stomach test 
will show that these ducklings did not eat any cabbage worms.” The correct answer is answer C 
since “the other two options are no more specific than the hypothesis and the testing procedures” 
(p. 47). Twelve of the 24 participants (A5, A8, E9, A11, E12, E15, A16, A17, E18, E19, E23, 
A25) did not provide meaningful verbal data.  
Seven of the 12 participants (E1, E2, A3, E6, E13, A14, A20) who provided verbal data 
selected A.  These participants evaluated the statements by trying to discern which answer was 
right and which were wrong. E1, E2, E6, and E13 disregarded that a statement was being tested 
and questioned the validity of the initial statement. For example, on option B, E2 stated, “He 
may eat it but die after seven hours.” E6 said, “Cabbage worms might actually not be harmful or 
fatal to ducklings.” E13 expressed, “It is not necessary that the six hours prediction would be 
right…then it’s not true.” For option C, E1 stated, “L doesn’t make any sense because…the test 
should show that they have eaten cabbage worms if they did die or not..” E2 said, “If they’re out 
there for one hour…and not all of them died, it means that some of them also may have died 
after six hours but then they pretty much died from something else probably not a cabbage 
worm.” E6 expressed, “They are only put in the cabbage patch…this doesn’t really mean that the 
ducklings will necessarily eat from the cabbage, so I don’t think this is accurate.” E13 said, “It’s 
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not necessary that the test will show that they didn’t eat cabbage worm(s), they might be eating 
cabbage worms and didn’t die from them” A3 and A20 stated that both A and C were true but 
selected A because it included the testing procedure and was therefore more precise. A14 
struggled with her choice because every option was accurate. She eventually selected A because 
she thought it was the most effective.  
 One of the 12 participants (E10) who provided verbal data selected B. E10 did not 
consider option C. He selected B after determining that A was inaccurate. He mistakenly 
determined that A was wrong because it said, “After eating the worm and in the example before 
it says that they should do the test…during the 12 hours, not after.” The actual statement from 
the CCTT states “during the previous twelve hours.”  
 Four of the 12 participants (A4, A7, A21, E22) who provided verbal data selected the 
correct answer C. A4 and A7 chose C after eliminating A and B. A4 disregarded the statement 
being tested and determined that option B was wrong because, “(The ducklings) can die from 
other things unrelated to cabbage worms.” She decided that C was more convincing than A. A7 
stated that options A and B were meaningless. She selected C because it was “more 
logical…because they had a control group” although there was no control group in C. A21 
disregarded the statement being tested and determined that option B was wrong stating, “How do 
we know that the cabbage worms didn’t affect the ducklings.” E22 provided limited verbal 
processes and selected C because it was, “More reasonable.” 
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Table 31  
Item-level Verbal Data on TAP Question 39 
Description of Response Participants 
Selected A: Disregarded that a statement was 
 being tested and questioned the validity of 
 the statement. 
E1, E2, E6, E13** 
Selected A: Used the criteria that A was more 
 precise than C 
A3, A20 
Selected A: Used the criteria that A was the 
 most effective 
A14 
Selected B: Misunderstood A and did not 
 consider C 
E10 
Selected C*: Used process of elimination A4, A7 
Selected C*: More reasonable E22 
Did not provide meaningful verbal data A5, A8, E9, A11*, E12, E15, A16, A17, E18, 
E19, A21*, E23*, A25 
*Correct answer 
**Mismarked answer sheet 
 
 
Item-level responses on TAP question 40 
On question 40 there are three statements. Option A (letter N) includes the random 
selection of ducklings and feeding them cabbage worms. Option B (letter O) involves the 
random selection of ducklings and releasing them in a cabbage patch. Option C (letter P) consists 
of the random distribution of ducklings into two groups with one group that is fed worms and 
one that is not. The correct answer is answer C since “random assignment to experimental and 
control groups is used in P” (p. 46). Seven of the 24 participants (A8, E9, A11, E12, A16, A17, 
E18) did not provide meaningful verbal data. 
Six of the 17 participants (E2, A3, A4, E6, E19, E23) who provided verbal data indicated 
A was the correct answer. These participants selected A because it was the simplest, most 
specific, and most controlled option. E2 stated, “When you have a prediction you will need to 
know that you’re sure of it.” He used his own definition of prediction as the criteria for his 
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choice. Similarly, E23 said, “N can be predicted because in O and P there might be other 
variables leading to the death of the ducklings.” A4 said that B and C were complicated and, “If 
the statement is saying that all the (ducklings) that eat will die in 6 hours…the first one is true.” 
A3 mistakenly selected B on the answer sheet. She stated, “I don’t think hunger has anything to 
do with it…so N (option A) is the best answer.” E6 and E19 were confused because all the 
options were possible predictions. E6 chose A because, “I don’t think that turned loose has the 
same meaning as fed a cabbage worm…I’m gonna go with N because I think it’s more…stable.” 
E19 stated, “This is right because if the prediction matches, cabbage worm equals death.” 
Five of the 17 participants (A7, E13, E15, A20, E22) selected option B. E15 stated that 
the questions were “too philosophical” and didn’t “even want to think about it, so I’ll just pick N, 
which is B.” Three participants (A7, E13, E22) eliminated A. A7 didn’t verbally consider option 
C. E22 selected B over C because B included a testing procedure. E13 determined that A and C 
were not true because, “We’re not sure if…eating the cabbage worm will lead to death during the 
six hours.” One of the participants (A20) evaluated all three options and determined that all three 
were good experiments. She selected B because, “O is the easiest for guiding an actual 
experiment.” 
 Six of the 17 participants (E1, A5, E10, A14, A21, A25) who provided verbal data 
selected the correct answer C. Two of the participants (E1, A5) stated having a control group was 
the criteria they used to choose C. E1 stated, “That makes the most sense because they actually 
have a control group.” A5 said, “They are dividing them…randomly, one (group) given worms, 
one group without worms.” Two of the 8 participants (A21, A25) did not verbalize criteria for 
their choice. A21 simply stated that, “This (C) is the most true.” A25 said, “(A) wrong, (B) 
normal, ok C.” One of the participants (E10) eliminated A and B as incorrect. He eliminated A 
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because it mentioned six broods and the original experiment did not say anything about six 
broods. He eliminated B because the ducklings may die of something else. He stated that C was 
the most controlled, “It makes the most sense since they’re being fed the worms so they know 
that they’re eating the worms for sure.” One of the participants (A14) selected C because, 
“Maybe they will die and maybe they won’t die (in C).” 
Table 32  
Item-level Verbal Data on TAP Question 40 
Description of Response Participants 
Selected A: Used the criteria that A was the 
 simplest, most specific, or most controlled 
 choice 
E2, A3**, A4, E6, E19, E23 
Selected B: Guessed E15 
Selected B: Eliminated A/Did not consider C A7 
Selected B: Eliminated A/Chose B because it has 
 a testing procedure 
E22 
Selected B: Eliminated A and C because they 
 were not true 
E13 
Selected B: Easiest for guiding an actual 
 experiment 
A20 
Selected C*: Because of control group E1, A5 
Selected C*: Eliminated A and B using flawed 
 process of elimination 
E10, A25 
Selected C*: Based on possibility of ducks living A14 
Selected C*: Most true A21 
Did not provide meaningful verbal data A8*, E9, A11, E12, A16, A17, E18* 
*Correct answer 
**Mismarked answer sheet 
 
 
Section 6: Definition & Assumption Identification 
 Section 6 is designed to assess skills in deduction, assumption identification, and 
meaning. Deduction is also assessed in sections 1 and 5. Meaning is assessed in section 2. 
Section 6 adds the skill of identifying assumptions. According to the information provided with 
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the CCTT, “An assumption fills a gap in reasoning; you must decide what is being taken for 
granted.” The instructions in this section state, “Items 43 through 46 provide situations in which 
a definition is called for. From the three definitions that follow each description, pick the one (A, 
B, or C) that gives the best meaning.” Participants were asked to think-aloud on 2 of 4 questions 
and achieved a mean aggregate section level score of 1.5/4 (SD = 1.06). The think-aloud 
questions revolve around the definition of a stock car.  
Item-level responses on TAP question 43 
 Question 43 involves a discussion between Bill and his mother. Bill’s mother states 
“that’s a nice stock car you have there,” and then Bill explains why his car is not a stock car. 
Based on Bill’s response, the test-taker must choose between three sentences that define the 
meaning of stock car. Option A includes two contradictory ideas that are both stated in Bill’s 
response. Option B consists of two clearly stated ideas from Bill’s response that differentiate 
Bill’s car from a stock car. Option C, the correct answer, is the unstated idea that “a stock car is a 
standard automobile, as turned out by the factory and sold to the public.” It is this unstated 
assumption that Bill is reacting against in defining why his car is not a stock car. Three of the 24 
participants (A7, E12, E15) did not provide meaningful verbal data. 
 Seven of the 21 participants (A3, A5, E6, A16, E18, E19, A25) who provided verbal data 
selected option A. Two participants (A16, A25) evaluated all three options as wrong. A16 did 
not say why she chose A. A25 only stated, “I think it’s A because from the three choices, this 
one makes the most sense.” Four of the participants (A3, E6, E18, E19) either ignored or 
immediately eliminated the correct option C. E6’s initial expression was, “I don’t think it’s C.” 
A3 said, “First thing it is not C.” After reading C, E18 stated, “No, its’s not C.” A3, E6, and E19 
missed that what Bill described was not a stock car. For example, E19 stated, “So a stock car is 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  161 
one with bumpers, ok, no fenders and special bumpers.” A3 expressed, “A stock car is a car that 
has bumpers made out of heavy pipe.” E6 said, “Ok, so it has heavy pipe and no fenders, ok, 
missing fenders and special bumpers.” It was unclear why E18 selected A. One of the 7 
participants (A5) used her own notion of a stock car as the criteria for choosing A. She stated, 
“On a normal car that you see, everything is the same, but a car that is stock has much newer 
details and is much nicer and even more luxurious than a normal car.”  
 Ten of the 21 participants (E1, A4, A8, E9, E10, A11, A17, A21, E22, E23) who 
provided verbal data selected B. Two participants (A11, A17) verbally eliminated A and did not 
consider C, but it was unclear from the verbal data why they selected B. Eight participants (E1, 
A4, A8, E9, E10, A21, E22, E23) accurately deduced that a stock car has fenders and does not 
have bumpers made of heavy pipe, but missed the importance of the automobile manufacture and 
dealer’s showroom in Bill’s response. For example, A4 stated, “Logically a stock car must have 
fenders and not be made from pipe like he said.” E9 expressed, “He said that…if it turns out with 
no fenders, its got fenders, so (a) stock car is an automobile that has fenders.” E10 said, “I’m 
gonna go with B since that’s exactly what he said and they’re asking Bill’s notion.” E22 stated, 
“As he said, it is, was clear that (he) was mentioning or pin-pointing out the bumpers and about 
that there are no fenders in the car, so it’s B.” These participants engaged in partial or incomplete 
analysis of Bill’s response. E1, A4, A8, E9, and E23 only verbally considered B. E10, A21, E22 
verbally eliminated C as a possible option stating, “That’s not what he meant” E10, “C is not it, 
definitely not” A21, “No, it’s not C” E22.  
 Four of the 21 participants (E2, E13, A14, A20) who provided verbal data selected the 
correct answer C. Two of the 6 participants (E2, E13) used the information from Bill’s response 
to create a general definition of a stock car. They then used this definition as the basis for 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  162 
selecting C as the most strongly supported conclusion. For example, E2 stated, “Making heavy 
steel pipe for a bumper and a fender means that non-standard work has been done on the vehicle, 
there is no manufacturer that puts that stuff on to the cars as the standard stock configuration, 
thus C is…the definition.” E13 expressed, “The right (answer) is C…since B and C include 
specific things missing…but these…are only found in Bill’s case or there might be other things 
related to the stock car or the non stock car, so the stock is the standard automobile that is sold 
by the factory to the public.” One participant (A14) expressed her own conception of a stock car 
as a fancy, fully-equipped, expensive automobile. She stated that none of the choices were 
accurate, but did not explain why she chose C. One participant (A20) eliminated A and B as 
incorrect and selected C by the process of elimination. She stated, “A can’t be correct, B also no, 
so I can only choose C.” 
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Table 33  
Item-level Verbal Data on TAP Question 43 
Description of Response Participants 
Selected A: Evaluated all three answers as 
 wrong. No criteria for choice 
A16, A25 
Selected A: Ignored or eliminated C. Missed 
 that Bill’s description was not a stock car 
A3, E6, E19 
Selected A: Ignored or eliminated C. Unclear 
 criteria for choice 
E18 
Selected A: Used own notion of stock car as 
 criteria for choice 
A5 
Selected B: Partial or incomplete analysis of 
 information 
E1, A4, A8, E9, E10, A21, E22, E23 
Selected B: Verbally eliminated A, did not 
 consider C 
A17, A11 
Selected C*: Created general definition as 
 criteria for choice 
E2, E13 
Selected C*: Verbalized own definition. Did 
 not express criteria for choice 
A14 
Selected C*: Used process of elimination A20 
No meaningful verbal data A7, E12, E15 
*Correct answer 
 
 
Item-level responses on TAP question 44 
 In question 44, Joan provides one condition that is necessary and sufficient to make a car 
a stock car, “It has an ordinary engine that hasn’t been changed since it came off the assembly 
line.” Option A uses information taken from question 43 to define a stock car. The correct 
answer B reads, “A stock car is an automobile with a standard engine.” Option B includes the 
genus classification of automobile with the differentia of a standard engine to define stock car. 
Option C states, “A stock car is where the engine is standard.” C is incorrect because the phrase 
“is where” fails to give the general category and as a result “the definition does not provide a set 
of words equivalent in meaning to the term being defined” (R, Ennis, personal communication, 
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February 2018). Nine of the 24 participants (A4, A5, E6, A7, A8, A14, E15, A16, E23) did not 
provide meaningful verbal data.  
 One of the 15 participants (E9) who provided verbal data selected A. She chose A using 
the process of elimination. She did not accept Joan’s definition of a stock car and assumed that a 
stock car can have the engine removed and still remain a stock car. As a result, she eliminated B 
and C because, “They can remove the engine as they want and replace it with another one.”  
 Eight of the 15 participants (E1, E2, E10, E12, E13, E18, E19, A21) who provided verbal 
data selected the correct answer B. None of the participants produced verbal data that indicated 
that they selected B for the reasons articulated in the CCTT answer key. Two of the participants 
(A4, A5) only considered B and provided no clear criteria for their selection. Two of the 
participants (E1, E12) stated that they did not understand the difference between options B and C 
and did not provide clear criteria for their selection. For example, referring to B and C, E1 stated, 
“It’s the same.” E12 said, “What’s the difference (between B and C) no one knows.” Two of the 
participants (E18, E19) verbally eliminated A and provided no clear criteria for their selection. 
Four of the participants (E2, E10, E13, A21) created criteria for their choice unrelated to either 
Joan’s statement or the answer. For example, E2 stated, “Joan is also not a mechanic so she 
doesn’t know anything about cars, a stock car is an automobile with a standard engine, that’s her 
notion probably, so B.” E10 expressed, “Standard engine I guess, not engine is standard. Engines 
are standard in all cars so I’m gonna go with B.” E13 said, “For a car to be called a stock car the 
main thing or…the first factor should be that the engine is standard from the factory and not 
changed, other parts come later, so the answer is B (although B does not mention the factory or 
changed parts).” A21 expressed, “I’m confused between B and C. I don’t really understand (the 
statement) where the engine is standard so I’ll put B.” 
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 Six of the 15 participants (A3, A11, A17, A20, E22, A25) who provided verbal data 
selected C. Two of the participants (A11, A17) stated no to A and B and then chose C without 
verbalizing the criteria for their choice. Two of the participants (A3, A25) said that the answer 
was C because Joan stated that a stock car has a standard engine. For example, A3 said, “It’s C 
because it has to have a standard engine in it.” 25A stated, “Right, it said it has an ordinary 
engine so C.” One of the participants (A20) chose C because, “He said this alone makes it a 
stock car as if this is sufficient.” One of the participants (E22) used criteria that was not included 
in the answer choice. She said, “It’s the issue of…not changing the engine for a long time…so 
C.”  
Table 34  
Item-level Verbal Data on TAP Question 44 
Description of Response Participants 
Selected A: Used process of elimination E9 
Selected B*: Verbalized they did not understand 
 difference between B and C. No criteria for 
 choice 
E1, E12 
Selected B*: Eliminated A. No criteria for 
 choice 
E18, E19 
Selected B*: Created unstated criteria  E2, E10, E13, A21 
Selected C: Eliminated A and B. No criteria  for 
choice 
A11, A17 
Selected C: Based on statement that a stock  car 
has a standard engine 
A3, A25 
Selected C: Based on statement that this alone 
 makes it a stock car 
A20 
Selected C: Created unstated criteria E22 
Did not provide meaningful data A4*, A5*, E6*, A7, A8, A14, E15*, A16*, 
E23* 
*Correct answer 
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Section 7: Assumption Identification 
 Section 7 consists of 6 questions designed to assess skills in deduction and assumption 
identification. Participants were asked to think-aloud on 3 of 6 questions and achieved a mean 
aggregate section level score of 2.46/6 (SD = 1.50). 
On each question a speaker makes a statement referring to the behavior of children in the 
city of Galton. The test-taker is informed that “an assumption is a statement that is taken for 
granted” and asked to identify the unstated assumption in each item. According to the CCTT 
answer key, the test-taker is required to deduce which statement fills a gap in reasoning (p. 47). 
The correct answer for each question is the premise of a syllogism. The conclusion of the 
syllogism is either that Galton’s children misbehave or behave properly. The question statement 
includes the middle term of the syllogism. For example, question 50 reads, “The fact that 
Galton’s children have been forced to work explains their misbehavior.” The correct answer is, 
“Children who have been forced to work behave improperly.” To restate this question in the 
form of a syllogism, it would read, “Children who have been forced to work behave improperly, 
Galton’s children have been forced to work, therefore Galton’s children behave improperly.”  
Each question presents three possible answers. As mentioned above, the correct answer is 
the premise of the syllogism. One of the incorrect answers presents the premise of the syllogism 
with the terms reversed. For example, on question 50 instead of, “Children who have been forced 
to work behave improperly,” option B reads, “Children who behave improperly have been forced 
to work.” The other incorrect answer presents the opposite form of the premise. On question 50 
instead of, “Children who have been forced to work behave improperly,” option A reads, 
“Children who have never been forced to work behave properly.”  
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 None of the participants who provided verbal data attempted to answer the question or 
identify the gap in reasoning by analyzing the relationship between terms and premise. Six of the 
participants (E1, E15, A16, E19, A21, E22) never selected an answer with the terms reversed. 
Five of the participants (A3, E6, A8, A14, A17) never selected an answer with the opposite form 
of the premise. Two of the participants (E19, A20) never selected the correct answer. Twelve of 
the participants (E2, A4, A5, A7, E9, E10, A11, E12, E13, E18, E23, A25) selected at least one 
choice from all three types of answers.  
Table 35  
Selection Patterns on Section 7 Questions 
Selection Patterns Participants 
Never selected an answer with reversed terms E1, E15, A16, E19*, A21, E22 
Never selected an answer with opposite form 
 of the premise 
A3, E6, A8, A14, A17 
Never selected a correct answer E19*, A20 
Selected at least one choice from all three 
 types of answers 
E2, A4, A5, A7, E9, E10, A11, E12, E13, E18, 
E23, A25 
*Fit in two categories  
Selection patterns on TAP questions 47 and 48 
 Questions 47 and 48 are the same syllogism with opposite middle terms. Question 47 
states that “children have been severely punished” and therefore misbehave. Question 48 states 
“these youngsters have never been punished” and therefore misbehave. Four of the 24 
participants (E2, A8, E15, E22) selected the correct answer on both questions. Three of the 24 
participants (A3, A11, A14) selected the flipped middle term on both questions. Four of the 24 
participants (A16, E19, A20, A21) selected the opposite form of the premise on both questions. 
Four of the 24 participants (E1, A4, A7, E12) selected answers consistent with a particular point 
of view on punishment and misbehavior. Six of the 24 participants (E6, E10, A17, E18, E23, 
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A25) selected one correct answer and one flipped middle term answer. Three of the 24 
participants (A5, E9, E13) produced inconsistent selection patterns. 
Table 36  
Selection Patterns on TAP Questions 47 and 48 
Selection Patterns Participants 
Both correct answers E2, A8, E15, E22 
Both flipped middle term A3, A11, A14 
Both opposite form of premise A16, E19, A20, A21 
Consistent with particular point of view on 
punishment and misbehavior 
E1, A4, A7, E12 
One correct answer and one flipped middle 
 term answer 
E6, E10, A17, E18, E23, A25 
Inconsistent selection pattern A5, E9, E13 
 
Nine of the 24 participants (E2, A7, A8, E10, E12, A16, A17, E18, A25) did not provide 
meaningful verbal data. 
Eight of the 15 participants (A3, A11, A14, E15, E19, A20, A21, E22) who provided 
verbal data selected the same type of answer on both questions indicating the possible use of the 
same criteria on both questions. Two participants (E15, E22) selected the correct answer on both 
questions although they expressed that the correct answer and the opposite form answer are the 
same. On question 47, E15 stated, “A and C…revolve around the same meaning but in two 
different ways.” E22 said, “The assumption is that children who are severely punished 
misbehave although children who haven’t been severely punished also behave properly.” E15 
did not provide a clear reason for her choice of A over C. E22 selected the correct answer A 
because the opposite form answer was “not mentioned in the statement.” Three participants (A3, 
A11, A14) selected the flipped middle terms answer on both questions. On question 47, A3 
selected the flipped middle term because it was the clearest restatement of the main idea in the 
question. She stated, “Because they misbehave maybe they’ve been severely punished.” On 
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question 48, she based her choice on her personal opinion about punishment expressing, “No, 
definitely they need to be punished…if there is no punishment their misbehavior will definitely 
continue, definitely B.” A14 expressed her personal opinion and then considered all the options 
the same on both questions. She agreed with the ideas in question 47 and disagreed with the 
ideas in question 48, but did not provide clear verbal processes that explained her choices. Three 
participants (E19, A20, A21) selected the opposite form of the correct premise on both questions. 
E19, A20, and A21 equated the term unspoken assumption with unspoken phrase. These 
participants selected their choice based on the criteria that the opposite form of the premise 
included words not mentioned in the question. For example, A20 stated, “Now they want an 
assumption that is not spoken and A is spoken, also (B) is spoken…and (C) is unspoken.”  
 Two of the 15 participants (E1, A4) who provided verbal data selected answers on 
questions 47 and 48 that were consistent with a particular point of view about the relationship 
between punishment and misbehavior. E1 presented inconsistent reasoning processes and did not 
clarify the criteria she used to make her choice. A4 only evaluated one option on question 47 and 
concluded that all three options were the same and not logical on question 48. It was unclear why 
she chose her answers.  
 Two of the 14 participants (E6, E23) who provided verbal data selected one correct 
answer and one answer with flipped middle terms. E23 agreed with the correct answer A on 
question 47 but selected B because ,“It should be the other way around.” E6 assessed what she 
thought was the emphasis of the speaker and selected A on question 47 because, “He emphasized 
that the real problem is in the…severe punishment itself,” and B on 48 because, “B provides 
more of an explanation for the behavior rather than the punishment.”  
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Three of the 15 participants (A5, E9, E13) who provided verbal data produces 
inconsistent selection pattern. A5 and E9 made their choices based on personal opinions about 
punishment in child-rearing. A5 expressed, “It’s true the reason might be because they’ve been 
severely punished but we can’t apply this to the whole world,” and, “In my opinion, punishment 
is very important in child-rearing. Children, when they do something wrong and aren’t punished 
will definitely continue to misbehave.” E9 stated, “Children who have (been) severely punished, 
yes, misbehave because if they get punished all the time it’s not gonna matter anymore,” and, 
“From time to time punishment should be done so I think that yes children (who) are punished 
also behave properly.” E13 selected C on question 47 because the phrase “behave properly” was 
not stated. On question 48, his reasoning processes were confused and difficult to understand. 
Table 37  
Item-level Verbal Data on TAP Questions 47 and 48 
Selection Patterns Participants 
Correct answer: Opposite form also true E15, E22* 
Correct answer: Opposite form not mentioned E22* 
Flipped middle terms: Personal opinions, no 
 criteria for selection 
A3, A11, A14 
Opposite forms: Unspoken assumption 
 understood as unspoken phrase 
E19, A20, A21 
Consistent point of view E1, A4 
One correct, one flipped middle term: matter 
 of emphasis 
E6 
One correct, one flipped middle term: Should 
 be other way around 
E23 
Inconsistent selection patterns A5, E9, E13 
No meaningful verbal data E2, A7, A8, E10, E12, A16, A17, E18, A25 
*Fit in two categories 
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Item-level responses on TAP question 49   
Question 49 does not have an obvious gap-filler. The test-taker must identify that the 
correct answer “Children who behave badly have been punished at some time” is roughly 
equivalent to more obvious gap-filler “children who are not punished will behave well” (p. 47). 
Participants received their lowest item-level score in section 7 on question 49. Five of the 24 
participants (A3, E6, A8, A14, A16) selected the correct answer A. Eleven of the 24 participants 
(E1, A5, A7, E10, A11, E12, E15, E19, A21, E22, E23) selected the opposite form choice B. 
Eight of the 24 participants (E2, A4, E9, E13, A17, E18, A20, A25) chose the flipped terms 
option C. Eleven of the 24 participants (A3, A5, A7, A8, A11, E12, A14, E15, A16, A17, E18,) 
did not provide meaningful verbal data.  
 One of the 13 participants (E6) who provided verbal data selected the correct answer A. 
E6 expressed that the correct answer was A and not B because of the verb tense. She stated, “Ok, 
that’s because he said that would take care of things which means that they’re already behaving 
badly and there must be something to be done about the issue and he’s assuming that all the 
children who behave badly have been punished at some point therefore what should be done is to 
never punish them later on, so I guess it’s A.” 
 Six of the 13 participants (E1, E10, E19, E22, A21, E23) who provided verbal data 
selected B and concluded that the statement meant that you are not supposed to punish a child 
because punishment will lead the child to misbehave. They used some form of the restated 
question as the criteria for their choice of B. E1 said, “Not punishing them is the answer for their 
behavior, so B is the assumption.” E10 stated, “So do not punish I guess is equal to no 
problem…I think this one (B) makes sense because to not is no problem but if you punish them 
they will misbehave, so I’m gonna go with B.” E19 expressed, “Never punish that they can 
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behave…that will take care of things if we never punish them, ok, B.” E22 said, “So the 
assumption over here is the children who are punished will misbehave, that’s why on the safe 
side we’re not supposed to punish any child so that…this would not lead him…to misbehave, so 
it’s B.” E23 stated, “It’s B since…he said to never punish them meaning…that would take care 
of things, meaning they will not cause any trouble or misbehave.” One of the 11 participants 
(A21) chose B because the words in B were not mentioned in the statement. She said, “(B) is the 
most correct or the one not mentioned is B.” 
Six of the 13 participants (E2, A4, E9, E13, A20, A25) who provided verbal data selected 
C. E2 disagreed with the statements and then restated the question as the criteria for his selection. 
He stated, “His assumption would be that children who behave properly have never been 
punished, children who behave badly have been punished, yeah, if we stop punishing them that 
would take care of things. So if they’re no longer punished or if they have never been punished 
they will no longer behave improperly, so I guess his assumption is C.” A4 eliminated option B 
because of the verb tense of the statement. She stated, “(B) the assumption is this is something 
that already happened not something that will happen in the future…so not the second one.” She 
did not provide verbal data that explained why she chose C instead of A. E9 made her selection 
based on her personal opinion. E13 chose C because he concluded it was the wrong assumption. 
He said, “(A) this is an assumption since he said we should never punish them, (B) yes it may be 
an assumption, (C) ok, this is the wrong assumption.” A20 selected C because it was unclear 
who said C. She said, “(C) is unspoken because it is not know who said this and we can’t know.” 
A25 stated that all three answers were not answers for this question and then selected C.  
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Table 38  
Item-level Verbal Data on TAP Question 49 
Description of Response Participants 
Selected A*: Used criteria of verb tense E6 
Selected B: Restated question and used 
 statement as the criteria for choice 
E1, E10, E19, E22, E23 
Selected B: Word in B not mentioned in 
 answer choice 
A21 
Selected C: Eliminated B based on verb tense. 
 No criteria for C over A 
A4 
Selected C: Restated question and used 
 statement as the criteria for choice 
E2 
Selected C: Used personal opinion as criteria 
 for choice 
E9 
Selected C: Because it was the wrong 
 assumption 
E13 
Selected C: Because it is unclear who said 
 option C 
A20 
Selected C: All three answers wrong A25 
Did not provide meaningful data A3*, A5, A7, A8*, A11, E12, A14*, E15, 
A16*, A17, E18 
*Correct answer 
 
Research Question 2 
 Ten Sample Reasoning Mindset Test questions designed to assess the critical thinking 
dispositions of inquisitiveness, open-mindedness, truth-seeking, critical thinking self-confidence, 
and maturity were used in this study. Each disposition was addressed through two 6-point, 
Likert-Scale questions. Participants were asked to use a TAP Protocol to read the questions and 
make their selections. In addition, they were asked to verbally explain the reason for their 
selection choices. The verbal data were collected and coded based on the way that participants 
framed their responses. Predetermined categories were used to code answers framed in 
pragmatic, moral, logical, personal type/nature, religious, situational, social/relational, and 
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ideological terms. Additional patterns that emerged in the verbal data were labelled and utilized 
as appropriate. The verbal data were examined to address the following research question. 
2. How do undergraduate Lebanese students frame and self-report on critical thinking 
questions from Insight Assessment’s Sample Reasoning Mindset Test designed to assess 
dispositions toward inquisitiveness, open-mindedness, truth-seeking, critical thinking, 
self-confidence, and maturity? 
Disposition of Inquisitiveness 
 Two questions from the SRMT were selected to measure the critical thinking disposition 
of inquisitiveness. Question one stated, I need to know the reasons why things happen. Question 
nine read, I prefer assignments where I am told exactly what to do and how to do it. Each 
participant’s critical thinking disposition of inquisitiveness was calculated on a scale of 2-12 
based on Likert-scale responses to these two questions. A score of two indicates the strongest 
disposition of inquisitiveness and a score of 12 indicates the weakest disposition of 
inquisitiveness. Eighteen of 24 participants (E1, E2, A3, A4, E6, E9, E10, E12, A14, E15, A16, 
A17, E18, A20, A21, E22, E23, A25) achieved a score of six or lower indicating a positive 
disposition of inquisitiveness. 
Table 39 
Likert-scale Response Scores for the Disposition of Inquisitiveness 
Disposition Score Participants 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
A20 
A14, A17, E23, A25 
E1, A4, E9 
E2, A3, E6, E10, E12, E15, A16, E18, A21, E22 
A8, A11, E13 
A5, A7 
E19 
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The verbal processes of the participants were examined to identify the ways that participants 
framed each question. 
SRMT question one 
 On question one, I need to know the reasons why things happen, ten participants (E1, A3, 
A5, A7, E10, E15, A20, E22, E23, A25) framed their answers in the pragmatic terms of how 
they could benefit from information or only having an interest in information that would impact 
them directly. Four participants (E12, E13, E18, E19) framed answers in the general ideological 
terms. Three participants (A11, A14, A20) framed answers in primarily religious terms. Two 
participants (A4, E6) framed answers in the pragmatic terms of psychological well-being. Three 
participants (A17, A20, E23) framed their answers in terms of their personal type/nature. One 
participant’s answer (A21) did not fit a specific category. Four participants (E2, A8, E9, A16) 
provided no meaningful verbal data. 
Table 40  
Framing of SRMT Statement: I need to know the reason why things happen 
Ways Answers were Framed Participants 
Framed in pragmatic terms of benefit or 
 direct impact 
E1, A3, A5, A7, E10, E15, A20*, E22, E23*, 
A25 
Framed in general ideological terms E12, E13, E18, E19 
Framed in primarily religious terms A11, A14, A20* 
Framed in pragmatic terms of well-being A4, E6 
Framed in terms of personal type/nature A17, A20*, E23* 
No category A21 
No meaningful verbal data E2, A8, E9, A16 
*Fit in multiple categories 
 
 
Item-scale responses to SRMT question one 
 Eight of the 24 participants (E1, A3, E9, E12, A14, A16, E18, A20) strongly agreed with 
the question one statement “I need to know the reason why things happen.” Two of the 8 
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participants (E9, A16) provided no clear or meaningful verbal data. Two of the 8 participants 
(E12, E18) expressed in ideological terms that everything happens for a reason. E12 stated, “I 
strongly agree because everything happened for a reason, almost everything happened for a 
reason, so I should know the reasons to know the results (of) why he did this or didn’t (do) that, 
why this event happened this day.” E18 said, “Things happen…for a reason, so that’s why I 
agree strongly.” Two of the 8 participants (A14, A20) framed the answer in terms of religion and 
personal responsibility. A14 stated, “I want to know why things happen, is it because it was what 
God willed? Or is it because of what I’ve done? Or is it God’s decree and predestined? Is it 
something that’s going to happen no matter what?” A20 said, “Why did this happen? Is it 
because I did it or because of a specific mistake or just something related to who I am as a Sunni 
Muslim? In addition, I want to deal with it, is there a specific lesson I need to learn?” A20 also 
stated in pragmatic terms, “How can I benefit from the people and things around me,” and 
expressed in terms of her personal nature/type, “I strongly agree…because I have the curiosity to 
know.” Two of the 8 participants (E1, A3) primarily framed their answers in pragmatic terms. E1 
stated, “I have to…critically think about it to understand why it happened so I can benefit from it 
and I can take the positive aspect from it and not just say that well everything happens just for a 
reason.” She rejected the idea that everything happens for a reason and emphasized personal 
autonomy saying, “Everything I do is because I chose it, so that’s why I need to understand…the 
reason for everything.” A3 expressed, “It is important that I know how and why things happen so 
I can understand more about what is happening with me.”  
 Six of the 24 participants (A8, A11, E15, A17, E23, A25) agreed with the statement “I 
need to know the reason why things happen.” One of the 6 participants (A8) did not provide 
meaningful verbal data. Two of the 6 participants (E15, A25) framed their answer in pragmatic 
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terms. E15 said, “For example…a problem that I faced I want to know how to avoid it next time 
and if it was something good I want to know…the steps that or things that led to this good 
occasion.” A25 stated, “For example, if someone is telling me something that happened with him 
and wants a solution, if I don’t know how it happened…I won’t know how to answer to help 
him.” One of the 6 participants (A17) framed her answer in terms of personal nature/type. A17 
stated, “I agree because I’m curious to know.” One of the 6 participants (E23) used a mixture of 
personal nature/type and pragmatic terms. She said, “I’m someone who’s very logical so for me 
to do something most of the time I need to know why.” One of the 6 participants (A11) framed 
his answer in terms of religion and personal responsibility. He said, “It depends on what is 
happening. There are things that are predestined to happen, things that you choose to happen, 
things that happen so you’ll do something… Nothing happens without a reason. Maybe it is fate 
or maybe you’re the reason for the problem…or maybe someone else is the cause.”  
 Eight of the 24 participants (E2, A4, A5, A7, E10, E19, A21, E22) agreed a little with the 
statement “I need to know the reason why things happen.” One of the 8 participants (E2) did not 
provide meaningful verbal data. Five of the 8 participants (A4, A5, A7, E10, E22) answered the 
question in pragmatic terms. A5 stated, “Sometimes we are responsible for what happens and 
sometimes others are responsible. So we need to know what is happening so we can avoid things, 
but if it is something outside our control or will, then there is no reason to know it.” A7 
expressed, “If things are happening, like if the resistance is fighting so and so, I’m not interested 
in that. But recently, I know that there might be a war, this is something I want to know…But if 
something happens unrelated to my country or me…I’m not interested in what happened or why 
it happened.” E10 answered, “I would like to know the reasons why things happen if the reasons 
are tied to me, not to anyone else, or close friends and mostly family and myself. If it’s 
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for…friends that I don’t really know, I wouldn’t really care why things happen to them.” E22 
said, “I agree a little bit because this gives me a kind of control on everything that’s going on in 
my life…agree a little bit because over thinking about it or… knowing every single reason or 
detail is an extreme.” A4 framed her answer in the pragmatic terms of psychological well-being. 
She stated, “Sometimes when I know why things happen, it comforts me, I feel like I’m in 
control…but other times if I’m seeing why…bad things happen in the world like wars…it has a 
negative emotional impact on me.” One of the 8 participants (E19) framed the answer in 
ideological terms. She stated, “Everything happens for a reason,” but didn’t explain why she 
agreed a little. One of the 8 participants (A21) was only interested in knowing answers to 
essential human questions, but not interested in knowing information about her personal 
experience. She said, “I want to know why we are here…why we were created…what will 
happen when we die…how the heart works…but there are things I don’t really want to know. 
For example, things that happen suddenly or what will happen tomorrow…or when I’ll die.”  
 Two of the 24 participants (E6, E13) disagreed a little with the statement “I need to know 
the reason why things happen.” One of the 2 participants (E6) framed the question in the 
pragmatic terms of psychological well-being. She said, “If I tire myself with constantly asking 
why did this happen, why didn't this happen...I don't think and I'm going to be able to live a 
happy life or at least a low stress sort of life and it's really important for you to be you to be 
happy.” One of the 2 participants (E13) responded in ideological terms saying, “There are some 
things that cannot be known, they are mysterious for scientists even though (they have been) 
studying things for many long years.”  
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Table 41  
Verbal Data on SRMT Statement: I need to know the reason why things happen 
Description of Response Participants 
Strongly Agree: Ideological terms, everything 
 happens for a reason 
E12, E18 
Strongly Agree: Religious terms/Determining 
 personal responsibility 
A14, A20* 
Strongly Agree: Pragmatic terms, personal 
 benefit, personal impact 
E1, A3 
Strongly Agree: No meaningful verbal data E9, A16 
Agree: Pragmatic terms, personal benefit, 
 helping others 
E15, A25 
Agree: Type/Nature of person, curious A17 
Agree: Mix of type/nature, pragmatic terms E23 
Agree: Religious terms/Determining personal 
 responsibility 
A11 
Agree: No meaningful data A8 
Agree a little: Pragmatic terms, personal 
 impact, control 
A5, A7, E10, E22 
Agree a little: Pragmatic terms, well-being A4 
Agree a little: Ideological terms, everything 
 happens for a reason 
E19 
Agree a little: Essential human questions, not 
 personal experience 
A21 
Agree a little: No meaningful verbal data E2 
Disagree a little: Pragmatic terms, well-being E6 
Disagree a little: Ideological terms, some 
 things can’t be known 
E13 
*Also answered in personal nature/type and pragmatic terms 
 
SRMT question nine 
 On question nine, I prefer assignments where I am told exactly what to do and how to do 
it, eight participants (E2, E6, E10, A17, A20, E22, E23, A25) framed answers based on the 
values of creativity, independence, and self-reliance. Seven participants (E1, A4, E9, E13, A14, 
E15, A21) framed answers situationally. Six participants (A3, A5, A8, A11, E18, E19) framed 
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answers in pragmatic terms. One participant (A16) framed the answer in general ideological 
terms. Two participants (A7, E12) provided no meaningful verbal data.  
Table 42  
Framing of SRMT Statement: I prefer assignments where I am told exactly what to do and how 
to do it 
Ways Answers were Framed Participants 
Value of creativity, independence, 
 and self-reliance 
E2, E6, E10, A17, A20, E22, E23, A25 
Framed situationally E1, A4, E9, E13, A14, E15, A21 
Framed in pragmatic terms A3, A5, A8, A11, E18, E19 
Framed in ideological terms A16 
Provided no meaningful verbal data A7, E12 
 
Item-scale responses to SRMT question nine 
 Five out of 24 participants (E6, A17, A20, E23, A25) disagreed with the question nine 
statement I prefer assignments where I am told exactly what to do and how to do it. Three of the 
5 participants (E6, A20, E23) expressed that they disagreed because they value creativity. A20 
stated, “(The assignment) shouldn’t be very constrained to the extent that I can only do what is 
required because I know I can be creative as long as I’m given the general idea and how I’m 
supposed to work.” E23 said, “I would like some space…so I can be creative and do it my way.” 
E6 expressed, “I really believe that assignments should reflect in a way or another upon the 
person’s creativity, the person’s way of thinking, the person’s personality.” In addition, E6 
emphasized the importance of self-expression stating, “Many students really underestimate their 
ability because they cannot fully express themselves because their assignments are really 
limited.” Two of the 5 participants (A17, A25) focused on the importance of self-reliance and 
initiative as the reason for preferring not to be told how to do an assignment. A17 said, “I don’t 
prefer this because in university you need to rely on yourself a lot.” A25 expressed, “I don’t 
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prefer to be told everything because I need to know when to take initiative to do something 
specific…to challenge myself.”  
 Six out of 24 participants (E2, E10, E13, A14, A21, E22) disagreed a little with the 
question nine statement I prefer assignments where I am told exactly what to do and how to do it. 
Two of the 6 participants (E10, E22) expressed the importance of creativity and independence. 
E10 said, “I like a little bit of creativity…I like being told what to do but I don’t like being (told) 
how to do it, I like doing it in my own way…I like some independence and freedom.” E22 
expressed, “I do prefer assignments that are clear in the matter of what to do but now how to do 
it. I completely hate it when I get an assignment that (is) really structured…I’m more into the 
creative aspect. I love to be creative…I need to put a plan, but I would be the one who would put 
that plan.” Three of the 6 participants (E13, A14, A21) framed their answers situationally. E13 
stated, “There are assignments it is better to know how exactly to do it and there are some 
assignments that need critical thinking and analysis.” A14 said, “Definitely there are things 
where I like to be told how to do something, to be pampered…but there are things that I like to 
think about, things I’m interested in, I like to think about the way to do it…but other things, no, I 
prefer to be told what to do and then be done with it.” A21 framed her answer situationally in 
terms of how she feels. She stated, “When someone tells me what I need to do and how to do it, I 
feel a bit reassured about the assignment, I feel I can do the assignment quickly. But I sometimes 
also like to do work whenever I want…not necessarily have to make a plan to complete the 
assignment.” One of the 6 participants (E2) valued initiative and self-reliance. He expressed that 
he likes to use the tools he has acquired in class to solve the assignment. He said, “If the 
assignment contains steps on what you should do then it’s not an assignment...assignments in life 
and work are not IKEA items.”  
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 Four of the 24 participants (A4, E15, E9, E1) agreed a little with the statement I prefer 
assignments where I am told exactly what to do and how to do it. Two of the 4 participants (E1, 
A4) answered situationally, they generally like to be told what to do but also like some freedom. 
E1 said, “(When) I’m given something for the first time I actually don’t know how to do it and 
exactly what to do so in certain places I do need to be told what to do and how to do and then 
after that I can do it on my own.” A4 expressed, “I prefer for someone to tell me what to do so I 
can know how to do it the most appropriate and best way, but sometimes I like to be given space 
and freedom to figure out myself what the best way is for me.” Two of the 4 participants (E9, 
E15) expressed their answers situationally, depending on the assignment. E9 stated, “Sometimes 
no…um yeah, I prefer like I should do this.” E15 said, “I agree a little depending on the 
assignment.”  
 Eight of the 24 participants (A3, A5, A7, A8, A11, E12, A16, E18) agreed with the 
statement I prefer assignments where I am told exactly what to do and how to do it. Five of the 8 
participants (A3, A5, A8, A11, E18) framed their answers in pragmatic terms. They said that 
being told what to do and how to do it makes things easier, gives good results, and makes 
everyone satisfied. For example, A3 stated, “The most important thing is for someone to be clear 
about what he wants. If someone is clear about what he wants, the second person can do what the 
first person wants efficiently and both parties will be satisfied.” A5 expressed, “This is better so 
that the results is assured…and faster…and better than having to figure it out himself.” A8 said, 
“I agree because it will be easier for you if you know what you need to do and how to do it.” 
A11 expressed, “Definitely, if you know the way to do it and how to get there, it is definitely a 
better assignment…they are deciding the way that is easiest for you. It is definitely better than 
you deciding and carrying the responsibility.” E18 stated that she likes to be told what to do 
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because, “Maybe I will do the wrong part of the assignment and I will not (be) able to do it as 
she or he wants, so of course, I prefer to be told.” One of the 8 participants (E12) answered based 
on his personal type/nature. He expressed, “I agree because I don’t like my assignments because 
it’s in my nature…yeah, because I want to need to do it and finish.” One of the 8 participants 
(A16) answered in ideological terms. She said, “Definitely, the whole world is like that.” One of 
the 8 participants (A7) provided limited verbal data. A7 only stated, “I like someone to tell me 
do this and this.” 
 One of the 24 participants (E19) strongly agreed with the statement I prefer assignments 
where I am told exactly what to do and how to do it. She stated in pragmatic terms, “It’s either I 
know exactly what the instructor tells me to do or I wouldn’t do it just like you, he, or she 
wants.”  
 Three participants (E10, E22, E23) made the specific distinction between being told what 
to do and being told how to do it. For example, E10 stated, “I like being told what to do but I 
don’t like being (told) how to do it. E22 stated, “I do prefer assignments that are clear…in the 
matter of what to do but not how to do it.” E23 said, “I prefer that instructions be clear, but not to 
be told how to do it.”  
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Table 43  
Verbal Data on SRMT Statement: I prefer assignments where I am told exactly what to do and 
how to do it 
Description of Response Participants 
Disagree: Values creativity E6, A20, E23* 
Disagree: Values initiative and self-reliance A17, A25 
Disagree a little: Values creativity and independence E10*, E22* 
Disagree a little: Situationally depends on the type of 
 assignment 
E13, A14 
Disagree a little: Situationally depends on the how she feels A21 
Disagrees a little: Values initiative and self-reliance E2 
Agree a little: Situational, generally like to be told what to do 
 but also like freedom 
E1, A4 
Agree a little: Situationally depends on the type of 
 assignment 
E9, E15 
Agree: Pragmatic, easier, good results, everyone happy A3, A5, A8, A11, E18 
Agree: Type/Nature of person E12 
Agree: Ideological terms, everyone’s preference A16 
Agree: No meaningful verbal data A7 
Strongly Agree: Pragmatic, wants to do it right E19 
*Distinguished between being told what to do and how to do it. 
 
Disposition of Open-mindedness 
 Two questions from the SRMT were selected to measure the critical thinking disposition 
of open-mindedness. Question two stated, Once I have made my decision, I do not change my 
mind. Question five read, Only weak-minded people change their minds. Each participant’s 
critical thinking disposition of open-mindedness was calculated on a scale of 2-12 based on 
Likert-scale responses to these two questions. A score of 12 indicates the strongest disposition of 
open-mindedness and a score of 2 indicates the weakest disposition of open-mindedness. 
Eighteen of 24 participants (E1, E2, A4, A5, E6, E9, E10, E12, E13, A14, E15, A16, A17, E19, 
A21, E22, E23, A25) achieved a score of 8 or higher indicating a positive disposition of open-
mindedness. 
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Table 44 
Likert-scale Response Scores for the Disposition of Open-mindedness 
Disposition Score Participants 
12 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
5 
E12, E13 
E9, A14, A16, A21 
E1, E2, E10, E22 
A4, A5, E6, E19, E23, A25 
E15, A17 
A7, A8, E18, A20 
A3, A11 
 
The verbal processes of the participants were examined to identify the ways that participants 
framed each question. 
SRMT question two 
 On question two, Once I have made my decision, I do not change my mind, eight 
participants (E2, A4, A5, E9, E10, A14, A16, A17) framed the answer by describing the type of 
decision they would change. Six participants (E6, A7, E15, E19, A20, E22) framed the answer in 
terms of their personal type/nature. Three participants (E1, E13, A21) framed their answer 
situationally and discussed the role of circumstances in changing their minds. Three participants 
(A3, A11, E23) framed the answer based on confidence in their decision-making process. Two 
participants (E12, A25) framed their answer in the logical terms of if they were convinced. Two 
participants (A8, E18) provided no meaningful verbal data.  
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Table 45  
Framing of SRMT Statement: Once I have made my decision, I do not change my mind  
Ways Answers were Framed Participants 
Change based on type of decision E2, A4, A5, E9, E10, A14, A16, A17 
Framed in terms of type/nature E6, A7, E15, E19, A20, E22 
Framed situationally, based on 
 circumstances 
E1, E13, A21 
Framed in terms of self-confidence A3, A11, E23 
Framed in logical terms E12, A25 
Provided no meaningful verbal data A8, E18 
 
Item-scale responses to SRMT question two 
 Three out of 24 participants (E12, E13, A14) strongly disagreed with the question two 
statement Once I have made my decision, I do not change my mind. One of the 3 participants 
(E13) focused on the role of circumstances in changing his mind. He stated, “Once I have made 
my decision many things may happen, maybe I’ll be forced to change my mind due to the 
circumstances around me, something suddenly happened, unexpected never came to my 
mind…most of the time I am not sure (one) hundred percent, so I might change my mind.” One 
of the 3 participants (A14) framed her answer based on the type of decision. She expressed, “Of 
course I change my mind because sometimes I make a quick decision and decide without enough 
knowledge and later I change my mind.” One of the 3 participants (E12) framed his answer in 
logical terms. He said that he always changes his mind if he is convinced. 
 Five of the 24 participants (E1, E2, E9, A16, A21) disagreed with the question two 
statement Once I have made my decision, I do not change my mind. Three of the 5 participants 
(E2, E9, A16) framed their answer based on the type of decision. For example, E2 equated 
educated decisions with those that lead to financial prosperity and uneducated decisions with 
those that lead to poverty. He stated that you should change your mind if you make an 
uneducated choice. E9 stated, “Sometimes I take a decision…very quickly or without thinking 
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about it and then I regret my decision.” A16 said, “There are things where I don’t really think 
about it.” Two of the 5 participants (E1, A21) focused on the role of circumstances in changing 
their minds. E1 said, “Everything is always changing…(I) might be in a certain state of mind 
when (I) makes this decision but can change it because something might happen…that affects the 
decision.” A21 expressed, “A lot of times I take decisions and then something changes in my life 
or circumstances or something and I change my decision.”  
 Nine of the 24 participants (A4, A5, E10, A17, E18, E19, A20, E22, A25) disagreed a 
little with the statement Once I have made my decision, I do not change my mind. Four of the 9 
participants (A4, A5, E10, A17) framed their answer based on the type of decision. These 
participants referenced changing a wrong or stupid decision. For example, A4 stated, “When I 
make a decision and later find out more information, it helps me to review my decision…or 
maybe I assumed something and it turned out to be wrong, I will definitely change my mind.” 
A5 said, “Sometimes my choice is wrong…in addition I need to stay open to allowing others to 
correct me…you need to listen to the opinion of others to at least make sure that your decision 
won’t lead you to something wrong.” E10 described making a stupid decision. He said, “I would 
change my mind if the decision…was in a bad time, drunk, something else like that, and if my 
decision was stupid. I would not change my decision basically (if) I’m bound to an agreement, 
contract…if it’s in a professional field.” A17 expressed, “I disagree (a little) because sometimes I 
rethink something again and find out that I was wrong.” Three of the 9 participants (E19, A20, 
E22) answered based on their personal type/nature. E19 stated, “I do change my mind because 
I’m a hesitant person (and) sometime I overthink something right after I’ve made a decision.” 
A20 expressed, “Sometimes I think too much about things because of my nature, I am afraid I’m 
not giving something its due.” E22 said, “Things might change so I need to, I am an adaptable 
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person basically, so if something had changed or other plans had popped up, I basically need to 
change my mind.” One of the 9 participants (A25) framed her answer in logical terms. She 
stated, “Sometimes I make a decision and see it from a particular point of view and then maybe 
someone else comes and changes my mind. If he changes my mind I can change my decision if 
he was truly convincing.” One of the 9 participants (E18) provided no meaningful verbal data.  
 Four of the 24 participants (E6, A11, E15, E23) agreed a little with the statement Once I 
have made my decision, I do not change my mind. Two of the 4 participants (E6, E15) framed 
their answers based on their personal type/nature. For example, E6 stated, “I’m a moody person 
so I think I’ve mixed both but when I take a serious decision I don’t really back out from it. I 
either take the decision and continue to the very end of it or I don’t (take the decision) from the 
first place.” E15 said, “It’s tough for me to make a decision because I follow my emotions most 
of the time, but once I made it, I do not change unless something really urgent occurs.” Two of 
the 4 participants (A11, E23) framed their answers in terms of self-confidence. A11 expressed, 
“When I make a decision I am convinced that it is the right decision, the right choice, and I don’t 
want to change my decision because I have conviction about the decision, it is a good decision, 
the best decision for me…and if I changed my decision it might cause a bigger problem.” E23 
stated, “It takes me a lot to make a decision so when I do make a decision I try not to change it.”  
 One of the 24 participants (A8) agreed with the statement Once I have made my decision, 
I do not change my mind. A8 did not provide sufficient verbal data to categorize his response. He 
only stated, “Most of the time I don’t like to change my mind.”  
Two of the 24 participants (A3, A7) strongly agreed with the statement Once I have 
made my decision, I do not change my mind. One of the 2 participants (A3) framed her answer in 
terms of self-confidence. She said, “I strongly agree because when I make a decision I have 
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thought about it a lot and I don’t make quick decisions. Because of this I don’t change my 
decision because I am sure of it.” One of the 2 participant (A7) answered based on her personal 
type/nature. She expressed, “I feel like I’m stubborn when I make a decision. I’m a really 
stubborn person…I don’t change my decision even if it’s something I regret.” 
Table 46  
Verbal Data on SRMT Statement: Once I have made my decision, I do not change my mind 
Description of Response Participants 
Strongly Disagree: Type of decision, quick/uninformed A14 
Strongly Disagree: Circumstances impact decision E13 
Strongly Disagree: If convinced of different perspective E12 
Disagree: Type of decision, uneducated/quick E2, E9, A16 
Disagree: Circumstances impact decision E1, A21 
Disagree a little: Type of decision, wrong/stupid A4, A5, E10, A17 
Disagree a little: Type/Nature, hesitant, overthinking, 
 adaptable 
E19, A20, E22 
Disagree a little: If convinced of different perspective A25 
Disagree a little: No meaningful verbal data E18 
Agree a little: Type/Nature, moody, emotions E6, E15 
Agree a little: Self-confident  A11, E23 
Agree: Insufficient verbal data A8 
Strongly Agree: Self-confident A3 
Strongly Agree: Type/Nature, stubborn A7 
 
SRMT question five 
 On question five, Only weak-minded people change their minds, thirteen participants 
(A4, A5, E6, A7, A8, E12, E13, A14, E19, A20, E22, E23, A25) framed their answers in general 
ideological terms. Five participants (E1, E9, E10, E15, E18) framed the answer in terms of 
personal experience. Four participants (E2, A16, A17, A21) framed the answer in the pragmatic 
terms of change is for the better. One participant (A3) framed her answer situationally. One 
participant (A11) misunderstood the statement.  
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Table 47 
Framing of SRMT Statement: Only weak-minded people change their minds 
 
Ways Answers were Framed Participants 
Framed in ideological terms 
 
Framed in terms of personal experience 
Framed in pragmatic terms 
Framed situationally 
Misunderstood statement 
A4, A5, E6, A7, A8, E12, E13, A14, E19, A20, 
E22, E23, A25 
E1, E9, E10, E15, E18 
E2, A16, A17, A21 
A3 
A11 
 
Item-scale responses to SRMT question five 
 Nine out of 24 participants (E6, A7, E9, E10, E12, E13, A16, A21, E23) strongly 
disagreed with the question five statement Only weak-minded people change their minds. Five of 
the 9 participants (E6, A7, E12, E13, E23) framed their answers in ideological terms. E6 and E13 
stated that the willingness to change one’s mind is a characteristic of strong-mindedness and 
maturity. E6 said, “I will go to extremes in this one even thought I really don’t like to go to 
extremes, but sometimes really open and strong-minded people choose to change their minds and 
their mentality…Actually, I find it really important that people change their mind.” E13 
expressed, “Changing their minds after knowing their mistakes shows that they are well-matured 
people.” E12 simply stated, “There’s a right thing in this statement with people who change their 
minds, but that’s not a characteristic for weak-minded people.” A7 and E23 stated that 
circumstances or logic require change. A7 stated, “Definitely no, when someone changes his 
mind there are specific circumstances that compel him to change his mind, it’s not that he is 
weak.” E23 said, “I believe that if someone gives a logical explanation or shows the other side of 
a point or something turned up to change the evidence…I believe if they don’t change their 
minds then they are just stubborn people.” Two of the 9 participants (E9, E10) framed their 
response in the terms of personal experience. E9 shared, “My grandfather used to tell me that 
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you’re weak minded and you change your mind a lot…it hurts me now so now I strongly 
disagree.” E10 said, “No, not really. I’ve changed my mind before…or it affects…yourself, 
myself, and my family in my case, then no, I would change my mind, I’d change it fast and 
well.” Two of the 9 participants (A16, A21) answered in pragmatic terms indicating that you 
should change your mind if you find a better choice. A16 expressed, “No, no, no, it can be 
assumed someone saw something better to change his decision and this is not weak.” A21 stated, 
“Maybe sometimes someone changes his mind for something good. For example, he was doing 
something before and thought something before and now he changes to something better and this 
change…isn’t a sign of weakness.”  
Ten out of 24 participants (E1, E2, A4, A5, A8, A14, E15, E19, E22, A25) disagreed 
with the statement Only weak-minded people change their minds. Seven of the 10 participants 
(A4, A5, A8, A14, E19, E22, A25) framed their answers in ideological terms. Four of the seven 
participants (A4, A5, A8, A14) who framed answers ideologically expressed that the opposite is 
true; changing one’s mind is a sign of being reasonable, open-minded, and strong-minded. For 
example, A4 said, “If someone changes his mind, this doesn’t mean he is weak-minded, it means 
he is reasonable…it’s the opposite, sometimes completely opposite. Someone is weak-minded 
because he…won’t change his mind regardless of what happens, or regardless of evidence.” A5 
stated, “A person who is able to change his mind, to change his thinking, he’s open-minded, he 
sees right from wrong.” A8 expressed, “It’s the opposite, this (changing your mind) is something 
good.” A14 said, “The opposite is true, when someone sees something wrong and is able to 
change his mind, this is a strong-minded, not weak-minded person, he is powerful.” Three of the 
7 participants (E19, E22, A25) who framed answers ideologically expressed that changing your 
mind has nothing to do with weak-mindedness. E19 stated, “I don’t think changing (one’s) mind 
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is about if someone is weak-minded or not…it’s not about weak-minded people, (it) doesn’t have 
to be connected to how their mind is.” E22 expressed, “It’s not about whether you’re weak or 
strong-minded and I don’t know exactly what weak-minded is.” A25 said, “Maybe someone had 
a particular idea and reconsidered and became convinced in a different idea. This has nothing to 
do with, doesn’t demonstrate weak-mindedness.” Two of the 10 participants (E1, E15) who 
disagreed framed their answers in terms of having personally changed their own mind. E1 
expressed, “If I have to agree with that…I have to contradict myself up there when I said that I 
can change my mind and I can subjectively say that I am not a weak-minded person.” E15 said, 
“I do not agree with this because when I make a decision then change my mind for a certain 
reason, most of the time I find that it was a good decision.” One of the 10 participants (E2) who 
disagreed stated pragmatically that a person should change his mind if, “He figure out that what 
he’s doing right now is not for his benefit or the benefit of others.” 
Two of the 24 participants (A3, A17) disagreed a little with the statement Only weak-
minded people change their minds. A3 answered situationally. She said, “Maybe someone goes 
through circumstances or any situation that allows him to change his mind because of the 
circumstances or other conditions.” A17 referred to his answer on question two and 
pragmatically stated, “Like I said above, maybe the second time when you think, you’ll find it is 
better to change your mind.”  
Two of the 24 participants (E18, A20) agreed a little with the question five statement 
Only weak-minded people change their minds. One of the 2 participants (E18) framed her answer 
in terms of personal experience. She expressed, “There’s sometimes I feel weak-minded when I 
change my mind…but it will be in the past so I had not to regret…it, so sometimes I feel I was 
weak-minded when I changed my mind, but I don’t agree…I agree a little.” One of the 2 
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participants (A20) responded ideologically and clarified that a person who changes his mind in 
all decisions, big and little, is weak-mindedness. She also stated this principle does not apply to 
people who change their minds when they find out they are wrong.  
One of the 24 participants (A11) agreed with the question five statement but 
misunderstood the meaning of the question. He thought the statement meant that people with 
weak-minds should change their way of thinking. He said, “Yes, whoever has a weak mind 
should strengthen his mind…A weak mind doesn’t leads us to right things.” 
Table 48  
Verbal Data on SRMT Statement: Only weak-minded people change their minds 
Description of Response Participants 
Strongly Disagree: Equated willingness to change with 
being strong-minded and mature 
E6, E13 
Strongly Disagree: Not a characteristic of weak-minded E12 
Strongly Disagree: Logic/Circumstances require change A7, E23 
Strongly Disagree: Based on personal experience E9, E10 
Strongly Disagree: Pragmatic, change for the better A16, A21 
Disagree: Opposite, characteristic of reasonableness, 
 open-mindedness, strong-mindedness 
A4, A5, A8, A14 
Disagree: Nothing to do with weak-mindedness E19, E22, A25 
Disagree: Personal experience of changing mind E1, E15 
Disagree: Pragmatic, change is for the better E2 
Disagree a little: Situational, circumstances A3 
Disagree a little: Pragmatic, change is for the better A17 
Agree a little: Personal experience of changing mind E18 
Agree a little: If in big and little decisions A20 
Agree: Misunderstood statement A11 
 
Disposition of Self-confidence 
 Two questions from the SRMT were selected to measure the critical thinking disposition 
of self-confidence. Question three stated Most of the time I feel confused. Question eight read I 
exaggerate how sure I am of my decisions. Each participant’s critical thinking disposition of self-
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confidence was calculated on a scale of 2-12 based on Likert-scale responses to these two 
questions. A score of 12 indicates the strongest disposition of self-confidence and a score of 2 
indicates the weakest disposition of self-confidence. Fifteen of 24 participants (E1, E2, A3, A5, 
E6, E12, E13, A14, A16, A17, E19, A21, E22, E23, A25) achieved a score of 8 or higher 
indicating a positive disposition of self-confidence. 
Table 49 
Likert-scale Response Scores for the Disposition of Self-confidence 
Disposition Score Participants 
12 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
2 
E13 
A5, A17, E22 
E1, A3, E6 
E2, E12, A14, A16, E19, A21, E23, A25 
A7, A8, E10 
A4, A11, A20 
E15, E18 
E9 
 
The verbal processes of the participants were examined to identify the ways that participants 
framed each question. 
SRMT question three 
 On question three, Most of the time I feel confused, nine participants (E2, A3, A11, E12, 
A16, E19, E19, A20, A21, E23) framed their answers situationally. Eight participants (E1, A4, 
E9, A14, E15, A17, E18, E22) framed their answers in terms of personal type/nature. Five 
participants (E6, A8, E10, E13, A25) responded based on self-confidence. One participant (A5) 
responded in ideological terms. One participant (A7) was indifferent to the statement.   
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Table 50  
Framing of SRMT Statement: Most of the time I feel confused 
Ways Answers were Framed Participants 
Framed situationally E2, A3, A11, E12, A16, E19, A20, A21, E23 
Framed based on type/nature E1, A4, E9, A14, E15, A17, E18, E22 
Framed based on confidence E6, A8, E10, E13, A25 
Framed in ideological terms A5 
Indifferent to statement A7 
 
Item-scale responses to SRMT question three 
 Two of the 24 participants (E13, A25) strongly disagreed with the statement Most of the 
time I feel confused. Both participants expressed self-confidence. E13 stated, “Most of the time I 
don’t feel confused. I can grasp several things quickly.” A25 said, “I don’t consider myself this 
way. I am confident in myself…sometimes depending on the thing, maybe I have a presentation 
and I’m not sure of it, I may appear uncertain, but that’s rare.”  
 Nine of the 24 participants (A5, E6, A7, A8, E10, A14, A17, E19, E22) disagreed with 
the question three statement Most of the time I feel confused. Three of the 9 participants (A14, 
A17, E22) produced responses based on their personal type/nature. A14 stated, “I’m not 
confused, I’m the opposite, I’m a really fun person, I’m a relaxed person.” A17 responded, “I 
disagree because I’m a person who is relaxed about life.” E22 expressed, “For me I hate 
uncertainty and I hate confusion. I try to know everything around me and if I feel like I’m gonna 
reach that state, I would stop and manage it before I reach the confusion state.” Three of the 9 
participants (E6, A8, E10) responded with self-confidence. E6 stated, “I usually never do 
anything unless I do proper research.” A8 said, “I disagree because, maybe occasionally, but 
most of the time no.” E10 expressed, “Feel confused, not really, in education…I don’t feel 
confused, everything is going as planned, so no.” One of the 9 participants (A5) responded 
ideologically and expressed that if someone is confused most of the time, that person is not 
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mentally healthy. One of the 9 participants (E19) framed her answer situationally in personal 
terms and stated, “I think I’m clear on the stuff that goes in life, at least most of the stuff in my 
personal life I mean.” One of the 9 participants (A7) responded with indifference. She stated, “I 
don’t care about this at all.” 
 Three of the 24 participants (E1, A11, A16) disagreed a little with the statement Most of 
the time I feel confused. One of the 3 participants (E1) responded based on her personal 
type/nature. She stated, “I can’t say most of the time because I’m a reasonable person.” Two of 
the 3 participants (A11, A16) responded situationally. A11 equated confusion with insecurity and 
said, “If I went to a place that is unsafe, or something, maybe I’d be confused, or maybe if I’m in 
an exam…but nothing else other than that.” A16 expressed, “Some things yes, some things no.”  
 Seven of the 24 participants (E2, A3, E12, E18, A20, A21, E23) agreed a little with the 
statement Most of the time I feel confused. Six of the 7 participants (E2, A3, E12, A20, A21, 
E23) framed their response situationally. E2 stated, “You could be confused on…why 
things…just happen…or you look at a piece of abstract art (and) you’re confused…or you have 
lost a loved one yet you’re confused if you should cry or laugh or not feel anything…so 
confusion depends on…what just happens.” A3 expressed, “Someone may feel confused but not 
in all situations. Maybe there are situations where he is really comfortable and situations that are 
new to him…that make him confused.” E12 emphasized that he is mostly not confused. He said, 
“There’s certain things that I feel confused of, so I agree a little, but there’s almost everything 
(that I am) not confused about.” A20 said, “When something is really new, or really important to 
me like standing in a particular place in front of people, but generally I am not confused in other 
things, with friends, or even with professors.” A21 expressed, “For example, when I’m at home 
by myself, I say the same things, but when I’m out I talk differently and act differently.” E23 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  197 
distinguished between what she called logical stuff and formal stuff. She stated that she is not 
confused with logical stuff, but always confused about formal stuff. One of the 7 participants 
(E18) responded based on her personal type/nature. She stated that she is confused, “Even in life 
when someone (asks) the simplest question, if you want to go to X restaurant or I don’t know…if 
I have another…priority, I feel confused, I have to go or no.”  
 One of the 24 participants (E15) agreed with the statement Most of the time I feel 
confused. She responded based on her personal type/nature and said, “I agree because I have this 
thing where I think a lot of the feelings of the person or the thing I’m dealing with more than I 
think of my own benefit.”  
Two of the 24 participants (A4, E9) strongly agreed with the statement based on their 
personal type/nature. A4 stated, “One-hundred percent, even in simple things I feel confused. I 
feel like I don’t know everything and even if I knew everything, I feel like I can’t control my 
life. I feel lost if I can say that.” E9 expressed, “Actually not most of the time, all the time I feel 
confused because…I always feel that what I’m doing…they’re not perfect and honestly I love 
things being perfect, that’s why I’m always confused.” 
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Table 51  
Verbal Data on SRMT Statement: Most of the time I feel confused 
Description of Response Participants 
Strongly Disagree: Self-confident E13, A25 
Disagree: Type/Nature, fun, relaxed, hates  uncertainty A14, A17, E22 
Disagree: Self-confident E6, A8, E10 
Disagree: State of confusion not mentally healthy A5 
Disagree: Indifferent A7 
Disagree: Situational, not in personal life E19 
Disagree a little: Type/Nature, reasonable E1 
Disagree a little: Situational A11, A16 
Agree a little: Situational E2, A3, E12, A20, A21, E23 
Agree a little: Type/Nature, confused about priorities E18 
Agree: Type/Nature, thinks of others instead of self E15 
Strongly Agree: Type/Nature, Life is out of control A4 
Strongly Agree: Type/Nature, perfectionist E9 
 
SRMT question eight 
 One question eight, I exaggerate how sure I am of my decisions, nine participants (A5, 
E6, E9, E10, E12, A14, E15, E19, A21) framed exaggeration as a tool. Five participants (E2, A3, 
A4, E13, E23) framed their answers in terms of self-protection. Four of the participants (A8, 
A11, E18, A25) provided verbal responses that were unclear as to whether they understood the 
meaning of the word exaggerate. Two of the participants (E1, E22) framed their answers based 
on personal type/nature. Four participants (A7, A16, A17, A20) did not provide meaningful 
verbal data.  
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Table 52  
Framing of SRMT Statement: I exaggerate how sure I am of my decisions  
Ways Answers were Framed Participants 
Framed exaggeration as a tool A5, E6, E9, E10, E12, A14, E15, E19, A21 
Framed in terms of self-protection E2, A3, A4, E13, E23 
Possibly misunderstood meaning A8, A11, E18, A25 
Framed in terms of type/nature E1, E22 
No meaningful verbal data A7, A16, A17, A20 
 
Item-scale responses to SRMT question eight 
 Two of the 24 participants (A3, E13) strongly agreed with the statement I exaggerate 
how sure I am of my decisions. Both participants responded based on self-protection stating that 
they don’t exaggerate because they might be wrong. A3 said, “It is not necessary that I am 
always sure of my decisions and even if I am sure of my decision there is something in me that 
says that I might be wrong.” E13 expressed, “I always think about my decisions…but I am not 
always sure of my decisions.”  
 Nine of the 24 participants (E1, E2, A4, A5, E12, A17, A21, E22, E23) disagreed with 
the question eight statement I exaggerate how sure I am of my decisions. Three of the 9 
participants (E2, A4, E23) responded based on self-protection stating that they do not exaggerate 
because there is a chance that they may be wrong. E2 stated, “You may state that you’re going to 
do this and you go with it yet the results of what you did may fail…you should never exaggerate 
it only leads to pain and disappointment.” A4 said, “I try not to exaggerate as much as possible 
so that if something turns out wrong, I won’t be wrong.” E23 stated, “No because there’s always 
like 25% of any decision you know there’s always some doubts, so I disagree.” Two of the 9 
participants (E1, E22) framed their answers in terms of their personal type/nature. E1 stated, 
“I’m not the type of person who openly talks about decisions that I make, I only state them and 
give a brief explanation because…I consider that private.” Similarly, E22 said, “I’m not the kind 
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of person that likes to share every single detail about how I reached my decision…I would love 
to keep it clear and short so that’s why I don’t exaggerate.” Two of the 9 participants (A5, A21) 
framed exaggeration as a tool they don’t need because they are confident and clearly present the 
reasons for their decisions. A5 expressed, “Someone just needs to explain his decision and gives 
the reasons that make him sure of it, and give evidence, this is enough. There is no need for 
someone to exaggerate.” Similarly, A21 said, “Always when I am certain of my decision I 
explain what the decision is and give the reasons why or points that explain why I made the 
decision.” One of the 9 participants (E12) expressed that exaggeration is a tool to seek attention. 
One of the 9 participants (A17) did not provide meaningful verbal data.  
 Two of the 24 participants (E6, A16) disagreed a little with the statement I exaggerate 
how sure I am of my decisions. E6 framed her exaggeration as a tool she does not need. She 
expressed, “If I take a decision that I'm not sure of first of all before …telling anyone else…I 
confront myself I tell myself that for example this might not be the right decision…but this 
doesn't mean that sometimes I don't do this unconsciously or without noticing.” A16 did not 
provide meaningful verbal data.  
 Four of the 24 participants (A14, E15, E19, A20) agreed a little with the statement I 
exaggerate how sure I am of my decisions. Three of the 4 participants (A14, E15, E19) framed 
their answers in social/relational terms and expressed that they use exaggeration as a tool to 
convince others of their decisions. For example, A14 stated that she uses exaggeration with 
others when she has some doubts. She said, “I exaggerate that I’m sure of my decision but I 
might have some doubts about the issue.” E15 uses exaggeration with others when she is sure of 
her decision. She stated, “It takes me a lot of time to make a decision so I become very sure of it 
and I have enough reasons or evidence to prove it, so I get a bit exaggerate.” E19 expressed that 
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she uses exaggeration to stress how sure she is of her decision. She stated, “Sometimes I make it 
sound all dramatic and say…how I’m sure of my decisions.” A20 did not provide clear verbal 
data that clarified the reason for her selection. 
 Six of the 24 participants (A7, A8, E10, A11, E18, A25) agreed with the question eight 
statement I exaggerate how sure I am of my decisions. One of the 6 participants (E10) stated that 
he exaggerates as a tool to affirm his decision to himself. One of the 6 participants (A7) did not 
provide meaningful verbal data and simply stated, “Yes, I exaggerate a lot.” In the verbal data of 
4 of the 6 participants (A8, A11, E18, A25) who agreed, it was unclear whether they understood 
the proper meaning of the term exaggerate. The Arabic word for “I exaggerate,” غلابأ, is similar to 
the Arabic word for “I inform,” غلبا. Although the two words are spelled differently, it was 
unclear whether or not the participants understood the statement I exaggerate how sure I am of 
my decisions to mean “I inform others how sure I am of my decision.” A8 seemed to 
misunderstand the term and stated, “I don’t usually tell others my decision unless I’m sure of it 
first.” A11 said, “I exaggerate (or inform others of) my decision when I am certain of it. Of 
course I want to explain it a lot and why I’m so committed to my decision.” A25 stated, “When I 
am certain of something I want to exaggerate (or inform others of) the decision and show that I 
am certain of it.” E18 did not understand the English word exaggerate. The moderator provided 
the Arabic word for exaggerate, but the participant’s verbal response indicated that she mistook 
it to mean “to inform.” She responded positively saying, “Maybe their opinion will help me.”  
 One of the 24 participants (E9) agreed strongly with the statement I exaggerate how sure 
I am of my decisions. She framed her response in social/relational terms as a tool to convince her 
family. She said, “A lot of times I exaggerate because honestly I would like to prove that my 
decision is correct especially in front of my family and parents.” 
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Table 53  
Verbal Data on SRMT Statement: I exaggerate how sure I am of my decisions 
Description of Response Participants 
Strongly Disagree: Self-protection, wrong decision A3, E13 
Disagree: Self-protection, outcome of decision unknown E2, A4, E23 
Disagree: Type/Nature, private person E1, E22 
Disagree: No need, simply present reasons A5, A21 
Disagree: Exaggeration a tool to seek attention E12 
Disagree: No meaningful verbal data A17 
Disagree a little: No need E6 
Disagree a little: No meaningful verbal data A16 
Agree a little: Social tool to convince others A14, E15, E19 
Agree a little: Unclear verbal data A20 
Agree: Personal tool to assure self E10 
Agree: No meaningful verbal data A7 
Agree: Unclear verbal data, to exaggerate or to inform A8, A11, E18, A25 
Strongly Agree: Social tool to convince others E9 
 
Disposition of Critical Thinking Maturity 
 Two questions from the SRMT were selected to measure the critical thinking disposition 
of maturity. Question four stated Too much education can really mess a person up. Question 
seven read Facts are facts, no interpretation needed. Each participant’s critical thinking 
disposition of maturity was calculated on a scale of 2-12 based on Likert-scale responses to these 
two questions. A score of 12 indicates the strongest disposition of maturity and a score of 2 
indicates the weakest disposition of maturity. Eleven of 24 participants (E1, A5, E6, A7, E13, 
A16, A17, E19, A21, E22, A25) achieved a score of 8 or higher indicating a positive disposition 
of maturity. 
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Table 54 
Likert-scale Response Scores for the Disposition of Maturity 
Disposition Score Participants 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
2 
E1, E13, E19 
A5, A16, A21, E22 
A7, A17 
E6, A25 
A3, A4, E10, E12, A14 
E2, A11, E23 
A8, E15, A20 
E18 
E9 
 
The verbal processes of the participants were examined to identify the ways that participants 
framed each question.  
SRMT question four 
On question four, Too much education can really mess a person up, eight participants 
(E1, A5, E6, E13, E19, A21, E22, A25) framed their answers ideologically by describing the 
benefits of education. Three participants (E2, A7, A20) framed their responses ideologically by 
describing the best type of education. Three participants (A3, A17, E23) responded in general 
ideological terms. Three participants (E9, E12, E15) framed their responses in terms of personal 
experience. Two participants (A8, E10) framed their answers in social/relational terms. One 
participant (A4) responded to the statement using the terms of psychological well-being. One 
participant (A16) framed her answer in moral terms. Two participants (A14, E18) misunderstood 
the statement. One participant (A11) did not provide meaningful verbal data.  
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Table 55  
Framing of SRMT Statement: Too much education can really mess a person up 
Ways Answers were Framed Participants 
Ideological, benefits of education E1, A5, E6, E13, E19, A21, E22, A25 
Ideological, best type of education E2, A7, A20,  
Ideological, general terms A3, A17, E23 
Framed in terms of personal 
 experience 
E9, E12, E15 
Framed in social/relational terms A8, E10 
Framed in terms of well-being A4 
Framed in moral terms A16 
Misunderstood statement A14, E18 
No meaningful verbal data A11 
 
Item-scale responses to SRMT question four 
 After the third Arabic TAP session, I discovered that the initial translation of question 
four provided from Insight Assessment was inaccurate. As a result, A3, A4, and A5 had a 
different written translation of the question than the remaining Arabic-language participant. A3’s 
answer indicated that she correctly understood the meaning of the statement. I verbally clarified 
the meaning of the statement for participants A4 and A5 upon their request. After changing the 
translation, A14 and A25 still had difficulty understanding the intention of the statement. They 
understood the meaning of “mess a person up” as “limits a person.” 
 Six of the 24 participants (E1, A5, E13, E19, E22, A25) strongly disagreed with the 
statement Too much education can really mess a person up. All six participants responded 
ideologically by listing the various benefits of education. E1 stated, “Through education you can 
become more open-minded, you can be introduced to more culture…in fact it makes you think in 
a different perspective not just one perspective.” A5 said, “I strongly disagree because the more 
you learn, the more open-minded you are in everything you study. You also can analyze more, 
be more critical, so too much education definitely doesn’t get someone lost, the opposite is true, 
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it helps you become more aware.” E13 expressed, “Studying more will make the person more 
knowledgeable…and good in several aspects of life.” E19 stated, “I think it boosts the brain’s 
mental capacity, not makes it decline.” E22 equated education with learning and expressed, “It’s 
gonna enrich their experience and their knowledge about life and their career, their choices, 
social interaction, relationships.” A25 simply stated, “The opposite is true, it benefits a person…I 
don’t think it will limit a person.”  
 Three of the 24 participants (E2, E12, E23) disagreed with the statement Too much 
education can really mess a person up. One of the 3 participants (E2) framed his answer 
ideologically by describing the best type of education. He expressed, “If a person is educated in 
engineering, programming, biology, and business, he may become a pretty successful person…It 
depends on what field you’re educated in, not how long you’re educated.” One of the 3 
participants (E12) framed his answer in the terms of personal experience. He said, “I’ve seen 
people who are highly educated and they are a total mess, but there’s other people that…are too 
much educated but they are…I like these people…I disagree because the majority of people I 
met who were highly educated weren’t that mess(ed up).” One of the 3 participants (E23) 
expressed in the general ideological terms that it depends on how deeply you go into a topic. She 
said, “Too much education can straighten a person up but…being too engaged, you know really 
digging into everything that you’re taking or what you’re studying, yea, might mess a person 
up.” 
 Five of 24 participants (E6, A8, A16, A17, A21) disagree a little with the statement Too 
much education can really mess a person up. Two of the 5 participants (E6, A21) responded 
ideologically by listing the benefits of education. For example, E6 presented a high and broad 
view of education and stated, “I believe that education is way more than books and 
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schools…education can be through traveling around the world….and exploring new thing. I 
really don’t think education can mess a person up. I think it’s the thing that really builds a 
person.” A21 expressed that education changes a person. She stated, “Education changes a 
person and changes what he thinks and what he believes, or he used to think something and then 
learns something new. It changes your way of thinking. You learn new things. I don’t think it 
will be negative.” One of the participants (A17) framed his answer in general ideological terms. 
He stated, “Education is the only thing that the more you do it, it doesn’t harm you.” One of the 
5 participants (A8) framed his answer in social/relational terms. He expressed that book learning 
can ruin relationships or keep someone from knowing how to act in society. A8 stated, 
“Someone may understand books but not understand life.” A16 framed her response in moral 
terms. She said, “Education can lead someone to do something bad or good.”  
 Six of the 24 participants (A4, A7, E10, A14, E18, A20) agreed a little with the 
statement Too much education can really mess a person up. Two of the 6 participants (A7, A20) 
framed their response ideologically by describing the best type of education. 
 A7 stated, “If through education you are becoming more cultured…developing yourself, this 
definitely doesn’t tire someone out but the opposite is true, you are raising your status. But, if 
your idea of education…is like we have here, memorization and study, this will definitely 
psychologically exhaust a person.” A20 said, “If you are only learning talk without practical 
application, this definitely has a negative effect…education without application is of no use.” 
One of the 6 participants (A4) stated her answer in the terms of psychological well-being. She 
expressed, “I agree that sometimes education can impact a person in a way we don’t expect. For 
example, he begins learning about something he shouldn’t or it has a negative impact on him 
emotionally…things really bad or not good. This is something that later he might say I wish I 
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didn’t know that.” E10 framed his response in social/relational terms. He made a distinction 
between “street smart” and “education smart” and commented on the possible negative impact of 
too much education. He said, “If you’re only focusing on education then I don’t think you would 
have a social life.” Two of the 6 participants (A14, E18) misunderstood the question. A14 
thought that the statement was saying that education restricts a person. E18 thought the statement 
meant that education will be messy. 
 Two of the 24 participants (A11, E15) agreed with the statement Too much education 
can really mess a person up. A11 provided unclear verbal processes. E15 framed her answer in 
terms of personal experience. She said, “I’ve seen someone very close to me who got caught up 
way too much by his education and by the time he grew…pretty old he realized that is was not 
that necessary for him to have all this done in his life.”  
 Two of the 24 participants (A3, E9) strongly agreed with the statement Too much 
education can really mess a person up. A3 answered in general ideological terms stating that too 
much of anything is not good. E9 framed her answer in terms of personal experience. She said, 
“Yes 100%. I finished my first major at the age of 21. I did biomedical lab and now I’m here 
doing human resources and yes I’m really messed up because first I’m not working my first 
major and now I am convinced with HR but I’m getting bored because I’m…23 and I’m not 
working.” 
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Table 56  
Verbal Data on SRMT Statement: Too much education can really mess a person up 
Description of Response Participants 
Strongly Disagree: Positive impact of education:  
 open- minded, knowledgeable for life, boost mental 
 capacity, enrich holistic experience. 
E1, A5, E13, E19, E22, A25 
Disagree: Depends on type of education E2 
Disagree: Framed in terms of personal experience E12 
Disagree: General terms, too deep not good E23 
Disagree a little: Positive impact of education: builds 
 person up, changes what you believe and think 
E6, A21 
Disagree a little: General terms, no possible harm A17 
Disagree a little: Social, book/life learning  A8 
Disagree a little: Moral terms, good or bad action A16 
Agree a little: Depends on type of education: cultured or 
 memorization, theoretical or practical 
A7, A20 
Agree a little: Framed in terms of well-being A4 
Agree a little: Social, book/life learning  E10 
Agree a little: Misunderstood statement A14, E18 
Agree: Unclear verbal processes A11 
Agree: Framed in terms of personal experience E15 
Strongly Agree: General terms, too much not good A3 
Strongly Agree: Framed in terms of personal experience E9 
 
SRMT question seven 
 On question seven, Facts are facts, no interpretation needed, five participants (A5, A7, 
E12, A17, A20) framed responses in general ideological terms. Five participants (A8, E9, E15, 
E23, A25) framed answer based on the ideological belief that all facts are clear and trustworthy. 
Three participants (E1, E13, E19) answered in ideological terms by distinguishing the difference 
between types of facts. Two participants (A14, E22) framed answers based on the ideological 
belief that all facts are tentative. Two participants (E2, E18) ideologically framed interpretation 
as deception or lies. Two participants (A4, E6) framed answers in affective terms. One 
participant (A3) framed answers in pragmatic terms. One participant (A21) framed her response 
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with a mixture of pragmatic and logical terms. One participant (E10) framed his answer 
situationally in personal/experiential terms. Two participants (A11, A16) provided unclear or 
insufficient verbal data.  
Table 57  
Framing of SRMT Statement: Facts are facts, no interpretation needed 
Ways Answers were Framed Participants 
General ideological terms A5, A7, E12, A17, A20 
Ideological terms, facts clear and trustworthy A8, E9, E15, E23, A25 
Ideological terms, types of facts E1, E13, E19 
Ideological terms, facts are tentative A14, E22 
Ideological terms, interpretation as deception E2, E18 
Framed in affective terms A4, E6 
Framed situationally E10 
Framed in pragmatic terms A3 
Mixture of pragmatic/logical terms A21 
No meaningful verbal data A11, A16 
 
Item-scale responses to SRMT question seven 
 Question seven Facts are facts, no interpretation needed presented a challenge in the 
Arabic translation. The Arabic term used for interpretation in the SRMT, “ريسفت,” also carries the 
meaning “explanation.” It was clear from the verbal processes of seven Arabic-language 
participants (A3, A5, A7, A17, A20, A21, A25) that they read the statement as “Facts are facts, 
no explanation necessary.” In addition, one English-language participant (E12) used the English 
terms interpretation with the meaning of explanation.  
Four of the 24 participants (A3, A7, A16, A21) strongly disagreed with the statement 
Facts are facts, no interpretation needed. Three of the 4 participants (A3, A7, A21) clearly 
understood the meaning of the statement to refer to explanation, not interpretation. A3 framed 
her answer in pragmatic terms. She stated, “There is no need to explain but at the same time, no, 
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someone needs an explanation for these facts in order to be able to follow them.” A21 used a 
mixture of pragmatic and logical terms. She said, “There is always a need for explanation of a 
fact in case, for example, someone asked me something, I can say that this facts is this, but it is 
not necessary to always believe an explanation because someone needs to explain a fact and give 
evidence and studies about how he arrived at the fact for me to believe it.” A7 framed her answer 
in general ideological terms. She expressed, “Wrong, everything has an explanation in this 
world…No need for explanation! Definitely not.” It was unclear from the minimal verbal 
processes of A16 how she framed the question and whether she understood the meaning of ريسفت 
as interpretation or explanation. She only said, “On the contrary, facts need explanation (or 
interpretation).” 
Four of the 24 participants (E1, E13, A17, E19) disagreed with the statement Facts are 
facts, no interpretation needed. Three of the 4 participants (E1, E13, E19) made an ideological 
distinction between types of facts. For example, E1 stated, “I’m a scientific person. I do believe 
in facts. I just don’t believe in things that do not have proof but sometimes you do need further 
interpretations and further explanations…there is no absolute truth to everything.” E13 
expressed, “There are facts that are based on accurate numbers or accurate studies that most 
people agree on and there are facts that people still till now interpret and debate about since the 
main components that led to this fact are also debated.” E19 said, “I think there’s (an) 
explanation to most of (the) things we have around, most not all, so that’s why interpretation is 
needed.” One of the 4 participants (A17) understood the term interpretation as explanation and 
framed his answer in general ideological terms. He stated, “Of course there needs to be 
explanations because not everyone in the world can immediately comprehend the facts.”  
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 Seven of the 24 participants (A4, A5, E6, E10, A11, A14, E22) disagreed a little with the 
statement Facts are facts, no interpretation needed. Two of the 7 participants (A4, E6) framed 
their answer in affective terms. For example, A4 expressed, “I agree facts are facts…but 
sometimes there is a place for emotions and feelings, so facts are something and emotions are 
something else, so I think that sometimes a person…uses emotions to support facts.” E6 stated, 
“An instructor always told us…feelings are facts…she always told us that you can never tell a 
person that what they’re feeling is not true…they’re feeling it as fact so I think we might need to 
interpret in such a situation…and we really need to see things from their perspective.” Two of 
the 7 participants (A14, E22) focused ideologically on the tentative nature of facts. A14 stated, 
“Facts are fact for sure and there is discussion about a fact, but sometimes it may be wrong, the 
understanding is wrong…There is nothing stock and this is it, there are always things that 
interpret it.” E22 expressed, “Science and everything around us is tentative…so basically we do 
need to interpret and analyze…but we must also not underestimate…the processes that have 
been going to reach…those facts.” One of the 7 participants (E10) framed his answer in 
situational terms. He said, “If you’re married and you cheat, you did cheat, that’s a fact, but it is, 
you could be drunk…there are so many things that could be going on with you, the fact aren’t 
always facts.” One of the 7 participants (A11) produced unclear verbal processes. One of the 7 
participants (A5) understood interpretation as explanation and framed her response in general 
ideological terms. She stated, “True that facts are facts but you also want to understand facts 
because there is no fact without anything and you need to understand what happened and why it 
happened especially if you can know this scientifically.” 
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 One of the 24 participants (E15) agreed a little with the statement Facts are facts, no 
interpretation needed. Although she commented that in rare cases a fact can change, she framed 
her answer in the ideological terms of facts as clear and trustworthy. 
 Four of the 24 participants (A8, E12, A20, A25) agreed with the statement Facts are 
facts, no interpretation needed. Two of the 4 participants (E12, A20) mismarked the answer 
sheet. Their verbal processes indicated the general ideological belief that facts need to be 
explained. For example, E12 used the term interpretation with the meaning of explanation. He 
said, “No, there should be interpretations…to know why it became a fact…I agree that 
interpretation (is) needed.” A20 expressed, “I agree…because sometimes you need to understand 
facts and you need them explained so you can know why they are facts.” Two of the 4 
participants (A8, A25) commented that facts are generally clear and do not need 
interpretation/explanation.  
 Four of the 24 participants (E2, E9, E18, E23) strongly agreed with the statement Facts 
are facts, no interpretation needed. Two of 4 participants (E2, E18) framed the concept of 
interpretation as deception or lies. E2 stated, “Once you make a lie and you make people know 
that this lie is a false fact they’re going to end up stumbling on the actual fact that is actually true 
and that the statement that you said was the actual truth, the absolute truth yet it keeps changing 
is false.” E18 expressed, “If you say something…without lies you don’t need to remember or 
think twice when after two years (you think) what was said.” Two of the 4 participants (E9, E23) 
framed their answers in the ideological terms of facts as clear and trustworthy. E9 stated, “I think 
they got to the point that they made it as a fact after a lot of probably scientific experiments and 
proofs.” E23 expressed, “I am very logical so when there is a fact…it’s a fact.” 
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Table 58  
Verbal Data on SRMT Statement: Facts are facts, no interpretation needed 
Description of Response Participants 
Strongly disagree: Interpretation as explanation, 
 pragmatic terms 
A3 
Strongly disagree: Interpretation as explanation, 
 pragmatic and logical terms 
A21 
Strongly disagree: Interpretation as explanation, 
 general ideological terms 
A7 
Strongly disagree: Minimal verbal processes A16 
Disagree: Two kinds of facts E1, E13, E19 
Disagree: Interpretation as explanation, A17 
 general ideological terms  
Disagree a little: Emotions play a role in facts A4, E6 
Disagree a little: Facts are tentative and changing A14, E22 
Disagree a little: Framed in situational terms E10 
Disagree a little: Interpretation as explanation, 
 general ideological terms 
A5 
Disagree a little: Unclear verbal processes  A11 
Agree a little: Facts are trustworthy E15 
Agree: Mismarked, Interpretation as explanation, 
 general ideological terms 
E12, A20 
Agree: Facts are trustworthy, generally clear A8, A25 
Strongly agree: Interpretation framed as deception E2, E18 
Strongly agree: Facts are trustworthy E9, E23 
 
Disposition of Truth-seeking 
 Two questions from the SRMT were selected to measure the critical thinking disposition 
of truth-seeking. Question six stated Like everyone else, I say whatever I need to say to get what 
I want. Question ten read Every belief should be evaluated. Each participant’s critical thinking 
disposition of truth-seeking was calculated on a scale of 2-12 based on Likert-scale responses to 
these two questions. A score of 12 indicates the strongest disposition of truth-seeking and a score 
of 2 indicates the weakest disposition of truth-seeking. Thirteen of 24 participants (E1, E2, E6, 
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A7, E10, E12, E13, A14, A16, A17, E18, E19, A25) achieved a score of 8 or higher indication a 
positive disposition of truth-seeking. 
Table 59 
Likert-scale Response Scores for the Disposition of Truth-seeking 
Disposition Score Participants 
12 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
4 
3 
E1 
E6, E12, E19, A25 
A14, A16, A17, E18 
E2, A7, E10, E13 
A4, A5, A8, A20, A21, 
A3, A11, E15, E22 
E23 
E9 
 
The verbal processes of the participants were examined to identify the ways that participants 
framed each question.  
SRMT question six 
On question six, Like everyone else, I say whatever I need to say to get what I want, only 
nine participants (E1, A4, E6, A8, E10, E15, E18, E19, A21) accurately interpreted the meaning 
of the statement. Five participants (E1, E6, A8, E18, E19) who understood the meaning framed 
their answers in primarily moral terms. Three participants (A4, E15, A21) who understood the 
meaning framed their answers with a mixture of moral and pragmatic terms. One participant 
(E10) who understood the meaning framed his response in purely pragmatic terms. 
Eleven participants (E2, A3, E9, E12, E13, A14, A17, A20, E22, E23, A25) 
misinterpreted the meaning of the statement. Five participants (A3, E12, E13, A17, A20) who 
misunderstood the meaning framed their response in pragmatic terms. Five participants (E2, E9, 
A14, E22, E23) who misunderstood the meaning framed their answers in the terms of social 
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implications. One participant (A25) who misunderstood the meaning framed her response in 
general terms. Four participants (A5, A7, A11, A16) did not provide meaningful verbal data.  
Table 60  
Framing of SRMT Statement: Like everyone else, I say whatever I need to say to get what I want 
Ways Answers were Framed Participants 
Understood meaning: Moral terms E1, E6, A8, E18, E19 
Understood meaning: Moral/Pragmatic terms A4, E15, A21 
Understood meaning: Pragmatic terms E10 
Misunderstood meaning: Pragmatic terms A3, E12, E13, A17, A20 
Misunderstood meaning: Social implications E2, E9, A14, E22, E23 
Misunderstood meaning: General terms A25 
Did not provide meaningful verbal data A5, A7, A11, A16 
 
Item-scale responses to SRMT question six 
 After the first TAP Arabic session, I changed the wording of question six. A3’s response 
made it clear that the question did not communicate the same meaning as its English equivalent. 
After updating the translation, a few English-language and Arabic-language participants still 
misunderstood the meaning of the statement. Six participants (A3, E12, E13, A17, A20, A25) 
understood the meaning of the statement as “Like everyone else, I speak up or speak out to get 
what I want.” Five participants (E2, E9, A14, E22, E23) understood the meaning of the statement 
as “Like everyone else, I should say what I really think to get what I want.” 
 Two of the 24 participants (E1, E2) strongly disagreed with the statement Like everyone 
else, I say whatever I need to say to get what I want. E1 framed her answer in primarily moral 
terms. She stated, “Sometimes what a person wants is not what he actually needs…and I can’t 
just say whatever I want because I can’t be selfish like that…I might find different ways to get 
what I want and have to think a lot… about what I want to see if it’s actually important or it’s 
just like getting what I want for the sake of getting it.” E2 understood the meaning of the 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  216 
statement as “I should say what I think.” He framed his response by discussing the social 
implications of expressing what you think. He stated, “You cannot just go and say what you 
think, they may think of you as a person that hates others, people don’t want to employ people 
that hate them…That’s why sometimes if you want something, you can’t be yourself, which is 
quite sad, so yeah, you can’t say whatever you want (to) get what you need.”  
 Six of the 24 participants (E6, A8, E12, E13, E18, E19) disagreed with the statement Like 
everyone else, I say whatever I need to say to get what I want. Four out of the 6 participants (E6, 
A8, E18, E19) framed their answers in moral terms. E6 and E18 equated saying whatever they 
need to say with lying. E6 stated, “I will never say something just because it will get me what I 
want if it contradicts what I believe…that’s out of my character…I say whatever I believe in 
whatever I’m convinced in and I’d eventually get what I want because I believe that’s the right 
way.” E18 stated, “it (to not lie) is the key of success in every stage of our lives…if I am like 
this, I lie in one word in everything, my children will be like me, so I’ll not be happy of course.” 
A8 expressed, “A person should say what is necessary, I mean something as it actually is, not 
what he wants in order to flatter a person. Ok now, there are times when you have to not tell a 
story the way it actually is, but you shouldn’t change anything in the story. But, no, you should 
say things as they are.” E19 said, “If I want something and to get it I have to say something 
inappropriate, then, no, not that kind of person.” Two of the 6 participants (E12, E13) 
misunderstood the statement as “I should speak up” and responded in pragmatic terms. E12 
expressed, “There’s certain things that you should get without saying.” E13 said, “Sometimes 
speaking is the wrong choice, sometimes I should just be silent. Silence may be the answer of the 
solution to what I want.” 
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 Eight of the 24 participants (A4, A7, E10, E15, A16, A17, A21, A25) disagreed a little 
with the statement Like everyone else, I say whatever I need to say to get what I want. Two of the 
8 participants (A7, A16) did not provide meaningful verbal data. Three of the 8 participants (A4, 
E15, A21) framed their answers with a mixture of moral and pragmatic terms. A4 answered the 
question through a self-dialogue. She said, “In life you sometimes need to say things that you 
don’t mean 100% in order to get things done but at the same time what does this do to your 
character? You’re not considering your emotions or your opinion but are only thinking about 
getting things done or not having people upset with you…I disagree, no disagree a little.” E15 
said, “I do not say what people want…because I like to respect what I believe…but I disagree a 
little because sometimes I don’t really care about what’s going on so I just say what people want 
me to say.” A21 expressed, “Not everything you say is to get what you want…unless I was really 
in need of something, maybe I’d do that or if something is really dangerous or if I need to get 
something maybe I’d do this, but I don’t always say what I don’t believe in to get things that 
aren’t that necessary in life.” One of the 8 participants (E10) framed his response in purely 
pragmatic terms. He said, “You could twist things around, you can put a little white lie in it, you 
don’t always have to be straightforward because I don’t think that would get you anywhere 
especially if it’s something big.” Two of the 8 participants (A17, A25) understood the meaning 
of the statement as “I speak up to get what I want.” A17 responded in pragmatic terms and said, 
“I say what I need to say to get my point across.” A25 answered in general terms and expressed, 
“I don’t usually not speak just because I want something.”  
 Three of the 24 participants (A14, E22, E23) agreed a little with the statement Like 
everyone else, I say whatever I need to say to get what I want. All three participants understood 
the meaning of the statement as “I say what I want to say.” All three participants (A14, E22, 
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E23) framed their answers in the terms of the social consequences of speaking one’s mind. For 
example, A14 stated, “Of course, I do this with my family, I say what I want to get what I 
want…but it’s not like this with everyone…I can’t say whatever with anyone to get what I want. 
There are morals, appropriate ways of speaking, there are taboos, issues like this.” E22 
expressed, “I’m an honest person, I don’t know how to play on words to get what I want, I state 
it directly, but throughout life experiences I’ve notice that there are different people…that 
understand differently what I’m saying so I need to be more in control of what I’m saying…I’m 
not gonna say it in the way I’m thinking it out loud because that’s gonna affect the relationship 
with the person outside that I’m arguing with.” E23 stated, “As long as I’m not disrespecting 
anyone or hurting anyone then yes I’ll say what I need to say to get what I want.”  
 Two of the 24 participants (A5, A11) agreed with the statement Like everyone else, I say 
whatever I need to say to get what I want. Both participants provided unclear verbal data. A5 
said, “That’s right, if someone wants something he needs to say what’s required in order to take 
it. Someone can’t say the opposite of what is required…For someone to get what he wants, he 
needs to say what is necessary.” A11 did not clarify the reasons for his choice or how he 
understood the statement. He simply stated, “Everyone has their own way to get to a place…so 
everything has a way to get it, to talk about it.” 
 Three of the 24 participants (A3, E9, A20) strongly agreed with the statement Like 
everyone else, I say whatever I need to say to get what I want. Two participants (A3, A20) 
understood the meaning of the statement as “I speak out to get what I want.” A3 read a different 
translation than the other 23 participants. She responded to the original translation in pragmatic 
terms saying, “Everything I want or want to get I say and I don’t hide it because there is no other 
way to get it.” Similarly, A20 expressed, “I strongly agree because…for example I ask a 
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question…to get the answer I need also to ask in order to get what I want.” One participant (E9) 
interpreted the statement as “I should say what I really think to get what I want.” She framed her 
answer in the terms of social consequences of speaking one’s mind. E9 stated, “I used to think a 
lot about the thing, I used to make sure what the person in front of me will think about the thing I 
want to say…but now no, yea, I say whatever I want to say and I don’t care.” 
Table 61  
Verbal Data on SRMT Statement: Like everyone else, I say whatever I need to say to get what I 
want 
Description of Response Participants 
Strongly disagree: Moral terms, can’t be selfish E1 
Strongly disagree: Social implications, can’t say what 
 you actually think 
E2 
Disagree: Moral terms, lying or inappropriate speech E6, A8, E18, E19 
Disagree: I speak out, pragmatic E12, E13 
Disagree a little: No meaningful data A7, A16 
Disagree a little: Mix of moral/pragmatic terms A4, E15, A21 
Disagree a little: Pragmatic E10 
Disagree a little: Pragmatic, I should speak out A17 
Disagree a little: Pragmatic, general terms A25 
Agree a little: Social implications, depends on audience A14, E22, E23 
Agree: Unclear verbal processes A5, A11 
Strongly Agree: Pragmatic A3, A20 
Strongly Agree: Social implication, don’t care E9 
 
SRMT question ten 
On question 10, Every belief should be evaluated, five participants (A11, E12, A16, A17, 
E19) provided no meaningful verbal data. Eight of the 19 participants (A4, A8, E9, E13, E15, 
A21, E22, E23) who provided verbal data framed their answers in terms of evaluating or judging 
other peoples’ beliefs. Six of the 19 participants (A3, E6, A7, E18, A20, A25) who provided 
meaningful verbal data responded to the statement in the pragmatic terms of general 
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improvement, progress, or avoiding error. Three participants (E1, E2, A5) framed their responses 
in general ideological terms. One of the 19 participants (E10) framed his response contextually 
saying that it depends on your location. One of the 19 participants (A14) who provided verbal 
data misunderstood the statement and expressed that she enjoys debate.  
Table 62  
Framing of SRMT Statement: Every belief should be evaluated 
Ways Answers were Framed Participants 
General terms: Pragmatic A3, E6, A7, E18, A20, A25 
General terms: Ideological E1, E2, A5 
General terms: Contextual E10 
Terms of evaluating others: Ideological, 
 freedom of belief 
A4, A8, E9, E13, E15, A21,  
E22, E23 
Misunderstood: Likes to debate A14 
No meaningful verbal data A11, E12, A16, A17, E19 
 
Item-scale responses to SRMT question ten 
 Four of the 24 participants (E1, A14, A20, A25) strongly agreed with the statement 
Every belief should be evaluated. Two of the four participants (A20, A25) framed their answers 
in pragmatic terms. A20 stated that evaluation is a way to avoid error. She said, “I strongly agree 
because it is necessary to evaluate on an ongoing basis especially if a belief is based on a 
religious authority or from society, if it is a mix between the two. Sometimes we fall into an idea, 
a societal belief, and we are focused on it and there is something wrong in it, but, tradition and 
beliefs don’t change, so no, you need to continue evaluating things.” A25 expressed, “Evaluating 
is the way to improve, so of course I’m interested in evaluating all beliefs.” One of the four 
participants (E1) responded in general ideological terms. E1 stated that everyone should evaluate 
beliefs, “You can’t just acknowledge only one perspective, you have to acknowledge…a lot. You 
might not agree with it but at least you have to evaluate it and take it into consideration.” One of 
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the four participants (A14) framed her answer in personal terms . She understood the meaning of 
the question as “I like to evaluate every belief” and said, “I really love to evaluate everything 
from beliefs to issues that I believe in and do not believe in. I love to evaluate and 
argue…discuss an issue, why or why not. I really love debates.”  
 Seven of the 24 participants (A3, A5, E6, E12, A16, A17, E19) agree with the statement 
Every belief should be evaluated. Four of the seven participants (E12, A16, A17, E19) did not 
provide meaningful verbal data. One of the seven participants (A3) framed her answer in the 
terms determining if something is correct or incorrect. She stated, “I agree because we need to 
evaluate everything in order to see if it is right or wrong or the negative things about it and the 
positive things about it.” One of the seven participants (E6) framed her response in the pragmatic 
terms that evaluating beliefs is what has led to progress. She stated, “Our lifestyle has changed, 
the context we're living in has changed, beliefs are really affected by many variables and if we 
don’t evaluate our beliefs we would have stayed on, I don't know, how many centuries back, and 
if beliefs weren't evaluated then they won't be updated and we wouldn't have reached whatever 
stage we are at now. I believe that we would have been way behind hadn't we evaluated and 
updated our beliefs every once in a while.” One of the seven participants (A5) answered in 
general ideological terms stating that evaluation is necessary in a multicultural society. She said, 
“Especially when we have a number of different groups of people (in a society). So evaluating is 
positive and it should not be biased. We should evaluate all beliefs and all points of view.” 
 Five of the 24 participants (A4, A7, E10, A11, E18) agreed a little with the statement 
Every belief should be evaluated. One of the five participants (A11) did not provide meaningful 
verbal data. Two of the five participants (A7, E18) framed their answers in pragmatic terms. A7 
expressed that we evaluate beliefs to avoid error. E18 said that it depends on how much time it 
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takes. She stated, “Sometimes to doubt everything…it will take my time, so I agree a little 
because sometimes we should evaluate every belief…but sometimes not.” One of the seven 
participants (E10) framed his answer in contextual terms. He said, “Religious beliefs I guess 
should be evaluated especially in Lebanon…outside not that much…this depends on where you 
are. If you’re in Lebanon, yes, they should be strongly evaluated but if you’re outside, if you’re 
in the North American countries, I don’t think that beliefs should be evaluated…I don’t think 
they care about that that much in my opinion so I’m gonna go with agree a little, mostly depends 
on where you are.” One of the seven participants (A4) framed the question in terms of evaluating 
others. She stated that you shouldn’t evaluate others except in things that are important like their 
behavior. She said, “Sometimes a belief has nothing to do with anything. If we are evaluating a 
person we don’t need to consider all his beliefs. Maybe the belief has nothing to do with 
anything…someone likes something and someone else likes something else, or believes in 
something and someone else believes in something else. At the same time we need to evaluate 
the things that have important meaning. For example, how he acts in the world, if he is honest or 
likes to help others…important things.”  
 Three of the 24 participants (E13, A21, E22) disagreed a little with the statement Every 
belief should be evaluated. All three participants framed their answers in terms of evaluating 
others and framed their responses in the ideological terms of freedom of belief. For example, 
E13 stated, “People have the freedom to do or choose whatever or to believe whatever they want, 
but not every belief should be evaluated, some beliefs are based on things, or factors that cannot 
be accepted by most of the people…this doesn’t allow us to evaluate it.” A21 expressed, “People 
in the world need to be free to believe what they want. We don’t need to always evaluate what 
they say but there are some situations where this belief impacts others, in this case maybe we 
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have to evaluate beliefs and have an opinion on them.” E22 stated, “When it comes to belief 
that's out of my business, I don't interfere on the belief of others, but maybe in my inner mind I 
do think about why (does) that person believe that way but I don't over exaggerate about it or 
think about it or even maybe judge that person. So it's not about judging or evaluating because 
it's out of my business… whatsoever the person thinks about.” 
 Four of the 24 participants (E2, A8, E9, E15) disagreed with the statement Every belief 
should be evaluated. Two of the four participants (A8, E15) framed their responses in terms of 
evaluating others and answered using the ideological terms of freedom of belief. A8 said, 
“Everyone is free to believe whatever they want. There needs to be guidelines that protect human 
rights, this is right, you evaluate that, but not how they think.” E15 expressed, “Not every single 
belief should be evaluated because again belief is something personal and I do not consider 
anybody's belief to be wrong, it is something up to the person.” One of the four participants (E2) 
answered in general ideological terms and stated that evaluating beliefs leads to fanaticism. One 
of the four participants (E9) framed her response in the terms of others not evaluating her beliefs. 
She expressed, “I might believe in something which you don’t believe in so why should you 
evaluate my belief then.” 
 One of the 24 participants (E23) strongly disagreed with the statement Every belief 
should be evaluated. She stated, “No, everyone is free to believe in whatever they want, they 
shouldn’t be evaluated.” 
 
 
 
 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  224 
Table 63  
Verbal Data on SRMT Statement: Every belief should be evaluated 
Description of Response Participants 
Strongly agree: Pragmatic, to avoid error, improve A20, A25 
Strongly agree: Ideological, necessary E1 
Strongly agree: Misunderstood, likes debate A14 
Agree: No meaningful verbal data E12, A16, A17, E19 
Agree: Pragmatic, positives/negative, progress A3, E6 
Agree: Necessary in a multicultural society A5 
Agree a little: Pragmatic, avoid error, depends on time A7, E18 
Agree a little: Contextual E10 
Agree a little: Evaluating others, important behavior A4 
Agree a little: No meaningful verbal data A11 
Disagree a little: Evaluating others, freedom of belief E13, A21, E22 
Disagree: Evaluating others, freedom of belief A8, E9, E15 
Disagree: General terms, leads to fanaticism E2 
Strongly disagree: Evaluating others, freedom of belief E23 
 
Research Question 3 
 Patterns were identified in the verbal processes produced by participants on the Cornell 
Critical Thinking Test and the Sample Reasoning Mindset Test. These patterns were analyzed to 
address the following research question. 
3. Do undergraduate Lebanese students employ culturally-specific reasoning processes in 
responding to questions on the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z and the Sample 
Reasoning Mindset Test? 
Whether the following patterns should be characterized as “culturally-specific” will be discussed 
in chapter 5. 
Patterns of reasoning on the CCTT 
 A number of patterns were identified in the verbal reasoning processes of participants on 
the CCTT. In section 1, participants were asked to identify, trace, and neutrally evaluate the 
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relationships between statements. The majority of participants demonstrated a pattern of 
selecting answers based on personal opinion/perception of the conclusion and/or overall 
argument. Twenty-two participants provided verbal data in section 1. Twelve participants (E2, 
A3, A5, E6, A8, E9, A11, E13, A14, A17, E23, A25) selected answers based on personal 
opinion. Six participants (E1, A4, A7, E12, E19, A21) neutrally analyzed and evaluate the 
relationship between statements. Three participants (E10, A16, E22) produced a mixture of 
evaluative reasoning based on opinion and the ability to evaluate the relationship between 
statements. One participant’s responses (A20) did not fit into a specific pattern.  
In section 3, question 23, participants generally disregarded the information provided in 
parentheses and failed to identify the credibility of a source as an important factor in establishing 
believability. Fourteen of the 19 participants (E2, A5, A7, A8, E10, E12, E13, A14, E15, E18, 
E19, A20, A21, E23) who provided verbal data paid no attention to the information in the 
parentheses and attempted to answer the question with reference to the italicized statements 
alone. 
 Another pattern that emerged was the propensity to answer inductive questions designed 
to identify best-explanation criteria in the terms of right and wrong. For example, on question 22, 
sixteen of the 18 participants (E1, E2, A3, A5, E6, A7, E10, E13, A14, A16, E18, E19, A20, 
A21, E22, E23) who provided verbal data attempted to determine which statement was correct or 
incorrect instead of evaluating which of the two accurate statements was more believable. On 
question 39, participants were presented three viable experiments and asked to find the “best 
prediction.” Eleven of the 12 participants (E1, E2, A3, A4, E6, A7, E10, E13, A14, A20, A21) 
who provided verbal data selected answers by trying to determine which option was right and 
which options were wrong. Twelve of the 24 participants did not provide meaningful verbal data 
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on question 39. The fact that 50% of participants did not verbalize their thinking processes may 
indicate that participants found this section difficult (Leighton, 2004, 2017). 
 The tendency to frame question in terms of right and wrong as well as participant 
disregard for the additional information provided in parenthesis was consistent with another 
pattern that emerged in the verbal data. Participants consistently attempted to simplify tasks. 
They performed well in comparing simple, straightforward experiments, but on more 
complicated tasks, participants generally either only evaluated one option or used the process of 
elimination to arrive at their conclusion without weighing choices against each other. In addition, 
participants had difficulty navigating questions involving nuance, multiple variables, or the 
consideration of a broader picture.  
 An example of the pattern of evaluating one option and/or the failure to compare answers 
was evident in section 2. The verbal processes in question 11 are representative of the way that 
participants generally approached TAP questions in the section. Two participants (A8, A17) did 
not provide any meaningful verbal data.  Eleven of the 22 participants (E1, E2, A3, A4, A5, A8, 
E9, A11, E15, A17, E23) who provided verbal data did not verbally consider more than one 
choice. Only three of these participants (A4, E9, E15) selected the correct answer. Eleven of the 
22 participants (E6, A7, E10, E12, E13, A14, E19, A20, A21, E22, A25) who provided verbal 
data arrived at their conclusion through the process of elimination. Only four of these 
participants (E6, E13, A14, A21) produced verbal data that demonstrated the process of 
weighing possible answer against each other. The remaining seven participants eliminated 
options individually without comparing answers. In total, 18 of 22 participants did not compare 
the possible choices in the process of determining their answer.  
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In addition, the combination of results from selection responses and verbal data on 
section 2 indicated that 22 out of 24 participants did not understand the nuanced concept of 
equivocation. Verbal data from 14 participants (E1, A4, E6, E9, E10, A11, E12, E13, A14, E15, 
A16, E19, A20, E22) demonstrated a misunderstanding of the concept of equivocation. Three 
participants (E2, A3, A5) never verbally assessed or considered choices related to using a word 
in two ways. Three participants (A8, A17, A25) provided limited or no verbal processing 
although their patterns of answers indicated a misunderstanding or lack of consideration of type 
1 choices. Two participants (A7, A21) produced selection patterns that indicated a general 
misunderstanding of equivocation, although they identified the correct type 1 answer on question 
15. Two participants (E18, A21) asked the moderator to explain the meaning of using a word in 
two ways and then correctly chose multiple type 1 answers.  
Another example of the pattern of simplifying choices and the failure to compare options 
was evident in section 5, question 40. Similar to question 39, participants were instructed to 
choose the “best predictions.” Seven of the 24 participants (A8, E9, A11, E12, A16, A17, E18) 
did not provide meaningful verbal data. Nine of the 17 participants (E2, A3, A4, E6, E10, E19, 
A20, E22, E23) who provided verbal data selected what they believed was the simplest, most 
specific, and most controlled option. Four participants (A7, E13, A14, A25) eliminated options, 
but did not verbally compare answers. Three of these four (A7, E13, A14) questioned the validity 
of the initial statement as the criteria for determining which options were wrong. One participant 
(A21) selected her answer because it was, “Most true.” One participant (E15) guessed. Only two 
participants (E1, A5) selected the correct answer using the criteria stated in the CCTT manual. 
Only one of these two (E1) produced verbal processes that demonstrated the process of 
comparing multiple options in order to determine the best prediction.  
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In sections 4, the majority of participants performed well in simple comparative analysis, 
but found it difficult to navigate questions with variables whose effects were unknown. On 
question 26, thirteen of the 19 participants (E2, A4, A5, A7, E10, A11, E12, E13, E18, E19, 
A20, E22, E23) who provided verbal data accurately analyzed and compared similar experiments 
with different results. On questions 28 and 30, fourteen of the 20 participants (E1, E2, A4, A5, 
E6, A7, E10, A11, A14, A16, E18, E19, A20, E23) who provided verbal data demonstrated the 
ability to identify that information from similar types of reports/experiments supported the 
conclusion of the original experiment. In contrast, on questions 27 and 29 participants 
demonstrated a consistent inability to trace the impact and implications of additional variables. 
On question 27, eighteen of the 19 participants (E1, E2, A3, A4, A5, E6, A7, A8, E9, E10, E12, 
A14, E18, E19, A20, A21, E22, E23) who provided verbal data were not able to identify the 
impact of an additional variable on part of an experimental group. On questions 27 and 29, none 
of the participants who produced meaningful verbal data selected the correct answers for the 
right reasons on both questions.  
Similarly, in section 6, question 43, participants displayed the ability to perform a simple 
analysis but the inability to construct a broader definition. Twenty-one participants provided 
meaningful verbal data on question 43. Twelve of the 21 participants (E1, E2, A3, A4, E6, A8, 
E9, E10, E13, A21, E22, E23) provided verbal data that demonstrated the skill of simple 
analysis. Eight of these 12 participants (E1, A4, A8, E9, E10, A21, E22, E23) accurately 
deduced the details of a specific stock car but were unable to identify the broad, general 
definition. Two of these 12 participants (A3, E6) immediately eliminated the correct answer, 
deduced the details of a stock car, but missed that what was described was not a stock car.  Only 
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two of the 21 participants (E2, E13) who provided meaningful verbal data were able to construct 
a general definition of a stock car using the information provided in the question.  
 Another pattern that emerged was that participants did not demonstrate the ability to 
understand or analyze statements framed in the deductive terms of propositional logic. As stated 
above, in section 1 only six participants demonstrated a consistent ability to neutrally analyze the 
relationship between statements and identify whether or not a conclusion followed necessarily. 
In section 7, none of the participants produced verbal processes that demonstrated the ability to 
identify a gap in syllogistic reasoning or the ability to construct, deconstruct, or analyze 
statements presented in the form of syllogistic, propositional logic.  
Patterns of reasoning on the SRMT 
A number of patterns were identified in participant verbal responses on the SRMT. Three 
SRMT statements lent themselves to meta-reflection on the nature of reality, I need to know the 
reasons why things happen; every belief should be evaluated; and facts are facts, no 
interpretation needed. 
In response to question one, I need to know the reason why things happen, the majority of 
participants who provided meaningful verbal data framed their answers in pragmatic terms and 
did not articulate an interest in a broad understanding of the way the world works. For example, 
seventeen participants (E1, A3, A4, A5, E6, A7, E10, A11, E12, E13, A14, E15, A17, A20, E22 
E23, A25) provided verbal data that clearly justified why they did or did not want to know why 
things happen. Twelve of these 17 participants (E1, A3, A4, A5, E6, A7, E10, E15, A20, E22, 
E23, A25) framed their responses in pragmatic terms such as only wanting to know about things 
that impacted them personally, they could benefit from, would help them manage their lives, or 
would not negatively affect their psychological well-being. Two of the 15 participants (A11, 
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A14) expressed an interest in knowing who is culpable for different events; God, fate, or 
themselves? Only two participants (A17, A20) expressed any sentiment related to a general 
interest or disposition of inquisitiveness about the nature of reality.  
In response to question ten, Every belief should be evaluated, participants did not engage 
in self-reflection. None of the 19 participants who provided meaningful verbal data applied the 
statement, Every belief should be evaluated, to an evaluation of their own personal beliefs. Eight 
of the 19 participants (A4, A8, E9, E13, E15, A21, E22, E23) framed their answers in terms of 
evaluating or judging other peoples’ beliefs. All eight participants expressed that people should 
be free to believe whatever they want. Six of the 19 participants (A3, E6, A7, E18, A20, A25) 
who provided meaningful verbal data responded to the statement in the pragmatic terms of 
general improvement, progress, or avoiding error. Only two participants (E1, A5) provided more 
nuanced responses about the value of considering multiple points of view. The verbal responses 
of the remaining four participants (E2, E10, A14) did not fit into one of the categories stated 
above. 
In response to question seven, given the choice between interpreting the statement as 
Facts are facts, no interpretation necessary, or Facts are facts, no explanation necessary, seven 
Arabic-language participants (A3, A5, A7, A17, A20, A21, A25) understood the meaning of the 
statement as the more straightforward Facts are facts, no explanation necessary. In the verbal 
processes of four Arabic-language participants (A4, A8, A11, A16) it was unclear whether they 
understood the meaning as explanation or interpretation. Only one Arabic-language participant 
(A14) clearly responded to the statement using the more nuanced concept of interpretation. In 
addition, one English-language participant (E12) used the English word interpretation with the 
meaning of explanation. Two English-language participants (E2, E18) equated 
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interpretation/explanation with deception and lies. In total, seven of the 20 participants (E1, E6, 
E10, E13, A14, E19, E22) who provided meaningful verbal data clearly understood the intended 
meaning of the statement and responded to the concept of interpretation.  
Three SRMT statements produced patterns related to the specific understanding of weak-
mindedness, exaggeration, and confusion. Question five, Only weak-minded people change their 
minds, produced the strongest responses from participants. Nineteen of the 23 participants who 
provided meaningful verbal data either strongly disagree (E6, A7, E9, E10, E12, E13, A16, A21, 
E23) or disagreed (E1, A4, A5, A8, E10, A14, E15, E19, E22, A25) with associating weak-
mindedness with changing one’s mind. Thirteen participants (A3, A4, A5, E6, A7, A8, E12, E13, 
A14, E19, E22, E23 A25) responded in general ideological terms as to why it is appropriate 
and/or necessary to change one’s mind. Five participants (E1, E9, E10, E15, E18) responded 
based on the experience of having changed their own mind. Four participants (E2, A16, A17, 
A21) expressed in pragmatic terms that change is for the better.  
In response to question eight, I exaggerate how sure I am of my decisions, none of the 
participants who provided meaningful verbal data framed their answers in the moral terms of 
exaggeration as right or wrong. Four of the participants (A7, A16, A17, A20) provided no 
meaningful verbal data. Four participants (A8, A11, E18, A25) seemed to understand the 
statement as I inform others how sure I am of my decisions. Nine of the 16 participants (A5, E6, 
E9, E10, E12, A14, E15, E19, A21) who provided meaningful verbal data discussed in morally 
neutral terms the use of exaggeration as a tool to convince others or convince themselves of their 
choices. Four of these nine (A5, E6, E12, A21) stated that they have no need to use exaggeration 
as a tool because they are confident in their decisions. Five of these nine (E9, E10, A14, E15, 
E19) stated that they regularly use exaggeration as a tool to convince themselves or others. Five 
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participants of the 16 participants (E2, A3, A4, E13, E23) who provided meaningful verbal data 
framed the responses in the terms of self-protection from the social consequences of being 
wrong. Two of the 16 participants (E1, E22) who provided meaningful verbal data expressed that 
they are not the type of person who shares or discusses their decisions.  
In response to question three, Most of the time I feel confused, the majority of participants 
expressed self-confidence and many of the participants framed confusion as something negative. 
Thirteen of the 24 participants (E1, E6, A8, E10, A11, E12, E13, A14, A17, E19, A20, E22, 
A25) verbally stated that they are generally not confused. Ten participants (E1, A5, E6, A7, A8, 
A14, A17, A21, E22, A25) specifically framed confusion in negative terms such as being 
anxious, mentally unhealthy, or uptight. Four participants (A3, A16, E23) responded neutrally 
stating that sometimes they are confused and other times they are not. Four participants (A4, E9, 
E15, E18) said that they are often confused. One participant (A7) was indifferent to the 
statement. 
Question six, Like everyone else, I say whatever I need to say to get what I want, 
produced particular patterns of responses based on how the participants understood the meaning 
of the question statement. Four participants (A5, A7, A11, A16) did not provide meaningful or 
clear verbal data. The remaining 20 participants framed their responses similarly based on how 
they interpreted the meaning of the statement.  
Six participants (A3, E12, E13, A17, A20, A25) understood the statement to mean Like 
everyone else, I speak up or speak out to get what I want. Five of these 6 participants (A3, E12, 
E13, A17, A20) responded in primarily pragmatic terms. Two participants (E12, E13) disagreed 
with this meaning of the statement because it is sometimes better to be silent in order to get what 
you want or because you should get what you want without having to ask. Two participants 
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(A17, A25) disagreed a little with this meaning of the statement. One of these two participants 
(A17) stated that you should speak out in order to get your point across. One of the participants 
(A25) said that you should sometimes speak out whether or not it will get you something in 
particular. Two participants (A3, A20) strongly agreed because you need to ask in order to get 
what you want.  
Five participants (E2, E9, A14, E22, E23) understood the statement to mean Like 
everyone else, I say what I really think to get what I want. These five participants all framed their 
answers in terms of the social implications of speaking your mind. One participant (E2) strongly 
disagreed and stated that you can never say what you really think because of the social 
consequences. Three participants (A14, E22, E23) agreed a little and expressed that you can say 
what you really think as long as you are in a safe environment without social repercussions. One 
participant (E9) strongly agreed and said that she used to care about the social implications of 
what she said, but no longer cares about the social consequences of speaking her mind.  
Nine participants (E1, A4, E6, A8, E10, E15, E18, E19, A21) understood the intended 
meaning of the statement Like everyone else, I say whatever I need to say to get what I want. 
Five participants (E1, E6, A8, E18, E19) disagreed or strongly disagreed (E1) and framed their 
answers in moral terms. Three participants (A4, E15, A21) disagreed a little and answered with a 
mixture of moral and pragmatic terms. One participant (E10) disagreed a little and answered in 
purely pragmatic terms.  
 Finally, on question nine, I prefer assignments where I am told exactly what to do and 
how to do it, three approximately equal selection patterns emerged. Eight participants either 
disagreed (E6, A17, A20, E23, A25) or disagree a little (E2, E10, E22) based on the values of 
creativity, independence, and self-reliance. Six participants either agreed (A3, A5, A8, A11, 
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E18) or strongly agreed (E19) for the pragmatic reasons that being told makes things easier, 
produces good results, and makes everyone happy. One participant (A16) agreed and simply 
stated, “Definitely, the whole world would prefer that.” Seven participants either disagreed a 
little (E13, A14, A21) or agreed a little (E1, A4, E9, E15) and stated that it depends on the 
assignment or circumstances. Two participants (A7, E12) did not provide meaningful verbal 
data.    
Research Question 4 
 Participants were split into two comparable procedural groups. Twelve participants in 
group A completed the TAP protocol in Arabic. Twelve participants in group B completed the 
TAP protocol in English. Six to nine weeks after completing the first TAP sessions, four 
participants (A4, A11, E12, E13) completed a second TAP session in the alternate language. A 
quantitative analysis of participant choices was utilized to identify differences in scores based on 
language at the item-levels and section-levels. A comparative analysis of the participant TAP 
verbal responses between the two procedural groups and the four repeat sessions was completed 
to answer the following research question.   
4. Do bilingual students use comparable reasoning processes in answering equivalent 
questions in Arabic and English from the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z and the 
Sample Reasoning Mindset Test? 
Linguistic comparison of CCTT reasoning processes 
Frequency tables were used to identify CCTT TAP questions with at least a 15% 
discrepancy between Arabic and English scores.  
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Table 64     
Percentage of Correct CCTT Item-level Scores   
TAP Questions % Correct (English % Correct (Arabic) Total % Correct 
Section 1    
 Question 1 75 75 75 
 Question 2* 50 67 58 
 Question 3 92 83 83 
 Question 6 75 67 71 
 Question 7 67 67 67 
Section 2    
 Question 11 42 42 42 
 Question 12* 8 25 17 
 Question 13* 25 8 17 
 Question 14* 17 33 25 
 Question 15 50 42 42 
Section 3    
 Question 22 8 8 8 
 Question 23* 75 42 58 
Section 4    
 Question 26 67 58 63 
 Question 27* 8 25 17 
 Question 28 83 75 79 
 Question 29* 100 67 83 
 Question 30* 75 58 67 
Section 5    
 Question 39* 17 33 25 
 Question 40 33 42 38 
Section 6    
 Question 43 25 25 25 
 Question 44* 83 33 58 
Section 7    
 Question 47* 50 25 38 
 Question 48* 58 25 42 
 Question 49* 8 33 21 
* At least a 15% difference between scores from Arabic and English TAP sessions 
 
 A series of independent t-tests were run to determine differences in CCTT section level 
scores based on test language. The results showed no statistical differences between section 1 
scores in Arabic (5.25 ± 1.36) and English (4.91 ± 1.38); t(21) = 0.59, p = 0.556; section 2 scores 
in Arabic (3.25 ± 1.06) and English (2.67 ± 1.56); t(22) = 1.07, p = 0.294; section 3 scores in 
Arabic (1.42 ± 1.16) and English (1.08 ± 0.67); t(17.5) = 0.86, p = 0.401; section 4 scores in 
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Arabic (7.17 ± 1.64) and English (7.33 ± 1.37); t(22) = -.027, p = 0.790; section 5 scores in 
Arabic (1.67 ± 0.89) and English (1.08 ± 0.51); t(17.6) = 1.96, p = 0.065. 
section 7 scores in Arabic (2.33 ± 1.56) and English (2.58 ± 1.51); t(22) = -.040, p = 0.693. The 
results showed a significant difference between section 6 scores in Arabic (0.92 ± 0.67) and 
English (2.08 ± 1.08); t(22) = -3.17, p = 0.004. 
Table 65 
T-Test for Equality of Means Results for CCTT Section Scores by Language 
Variables  F Sig. t df Sig 2 MD Std. ED 95% CI 
         Lower Upper 
Section 1 EVA 0.03 0.86 0.598 21.00 0.556 0.341 0.570 -0.844 1.526 
 EVNA   0.598 20.77 0.556 0.341 0.570 -0.846 1.528 
           
Section 2 EVA 0.66 0.43 1.074 22.00 0.294 0.583 0.543 -0.543 1.709 
 EVNA   1.074 19.35 0.296 0.583 0.543 -0.552 1.718 
           
Section 3 EVA 8.19 0.01 0.860 22.00 0.399 0.333 0.388 -0.471 1.137 
 EVNA   0.860 17.54 0.401 0.333 0.388 -0.483 1.149 
           
Section 4 EVA 0.42 0.52 -0.270 22.00 0.790 -0.167 0.618 -1.447 1.114 
 EVNA   -0.270 21.32 0.790 -0.167 0.618 -1.450 1.116 
           
Section 5 EVA 5.45 0.03 1.969 22.00 0.062 0.583 0.296 -0.031 1.198 
 EVNA   1.969 17.65 0.065 0.583 0.296 -0.040 1.207 
           
Section 6 EVA 1.88 0.18 -3.174 22.00 0.004 -1.167 0.368 -1.929 -0.404 
 EVNA   -3.174 18.31 0.005 -1.167 0.368 -1.938 -0.395 
           
Section 7 EVA 0.08 0.78 -0.400 22.00 0.693 -0.250 0.625 -1.546 1.046 
 EVNA   -0.400 21.98 0.693 -0.250 0.625 -1.547 1.047 
Note: EVA = Equal variance assumed; EVNA = Equal variance not assumed;  
Sig 2 = Sig (2-tailed); MD = Mean Difference; Std. ED = Std. Error Diff;  
CI = Confidence Interval 
 
A comparative analysis of collected data was performed to identity different patterns in 
participant responses based on language.  
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Section 1: Deduction 
No differences based on language were evident in the verbal processes of participants on 
section 1. For example, three English-language participants (E1, E12, E19) and three Arabic-
language participants (A4, A7, A21) demonstrated the use of good analytic reasoning. Seven 
English-language participants (E2, E6, E9, E10, E13, E22, E23) and eight Arabic-language 
participants (A3, A5, A8, A11, A14, A16, A17, A25) produced an evaluative response based on 
personal opinion or a mixture of analytic reasoning and evaluative response based on personal 
opinion. Three English-language participants (E1, E9, E23) and four Arabic-language 
participants (A3, A5, A11, A14) evaluated and responded to only one answer on at least 4 out of 
5 TAP questions. Three English-language participants (E6, E10, E19) and three Arabic-language 
participants (A16, A20, A21) considered more than one option and arrived at their answer 
through the process of elimination on at least 4 out of 5 TAP questions.  
On question two, 67% of Arabic-language participants selected the correct answer versus 
50% of English-language participants. The verbal processes showed that an equal number of 
Arabic-language (A4, A7, A21) and English-language (E1, E12, E15) participants used analytic 
reasoning to arrive at the correct answer. The difference in selection choices was the result of 
more Arabic-language than English-language participants personally agreeing with the 
statement.  
Section 2: Meaning & Fallacies 
 Overall, no differences based on language were evident in the verbal processes of 
participants on section 2. For example, all twelve Arabic-language participants and ten English-
language participants (E1, E2, E6, E9, E10, E12, E13, E15, E19, E22) did not understand the 
concept of equivocation.  
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There was at least a 15% difference in scores on question twelve. After accounting for the 
mismarked answer sheet from E23, this difference was eliminated. As a result, three Arabic-
language participants (A16, A21, A25) and two English-language (E18, E23) participants 
selected the type 1 answer. Eight Arabic-language participants (A3, A4, A5, A7, A8, A14, A17, 
A20) and seven English-language participants (E6, E9, E10, E12, E13, E15, E22) selected the 
type 2 answer. One Arabic-language participants (A11) and three English-language participants 
(E1, E2, E19) selected the type 3 answer. The verbal data did not indicate any differences based 
on language on question 12.  
 Although the selection pattern indicated a potential difference in verbal processes on 
question 13, the verbal data did not reveal consistent differences. Four of the five participants 
(A3, E12, E13, E18, E23) who selected the correct option A were English-language participants. 
Three participants (A3, E13, E18) used different, inaccurate thinking processes to arrive at the 
correct answer. Six of the eight participants (E1, E6, A5, A8, A11, A14, A17, A25) who selected 
the incorrect option C were Arabic-language participants. There was no consistent patterns or 
differences in the verbal responses of the Arabic and English participants.  
 Two potential differences were evident in the verbal responses on question 14. Seven of 
the ten participants (E6, E10, E13, E15, E19, E22, E23, A4, A16, A21) who understood the 
statement “hasn’t shown that there are only two alternatives” to mean “hasn’t presented two 
alternative” were English-language participants. Four of the six participants (A5, A11, A14, 
A20, E1, E2) who used the criteria that there are other possible ways to clean water were Arabic-
language participants.   
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Section 3: Observation & Credibility of Sources 
 No differences based on language were evident in the verbal processes of participants on 
section 3. For example, on question 22, four Arabic-language (A3, A7, A20, A21) and four 
English-language (E1, E10, E13, E18) participants misread the data chart and concluded that 
option B was inaccurate. Two Arabic-language (A5, A14) and three English-language (E2, E22, 
E23) participants did not check the data chart. One Arabic-language (A4) and one English-
language (E12) participant used the correct criteria of precision. One Arabic-language (16A) and 
one English-language (19E) participant concluded that both statements were believable. On 
question 23, eight Arabic-language (A5, A7, A8, A14, A17, A20, A21, A25) and eight English-
language (E2, E10, E12, E13, E15, E18, E19, E23) participants attempted to answer the question 
with reference to the italicized statements alone. Two Arabic-language (A3, A4) and three 
English-language (E1, E6, E22) participants accurately evaluated the credibility of the source as 
the criteria for selecting the correct answer.  
There was a 33% difference between correct answers from Arabic and English-language 
participants on question 23. Five of the seven participants (E2, E10, E15, E19, E23, A14, A20) 
who used the conclusion that cabbage worms are poisonous to ducklings as criteria for selecting 
the correct answer B were English-language participants. Other differences in the verbal 
processes were unclear since four Arabic-language participants (A11, A16, A17, A25) did not 
provide meaningful verbal data.  
Section 4: Induction (Hypothesis Testing) 
 No differences based on language were evident in the verbal processes of participants on 
section 4. For example, on question 26, five Arabic-language (A4, A5, A7, A11, A20) and eight 
English-language (E2, E10, E12, E13, E18, E19, E22, E23) participants used analytic reasoning 
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to select the correct answer. On questions 27 and 29, four Arabic-language (A7, A14, A20, A21) 
and five English-language (E2, E18, E19, E22, E23) participants concluded that the additional 
variable had nothing to do with the experiment. On questions 28 and 30, seven Arabic-language 
(A4, A5, A7, A11, A14, A16, A20) and seven English-language (E1, E2, E6, E10, E18, E19, 
E23) participants accurately analyzed the relationship between the reports and the original 
experiment.  
 There was a 17% difference between correct Arabic and English-language participant 
answers on question 27. Although the selection pattern indicated a potential difference in verbal 
processes based on language, the verbal data did not reveal consistent differences. For example, 
18 of the 24 participants selected the incorrect option C, that the additional variable had nothing 
to do with the experiment. Nine of the 18 were Arabic-language participants (A3, A4, A5, A7, 
A8, A14, A16, A20, A21) and nine of the 18 were English-language (E1, E2, E6, E12, E13, E18, 
E19, E22, E23) participants. Of these 18 participants, nine provided verbal data. Four Arabic-
language (A7, A14, A20, A21) and five English-language (E2, E18, E19, E22, E23) participants 
used similar processes to arrive at their answers.   
Section 5: Induction (Planning Experiments) 
 No differences based on language were evident in the verbal processes of participants on 
section 5. On question 39, there was a 15% difference between correct Arabic and English-
language participant answers. Unfortunately, thirteen participants (A5, A8, E9, A11, E12, E15, 
A16, A17, E18, E19, A21, E23, A25) did not provide verbal meaningful verbal data making it 
difficult to compare a significant number of reasoning processes. There were no significant 
differences in verbal processes based on language on question 40.  
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Section 6: Definition & Assumption Identification 
 Although the quantitative analysis indicated a significance difference in section 6 scores 
by language, the verbal data did not demonstrate a significant difference in reasoning processes. 
On question 43, there was no difference in selection patterns and no clear differences in 
verbalized reasoning processes. On question 44, there was a 50% difference between correct 
Arabic and English language answers. Unfortunately, nine participants (A4, A5, E6, A7, A8, 
A14, E15, A16, E23) did not provide meaningful data and seven participants (E1, E9, A11, E12, 
A17, E18, E19) did not provide clear criteria for their selections. Of the remaining eight 
participants, one Arabic-language (A21) and four English-language (E2, E10, E13, E22) 
participants created criteria that was not included in the question. Three Arabic-language 
participants (A3, A20, A25) inaccurately used statements from the question as criteria for their 
selections.  
Section 7: Assumption Identification 
 No differences based on language were evident in the verbal processes of participants on 
section 7. There was at least a 15% difference on correct choices in all three section 7 questions. 
On question 47, there was a 25% difference in Arabic and English language correct answers, but 
there were no significant differences in the verbal reasoning processes. One Arabic-language 
(A4) and one English-language (E15) used analytic processes to arrive at the correct conclusion 
A. One Arabic-language (A7) and one English-language (E22) selected the correct choice by 
eliminating option C because C was not explicitly mentioned in the question. Two English-
language participants (E2, E9) selected the correct answer because they agreed with the 
statements and two English-language participants (E6, E10) created criteria unrelated to the 
instructions in order to select the correct answer. On question 48, there was a 33% difference in 
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Arabic and English language correct answers, but the verbal data did not reveal any significant 
differences in the verbal processes. On question 49, there was a 25% difference in in Arabic and 
English language correct answers, but eleven participants (A3, A5, A7, A8, A11, E12, A14, E15, 
A16, A17, E18) did not provide meaningful verbal data. As a result, it was not possible to 
identify whether there were meaningful differences in the verbal processes based on language. 
Linguistic comparison of SRMT reasoning processes 
  English-language participants scored slightly higher on overall positive scores related to a 
disposition of inquisitiveness (10 English-language vs 8 Arabic-language), open-mindedness (11 
English-language vs 7 Arabic-language), self-confidence (8 English-language vs 7 Arabic-
language) and truth-seeking (8 English-language vs 5 Arabic-language). Arabic-language 
participants scored slightly higher on overall positive scores related to the disposition of maturity 
(8 Arabic-language vs 6 English-language). 
 A comparison of the selection-response choices and verbal data demonstrated no 
significant differences in reasoning processes on the SRMT based on language. For example, on 
item-level responses to question one, I need to know the reasons why things happen, five Arabic-
language (A3, A4, A5, A7, A25) and five English-language (E1, E6, E10, E22, E23) participants 
framed their answers in primarily pragmatic terms. Four Arabic-language (A3, A14, A16, A20) 
and four English-language (E1, E9, E12, E18) participants strongly agreed, four Arabic-language 
(A8, A11, A17, A25) and two English-language (E15, E23) participants agreed, and four Arabic-
language (A4, A5, A7, A21) and four English-language (E2, E10, E19, E22) participants agreed 
a little. Two English-language participants (E6, E13) disagreed a little. Similar patterns of 
selection and verbal processes were replicated in responses to the remaining nine questions. No 
consistent differences based on language were evident. 
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Linguistic comparison of repeat participant processes 
 Four participants (A4, A11, E12, E13) participated in repeat sessions in the alternate 
language. Three out of four participants (P4R, P11R, P13R) scored slightly higher on the 
English-language version of the CCTT. One participant (P12R) received the same score in both 
languages. Two participants (P11R, P13R) had a slightly more positive disposition of 
inquisitiveness score in English compared to Arabic. One participant (P12R) had a slightly more 
positive disposition of inquisitiveness score in Arabic compared to English. One participant 
(P4R) received the same score in both languages. Three out of four participants (P11R, P12R, 
P13R) had a slightly more positive disposition of open-mindedness score in English compared to 
Arabic. One participant (P4R) received the same score in both languages. Two participants 
(P11R, P13R) had a slightly more positive disposition of self-confidence score in English 
compared to Arabic. One participant (P4R) had a slightly more positive disposition of self-
confidence score in Arabic compared to English. One participant (P12R) received the same score 
in both languages. Two participants (P4R, P13R) had a slightly more positive disposition of 
maturity score in English compared to Arabic. Two participants (P11R, P12R) had a slightly 
more positive disposition of maturity score in Arabic compared to English. Three out of four 
participants (P4R, P11R, P13R) had a slightly more positive disposition of truth-seeking score in 
English compared to Arabic. One participant (P12R) had a slightly more positive disposition of 
truth-seeking score in Arabic compared to English. 
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Table 66 
Comparison of Repeat Participants Scores on the CCTT and SRMT 
Participants CCTT Score Inq. OM SC Mat. TS 
A4 25 6 9 6 7 7 
P4R-E 28 6 9 5 8 8 
A11 20 7 5 6 6 6 
P11R-E 23 6 6 7 5 9 
E12 27 6 12 8 7 10 
P12R-A 27 5 9 8 10 11 
E13 22 7 12 12 11 8 
P13R-A 19 8 11 10 9 7 
Inq. = Inquisitiveness; OM = Open-mindedness; SC = Self-confidence; Mat. = Maturity;        
TS = Truth-seeking 
 
Item-level comparison of verbal processes of repeat participants 
 Repeat participant answers were compared to identify item-level differences in selection 
choices on TAP questions. The verbal data from questions where participants selected different 
answers in English and Arabic were compared to explore whether the participants used different 
reasoning processes depending on language.  
 P4 expressed that she is generally more comfortable in English than Arabic. She selected 
different answers on eight out of 24 TAP CCTT questions. On six out of the eight questions, 
there was no difference in the reasoning processes based on language. For example, on question 
15, P4 disagreed with Dobert’s reasoning in the statement. On the English version of the CCTT, 
she selected B, Dobert’s conclusion doesn’t necessarily follow from the reasons he gives. On the 
Arabic version she selected A, there is a serious mistake in the thinking in this part. Although the 
answer choices were different, the participant used similar reasoning processes in both languages 
to conclude that Dobert’s reasoning was wrong. 
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P4 used different reasoning processes on the two TAP questions in section 5. On question 
39 on the English-language CCTT, P4 selected the incorrect answer B because, “K is the easiest 
one…best one to prove.” On the Arabic-language CCTT, she eliminated answer B because, 
“They (the ducklings) can die from something else not related to worms.” On question 40 on the 
English-language CCTT, P4 selected the correct answer C because, “It approaches it as a test to 
prove the prediction.” On the Arabic-language CCTT, she considered all three options 
“complicated.” She selected the incorrect option A because, “If the statement (being tested) is 
saying that all the ducklings that ate will die in 6 hours…then the first one is correct.” In English, 
the participant focused on the best way to prove the prediction. In Arabic, she looked for right 
and wrong answers.  
P4 selected either the same answer or one degree of difference on nine out of 10 SRMT 
questions. She answered with two degrees of difference on question eight, but did not frame her 
answer in different terms. On question seven, Fact are facts, no interpretation necessary, she 
framed her response differently based on language. In English, she focused on not blindly 
following a fact. In Arabic she discussed the importance of emotions in supporting facts.  
P11 was clearly more comfortable in Arabic than English. He selected different answers 
on 13 out of 24 TAP CCTT questions. On seven questions (1, 2, 6, 23, 27, 43, 48), P11 selected 
the opposite answers in Arabic and English. In section 1, P11 answered questions based on his 
personal opinion, but on questions 1, 2, and 6 his opinion in Arabic was different than his 
opinion in English. For example, on question 1, in English P11 stated, “He has the good idea that 
most of the people hasn’t faced these problems should not be able to vote.” In Arabic he said, 
“Yes, it is necessary for an 18-year-old to face these problems and vote.” On question 6, P11 
made reference to the positive contributions made by foreigners in the Arab world. 
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Unfortunately, P11 produced limited verbal processes in Arabic and English making it difficult 
to understand the reasons behind the different choices he made in Arabic and English.  
P11 selected either the same answer or one degree of difference on seven out of 10 
SRMT questions. In general, the verbal data revealed no differences in the reasoning processes 
except that P11 read questions five and six differently in Arabic and English. On question five, 
Only weak-minded people change their minds, in Arabic he stated that those with weak minds 
should change their minds. In English he said that many things can cause a person to change his 
mind. On question six, Like everyone else, I say whatever I need to say to get what I want, in 
Arabic he understood the statement to mean that there are different ways to accomplish different 
goals whereas in English he stated, “No, not important to say whatever to take what you want, so 
I’m not like everyone else.” 
P12 selected different answers on nine out of 24 TAP CCTT questions. The verbal data 
revealed no significant differences in the reasoning processes used to answer the seven of the 
nine questions. On question 39, in English P12 attempted to find the correct choice, not best 
prediction, whereas in Arabic, he selected the best prediction based on the use of clean cages. On 
question 43, in English P12 used a general definition to evaluate the statements, whereas in 
Arabic he immediately eliminated the correct general definition and selected the specific 
description of Bill’s stock car.   
P12 selected either the same answer or one degree of difference on six out of 10 SRMT 
questions. Question eight was the only statement where P12 clearly used different reasoning 
processes according to language. In English he framed exaggeration as a way to get attention, 
whereas in Arabic he stated that he uses exaggeration as a tool to convince others of his decision 
when he is uncertain.  
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  247 
Although P13 scored better in English, he expressed his expectation that he would 
perform better in Arabic. He selected different answers on thirteen out of 24 TAP CCTT 
questions. On two of the 13 questions, the verbal data indicated that he mismarked one of the 
answer sheets and arrived at the same conclusion in both languages. On six of the 13 questions 
where he selected different answers, he used different reasoning processes. Three of these six 
occurred in section two on meaning and fallacies. On question 11, in English he stated, “There 
are only two alternatives,” whereas in Arabic he said, “The correct answer is A, this is wrong 
because he limited himself to two alternatives where there are many alternatives.” On question 
13, in English he arrived at the correct answer using the process of elimination, whereas in 
Arabic, P12 did not compare answers and selected the incorrect option C because “Algan can’t 
know that there was an error made in the investigation.” On question 15, in English he arrived at 
the correct answer using the process of elimination, whereas in Arabic, P12, again, focused on 
one answer, option B, and explained why it was the correct choice.   
On question 22, P13 misread the chart in Arabic and accepted the option A conclusion, 
whereas in English he did not find the experiment’s conclusion believable. On question 30, in 
English he reasoned from the specific to the general, whereas in Arabic he concluded that the 
information did not support the conclusion because the experiments were not identical. Similarly, 
on question 43, in English he created a general definition of a stock car and selected the correct 
answer, whereas in Arabic he focused on the details of Bill’s stock car.  
P13 selected either the same answer or one degree of difference on six out of 10 SRMT 
questions. He framed his responses differently based on language on two questions. On question 
four, Too much education can really mess a person up, in English P13 stated, “Too much 
education enhances the person’s mind…studying more and more will make the person more 
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knowledge and thus he will be more good in several fields or aspects of life.” In Arabic he 
expressed, “Maybe someone studies a lot and has a lot of knowledge and this will lead him to 
dangerous things or he’ll develop weapons or anything dangerous or viruses and he’ll have the 
curiosity to try it and will try it on humanity for example. He will be doing something wrong.” 
On question nine, I prefer assignments where I am told exactly what to do and how to do it, in 
Arabic P13 strongly agreed and focused on his need for a place even if there is room for 
creativity. In English he answer situationally and stated, “There are assignments it is better to 
know how exactly to do it and…there are some assignments that need critical thinking and 
analysis and it would be fun to just think about it and analyze things…and try to find the right 
solution by yourself.” 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This study explored the thinking processes of bilingual Lebanese undergraduate students 
with the aim of identifying the role of culture and contextual factors in critical thinking. Verbal 
data produced through a Think-aloud protocol (TAP) on selected items from the Cornell Critical 
Thinking Test (CCTT) Level Z were analyzed to examine the way that Lebanese students 
framed, interpreted, and answered critical thinking questions designed to measure deduction, 
induction, observation and credibility of sources, assumptions identification, and meaning. In 
addition, verbal data produced through a TAP on selected items from Insight Assessment’s 
Sample Reasoning Mindset Test (SRMT) were analyzed to explore how Lebanese students 
framed and self-reported on questions designed to assess the critical thinking dispositions of 
truth-seeking, open-mindedness, inquisitiveness, critical thinking self-confidence, and maturity.  
A secondary purpose of the study was to examine whether bilingual students used 
comparable processes to answer equivalent critical thinking questions in Arabic and English. 
Participants were divided into two similar procedural groups. One group was administered the 
English-language CCTT and SRMT and produced TAP verbal data in English. A second group 
was administered an Arabic-language translation of the CCTT and SRMT and produced TAP 
verbal data in Arabic (Lebanese dialect). A comparative analysis of the Arabic and English 
verbal data was completed with the goal of identifying linguistic differences in critical thinking 
processes. 
This chapter will discuss the findings of this study in light of conceptual approaches to 
critical thinking, culture and thinking, critical thinking assessment, empirical reviews, and the 
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aspects of Lebanese culture presented in chapter 2. It will then address the limitations of the 
study and possible challenges to the interpretations of the results. It will conclude with 
suggestions for future research and a personal reflection on the overall project.   
 A number of patterns were identified in the thinking processes of participants. This 
project specifically investigated the role of culture in critical thinking. As such, this section will 
begin with a discussion of why participant verbal processes should be labeled culturally-specific 
in light of the aspects of Lebanese culture presented in chapter 2. It will then move to a 
discussion of how the results of this study contribute to the contemporary debate over the 
conceptualization and assessment of critical thinking.  
Discussion of Findings 
Culture and critical thinking skills: The impact of sectarianism 
 The verbal data produced in this study support the claim that sectarianism impacts the 
critical thinking processes of Lebanese undergraduate students. Sectarianism is the sociopolitical 
system in Lebanon where power is divided among ethnoreligious communities according to 
established quotas and where ethnoreligious groups are empowered by the state to create and 
manage their own religious courts and personal status and family laws (Nassar, 1995; Salloukh, 
Barakat, Al-Habbal, Khattab, & Mikaelian, 2015). As such, sectarianism has created an 
educational environment in Lebanon characterized by protectionism (Hage, 1996), fear of 
engagement with diverse worldviews (Shuayb, 2012), and a failure to promote mutual 
understanding and social cohesion (Al-Habbal, 2011). Ethnoreligious leaders who run private 
schools have resisted national initiatives in education aimed at promoting pluralism (Abou 
Assali, 2012; Abouchedid & Nasser, 2002; Frayha, 2010). Conflict avoidance is one of the 
prevailing values in the classroom setting (Abouchedid & Nasser, 2002; Al-Habbal, 2011; 
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Karami Akkary, 2014; Shuayb, 2012). Evidence of the impact of sectarianism was present in the 
verbal data in sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. In CCTT sections 2 and 6, participants generally 
evaluated only one choice or used a simple process of elimination to select their answers. 
Although the process of elimination may be understood as a means of comparing answers, the 
verbal data did not provide evidence of careful deliberation, weighing choices, or considering 
possible alternatives. For example, on question 11 in section 2, 11 of the 22 participants who 
provided verbal data did not verbally consider more than one choice. The remaining 11 
participants arrived at their conclusions through the process of elimination. Seven of these 
participants eliminated options individually without comparing answers. Only four participants 
produced verbal data that demonstrated the process of weighing possible answers against each 
other. In total, 18 of 22 participants did not compare the possible choices in the process of 
determining their answers. In section 3, participants attempted to determine which statements 
were correct or incorrect instead of comparing degrees of believability. In section 5, participants 
attempted to identify the right experiment instead of comparing and weighing the elements of 
possible predictions to determine the best type of experiment. The failure to compare and 
consider multiple points of view is consistent with a sectarian system that reinforces siloed 
thinking and does not encourage constructive dialogue among ethnoreligious groups.  
In addition, in CCTT sections 4 and 6, participants did not engage in global reasoning or 
consider a broad perspective. Global reasoning is a central aspect of critical thinking in both 
objectivist and subjectivist schools of thought (Bailin, 1998; Blatz, 1989; R. H. Ennis, 2015; 
Facione, 1990a; McPeck, 1981; Papastephanou & Angeli, 2007; Paul & Binker Ed., 1990; 
Siegel, 1991; Thayer-Bacon, 1998). In section 4, the majority of participants performed well in 
simple comparative analysis, but found it difficult to navigate questions with variables whose 
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effects were unknown. In section 6, participants were able to perform a simple analysis but 
unable to construct a broad definition. For example, only two of the 21 participants who 
provided meaningful verbal data were able to construct a general definition of a stock car using 
the information provided. The lack of global reasoning or consideration of the impact of 
additional variables was consistent with the sectarianism’s failure to promote pluralism and 
multicultural understanding.  
The evidence from sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 supports the contention that Lebanon’s 
sectarian educational environment promotes narrow thinking and does not develop critical 
thinking skills such as withholding judgment and gathering multiple points of view. The verbal 
data also align with the expectation outlined in chapter 2, that students in a sectarian environment 
would be more concerned with choosing what is perceived as the right answer than providing a 
well-reasoned and reflective response. 
Culture and critical thinking dispositions: The impact of sectarianism 
The verbal data produced in this study support the claim that sectarianism impacts the 
critical thinking dispositions of Lebanese undergraduate students. On SRMT questions two and 
five, participants expressed a general willingness to change their minds. On question two, the 
majority of participants expressed that they would change an uninformed decision or that 
circumstances may require a change of mind. On SRMT question five, the majority of 
participants disagreed with the statement Only weak-minded people change their minds and 
framed a willingness to change their minds as a positive attribute. Even so, only two participants 
expressed that they would change their minds if they were convinced of a different perspective. 
On question five, only one participant stated that a logical argument from a different perspective 
would require a change of mind. None of the participants mentioned the possibility of personal 
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bias or the importance of being tolerant of divergent points of view associated with the 
description of the critical thinking disposition of open-mindedness (Facione et al., 1995). 
Although participants expressed a general willingness to revise and reconsider their decisions, 
they did not indicate a general interest in engaging with multiple perspectives or considering 
more than one viable option.  
In addition, the verbal data from questions one and ten indicated that participants do not 
actively pursue multifaceted understanding. For example, on question one, I need to know the 
reason why things happen, the majority of participants did not articulate an interest in a broad 
understanding of the way the world works. Instead, in more than half of the responses, 
knowledge was framed in the pragmatic terms of personal benefit. In line with the sectarian 
emphasis on conflict-avoidance, 8 of the 19 participants who provided meaningful data on 
question ten, Every belief should be evaluated, expressed that you should not evaluate others’ 
beliefs. None of the 19 participants who provided meaningful verbal data applied the statement 
Every belief should be evaluated to an evaluation of their own personal beliefs. In total, the 
verbal data from questions one, two, five, and ten indicated a general lack of inquisitiveness, a 
disinterest in the beliefs of a others, information framed in terms of self-interest, an avoidance of 
evaluating other points of view, and a failure to engage in self-examination; all characteristics 
consistent with the impact of sectarianism.    
The juxtaposition of participant self-reported willingness to change their minds along 
with a general lack of interest in exploring alternate points of view supports the claim that 
Lebanese schools fail to promote mutual understanding (Abouchedid & Nasser, 2002) and do not 
nurture student dispositions of inquisitiveness and open-mindedness. This dynamic also supports 
Ommering’s (2011) claim that Lebanese students are willing to discuss topics and consider other 
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options, but educators in Lebanon’s sectarian environment do not encourage a spirit of 
exploration, open-discussion, and exposure to multiple points of view. In total, the impact of 
sectarianism on the development of student critical thinking dispositions appears to be a result of 
a lack of training and exposure as opposed to a general disposition of close-mindedness. 
Culture and critical thinking skills: The impact of authoritarianism  
  The verbal data support the claim that authoritarianism impacts the critical thinking 
processes of Lebanese undergraduates. In an authoritarian educational environment, information 
is communicated directly and accepted by students in a top-down manner (Jurdak & El-Amine, 
2005). An authoritarian system does not create space for nuance, exploration of multiple points 
of view, or general questioning (Joseph, 1993). Assessment of student performance is generally 
based on the mastery of subject-matter material. The Lebanese educational system is built on a 
high-stakes test model that requires students to pass a nationally administered test after primary 
school (the Brevet) and secondary school (either the Lebanese Baccalaureate or the French 
Baccalaureate). These official exams emphasize the ability to reproduce information. For 
example, students prepare for the Lebanese official exams by memorizing sets of questions and 
answers in civics, history, and geography. In math and sciences, students are required to 
memorize a set number of equations that they need to be able to reproduce on official exams 
(School-Net Lebanon, www.schoolnet.edu.lb/indeng.htm).   
Evidence of the impact of authoritarianism was primarily present in the processes of 
participants in sections 2, 3, and 5.  In CCTT section 2, participants did not understand the 
nuanced concept of equivocation, a word being used in two ways. Although this 
misunderstanding may indicate a cultural bias in the test, it may also reveal the impact of an 
authoritarian system with no place for nuance in the interpretation and use of language. In CCTT 
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section 3, participants failed to identify the credibility of a source as an important factor in 
establishing believability. Instead, participants framed believability in terms of right and wrong 
and disregarded the information provided in parenthesis. In section 5, participants attempted to 
find the correct prediction instead of evaluating the best prediction. The acceptance of the 
credibility of statements may indicate the impact of an authoritarian system where information is 
taken at face value and then evaluated as either correct or incorrect. Similarly, deficiencies in 
inductive reasoning may be the result of an authoritarian educational environment that 
emphasizes knowledge reproduction and does not promote student-centered exploration and 
analysis.  
Self-confidence and self-regulation 
Self-confidence was evident in participant responses on the CCTT and SRMT. For 
example, 13 of 24 participants indicated that they are rarely confused. A number of participants 
verbally expressed confidence in their decision-making and reasoning processes. Researcher 
field notes taken during the TAP sessions indicated that 16 of the 24 participants exhibited strong 
self-confidence.  
In addition, the coding of the verbal responses on the CCTT and SRMT indicated that 
participants did not engage in the critical thinking skill of self-regulation. Self-regulation is the 
skill to “self-consciously monitor one's cognitive activities, the elements used in those activities, 
and the results educed, particularly by applying skills in analysis and evaluation to one's own 
inferential judgments with a view toward questioning, confirming, validating, or correcting either 
one's reasoning or one's results” (Facione, 1990, p. 19). As outlined above, verbal data from the 
CCTT showed that participants did not generally review, reflect on, or second-guess their 
choices. There were limited examples of self-correction where a participant examined a selection 
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and revised his or her choice after acknowledging an error in reasoning. Participant responses on 
the CCTT and SRMT did not demonstrate a pattern of the self-examination of personal views 
with a sensitivity to the possible influences of personal biases or self-interest (Facione, 2015). 
Participants did not provide evidence of meta-cognitive self-assessment of opinions or the 
willingness to evaluate their own inferential judgements with a view toward questioning or 
correcting their selections. 
Participant self-confidence and a lack of self-regulation may be traced to the impact of 
authoritarianism, where one correct answer is assumed and communicated, as well as the impact 
of sectarianism, where students are not asked to engage with multiple points of view. These 
results may also be the result of an educational system that emphasizes the mastery of clearly 
defined content and does not require students to consistently reflect on their own assumptions. 
Culture and critical thinking skills: Other cultural-specific observations  
 Only 6 of 22 participants demonstrated the ability to consistently reason neutrally in 
CCTT section 1. The general inability to evaluate statements neutrally may be evidence of the 
impact of a social belonging where contradicting the opinion of the “in-group” is perceived as 
threatening. Sectarianism, authoritarianism, and the cultural use of rhetoric may also reinforce a 
sense of confidence in one’s opinion (Wedeen, 1999).  
The concept of follows necessarily from the statements was generally disregarded and did 
not carry normative force in the reasoning processes of the majority of participants. For example, 
the verbal data indicated that participant opinions on whether or not 18 year-olds are mature was 
considered the most important criteria for determining whether or not 18 year-olds should be 
allowed to vote. The majority of participants were not concerned with whether or not 
conclusions follow necessarily from the statements. These results indicate that participants have 
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not generally been trained to approach argument by neutrally evaluating the relationship between 
statements and conclusions and/or do not consider this approach to evaluating arguments 
valuable or necessary. These results support McPeck’s (1981) claim that critical thinking 
assessments are tests that measure a learned accomplishment; in this case, the ability to trace the 
formal logical relationships between statements and conclusions. The verbal data also highlight 
the importance of Paul’s (1985) concept of preductive logic. Paul argues that preductive logic is 
the reasoning humans use consciously or unconsciously to shape a goal or issue before actually 
thinking about the issue. In section 1, participants generally framed their responses and answered 
questions in terms of whether they agree or disagreed with the conclusion in spite of instructions 
which specified a different set of requirements.  
Participants did not produce verbal processes that indicated the use of interdependent, 
dialectical reasoning (Nisbett et al., 2001). There was no evidence that participants attempted to 
find a compromise between opposing options. The majority of participants did not verbally 
consider the social consequences of their choices or take the broad context into account. 
Participants did not engage in the global, contextual reasoning associated with dialectical 
thinking. The verbal data indicated that on items where participants did not have an opinion, they 
engaged in simple, analytic reasoning, but on items where participants had a particular point of 
view, their opinion of the conclusion was more important than the ability to trace the 
relationships between the statements and conclusion. The verbal data did not clarify the sources 
of participant opinions. These results may indicate a need to develop a additional paradigms 
situated between dialectic and analytic thinking. It may also be that the approach used in the 
CCTT and SRMT primed a particular way of thinking that did not allow for an accurate 
assessment of dialectical, interdependent thinking (Varnum et al., 2010).  
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The lack of verbal data in section 5 and 7 indicate that participants found these sections 
difficult (Leighton, 2017). The difficulty of comparative tasks in section 5 may support Chan and 
Yan’s claim (2009) that adaptive rationalities lead to simplifying tasks to make them more 
manageable and may not be an indication of a lack of critical thinking ability.  
The linguistic relativity hypothesis states that the languages humans speak are intricately 
related to the way that people think about and interpret reality  (Dirven & Niemeier, 2000; 
Dragos, 2012; Goddard, 2003; Hussein, 2012; Tohidian, 2009). The results of this study did not 
reveal that test language had an impact on participant reasoning processes. The verbal data 
produced no evidence of differences in Arabic and English reasoning patterns on the CCTT and 
the SRMT. Instead, it produced a relatively even distribution of Arabic and English responses on 
different types of answers throughout both assessments. Similarly, the verbal data from repeat 
participants showed the use of similar reasoning processes on the majority of questions where 
they selected different answers in Arabic and English. The even distribution of participant 
choices across languages and the evidence of similar reasoning processes across languages 
indicates that the form of the questions and structured requirements utilized in the CCTT and 
SRMT had a more significant impact on participant thinking processes than the test language. 
This result supports the contention that test language does not impact the assessment of the 
specific skills and dispositions targeted in the CCTT and SRMT. 
Culture and critical thinking dispositions: Other cultural-specific observations 
The verbal data did not support the hypothesis that the majority of participants would 
frame their responses to the SRMT in collectivist and religious terms. For example, only 9 of 20 
participants responded to the statement I exaggerate how sure I am of my decisions using 
social/relational terms. Only 5 of 16 participants responded to the statement Like everyone else, I 
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say whatever I need to say to get what I want using social/relational terms. Only 3 of 20 
participants responded to the statement I need to know the reasons why things happen in 
religious terms and only one participant made any reference to religion in response to the 
statement Every belief should be evaluated. In addition, the impact of Lebanon’s shame/honor 
culture was not clearly evident in the verbal data from the SRMT. A small number of 
participants stated that they avoid exaggeration based on the fear of being found wrong. 
Although not clearly stated, it may be that the negative responses to the characterization of being 
confused or weak-minded were associated with shame. In total, there was no evidence that 
religious belief, collectivism, or the concept of shame were prominent in the way that 
participants understood and self-reported on what motivates their beliefs and actions. These 
results indicate that either these aspects of Lebanese culture have limited impact on critical 
thinking dispositions; participants are not generally aware of how shame, collectivism, and 
religion impact their beliefs and choices; or that the SRMT is not a useful tool for examining the 
impact of shame, religious belief, and collectivism on critical thinking dispositions. 
The verbal data raise questions about the disposition descriptors used in the SRMT. For 
example, none of the participants produced verbal responses that indicated “intellectual 
curiosity” and a “desire for learning even when the application of the knowledge is not readily 
apparent” (Facione, Sanchez, Facione, & Gainen, 1995, p. 6). Even so, SRMT scores indicated a 
position disposition of inquisitiveness in 18 of 24 participants. Similarly, participants did not 
indicate a “tolerance of divergent views” or a “sensitivity to the possibility of one’s own bias” (p. 
6) associated with open-mindedness. Even so, 18 of 24 participants received scores indicating a 
positive disposition of open-mindedness primarily based on a willingness to change their minds 
if they discovered that their decision was wrong.  
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  260 
In addition, the verbal data demonstrated a significant difference between the intention of 
the statement and the interpretation of the statement on a number of test items. For example, on 
SRMT question eight, the use of exaggeration was meant to indicate a lack of self-confidence, 
but participants did not generally associate exaggeration with confidence. Only 7 of the 22 
participants who provided verbal data on question seven discussed the nuanced concept of 
interpretation in response to the statement Facts are facts, no interpretation needed. Although 
positive responses to the statement Every belief should be evaluated were meant to measure a 
disposition of truth-seeking, participants framed their answers in terms of evaluating others’ 
beliefs or pragmatic interests. Only 9 of the 20 participants who provided verbal data on question 
six understood the intended meaning of the statement Like everyone else, I say whatever I need 
to say to get what I want. 
These results indicate that the items used in the SRMT were not effective for assessing 
the intended critical thinking dispositions among participants. The verbal data also highlight the 
importance of cultural meaning and understanding in the development of statements that target 
the assessment of defined critical thinking dispositions. In addition, the results call into question 
the use of trans-cultural instruments as a means to effectively assess critical thinking dispositions 
in cross-cultural contexts.  
Culture and critical thinking assessment 
 The CCTT is built on the objectivist conceptualization of critical thinking developed by 
Ennis (1962, 2011, 2015). Forty of the 52 CCTT questions assess knowledge of the scientific 
method, propositional forms of deductive logic, and the concept of equivocation. The remaining 
twelve questions are divided as follows: five questions assess the ability to evaluate credibility; 
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three questions assess the ability to identify an error in reasoning; and four questions assess the 
ability to reason from specific information to a general definition.  
The verbal data demonstrated that participants did not answer questions designed to 
assess deductive logic, equivocation, and the linguistic relationship between genus and 
differentia based on the criteria outlined in the CCTT manual. In addition, a number of 
participants were not able to effectively evaluate scientific experiments. In section 1, verbal data 
showed that participant selection choices were not an accurate measure of deductive reasoning. 
Even though participants received their second highest aggregate score in section 1, only 6 of 22 
participants were able to accurately trace the relationship between statements and their 
conclusions. In section 7, none of the 24 participants selected answers based on the description 
of an assumption as a syllogistic gap in reasoning. In section 2, 22 of 24 participants did not 
understand the concept of equivocation. Although 14 of the 24 participants selected the correct 
answer on question 44, none of the 15 participants who provided verbal data used the genus-
differentia criteria for selecting their answers (R, Ennis, personal communication, February 
2018). In addition, sections 4 and 5 of the CCTT primarily assess a test-taker’s knowledge of the 
steps used to plan and evaluate a scientific experiment.  The verbal data in the study indicated 
that participants who scored poorly on sections 4 and 5 generally did not know how to plan or 
assess the validity of a scientific experiment. Although participant selection responses may be an 
indication of weak critical thinking skills, a test-taker who has memorized the steps of the 
scientific method could perform well on sections 4 and 5 without using Ennis’ definition of 
critical thinking as “reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do” 
(Ennis, 2011b, p. 5). 
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The lack of knowledge about deductive formal logic expressed in the verbal data is 
consistent with Davies (2007) claim that it is the basic principles of western critical reasoning 
that are not understood, not necessarily a lack of critical thinking skills. The participants general 
failure to identify all of the elements necessary for a reliable scientific experiment support 
Halpern’s contention that multiple-choice critical thinking tests “are basically tests of verbal and 
quantitative knowledge” (Ku, 2009, p. 73). Participant ignorance of the concept of equivocation 
support Lun, Fischer, and Ward’s (2010) contention that critical thinking scores are less about 
critical thinking and more about language acquisition and background knowledge.  
Critics of the objectivist school of critical thinking claim that objectivist 
conceptualizations represent Western (Papastephanou & Angeli, 2007), scientific (Battersby & 
Bailin, 2011), linear (Bailin, 1995), effective thinking (Smith, 2001); not critical thinking. 
Papastephanou (2011) argues that the skills paradigm primarily assesses the type of skills the 
test-maker determines that people should be able to do well. Norris’ (1989) claims that critical 
thinking assessments actually test whether a test-taker is aligned with the extra-critical-thinking 
assumptions of the test makers. McPeck’s (1981) contends that critical thinking assessments are 
tests that measure a learned accomplishment. 
The verbal data from this study show that participants either did not use or did not 
understand the criteria utilized to assess their critical thinking skills on the CCTT. In many cases, 
the correct selection was not an indication that students used the targeted critical thinking skill. 
For example, as mentioned above, 14 of 24 participants selected the correct answer on question 
44, but the verbal data revealed that none of the participants used the intended criteria as the 
basis for their selection and none of the participants made their selections in section 7 based on 
the CCTT understanding of a gap in reasoning. Participants also received their second highest 
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aggregate score in section 1 even though the majority of participants answered based on their 
personal opinion of the conclusion. As such, this study supports the claim that either Lebanese 
undergraduate students are not skilled critical thinkers or that the CCTT, and by extension 
possibly all objectivist critical thinking assessments, is not an effective instrument for measuring 
critical thinking in the Lebanese context. The way these results are interpreted will be impacted 
by whether one adheres to the objectivist or subjectivist schools of critical thinking outlined in 
chapter 2.  
Culture and critical thinking: Final observations 
  In total, the verbal data revealed a number of examples where similar justifications and 
assumptions employed by participants led to incorrect answers. For example, in section 1, 
participants consistently prioritized their opinion of a conclusion as the primary criteria used to 
justify their answers. In sections 3 and 4, the data revealed shared assumptions such as the 
irrelevancy of parenthetical information and the perceived unimportance of additional variables. 
The verbal data also revealed a pragmatic, instrumentalist view of knowledge, a disposition of 
self-confidence, and a lack of reflective practice. In addition to these patterns, the verbal data 
demonstrated an unfamiliarity with forms of propositional logic, the concept of equivocation, 
and the elements used to evaluate and plan a scientific experiment. Based on the information 
presented in this study, the reader will need to determine the extent to which these patterns 
constitute a deficiency in critical thinking skills and/or dispositions. 
 Finally, these results highlight the limitations of normative critical thinking frameworks 
and critical thinking assessments in non-Western settings. The data also call into question the 
construct relevance of trans-cultural critical thinking tests and indicate that the evaluation or 
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comparison of critical thinking abilities across cultural contexts based on selection response 
assessments should be avoided.  
Limitations of the Research 
 There are a number of limitations associated with this study. TAP protocols are limited, 
general, methodologies. In this project, a number of participants provided incomplete or 
incoherent cognitive data at different times during the sessions. There were also occasional 
verbal gaps in the reasoning processes where it was evident that a non-verbalized, intermediate 
thought had occurred (Someren et al., 1994). The difficulty of certain items appeared to limit the 
verbal processes of select participants. In addition, it was evident that it was easier for some 
participants to verbalize their thoughts than others (Ericsson & Simon, 1998). As such, it may be 
argued that the verbal data presented in this study are not an adequate representation of the 
critical thinking processes used by the participants. It is accurate that the verbal data in this study 
do not represent a picture of the entire cognitive processes utilized by participants. It is also 
possible that participants employed unidentified critical thinking skills during verbal gaps in 
reasoning. Even so, the amount of data produced and the emergence of clearly identifiable 
patterns in the verbal reasoning process of participants support the claims presented in the 
project.   
 A second limitation is that the study interprets and labels the verbal data of participants 
using the aspects of Lebanese cultural outlined in the literature review without verbal data from a 
comparative group from a different culture. It is possible that similar patterns of reasoning could 
be discovered among different cultural groups. As such, it can not be clearly demonstrated that 
the verbal data represent what the researcher labels culturally-specific patterns of reasoning. This 
is a valid critique of the project that requires further research if it is to be addressed. 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  265 
 A third limitation in the study was the use of translated, highly structured critical thinking 
assessments as a means for examining linguistic relativity. This project utilized a domain-
centered approach to explore linguistic relativity. In a domain-centered approach, a researcher 
begins with a certain domain and then asks how various languages encode or construe it. In this 
case, the domain was critical thinking and the project examined how participants constructed 
their answers on the CCTT and SRMT based on their use of English or Arabic. Lucy (1997) 
outlines a number of weaknesses in domain-centered approaches. She highlights the “strong 
pressure to focus on domains that can be easily defined rather than on what languages typically 
encode.” She also states that the focus on a particular domain “tends to give a very narrow and 
distorted view of a language's semantic approach to a situation” and that “analysts typically 
concentrate only on those aspects of meaning that seem relevant to the domain.” She argues that 
“the key question for any domain-centered approach is how the domain has been delineated in 
the first place and what the warrant is for including or excluding particular forms and meanings” 
(p. 299). In the case of this project, it could be argued that the clearly defined forms and structure 
of the CCTT primed participants to think in a particular way irrespective of language. Although 
the SRMT provided a more flexible format for participant responses, the translation problems 
and misunderstandings of statements recorded in the results raise concerns about the 
effectiveness of the tool for assessing linguistic relativity. Again, these are valid concerns. There 
may be more effective, less structured, domain-centered approaches to examine the relationship 
between critical thinking and linguistic relativity. As such, any interpretation of the results in this 
study should be cognizant of these limitations.  
 Similarly, the questions used in the CCTT and SRMT were not designed to assess 
dialectical thinking. As such, the argument that the participants did not engage in dialectical 
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thinking must be tempered by the acknowledgement that the assessments used in the project 
were not primarily designed for this purpose. Even so, the questions in the CCTT sections 1 and 
7, as well as a number of the statements in the SRMT, did present statements situated in social 
contexts. These questions provide situations that can be used to identify differences in dialectical 
and analytical patterns of reasoning. In addition, CCTT section 2 requires participants to assess 
arguments. There was no evidence in the verbal data of participant attempts to find a 
compromise between opposing options. Similarly, CCTT section 3 required participants to 
engage in the broader, contextual reasoning associated with dialectical thinking.  
 As with many qualitative studies, this project used a relatively small number of 
participants from one location. As such, any attempt to generalize to the larger population should 
be avoided. Knight and Nisbett (2007) have shown that it is possible that individuals from 
geographically similar regions may think in different ways. Similarly, Varnum, Grossman, 
Kitayama, and Nisbett (2010) argue that although research may support correlations between 
culture and thought, these correlations may break down on the individual level such that modes 
of thought are expressed in different ways for different individuals within each group. In 
addition, the think-aloud protocol used in this project resulted in limited or incomplete verbal 
data on a number of questions. The small sample size and, at times, limited verbal data makes it 
possible that the analyses of participant verbal processes do not represent the critical thinking 
processes of other Lebanese undergraduate students. Further research must be done to 
substantiate these results.  
 Finally, the CCTT claims to assess particular critical thinking skills using specific criteria 
based on an objectivist conceptualization of critical thinking. This study analyzed and interpreted 
verbal data to address questions that extended beyond the intentions of the test. As such, the 
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conclusions articulated in this study represent starting points for further research, not definitive 
results. Further research is needed to support or revise the project’s conclusions.  
Suggestions for Future Research 
 As stated above, this project represents a starting point for further research. To 
substantiate or challenge the results of this study, replication studies should be performed in 
different cultural contexts. For example, using the same methodology, the analysis of verbal data 
from participants at a similarly situated US university would provide comparative data to help 
clarify whether the thinking processes used in this study are appropriately labeled as culturally-
specific. Since the conclusions did not produce evidence of linguistic relativity, a replication 
study could be conducted in a monolingual environment. A similar discussion of the 
historical/cultural background of each research context would need to be included in any 
replication study in order to accurately situated and analyze the verbal data.   
 Another type of replication study that would substantiate or challenge the results 
presented here would be a similar project conducted at another Lebanese university. A 
replication study could be improved by developing a better translation of the SRMT or attaining 
permission from Insight Assessment to use the California Critical Thinking Dispositions 
Inventory. Considering that the TAP protocol resulted in limited data on particular questions, it 
would be advantageous to recruit at least 30 participants in any replication study. In addition, 
considering only 24 of the 52 CCTT questions were used in the TAP protocol, a replication study 
could flip the think-aloud and non-think-aloud questions to produce verbal data for all 52 CCTT 
questions. The data collected from both studies could be useful in interpreting non-think-aloud 
selection responses.  
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 A third type of replication study that would inform the results presented here would be a 
study where participants receive training in the principles of propositional logic, equivocation, 
and the scientific method before engaging in a TAP session. It would be informative to examine 
whether a simple knowledge of these concepts would produce higher scores and/or different 
reasoning patterns on the CCTT.  
 A fourth type of replication study that would expand the scope of this project could target 
participants in Lebanon from different developmental ages. The CCTT Level X is aimed at 
fourth through fourteenth grade students. The CCTT Level Z is used with advanced and gifted 
high-school students, college students, graduate students, and other adults (Millman et al., 2005). 
A replication study with high-school students using the CCTT Level X and a replication study 
with professionals using the CCTT Level Z would provide data on the role of developmental age 
in the interpretation and use of these research findings.  
 It would also be advantageous to develop new methodological approaches to explore the 
results presented in this project. For example, this study demonstrated weaknesses among 
Lebanese undergraduate students in global reasoning and comparing options. By either 
identifying a currently existing instrument that targets these skills, or developing an appropriate 
instrument, it would be useful to more fully assess these specific skills in the Lebanese 
undergraduate population to see if similar patterns emerge. If similar patterns are identified using 
other approaches, this information could help inform curricular choices and methodological 
strategies that can be used to develop critical thinking in Lebanon. In addition, although this 
study did not provide evidence of linguistic relativity in critical thinking, it would be informative 
to approach the question of linguistic relativity using other methods in order to provide further 
support or to challenge the conclusions presented here.  
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 This project can help inform the practice of cross-cultural critical thinking instruction and 
the assessment of critical thinking skills and dispositions in cross-cultural and multicultural 
contexts. From the lens of a test-maker, the results suggest the need to include non-Western 
voices in the development of critical thinking instruments. From the lens of an administrator, the 
data can be utilized to outline the practical implications and inherent dangers of adopting specific 
approaches in teaching and assessing critical thinking. From the lens of a theoretician, the study 
emphasizes the importance of including culture and context in the ongoing debate over how to 
conceptualize critical thinking. Regardless of whether one adopts an objectivist or subjectivist 
approach, think-aloud protocols can be employed to help identify culturally-specific challenges 
to the development of critical thinking.  
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, as long as the human capacity to think critically continues to be one of the 
goals of education, it is important to situate educational approaches to the development and 
assessment of critical thinking in appropriate social/cultural/political/linguist contexts. This study 
has attempted to trace the boundaries of the critical thinking discussion and introduce the 
complexities of cultural location into the debate. It has also explored the specific educational 
context of Lebanon with the aim of providing data that can assist in the development of 
contextually relevant approaches to promoting critical thinking among Lebanese students.  
 Through the project, I have learned about the values that undergird different 
conceptualization of critical thinking. I have touched on epistemology, cultural psychology, 
sociology, and education. I have developed questions about certain goals in the critical thinking 
movement such as how to balance the educational pursuit of autonomy with social connectivity. 
The study has also raised concerns about prevailing, objectivist approaches to critical thinking, 
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specifically whether critical thinking as a linear, scientific way of knowing is inherently good as 
well as whether objectivist critical thinking skills are transferable to daily life. Through the 
project, I have clarified the challenges I face if I want to promote critical thinking in Lebanon. 
The study has laid the groundwork for a research agenda that I am passionate about and can 
pursue in the next stage of my academic career. Most importantly, I have reconfirmed my belief 
in the importance of critical thinking as a means to navigate the information and challenges in 
our multicultural world. 
  
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  271 
REFERENCES 
 
Abi-Mershed, O. (2010). Trajectories of education in the Arab world: Legacies and challenges. 
(O. Abi-Mershed & Studies, Eds.). New York: New York: Routledge. 
Abouchedid, K., & Nasser, R. (2002). The limitations of inter-group learning in confessional 
school systems: The case of Lebanon. Arab Studies Quarterly, 24(4), 61. 
Abrami, P. C., Bernard, R. M., Borokhovski, E., Waddington, D. I., Wade, C. A., & Persson, T. 
(2015). Strategies for Teaching Students to Think Critically: A Meta-Analysis. Review of 
Educational Research, 85(2), 275–314. http://doi.org/10.3102/0034654314551063 
Akl, L. (2007). The implications of Lebanese cultural complexities for education. Mediterranean 
Journal of Educational Studies, 12(2), 91–113. Retrieved from https://georgefox.idm. 
oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ehh&AN=3258
4181&scope=site 
Al-Habbal, J. S. (2011). The institutional dynamics of sectarianism: Education and personal 
status laws in postwar Lebanon. (Master's Thesis), Lebanese American University, Faculty 
of Arts and Sciences. 
Alexander, P. A., & Laboratory, T. D. R. and L. R. (2012). Reading into the future: Competence 
for the 21st Century. Educational Psychologist, 47(4), 259–280. Retrieved from 
http://10.0.4.56/00461520.2012.722511 
Ali, A. J., Krishnan, K., & Camp, R. C. (2006). A cross cultural perspective on Individualism 
and Collectivism orientations. Journal of Transnational Management, 11(1), 3–16. 
http://doi.org/10.1300/J482v11n01_02 
Ambady, N., & Bharucha, J. (2009). Culture and the brain. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 18(6), 342–345. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01664.x 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  272 
Archer, M., Decoteau, C., Gorski, P., Little, D., Porpora, D., Rutzou, T., Smith, C., Steinmetz, 
G., Vandenberghe, F. (2016). What is Critical Realism? Perspectives, 38(2), 4–9. 
Arslan, S., & Demirtas, Z. (2016). Social emotional learning and critical thinking 
disposition.(Report). Studia Psychologica: Journal for Basic Research in Psychological 
Sciences, 58(4), 276. http://doi.org/10.21909/sp.2016.04.723 
Ayyash-Abdo, H. (2001). Individualism and collectivism: The case of Lebanon. Social Behavior 
and Personality, 29(5), 503. http://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2001.29.5.503 
Bailin, S. (1992). Discovery, justification, and the generalizability question. In The 
Generalizability of critical thinking: Multiple perspectives on an educational ideal (pp. 87–
96). New York: Teachers College Press. 
Bailin, S. (1995). Is critical thinking biased? Clarifications and implications. Educational 
Theory, 45(2), 191–197. 
Bailin, S. (1998). Skills, generalizability and critical thinking (Twentieth World Congress of 
Philosophy). Boston. Retrieved from https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Educ/EducBail.htm 
Bailin, S., & Battersby, M. (2009). Beyond the boundaries: Critical thinking and differing 
cultural perspectives. Ethics and Education, 4(2), 189–200. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/17449640903326805 
Bailin, S., Case, R., Coombs, J. R., & Daniels, L. B. (1999). Conceptualizing critical thinking. 
Journal of Curriculum Studies, 31(3), 285. Retrieved from 
https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true
&db=aph&AN=3811719&scope=site 
Bank., W. (2011). Migration and remittances factbook 2011. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Retrieved from http://site.ebrary.com/id/10430849 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  273 
Barkhuizen, G. P., & Ellis, R. (2005). Analysing learner language. (G. P. Barkhuizen, Ed.). 
Oxford : Oxford. 
Barnett, R. & Society for Research into Higher Education. (1997). Higher education: A critical 
business. Buckingham: Society for Research into Higher Education & the Open University 
Press.Battersby, M., & Bailin, S. (2011). Critical Inquiry: Considering the Context. 
Argumentation, 25(2), 243–253. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9205-z 
Baxter, G. P., & Glaser, R. (1998). Investigating the cognitive complexity of science 
assessments. Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, 17(3), 37–45. 
Bell, D. A. (2000). East meets west: Human rights and democracy in East Asia. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Best Arab Region Universities Rankings. (2017). Retrieved April 28, 2017, from 
https://www.usnews.com/education/arab-region-universities/rankings?int=9e2808 
Black, B. (2012). An overview of a programme of research to support the assessment of critical 
thinking. Thinking Skills and Creativity, 7(2), 122–133. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tsc.2012.04.003 
Blatz, C. V. (1989). Contextualism and critical thinking: Programmatic investigations. 
Educational Theory, 39(2), 107–119. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.1989.00107.x 
Bondy, K. N., Koenigseder, L. A., Ishee, J. H., & Williams, B. G. (2001). Psychometric 
properties of the California Critical Thinking Tests. Journal of Nursing Measurement, 9(3), 
309-327. 
Branch, J. L. (2000). Investigating the information-seeking processes of adolescents: The value 
of using Think Alouds and Think Afters. Library and Information Science Research, 22(4), 
371–392. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0740-8188(00)00051-7 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  274 
Brookfield, S. D. (2011). Teaching for critical thinking: Tools and techniques to help students 
question their assumptions. Chichester: Wiley. 
Browne, M. N., & Keeley, S. M. (1988). Do college students know how to “Think Critically” 
when they graduate? Research Serving Teaching (Vol. 1). Retrieved from 
https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/ 
login.aspx?direct=true&db=eric&AN=ED298442&scope=site 
Buda, R., & Elsayed-Elkhouly, S. M. (1998). Cultural differences between Arabs and 
Americans: Individualism-collectivism revisited. Journal Of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 
29(3), 487–492. http://doi.org/10.1177/0022022198293006 
Camras, L. A., & Fatani, S. S. (2004). Development, culture, and alternative pathways to self-
conscious emotions: A commentary on Tracy and Robins. Psychological Inquiry, 15(2), 
166–170. 
Casey, J. G. (2005). Diversity, discourse, and the working-class student. Academe, 91(4),  
33–36. 
Chan, H. M., & Yan, H. K. T. (2009). Is there a geography of thought for East-West differences? 
Why or why not? In Critical Thinking and Learning (pp. 44–64). 
http://doi.org/10.1002/9781444306774.ch4 
Charters, D., Shweder, R. A., Minow, M., Markus, H. R., & Bledsoe, C. (2004). Engaging 
cultural differences: The multicultural challenge in liberal democracies. D. Charters, R. A. 
Shweder, M. Minow, & H. R. Markus, (Eds.), New York: New York : Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
Cochran, J. (2011). Democracy in the Middle East: The impact of religion and education. 
Lanham, Md.: Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  275 
Colenso, P. (2005). Education, conflict and social cohesion. Compare. Oxford: Taylor & Francis 
Ltd. 
Cuypers, S. E. (2004). Critical thinking, autonomy and practical reason. Journal of Philosophy of 
Education, 38(1), 75–90. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.0309-8249.2004.00364.x 
D’Ancona, C. (2005). Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in translation. In P. Adamson & R. C. 
Taylor (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Arabic philosophy. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge, UK. 
Davies, W. M. (2007). Cognitive contours: Recent work on cross-cultural psychology and its 
relevance for education. Studies in Philosophy & Education, 26(1), 13–42. Retrieved from 
10.1007/s11217-006-9012-4 
De Bono, E. (2006). De Bono's thinking course: Powerful tools to transform your thinking. 
Harlow: BBC Active. 
Dewey, J. (1933). How we think: A restatement of the relation of reflective thinking to the 
educative process,. Boston; New York: D.C. Heath and Co. 
Dirven, R., & Niemeier, S. (2000). Evidence for linguistic relativity. R. Dirven & S. Niemeier, 
(Eds.), Amserdam: Amserdam, NLD: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Dragos, B. (2012). Whorf’s conception of the relation between language and thought: A critical 
examination. Euromentor Journal - Studies about Education, (4). 
Elder, L. (1997). Critical thinking: The key to emotional intelligence. Journal of Developmental 
Education, 21(1), 40. Retrieved from https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http:// 
search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9710086319&scope=site 
Elder, L., & Paul, R. (2002). Critical thinking: Distinguishing between inferences and 
assumptions. Journal of Developmental Education, 25(3), 34. Retrieved from 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  276 
https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true
&db=aph&AN=6482290&scope=site 
Elder, L., & Paul, R. (2007). Critical thinking: The nature of critical and creative thought, Part II. 
Journal of Developmental Education, 30(3), 36–37. Retrieved from 
https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true
&db=aph&AN=25122573&scope=site 
Ennis, Robert H & Weir, E. (1985). The Ennis-Weir critical thinking essay test. Pacific Grove, 
CA: Midwest Publications. 
Ennis, R. H. (1962). A concept of critical thinking. Harvard Educational Review, 32(1), 81–111. 
Retrieved from https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/ 
login.aspx?direct=true&db=ehh&AN=19647375&scope=site 
Ennis, R. H. (1985). A logical basis for measuring critical thinking skills. Educational 
Leadership, 43(2), 44–48. 
Ennis, R. H. (1993). Critical thinking assessment. Theory Into Practice, 32, 179–186. Retrieved 
from 10.1080/00405849309543594 
Ennis, R. H. (1998). Is critical thinking culturally biased? Teaching Philosophy, 21(1), 15–33. 
Retrieved from https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/ 
login.aspx?direct=true&db=phl&AN=PHL1656820&scope=site 
Ennis, R. H. (2011a). Critical thinking: Reflection and perspective part I. Inquiry: Critical 
Thinking across the Disciplines, 26(1), 4–18. Retrieved from https://georgefox.idm. 
oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=phl&AN=PHL2
216120&scope=site 
 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  277 
Ennis, R. H. (2011b). Critical thinking: Reflection and perspective part II. Inquiry: Critical 
Thinking across the Disciplines, 26(2), 5–19. Retrieved from https://georgefox.idm. 
oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=phl&AN=PHL2
216080&scope=site 
Ennis, R. H. (2015). Critical thinking: A streamlined conception. In The Palgrave Handbook of 
Critical Thinking in Higher Education (pp. 31–47). New York : Palgrave Macmillan. 
Ennis, R. H. (2016). Definition: A three-dimensional analysis with bearing on key concepts. In 
OSAA 11 (pp. 1–19). Ontario: University of Windsor. Retrieved from 
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA11/papersandcommentaries/105/?utm_source=
scholar.uwindsor.ca%2Fossaarchive%2FOSSA11%2Fpapersandcommentaries%2F105&ut
m_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages 
Ennis, R. H., & Weir, E. (1989). The Ennis-Weir critical thinking essay test. 1989. Cheltenham, 
Vic.: Hawker Brownlow,. 
Ennis, R., & Norris, S. P. (1990). Cognitive assessment of language and math outcomes. In J. 
Algina & S. M. Legg (Eds.), Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Pub. Corp. 
Entelis, J. P. (1985). Ethnic and religious diversity in lebanon. Society, 22(3), 48–51. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/BF02699028 
Ercikan, K., Arim, R., Law, D., Domene, J., Gagnon, F., & Lacroix, S. (2010). Application of 
think aloud protocols for examining and confirming sources of differential item functioning 
identified by expert reviews. Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, 29(2), 24–35. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-3992.2010.00173.x 
Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1992). Protocol analysis:Verbal reports as data. H. A. Simon, 
(Ed.), Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Retrieved from 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  278 
web.a.ebscohost.com.georgefox.idm.oclc.org/ehost/ebookviewer/ 
ebook/bmxlYmtfXzE3NjFfX0FO0?nobk=y&sid=b47e913e-ea29-4342-ac82-
e62571a18f4d@sessionmgr4010&vid=2&format=EB&rid=1 
Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1998). How to study thinking in everyday life: Contrasting 
think-aloud protocols with descriptions and explanations of thinking. Mind, Culture, and 
Activity, 5(3), 178–186. http://doi.org/10.1207/s15327884mca0503_3 
Evers, C. W. (2007). Culture, cognitive pluralism and rationality. Educational Philosophy & 
Theory, 39(4), 364–382. Retrieved from 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2007.00345.x 
Facione, P. A. (1990a). Critical thinking: A statement of expert consensus for purposes of 
educational assessment and instruction. Research findings and recommendations. 
Facione, P. A. (1990b). The California Critical Thinking Skills Test--College Level. Technical 
Report #1. Experimental validation and content validity. Retrieved from 
https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true
&db=eric&AN=ED327549&scope=site 
Facione, P. A. (1990c). The California Critical Thinking Skills Test--College Level. Technical 
Report #2. Factors predictive of CT Skills. Retrieved from https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/ 
login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eric&AN=ED327550&s
cope=site 
Facione, P. A. (1990d). The California Critical Thinking Skills Test--College Level. Technical 
Report No. 3. Gender, ethnicity, major, CT self-esteem, and the CCTST. Retrieved from 
https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true
&db=eric&AN=ED326584&scope=site 
 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  279 
Facione, P. A., & Facione, N. C. (2002). The California critical thinking skills test: CCTST. 
Millbrae, CA: The California Academic Press. 
Facione, P. A., Facione, N. C., & Giancarlo, C. A. F. (2001). California critical thinking 
disposition inventory : CCTDI. Millbrae, CA: The California Academic Press. 
Facione, P. A., Sanchez, C., Facione, N., & Gainen, J. (1995). The disposition toward critical 
thinking. Journal of General Education, 44(1), 1–25. Retrieved from 
https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true
&db=eric&AN=EJ499944&scope=site 
Fessler, D. M. T. (2004). Shame in two cultures: Implications for evolutionary approaches. 
Journal of Cognition & Culture, 4(2), 207–262. Retrieved from 
http://10.0.4.139/1568537041725097 
Fischer, S. C., Spiker, V. A., & Riedel, S. L. (2009). Critical thinking training for army officers. 
Volume 2: A model of critical thinking. (A.S.I.N.C.S.B. CA, Ed.). 
Fisk, R. (1990). Pity the nation : the abduction of Lebanon. New York: Atheneum: Maxwell 
Macmillan International. 
Follman, J. (2003). Reliability estimates of contemporary critical thinking instruments. Korean 
Journal of Thinking & Problem Solving, 13(1), 73–81. Retrieved from 
https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true
&db=psyh&AN=2003-03628-006&scope=site 
Franck, T. M. (1997). Is personal freedom a Western value? The American Journal of 
International Law, 91(4), 593–627. http://doi.org/10.2307/2998096 
Frayha, N. (2004). Developing curriculum as a means to bridging national divisions in Lebanon, 
In S. Tawil, A. Harley (Eds.), Education, conflict and social cohesion. Paris: Unesco (pp. 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  280 
159-203), International Bureau of Education. 
Frayha, N. (2010). Pressure groups, education policy, and curriculum development in Lebanon a 
policy maker’s retrospective and introspective standpoint. In A. Mazawi, R.G. Sultana 
(Eds.), Education and the Arab 'world': Political projects, struggles, and geometries of 
power (pp. 93-113), New York, NY: Routledge. 
Frisby, C. L. (1992). Construct validity and psychometric properties of the Cornell Critical 
Thinking Test (Level Z): a contrasted groups analysis. Psychological Reports, 71(1), 291. 
Frisby, C. L., & Traffanstedt, B. K. (2003). Time and performance on the California Critical 
Thinking Skills Test. Journal of College Reading and Learning, 34(1), 26–43. 
http://doi.org/10.1080/10790195.2003.10850154 
Gass, S. M., & Mackey, A. (2016). Second language research: Methodology and design. S. M. 
Gass (Ed.), New York: New York : Routledge. 
Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretation of cultures selected essays. (A. C. of L. Societies, Ed.)The 
Interpretation of Cultures. New York: New York : Basic Books. Retrieved from 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu.georgefox.idm.oclc.org/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-
idx?c=acls;cc=acls;rgn=fulltext;idno=heb01005.0001.001;didno=heb01005.0001.001;view
=pdf;seq=13;node=heb01005.0001.001:4.1;page=root;size=100 
Gellatly, A., Rogers, D., & Sloboda, J. A. (1989). Cognition and social worlds. A. Gellatly, D. 
Rogers, & J. A. Sloboda, (Eds.), Oxford, England: New York: Clarendon Press. 
Giancarlo, C. A., & Facione, P. A. (2001). A look across four years at the disposition toward 
critical thinking among undergraduate students. Journal of General Education, 50(1),  
29–55. 
 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  281 
Gilbert, P. (1998). What is shame? In B. Andrews (Ed.), Shame Interpersonal Behavior, 
Psychopathology, and Culture. New York: New York: Oxford University Press. 
Goddard, C. (2003). Whorf meets Wierzbicka: Variation and universals in language and 
thinking. Language Sciences Language Sciences, 25(4), 393–432. 
Goddard, H. (2000). A history of Christian-Muslim relations. Chicago, Ill.: Chicago, Ill.: New 
Amsterdam Books. 
Greenwald, D. F., & Harder, D. W. (1998). Domains of shame: Evolutionary, cultural, and 
psychotherapeutic aspects. In P. Gilbert & B. Andrews (Eds.), Shame Interpersonal 
Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture (pp. 225–245). New York: New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Gumperz, J. J., & Levinson, S. C. (1991). Rethinking linguistic relativity, Current Anthropology, 
32(5), 613-623. 
Gutchess, A. H., Welsh, R. C., Boduroglu, A., & Park, D. C. (2006). Cultural differences in 
neural function associated with object processing. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 6(2), 102–9. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17007231 
Györi, G. (2000). Semantic change as linguistic interpretation of the world. In R. Driven & S. 
Neimeier (Eds.), Evidence for Linguistic Relativity (pp. 71–89). Amserdam: Amserdam, 
NLD: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Ha, F. I., & Tangney, J. P. (1995). Shame in Asian and Western cultures.(Shame and Related 
Emotions: An Interdisciplinary Approach). American Behavioral Scientist, 38(8),  
1114-1131. 
Hage, G. (1996). Nationalist anxiety or the fear of losing your other. Australian Journal of 
Anthropology, 7(2), 121. Retrieved from https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http:// 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  282 
search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9703213101&scope=site 
Hall, R. E. (2004). Intellect, soul and body in Ibn Sina: Systematic synthesis and development of 
the Aristotelian, Neoplatonic and Galenic theories. In D. C. Reisman (Ed.), Interpreting 
Avicenna: Science and Philosphy in Medieval Islam. Leiden: Leiden: Brill. 
Halpern, D. F. (2003). Critical thinking and reasoning: Current research, theory, and practice. In 
D. Fasko (Ed.), Cresskill, N.J.: Hampton Press. 
Halpern, D. F. (2007). Halpern critical thinking assessment using everyday situations. 
Claremont, CA: Claremont McKenna College. 
Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2006). Toward a psychological science for a cultural species. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 1(3), 251–269. Retrieved from 
http://pps.sagepub.com/content/1/3/251.abstract 
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world?(Author 
abstract)(Report). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, 61-135. 
Herrera, L. (2010). Education and ethnography. In A. Mazawi, R.G. Sultana (Eds.), Education 
and the Arab ‘world: Political projects, struggles, and geometrics of power (pp. 117–131). 
New York, N.Y.: Routledge. 
Hofstede, G. H. (1997). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. New York: New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Hussein, B. (2012). The sapir-whorf hypothesis today. Theory Pract. Lang. Stud. Theory and 
Practice in Language Studies, 2(3), 642–646. 
Hutchins, E. (2005). Material anchors for conceptual blends. Journal of Pragmatics, 37(10), 
1555–1577. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2004.06.008 
 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  283 
Ibrahim, R. W., & Howe, D. (2011). The experience of Jordanian care leavers making the 
transition from residential care to adulthood: The influence of a patriarchal and collectivist 
culture. Children and Youth Services Review, 33(12), 2469–2474. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2011.08.019 
Ichikawa, Jenkins, J., & Steup, M. (2017). The analysis of knowledge. Retrieved from 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/knowledge-analysis/ 
Inglis, J. (2003). Medieval philosophy and the classical tradition in Islam, Judaism, and 
Christianity. J. Inglis, (Ed.), London: London . 
Iskifoglu, G. (2014). Cross-cultural equivalency of the California Critical Thinking Disposition 
Inventory. Educational Sciences: Theory and Practice, 14(1), 159–178. Retrieved from 
https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true
&db=eric&AN=EJ1038770&scope=site 
Iskifoglu, G., & Agazade, A. S. (2013). Translation and validation of a Turkish version of the 
California Critical Thinking Disposition Inventory.(Report). Social Behavior and 
Personality: An International Journal, 41(2), 187. 
Jacobs, S. (1995). Technical characteristics and some correlates of the california critical thinking 
skills test, forms A and B. Research in Higher Education, 36(1), 89–108. 
http://doi.org/10.1007/BF02207768 
Jacobs, S. S. (1999). The equivalence of forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills 
Test. Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development, 31(4), 211–222. 
Jarrar, S. A., & Massialas, B. G. (1991). Arab education in transition: A source book. S. A. 
Jarrar (Ed.), New York: New York : Garland Pub. Retrieved from https://books. 
google.com.lb/books?id=gafOCwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  284 
Johanson, A. (1987). Can informal logic courses teach critical thinking: Reflections on McPeck 
and Paul. Retrieved from https://georgefox.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http:// 
search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eric&AN=ED292707&scope=site 
Johnstone, C. J., Bottsford-Miller, N. A., Thompson, S. J., National Center on Educational 
Outcomes MN., M., Council of Chief State School Officers DC., W., & National 
Association of State Directors of Special Education VA., A. (2006). Using the think aloud 
method (cognitive labs) to evaluate test design for students with disabilities and English 
language learners. Technical Report 44. National Center on Educational Outcomes. 
University of Minnesota, 350 Elliott Hall, 75 East River Road, Minneapolis, MN 55455. 
Tel: 612-626-1530; Fax: 612-624-0879; e-mail: nceo@umn.edu; Web site: 
http://education.umn.edu/NCEO/. 
Joseph, S. (1993). Connectivity and patriarchy among urban working-class Arab families in 
Lebanon. Ethos, 21(4), 452–484. 
Joseph, S. (1997). The public/private: The imagined boundary in the imagined nation/state/ 
community. Feminist Review, 57, 73–92. 
Kamens, D. H. (2013). Globalization and the emergence of an audit culture: PISA and the search 
for “best practices” and magic bullets. In PISA, Power, and Policy: The Emergence of 
Global Educational Governance (pp. 117–139). 
Karami Akkary, R. (2014). Facing the challenges of educational reform in the arab world. 
Journal of Educational Change, 15(2), 179–202. http://doi.org/doi:http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1007/s10833-013-9225-6 
Keesing, R. M. (1994). Radical cultural difference: Anthropology’s myth? In M. Pütz (Ed.), 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
     This is a test to see how clearly and carefully you think. 
     There are 52 items. Avoid wild guessing, although it is all right to make shrewd 
guesses when you have good clues. There is one best answer to each item.  
     Mark your answers with a soft pencil on the answer sheet.   
     The test will be divided into Sections I-VII (1-7). In each section, there will be 
questions that are designated as “Think-aloud Questions.” For these questions, you need 
to talk out loud while you solve the critical thinking test problems. The remainder of the 
questions will be designated as “Non Think-aloud Questions.” You do not need to talk 
out loud while you solve these problems. 
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SECTION IA 
In the first five items, two men are debating about voting by eighteen-year-olds. Mr. 
Pinder is the speaker in items 1, 2, and 4. Mr. Wilstings in the speaker in items 3 and 5. Each 
item presents a set of statements and a conclusion. In each item, the conclusion is underlined. Do 
not be concerned with whether or not the conclusions or statements are true. 
Mark items 1 through 5 according to the following system:  
If the conclusion follows necessarily from the statements given, mark A. 
If the conclusion contradicts the statements given, mark B.  
If the conclusion neither follows necessarily nor contradicts the statements given, 
mark C. 
 
If a conclusion follows necessarily, a person who accepts the statements is unavoidably 
committed to accepting the conclusion. When two things are contradictory, they cannot both be 
correct. 
CONSIDER EACH ITEM INDEPENDENTLY OF THE OTHERS.  
 
Think-aloud Questions 
1. “Mr. Wilstings says that eighteen-year-olds haven’t faced the problems of the world, and that 
anyone who hasn’t faced these problems should not be able to vote. What he says is correct, 
but eighteen-year-olds still should be able to vote. They’re mature human beings, aren’t 
they?” 
 
2. “Furthermore, eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote because anyone who will suffer 
or gain from a decision made by the voters ought to be permitted to vote. It is clear that 
eighteen-year-olds will suffer or gain from the decisions of the voters.” 
 
3. “Most eighteen-year-olds don’t know the difference between right and wrong. The right to 
vote should not be possessed by the members of a group if most of them don’t know this 
difference. It is obvious then that eighteen-year-olds shouldn’t have the right to vote.” 
Non Think-aloud Questions 
4. “Many eighteen-year-olds are serving their country. Now there can be no doubt that many 
people serving their country ought to be allowed the vote. From this you can see that many 
eighteen-year-olds ought to be allowed to vote.” 
 
5. “I agree with Mr. Pinder that anyone who will suffer or gain from a decision made by the 
voters ought to be permitted to vote. And it is true that eighteen-year-olds will suffer or gain 
from these decisions. But so will ten-year-olds. Therefore, eighteen-year-olds shouldn’t be 
allowed to vote.” 
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SECTION IB 
In the next five items, the two men are debating about immigration. Mr. Pinder is 
speaking in items 6, 8, and 9.  Mr. Wilstings is speaking in items 7 and 10. 
Use the same system to mark items 6 through 10: 
A. Conclusion follows necessarily from the statements given. 
B. Conclusion contradicts the statements given. 
C. Neither. 
 
CONSIDER EACH ITEM INDEPENDENTLY OF THE OTHERS.  
Think-aloud Questions 
6. “Mr. Wilstings has said that most foreigners have made positive contributions to our country. 
This is true. I will also admit that a group is not bad if most of its members do make positive 
contributions. But don’t be deceived by Mr. Wilstings’ fine-sounding language. Foreigners 
are a bad group and shouldn’t be admitted.” 
 
7. “All of you think it was all right to open our doors to all people from distant lands in the 
nineteenth century. Any person who thinks it was all right to do so at that time ought also to 
be in favor of doing so now. Thus, you ought to be in favor of opening our doors now to 
those from distant lands who are seeking admission to our country.” 
 
Non Think-aloud Questions 
8. “Mr. Wilstings has proposed that we open our doors to all the foreigners who want to enter 
our beloved country. But foreigners always have made trouble and they always will. Most of 
them can’t even speak English. Since anybody who makes trouble is bad, it follows that 
foreigners are bad.” 
 
9. “You may not know it, but for the past ten years the Communists in our country have been 
supporting a policy of unrestricted immigration. It is obvious why they support this policy of 
opening our doors to foreigners. Now I hate to say this, but Mr. Wilstings’ support of this 
policy leaves us but one conclusion: Mr. Wilstings is a Communist.” 
 
10. “I’m sorry that Mr. Pinder feels that way about it. Sure, foreigners make trouble and most of 
them can’t speak English. But even though it’s true that people who make trouble ought not 
to be admitted, we still ought to admit foreigners to our country. You don’t want to be 
selfish, do you?” 
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SECTION II 
The discussion that follows is divided into parts to correspond to items 11 through 21. 
There is faulty thinking going on in each part. Your job for each item is to pick the one best 
reason why the thinking is faulty. 
To take this part of the test, you need not know anything about the chlorination of water 
supplies.  
Think-aloud Questions 
11. DOBERT: I hear that you and some other crackpots are trying to get Gallton to chlorinate its 
water supply. You seem to think that this will do some good. There can be no doubt that 
either we should chlorinate or we shouldn’t. Only a fool would be in favor of chlorinating the 
water, so we ought not do it. 
ALGAN: You are correct at least in saying that we are trying to get the water chlorinated. 
Pick the one best reason why some of this thinking is faulty.  
A. Dobert is mistakenly assuming that there are only two alternatives. 
B. Dobert is using a word in two ways. 
C. Dobert is using emotional language that doesn’t help to make his argument reasonable. 
 
12. DOBERT: I guess you know that to put chlorine in the water is to threaten the health of every 
one of Gallton’s citizens, and that, you’ll admit, is bad. 
ALGAN: What right do you have to say that our health will be threatened? 
DOBERT: “Healthy living” may be defined as living according to nature. Now, we don’t 
find chlorine added to water in nature. Therefore, everyone’s health would be threatened if 
chlorine were added. 
Pick the one best reason why some of this thinking is faulty.  
A. Dobert is using emotional language that doesn’t help to make his argument reasonable. 
B. Dobert’s thinking is in error. 
C. Dobert is using a word in two different ways. 
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Think-aloud Questions 
13. DOBERT: Furthermore, Gallton’s water is pure already. I know this from the report, which 
you haven’t seen yet, that will soon be released by the State Water Survey. 
ALGAN: You can’t know that Gallton’s water is pure. The State Water Survey didn’t test all 
the water that we have available to us. They only took samples. Furthermore, you can’t know 
that they didn’t make an error in their investigation because there’s always a chance for error 
in any investigation. Therefore, you could never know that Gallton’s water is pure. 
Pick the one best reason why some of this thinking is faulty.  
A. Algan is not using “know” in its ordinary sense, yet he is expecting the effect that follows 
from its being used in the ordinary sense. 
B. Dobert, in using secret evidence, is not being fair, since this evidence is not available to 
everyone for inspection. 
C. Algan can’t know that an error was made in the investigation. 
 
14. ALGAN: The question boils down to two alternatives. Either we want clean, chlorinated 
water or we want bad-smelling, disease-ridden water. The citizens of Gallton certainly don’t 
want bad-smelling, disease-ridden water. What is left but to chlorinate?  
Pick the one best reason why some of this thinking is faulty.  
A. Algan hasn’t shown that there are only two alternatives. 
B. Algan is using emotional language that doesn’t help to make the argument reasonable. 
C. Algan is using the same word in two ways.  
 
15. DOBERT: Laying aside the question of whether medication is bad or good, wouldn’t you say 
that you are proposing a plan for medication? 
ALGAN: Not at all. Is killing germs in the water supply the same as treating a disease of the 
human body? Certainly not. Therefore, my plan cannot be called a plan for medication. 
DOBERT: Oh, but it is medication. Isn’t one of your stated goals the prevention of disease? 
Medication is the process of trying to restore or preserve health in any manner whatsoever. 
Whether your plan actually would result in preserving or restoring health doesn’t matter. The 
point is that you would be trying to do so and thus would be medicating people. 
Pick the one best reason why some of this thinking is faulty.  
A. There is a serious mistake in the thinking in this part. 
B. Dobert’s conclusion doesn’t necessarily follow from the reasons he gives. 
C. Dobert and Algan are using the same word differently. 
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Non Think-aloud Questions 
16. DOBERT: I understand that you look on this thing as an experiment. I’m sure that the 
citizens of Gallton don’t want to be guinea pigs in this matter. 
ALGAN: This is a demonstration. Nobody ought to object to a demonstration, since the 
purpose of a demonstration is not to find out something, but rather to show us something that 
is already known. An additional value of this demonstration of chlorination is that its purpose 
is also to test for the long-range effects of chlorination on the human body. This objective of 
the demonstration is a worthy one. 
Pick the one best reason why some of this thinking is faulty.  
A. Algan has not shown that knowing the long-range effects of chlorination is a worthy 
objective. 
B. Algan is using a word in two ways. 
C. There is an error in thinking in this part. 
 
17. DOBERT: Can you prove that chlorination is useful in making water safe? 
ALGAN: Yes, I can. Devton gets its water from the same place that we do. Three years ago, 
Devton had nine cases of typhoid fever. Two years ago they started to chlorinate and they 
had only two cases that year. That’s proof enough.  
Pick the one best reason why some of this thinking is faulty.  
A. Algan is using the same word in two ways. 
B. That’s not a big enough reduction. If there were no typhoid at all the second year, then 
Algan would have proven his statement. 
C. One such comparison is not enough to prove such a statement. 
 
18. DOBERT: In reality, you are proposing to poison our water supply when you propose to put 
chlorine gas in the water. Chlorine gas has been used in war to kill human beings. It is a 
deadly poison. Nobody wants to be poisoned. 
ALGAN: But when chlorine is mixed 3 1/2 parts per million, nobody will be hurt at all. 
DOBERT: That’s not the point. You’d still be putting a deadly poison in the water. That’s 
what it means to poison the water. So anyone drinking the water would necessarily be 
poisoned. 
Pick the one best reason why some of this thinking is faulty.  
A. Algan is missing the point. 
B. Dobert is using the same word in two ways. 
C. Dobert’s thinking is in error. 
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19. DOBERT: Furthermore, Gallton’s water is safe now.  
 
ALGAN: That’s not true. Nothing is safe as long as there’s a conceivable chance for 
something to go wrong. From this it follows that Gallton’s water is not safe.  
Pick the one best reason why some of this thinking is faulty.  
A. Algan has made the word “safe” useless for communicating information. 
B. Algan hasn’t said what he means by “safe.” 
C. There is a flaw in Algan’s thinking. 
 
20. DOBERT: The citizens of Gallton will have to make a choice. Either we want absolutely 
pure water or we should keep our present setup. Now any chemist can tell you that from a 
practical point of view it is impossible to remove all the impurities from a water supply. So 
we should leave things the way they are.  
Pick the one best reason why some of this thinking is faulty. 
A. Dobert hasn’t shown that there are only two alternatives. 
B. Dobert is using the same word in two ways. 
C. The conclusion doesn’t necessarily follow from the reasons given. 
 
21. DOBERT: To add chlorine is to add a drug to Gallton’s water supply. Obviously, we don’t 
want our citizens to be drugged every time they take a drink of water. 
ALGAN: What right do you have to say that chlorine is a drug? 
DOBERT: The term “drug” is defined in section 201 (g) of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act as an article intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, treatment, or prevention of 
disease in man or other animals. Now, since chlorine is intended for use in the prevention of 
disease, it is a drug.  
Pick the one best reason why some of this thinking is faulty.  
A. Dobert’s thinking is in error. 
B. Algan should realize that a person has a right to use a word in a special way. The 
important thing is that there be understanding of what is said. 
C. Dobert is using a word in two different ways. 
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SECTIONS III, IV, AND V 
REFER TO THE FOLLOWING EXPERIMENT: 
 
An experiment was performed by Drs. E. E. Brown and M. R. Kolter in the veterinary 
laboratory of the British Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. The doctors were interested in 
what happens to ducklings that eat cabbage worms. Several cases had been reported to them in 
which ducklings had “mysteriously” died after being in cabbage patches containing cabbage 
worms.  
Three types of ducklings were secured (Mallards, Pintails, and Canvasbacks), two broods 
of each. Each brood was then split into two equal groups as much alike as possible. For a one-
week period they were provided an approved diet for ducklings. All had this diet, except that half 
of each brood were provided something more: two cabbage worms daily per duckling. The 
condition of the ducklings at the end of the week was observed and is reported in the following 
table: 
TYPE OF 
DUCKLING 
ORIGINAL 
NUMBER 
IN BROOD 
REGULAR DIET 
REGULAR DIET 
PLUS WORMS 
  Healthy Ill Dead Healthy Ill Dead 
MALLARD 
8 3 1   2 2 
6 3     3 
PINTAIL 
6 2  1   3 
8 3 1  1  3 
CANVASBACK 
8 4    1 3 
8 3 1   1 3 
TOTALS 44 18 3 1 1 4 17 
 
The doctors drew this conclusion: CABBAGE WORMS ARE POISONOUS TO 
DUCKLINGS.  
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SECTION III 
The experiment attracted a great deal of attention. Many statements were made about the 
experiment and about the protection of ducklings. 
Items 22 through 25 each contain a pair of statements (A & B), which are underlined. 
Read both, then decide which, if either, is more believable.  
Mark items 22 through 25 according to the following system:  
If you think the first is more believable, mark A. 
If you think the second is more believable, mark B. 
If neither statement is more believable than the other, mark C. 
 
In making your decisions, use the information already provided and the information in 
parentheses after each statement. 
Think-aloud Questions 
22. A. Cabbage worms are poisonous to ducklings (said by Dr. Kolter). 
B. Six Canvasbacks died during the week of the experiment (said by Dr. Kolter). 
C. Neither statement is more believable. 
 
23. A.  During the week following the experiment, all of the ill ducklings died. (From an           
article in a magazine that can be found on almost every newsstand. The author, a    
popular international writer, stated that he obtained his information from Drs. Brown and 
Kolter.) 
 
B.  During the week following the experiment, the rest of the worm-fed ducklings died  
     (from the report written by Drs. Brown and Kolter). 
 
C.  Neither statement is more believable. 
 
Non Think-aloud Questions 
24. A. Six Pintails were healthy at the end of the experiment (said by Dr. Brown). 
B. Four worm-fed ducklings were ill at the end of the experiment (said by Dr. Brown). 
C. Neither statement is more believable. 
25. A.  Independent laboratory studies have shown conclusively that ducklings sprayed with  
Wrodane will not be harmed by eating cabbage worms (from an article in a magazine 
published by a chemical company that makes Wrodane). 
 
B. No satisfactory way has yet been found to counteract the poisonous effects of  
cabbage worms on ducklings (from the magazine article mentioned in Item No. 23, which 
appeared two months after the Wrodane article).  
 C. Neither statement is more believable.  
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SECTION IV 
From the original experiment, the doctors drew this conclusion:  
CABBAGE WORMS ARE POISONOUS TO DUCKLINGS.  
 
Mark items 26 through 38 according to the following system:  
A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
C. This information does neither.  
 
CONSIDER EACH ITEM INDEPENDENTLY OF THE OTHERS. 
Think-aloud Questions 
26. The experiment is repeated in Canada with twice as many ducklings. None of the  
ducklings die. At the end of the week, two of the regular-diet ducklings are ill, and three of 
the worm-diet ducklings are ill. 
 
27. It is discovered that during the original experiment the regular-fed ducklings had less  
sunlight than the worm-fed ducklings. It is not known whether or not the difference in 
amount of sunshine would have an effect on the health of ducklings. 
 
28. A group of well-known Canadian duck breeders report that they discovered long ago that  
      it was dangerous to ducklings to let them run in a cabbage patch. 
 
29. It is discovered that both sets of ducklings reached through their cages and drank water  
from a little ditch that ran past both cages. They drank practically no water out of the pans 
that were in the cages. The water in the ditch was ordinary water. 
 
30. A similar experiment is performed with young dogs. Another is performed with young  
turtles. In both cases the results are similar to those of the original duckling experiment. 
 
 
Non Think-aloud Questions 
31. The experiment is repeated. The results are similar. 
 
32. The experiment is repeated with three different varieties of ducklings, which are younger     
than the ones used in the original experiment. At the end of the week, two of the regular-diet 
ducklings are dead, and twenty of the worm-diet ducklings are dead. 
 
33. At the time of the original experiment, there was an apple tree shedding apples into the  
cages of both sets of ducklings. The experimenters did not expect this to happen. About the 
same number of apples fell into each cage. This kind of apple does not affect the health of 
ducklings. 
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Non Think-aloud Questions 
Reminder: Mark these items as follows: 
A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
C. This information does neither.  
 
CONSIDER EACH ITEM INDEPENDENTLY OF THE OTHERS. 
34. The experiment is repeated in Scotland. At the end of the week, all of the worm-fed  
ducklings are dead, and all of the regular fed ducklings are alive and healthy. But it is 
discovered that the man who handled the worms had been spraying fruit trees with arsenic 
and had carelessly transferred some arsenic to the feeding pan of the worm-fed ducklings. 
Arsenic is a deadly poison. 
 
35. A team of expert biologists examines the body structure and processes of ten common  
varieties of ducklings, including the three used in the experiment. The biologists can find no 
significant differences among the varieties examined except for coloring. 
 
36. The experiment is repeated in Canada with three different varieties of ducklings. All of  
the ducklings die, whether worm-fed or not. 
 
37. The experiment is repeated in the United States with twice as many ducklings. At the end  
of the week, 40 of the 44 regular diet ducklings are alive and healthy, and 39 of the 44 worm-
fed ducklings are alive and healthy. 
 
38. It turns out that at the time of the original experiment, a large oak tree was dropping  
acorns into the cages of the worm-fed ducklings only. The effect of this kind of acorn on the 
health of ducklings is not known. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CULTURE AND CRITICAL THINKING  317 
SECTION V 
A research worker sets out to test the truth of the statement:   
IF ANY DUCKLING EATS A CABBAGE WORM,  
THE DUCKLING WILL DIE WITHIN SIX HOURS. 
The research worker has developed an accurate, painless, and non-injurious stomach-
testing method for telling whether a duckling has eaten a cabbage worm during the previous 
twelve hours. The method can be used both with dead ducks and live ducks.  
In planning his experiments, he needs to make some predictions from the above 
statement.  
a. PREDICTIONS TELL WHAT WOULD BE TRUE, IF THE STATEMENT WERE     
TRUE. 
b. PREDICTIONS SHOULD BE USEFUL IN GUIDING AN ACTUAL 
EXPERIMENT.  
Remembering these two rules about predictions, answer items 39 through 42. The items 
refer to the seven possible predictions listed after item 42. 
Think-aloud Questions 
39. Of j, k, and l, which is the best prediction? Mark A for j; mark B for k; mark C for l. 
 
40. Of n, o, and p, which is the best prediction? Mark A for n; mark B for o; mark C for p. 
 
 
Non Think-aloud Questions 
41. Of k, l, and m, which is the best prediction? Mark A for k; mark B for l; mark C for m. 
 
42. Of m, n, and o, which is the best prediction? Mark A for m; mark B for n; mark C for o. 
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Possible predictions: 
j.  If any duckling eats a cabbage worm, the duckling will be dead within six hours, and 
if a stomach test is performed within twelve hours after eating the worm, the results 
of the stomach test will show that the duckling has eaten at least one cabbage worm.  
k. If any duckling does not die within six hours after a given period, then it did not eat       
any cabbage worms during that period.  
l. Suppose six hungry Pintail ducklings are put for one hour in a cabbage patch containing 
cabbage worms and then put in a clean cage for six hours. If any do not die during that 
period, the results of the stomach test will show that these ducklings did not eat any 
cabbage worms.  
m. If one Mallard duckling is selected at random from each of ten different broods, and 
all ten ducklings are kept away from cabbage worms for a twelve-hour period, then 
none will die during the last six hours of the twelve-hour period.  
n. If one Mallard duckling is selected at random from each of six different broods, and 
each selected duckling is fed a cabbage worm, all six ducklings will be dead within six 
hours.  
o. Suppose twelve hungry, randomly selected Canvasback ducklings are turned loose for 
one hour in a cabbage patch containing cabbage worms and then put in a clean cage 
for six hours. If each dies during that period, the results of the stomach tests will show 
that each has eaten a cabbage worm.  
p. If a group of ten healthy Canvasback ducklings that would probably live if not fed 
cabbage worms is randomly split in half, and each half is treated the same except that 
one group of five eats cabbage worms, then the worm-fed ducklings will die within six 
hours and the other ducklings probably will not. 
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SECTION VI 
Items 43 through 46 provide situations in which a definition is called for. From the three 
definitions that follow each description, pick the one (A, B, or C) that best gives the meaning. 
Think-aloud Questions 
43.  “That’s a nice stock car you have there, Bill,” his mother remarked.  
“Stock car!” exclaimed Bill. “That’s no stock car. Did you ever see a car in a dealer’s 
showroom with bumpers made out of heavy pipe? Do the automobile manufacturers turn 
out cars with no fenders? Of course not.”  
Bill’s mother then asked, “Just what do you mean by ‘stock car’?”  
Of the following, which is the best way to state Bill’s notion of a stock car?  
A. A stock car is an automobile that is, for the most part, made of standard parts put 
out by automobile manufacturers, but which might have missing fenders and special 
bumpers. 
B. A stock car is an automobile that has fenders and does not have bumpers made out 
of pipe. 
C. A stock car is a standard automobile, as turned out by the factory and sold to the 
public. 
44.  “It certainly is a stock car,” said Joan. “It has an ordinary engine that hasn’t been changed 
since it came off the assembly line. That alone makes it a stock car and that’s all that 
matters.” 
Of the following, what is the best way to state Joan’s notion of a stock car?  
A. A stock car is an automobile that is, for the most part, made of standard parts put out 
by automobile manufacturers, but which might have the fenders missing and special 
bumpers. 
B. A stock car is an automobile with a standard engine. 
C. A stock car is where the engine is standard. 
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Non Think-aloud Questions 
45.  “What are you making with that dough?” asked Mary’s father. 
“Dough!” exclaimed Mary. “Did you ever see anything made with yeast that was baked 
immediately after it was mixed? Naturally not,” she said as she put the mixture into the 
oven immediately after mixing it. “Therefore, it’s not dough.” “What do you mean by 
‘dough’?” her father asked. 
Of the following, which is the best way to state Mary’s notion of dough?  
A. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients, including yeast. 
B. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients, not baked immediately. 
C. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients, often baked in an oven. 
46.  “Why, of course that’s dough,” said Jim. “You’re making cookies, aren’t you? It’s not 
even called dough unless it’s used for cookies.” 
Of the following, which is the best way to state Jim’s notion of dough?  
A. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients not baked immediately unless used 
for cookies. 
B. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients which is used for cookies. 
C. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients, which is used for cookies unless 
it’s baked immediately. 
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SECTION VII 
In items 47 through 52, someone is speaking, but in each case there is an unstated 
assumption. An assumption is a statement that is taken for granted. From the choices that follow 
each item, select the one (A, B, or C) that is most probably the unstated assumption. Consider 
each item by itself. 
Think-aloud Questions 
47.  MR. ALGAN: The explanation of the misbehavior of Gallton’s present-day crop of 
youngsters is a simple one. These children have been severely punished at some time or 
other. That’s the trouble.  
A. Children who have been severely punished misbehave. 
B. Children who misbehave have been severely punished at some time. 
C. Children who haven’t been severely punished behave properly. 
48.  MRS. DOBERT: Their behavior can be explained by realizing that most of these 
youngsters have never been punished.  
A. Children who are punished behave properly. 
B. Children who behave improperly have never been punished. 
C. Children who have never been punished behave improperly. 
49.  MR. DOBERT: What we should do is never punish them. That would take care of things.  
A. Children who behave badly have been punished at some time. 
B. Children who are punished will misbehave. 
C. Children who behave properly have never been punished. 
Non Think-aloud Questions 
50.  MR. DOBERT: The fact that Gallton’s children have been forced to work explains their 
misbehavior. 
A. Children who have never been forced to work behave properly. 
B. Children who behave improperly have been forced to work. 
C. Children who have been forced to work behave improperly. 
51.  MRS. DOBERT: What we should do is not make them work. Then they would be all 
right. I know it.  
A. Children who are forced to work will misbehave. 
B. Children who are not forced to work will behave properly. 
C. Children who behave properly have not been forced to work. 
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Reminder: Select the one (A, B, or C) that is most probably the unstated assumption. 
52.  MRS. ALGAN: We ought to make them work. That will cure them.  
A. Children who aren’t forced to work will misbehave. 
B. Children who are forced to work will behave properly. 
C. Children who behave properly have been forced to work. 
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 ليماتتع
 
 هذا اختبار لمعرفة مدى الوضوح و الحرص الذي تفكر به.
 
لجيدة. ايح فقرة. تجنب التخمين السريع, لكن لا بأس من التخمينات اللاذعة حين تكون لديك المفات 25هنالك 
 هنالك إجابة واحدة هي الأفضل لكل فقرة.
 
 ) على ورقة الإجابة.2ظلل إجاباتك باستخدام قلم رصاص (رقم 
 
وت أسئلة للتفكير بص. سيتواجد ضمن كل مقطع أسئلة بعنوان "7إلى  1سُيقسَّ م الإختبار إلى مقاطع من 
تبّقى من  إكمال مسائل الّتفكير الّناقد. وما ". ضمن هذه الإسئلة، عليك أن تتكّلم بصوت مسموع أثناءمرتفع
ناء إكمالك أن تتكّلم بصوت مسموع أث ليس عليك". ّتفكير بصوت غير مرتفعللأسئلة الأسئلة ستكون بعنوان "
 لهذا الّنوع من الأسئلة.
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 (أ) 1القسم  
 
قرات ن بلغوا الثامنة عشر. المتحدث في الففي الفقرات الخمس الأولى, يتناقش رجلان حول حق التصويت لم
من  فهو السيد كنعان. تطرح كل فقرة مجموعة 5و  3هو السيد خوري, أما المتحدث في الفقرتين  4و  2, 1
اجات التصريحات و استنتاجا. و في كل فقرة, تم وضع خط تحت الاستنتاج. لا تقلق قيما إذا كانت الاستنت
 أو التصريحات صحيحة أم لا.
 
 وفق النظام التالي: 5إلى  1ظلل الفقرات من 
 
 .أالتصريحات المطروحة, ظلل  يتبع بالضرورةإذا كان الاستنتاج 
 .بالتصريحات المطروحة, ظلل  يناقضإذا كان الاستنتاج 
 . ج, ظلل يناقضهالا التصريحات المطروحة و  يتبع بالضرورة لاإذا كان الاستنتاج 
 
لى , يلتزم الشخص الذي يوافق على التصرحات بالموافقة عضرورة التصريحاتإذا كان الاستنتاج يتبع بال
 الاستنتاج. و إذا كان هنالك أمران متناقضان, فلا يمكن أن يكون الاثنان صحيحين.
 
 عن الفقرات الأخرى. مستقل تأمل كل فقرة بشكل
 
 أسئلة للتفكير بصوت مرتفع
 
جه هذه شرة لم يواجهوا مشكلات العالم, و ان أي شخص لم يوا. "يقول السيد كنعان أن من بلغوا الثامنة ع1
ينبغي تمكين من بلغوا الثامنة عشر من المشكلات لا ينبغي أن يصوت. ما يقوله صحيح, غير أنه 
 . فهم بشر ناضجون, أليس كذللك؟"التصويت
 
ار ص سيعاني من قر لان أي شخ ينبغي السماح لمن بلغوا الثامنة عشر بالتصويت. "بالإضافة إلى ذللك, 2
 منه ينبغي أن يسمح له بالتصويت. من الواضح أن من بلغوا الثامنة عشر تفيدسسييصنعه الناخبون أو 
 سيعانون أو سيستفيدون من قرارات الناخبينن."
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ن أ . "إن معظم من بلغوا الثامنة عشر لا يعرفون الفرق بين الصواب و الخطأ. و حق التصويت لا ينبغي3
من بلغوا  لا ينبغي منحيمتلكه أفراد مجموعة ما إذا كانت غالبيتهم لا تعرف هذا الفرق. من الواضح إذا أنه 
 "الثامنة عشر حق التصويت.
 
 بصوت غير مرتفع للتفكيرأسئلة 
 
هم . "إن العديد ممن بلغوا الثامنة عشر يخدمون بلدهم. و الان ما من شك أن العديد ممن يخدمون بلد4
ن أ ينبغيالعديد ممن بلغوا الثامنة عشر أن يسمح لهم بالتصويت. من هنا تستطيع أن تستنتج أن  ينبغي
 ."يسمح لهم بالتصويت
 
 أن يسمح ينبغي. "اتفق مع السيد خوري أن أي شخص سيعاني من قرار يصنعه الناخبون أو سيستفيد منه 5
ذلك  هذه القرارات أو سيستفيدون منها. لكنله بالتصويت. و صحيح أن من بلغوا الثامنة عشر سيعانون من 
 ."ويتالسماح لمن بلغوا الثامنة عشر بالتص ينبغيلا ينطبق أيضا على من بلغوا العاشرة من عمرهم. لذا, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 623  GNIKNIHT LACITIRC DNA ERUTLUC
 B1 noitceS
 (ب) 1القسم  
 
, و 8, 6قرات في الفقرات الخمس التالية, يتناقش الرجلان حول موضوع الهجرة. يتحدث السيد خوري في الف
 .01و  7, ويتحدث السيد كنعان في الفقرتين 9
 
 :01إلى  6استخدم نفس النظام لتظليل الفقرات من 
 
 التصريحات المطروحة. يتبع بالضرورة الاستنتاج -أ 
 التصريحات المطروحة. يناقضالاستنتاج  -ب 
 .لا هذا و لا ذاك –ج 
 
 عن الفقرات الأخرى. مستقل تأمل كل فقرة بشكل
 
 أسئلة للتفكير بصوت مرتفع 
 
ك أن . "قال السيد كنعان أن معظم الأجانب كانت لهم إسهامات إيجابية في بلدنا. هذا صحيح. و أقر كذل6
ول مجموعة ما لا تعد سيئة إذا كان معظم أفرادها ذوي إسهامات إيجابية. لكن عليكم ألا تنخدعوا بمعس
 "و لا ينبغي السماح لهم بالدخول. بارة عن مجموعة سيئةالأجانب عالكلام الذي يقوله السيد كنعان. 
 
ن التاسع . "جميعكم يعتقد أنه كان لا بأس من فتح أبوابنا لجميع الناس القادمين من مناطق بعيدة في القر 7
غي ينبعشر. و أي شخص يعتقد أنه لا بأس بذلك في ذلك الوقت ينبغي عليه أيضا أن يؤيد ذلك الآن. لذا, 
 ."د فتح أبوابنا الآن للقادمين من بلدان بعيدة ممن يسعون بدخول بلدناعليكم تأيي
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 أسئلة للتفكير بصوت غير مرتفع
 
ن الأجانب . "اقترح السيد كنعان أن نفتح أبوابنا لجميع الأجانب الذين يرغبون بدخول وطننا الحبيب. غير أ8
. و لما ئما. فمعظمهم لا يستطيعون حتى التحدث نالإنجليزيةقد تسببوا دائما بالمتاعب و سيتسببون بذلك دا
 ."الأجانب عبارة عن مجموعة سيئةكانت أية فئة تتسبب بالمتاعب تعتبر فئة سيئة, فإن ذلك يعني أن 
 
ة الهجرة . "قد لا تعرفون ذلك, غير أنه في السنوات العشرة الماضية كان الشيوعيون في بلدنا يؤيدون سياس9
ول ذلك, إن أسباب تأييدهم لهذه السياسة في فتح الأبواب أمام الأجانب واضحة. أكره الآن أن أقبلا قيود. 
 ."يوعيشالسيد كنعان غير أن تأييد السيد كنعان لهذه السياسة لا يترك لنا سوى استنتاجا واحدا, و هو أن 
 
عب و لأجانب يتسببون بالمتا. آسف لشعور السيد خوري بهذه الطريقة تجاه ذلك الموضوع. بالتأكيد أن ا01
لا انه معظمهم لا يتحدثون الإنجليزية. و رغم أنه من الصواب عدم السماح لمن يخلقون المتاعب بالدخول, إ
 لا اعتقد أنكم أنانين, أليس كذلك؟ ."لا يزال لزاما علينا السماح للأجانب بدخول بلدنا
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زء. . و هنالك تفكير خاطئ يجري في كل ج12إلى  11الية إلى أجزاء ترتبط بالفقرات تنقسم المناقشة الت
 .اختيار افضل سبب جعل التفكير خاطئاوظيفتك بالنسبة لكل فقرة هي 
 
 حاجة لك لمعرفة أي شيء حول عملية إضافة الكلور للمياه. لالأخذ هذا الجزء من الاختبار, 
 
 أسئلة للتفكير بصوت مرتفع
 
 ياض: سمعت انك و بعض المعتوهين الآخرين تحاولون دفع ولاية جّيان لإضافة الكلور لمياهها.ر  . 11
 ويبدو أنكم تعتقدون أن ذلك سيكون مجديا. ما من شك انه ينبغي علينا اما أن نعمل على إضافة
لينا فعل الكلور أو ألا نعمل على ذلك. الأحمق فقط هو من يؤيد إضافة الكلور للمياه, لذا لا ينبغي ع
 ذلك.
 
 آدم: أنت مصيب على الأقل في قولك أننا نحاول إضافة الكلور للمياه.
 
 يجعل بعض هذا التفكير خاطئا. سبباختر افضل 
 
 يفترض رياض خاطئا أن ثمة خيارين فقط. –أ 
 يستخدم رياض كلمة بطريقتين.  –ب 
 يستخدم رياض لغة عاطفية لا تساعد في جعل نقاشه منطقيا. –ج 
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رياض: اعتقد أنكم تعلمون أن وضع الكلور في المياه سيهدد صحة كل واحد من مواطني جّيان, و  . 21
 هذا أمر سيئ و تقرون بأنه سيئ.
 
 آدم: ما الذي يمنحك الحق بالقول أن صحتنا ستكون مهددة؟
 
لى ى الكلور مضافا إرياض: يمكن تعريف "الحياة الصحية" بأنها العيش وفق الطبيعة. و نحن لا نر 
 المياه في الطبيعة. لذا, فان صحة كل فرد ستكون مهددة إذا جرت إضافة الكلور.
 
 يجعل بعض هذا التفكير خاطئا. سبباختر افضل 
 
 يستخدم رياض لغة عاطفية لا تساعد في جعل نقاشه معقولا. –أ 
 تفكير رياض يأخذ مسارا خاطئا. –ب 
 مختلفتين.يستخدم رياض كلمة بطريقتين  –ج 
 
ه بعد رياض: إضافة إلى ذلك, فإن مياه جّيان نقية. و أنا أعرف ذلك من التقرير الذي لم تتطلع علي . 31
 و الذي سيتم نشره قريبا من قبل دائرة مسح المياه الخاصة بالولاية.
 
فرة لدينا, تو آدم: لا يمكنك أن تعرف أن مياه جّيان نقية. فدائرة مسح المياه لم تختبر جميع المياه الم
 فهم لم يأخذوا سوى عينات. إضافة إلى ذلك, أنت لا تستطيع معرفة أنهم لم يرتكبوا خطأ ما في
فحصهم لان هنالك دائما فرصة للخطأ في كل فحص. لذا, لا تستطيع معرفة فيما إذا كانت مياه 
 جّيان نقية.
 
 يجعل بعض هذا التفكير خاطئا. سبباختر افضل 
 
جم عن كلمة "تعرف" بمعناها المعتاد. و مع ذلك فإنه يتوقع أن يكون السبب النا لا يستخدم آدم –أ 
 استخدامها في سياقه الصحيح.
ق لم يكن رياض منصفا باستخدامه دليلا سريا ذلك الأن الدليل ليس في متناول كل فرد للتحق –ب 
 منه.
 ص.لا يستطيع آدم أن يعرف فيما إذا كان قد تم ارتكاب خطأ في الفح –ج 
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ريد مياها آدم: المسألة ينطوي عليها خياران. اما أننا نريد مياها نظيفة و مزودة بالكلور, أو أننا ن . 41
حة و ناقلة كريهة الرائحة و ناقلة للأمراض. و بالتأكيد أن مواطنو جّيان لا يريدون مياها كريهة الرائ
 ضافة الكلور؟للأمراض. فما الذي تبقى لنا سوى أن نقوم بعملية إ
 
 يجعل بعض هذا التفكير خاطئا. سبباختر افضل 
 
 لم يوضح آدم أن هنالك خيارين فقط. –أ 
 يستخدم آدم لغة عاطفية لا تساعد في جعل النقاش معقولا. –ب 
 يستخدم آدم نفس الكلمة بطريقتين. –ج 
 
طرح م جيدا, ألا تقول أنك ترياض: لو وضعنا جانبا مسألة إن كانت المعالجة الطبّية أمرا سيئا أ . 51
 خطة للمعالجة الطبّية؟
 
آدم: على الاطلاق, هل يعد قتل الجراثيم الموجودة في المياه مشابها لمعالجة مرض في الجسم 
 الطبّية. البشري؟ بالتأكيد لا. لذا, لا يمكن أن نسمي خطتي خطة للمعالجة
 
ذكرتها هو الوقاية من المرض؟ و الطبّية. اليس احد اهدافك التي  رياض: لا بل هي معالجة
نينا فيما الطبّية هي عملية محاولة استعادة الصحة أو حمايتها بأية وسيلة مهما كانت. لا يع المعالجة
 إذا كانت خطتك بالفعل ستعمل على حماية الصحة. ما يعنينا هو أنك ستحاول فعل ذلك و بالتالي
 فإنك ستعمل على معالجة الناس.
 
 جعل بعض هذا التفكير خاطئا.ي سبباختر افضل 
 
 هنالك خطأ خطير في التفكير في الجزء. –أ 
 أن استنتاج رياض لا يتبع بالضرورة الأسباب التي يطرحها. –ب 
 يستخدم رياض و آدم نفس الكلمة بشكل مختلف. –ج 
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 أسئلة للتفكير بصوت غير مرتفع
 
رغبون جّيان لا ي  عتبارها تجربة. و أنا واثق أن مواطنيرياض: ما أفهمه أنك تنظر لهذه المسألة با . 61
 في أن يكونوا حقل تجارب في ذلك.
 
آدم: هذا توضيح للموضوع. و ما أحد ملزم بالاعتراض على توضيح ما, بما أن الهدف منه ليس 
التوصل إلى شيء ما, بل توضيح شيء نعرفه مسبقا. و القيمة التي يضيفها هذا التوضيح الخاص 
ر على فة الكلور تتمثل في أنه يهدف أيضا إلى اختبار الآثار طويلة الأمد لعملية إضافة الكلو بإضا
 جسم الإنسان. و هذه الغاية من التوضيح تعد ذات أهمية.
 
 يجعل بعض هذا التفكير خاطئا. سبباختر افضل 
 
 ات قيمة.لم يوضح آدم أن معرفة الآثار طويلة الأمد لعملية اضافة الكلور هي غاية ذ –أ 
 يستخدم آدم كلمة ما بطريقتين. –ب 
 هنالك خطأ ما في التفكير في هذا الجزء. –ج 
 
 رياض: هل تستطيع اثبات أن عملية اضافة الكلور مفيدة في جعل المياه آمنة؟ . 71
 
سنوات,  مياهها من نفس المكان الذي نأخذ منه. قبل ثلاث  دانّيةآدم: نعم, استطيع ذلك. تأخذ ولاية 
 حالات مصابة بحمى التيفوئيد. قبل سنتين, بدأوا باضافة الكلور و سجلت لديهم 9 دانّيةلت سج
 حالتان في تلك السنة. و هذا دليل كافي.
 
 يجعل بعض هذا التفكير خاطئا. سبباختر افضل 
 
 يستخدم آدم نفس الكلمة بطريقتين. – -أ 
اتا على ما يد في السنة الثانية, لقدم آدم إثبهذا ليس دليلا كافيا. إذا لم تسجل و لا حالة تيفوئ –ب 
 قاله.
 مقارنة واحدة مثل تلك لا تعد كافية لإثبات ما يقوله. –ج 
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خدام رياض: في الواقع أنت تقترح تسميم مياهنا حين تقترح إضافة الكلور إلى المياه. لقد جرى است . 81
 لا أحد يرغب بأن يتم تسميمه. غاز الكلور في الحرب لقتل البشر. انه سم قاتل, و
 
 و نصف لكل مليون, لن يتضرر أحد. 3آدم: لكن حين يجري مزج الكلور بنسبة 
 
م رياض: هذا ليس بيت القصيد, فالواقع انك تضع سما قاتلا في المياه. و هذا ما تقصده من تسمي
 المياه. لذا فإن أي شخص يشرب الماء سيتسمم بالضرورة.
 
 بعض هذا التفكير خاطئا. يجعل سبباختر افضل 
 
 أن آدم يخرج عن بيت القصيد. –أ 
 يستخدم رياض نفس الكلمة بطريقتين. –ب 
 تفكير رياض يأخذ اتجاها خاطئا. –ج 
 
 رياض: اضافة إلى ذلك, فان مياه جّيان تعتبر آمنة الآن. . 91
 
. من هنا نستنتج آدم: هذا ليس صحيحا. لا شيء آمن طالما أن هنالك فرصة سانحة لوقوع خطأ ما
 أن مياه جّيان ليست آمنة.
 
 يجعل بعض هذا التفكير خاطئا. سبباختر افضل 
 
 جعل آدم من كلمة "آمنة" كلمة غير مفيدة لنقل المعلومة. –أ 
 لم يقل آدم ما يعنيه من كلمة "آمنة". –ب 
 هنالك عيب في تفكير آدم. –ج 
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لينا أن ن الاختيار. إما أننا نريد مياها نقية تماما أو أنه ينبغي عرياض: سيتوجب على مواطني جّيا . 02
 –من وجهة نظر عملية  –نحتفظ بوضعنا الحالي. يمكن لأي كيميائي أن يخبرك أنه من المستحيل 
 إزالة جميع الشوائب من المياه. لذا ينبغي علينا أن نترك الأمور كما هي.
 
 اطئا.يجعل بعض هذا التفكير خ سبباختر افضل 
 
 لم يوضح رياض أن هنالك خيارين فقط.  –أ 
 يستخدم رياض نفس الكلمة بطرقتين. –ب 
 أن الاستنتاج لا يتبع بالضرورة الأسباب المطروحة. –ج 
 
طنينا رياض: أن اضافة الكلور تعني إضافة دواء لمياه جّيان. من الواضح أننا لا نرغب بمداواة موا . 12
 كلما أرادوا شرب المياه.
 
 آدم: ما الذي يمنحك حق القول بأن الكلور عبارة عن دواء؟
 
ء و (ز) من القانون الفيدرالي للغذاء و الدوا 102رياض: إن اصطلاح "دواء" تم تعريفه في القسم 
نسان من المرض في الإ الوقايةمواد التجميل كمادة يقصد بها الاستخدام في التشخيص أو العلاج أو 
هو و الآن, لما كان الغرض من الكلور هو استخدامه للوقاية من المرض, فأو غيره من الحيوانات. 
 يعد دواء.
 
 يجعل بعض هذا التفكير خاطئا. سبباختر افضل 
 
 تفكير رياض يأخذ اتجاها خاطئا. –أ 
 على آدم أن يدرك أن للمرء الحق باستخدام كلمة ما بطريقة خاصة. فالمهم ما يقال. –ب 
 طريقتين مختلفتين.يستخدم رياض كلمة ب –ج 
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 ارجع للتجربة التالية:
 
ثروة السمكية قام كل من الدكتور براون و الدكتور كولتر بتجربة في مختبر البيطرة التابع لوزارة الزراعة و ال
لهما تقارير  دان الملفوف. و قد نقلتالبريطانية. و قد كان الاثنين مهتمين بما يحدث لفراخ البط التي تأكل دي
 عن العديد من الحالات التي ماتت فيها فراخ البط "بشكل غامض" بعد أن وضعت في مزرعة ملفوف تحتوي 
 على ديدان الملفوف.
 
تقسيم  أنواع من فراخ البط (البري, و البلبول, و الامريكي) مجموعتان من كل نوع. و تم 3تم الحصول على 
ذاء مجموعتين متساويتين و متشابهتين إلى اقصى حد ممكن. كما تم تزودها لمدة اسبوع بغ كل مجموعة إلى
متفق عليه خاص بالبط. و تم تقديم هذا الغذاء للجميع عدا أن نصف كل مجموعة جرى تزويدها بشيء 
 إضافي: دودتي ملفوف يوميا لكل فرخ بط. و تمت ملاحظة حالة فراخ البط في نهاية الاسبوع و جرى 
 تسجيلها في الجدول التالي:
 
العدد الأصلي  خذاء معتاد خذاء معتاد + الديدان
 في المجموع
 نوع البط
 مريض ميت
بصحة 
 جيدة
 مريض ميت
بصحة 
 جيدة
  
 بري 8 3 1   2 2
  6 3     3
 لبلبو 6 2  1   3
  8 3 1  1  3
 امريكي 8 4    1 3
  8 3 1   1 3
 المجموع   44 81 3 1 1 4 71
 
 الاستنتاج التالي: تعد ديدان الملفوف غذاء ساما لفراخ البط. توصل الاثنان إلى
 533  GNIKNIHT LACITIRC DNA ERUTLUC
 3 noitceS
 3القسم  
 
 لبط.لقد لفتت التجربة الكثير من الإهتمام, وسادت العديد من التصريحات حولها وحول سبل حماية فراخ ا
ي جرى وضع خط تحتها. على زوج من التصريحات (أ و ب), والت52إلى  22تشتمل كل من الفقرات من 
 إقرأهما و حدد بعد ذلك أيهما أصدق.
 
 وفق النظام التالي: 52إلى  22ضع إشارة على الفقرات من 
 
 .أأصدق, ظلل  الأولإذا كنت تعتقد أنَّ التصريح 
 .بأصدق, ظلل  الثانيإذا كنت تعتقد أنَّ التصريح 
 .جأصدق من الآخر, ظلل  منهماأّي  لم يكنإذا 
 
 لقراراتك, استخدم المعلومات الموجودة والمعلومات الواردة بين قوسين بعد كل تصريح. لدى اتخاذك
 
 أسئلة للتفكير بصوت مرتفع
 
 (قالها الدكتور كولتر) تعد ديدان الملفوف سامة لفراخ البط - أ . 22
 (قالها الدكتور كولتر). بطات أمريكية خلال الأسبوع الأول من التجربة 6ماتت  - ب    
 ليس أّي من التصريحين أصدق من الآخر. - ج   
 
كن , (من مقالة في مجلة يمخلال الأسبوع الذي أعقب التجربة, ماتت جميع فراخ البط المريضة - أ . 32
نُه قد أوقد صرَّح كاتب المقالة وهو كاتب دولي  .العثور عليها على جميع رفوف بيع المجلات تقريبا  
 ن براون وكولتر).حصل على المعلومات من الدكتوري
 . خلال الأسبوع الذي أعقب التجربة, ماتت باقي فراخ البط التي تغذت على الديدان - ب
 (من تقرير كتبه الدكتورين براون و كولتر).
 ي من التصريحين أصدق من الآخر.أليس  - ج    
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 أسئلة للتفكير بصوت غير مرتفع
 
 (قالها الدكتور براون) ل بصحة جيدة لدى نهاية التجربةبطات من نوع البلبو  6كانت  - أ . 24
  فراخ من البط التي تغذت على الديدان مريضة في نهاية التجربة 4كانت  - ب
 (قالها الدكتور براون)
 ليس أي من الصريحين أصدق من الآخر. - ج     
 
ن ى رشها بمادة الرودان لأظهرت دراسات مخبرية منفصلة بشكل حاسم أنَّ فراخ البط التي جر  - أ . 52
(من مقالة في مجلة نشرتها شركة للمواد الكيماوية تصنع مادة  .تتأذى من أكل ديدان الملفوف
 الرودان).
 بط.ال لم يتم بعد العثور على طريقة مرضية لمواجهة الآثار السامة لديدان الملفوف على فراخ - ب
 ظهرت بعد شهرين من مقالة مادة الرودان)., و التي 32الة المجلة المذكورة في الفقرة (من مق
 ليس أي من التصريحين أصدق من الآخر. - ج    
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  توصل الدكتوران من التجربة الأولى إلى الإستنتاج التالي:
 تعد ديدان الملفوف مادة سامة لفراخ البط.
 
 وفق النظام التالي: 83إلى  62ظلل الفقرات من 
 
 ت صحيحة, فإن هذه المعلومة تؤيد الإستنتاج.إذا كان -أ 
 فإن هذه المعلومة تخالف الإستنتاج., إذا كانت صحيحة -ب 
 هذه المعلومة لا تؤيد الإستنتاج ولا تخالفه. -ج 
 
 .الفقرات الأخرى  عن تأمل كل فقرة بشكل مستقل
 
 أسئلة للتفكير بصوت مرتفع
 
وع, ف عدد فراخ البط, ولم يمت أي منها. في نهاية الأسبجرت إعادة التجربة في كندا باستخدام ضع . 62
 فراخ ممن تغذوا على الديدان. 3مرض فرخين ممن تناولوا الطعام المعتاد. ومرضت 
 
شمس اكتشف أنه خلال التجربة الأولى كانت الفراخ التي تناولت الطعام المعتاد قد تعرضت لضوء ال .72
كمية  ذت على الديدان, ولا يعرف فيما إذا كان الإختلاف فيفترة أقل مما تعرضت له الفراخ التي تغ
 الإشعاع الشمسي له أثر على صحة الفراخ أم لا.
 
ة ذائعة الصيت من مربي طيور البط أنهم اكتشفوا قبل ذلك بفترة طويلة خطور  كندية تقول مجموعة . 82
 ترك فراخ البط في مزارع الملفوف.
 
مدت رؤوسها عبر قضبان الأقفاص وشربت المياه من حفرة صغيرة  قد اكتشف أن مجموعتي الفراخ . 92
قفاص, كانت تمر بالقرب من القفصين. وعمليا  فإن تلك الفراخ لم تشرب من الأواني الموجودة في الأ
 والمياه التي كانت في الحفرة كانت مياها عادية.
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تجربة أخرى على سلاحف صغيرة. في  تم إجراء تجربة مشابهة على كلبّين صغيرين. وأجريت . 03
 بط.الحالتين كانت النتائج مشابهة لتلك التي تمخضت عن التجربة الأولى التي أجريت على فراخ ال
 
 أسئلة للتفكير بصوت غير مرتفع
 
 تأمل كل فقرة بشكل مستقل عن الفقرات الأخرى.
 
 تم إعادة التجربة, وكانت النتائج مشابهة.  . 13
 
تي التجربة باستخدام ثلاثة أنواع مختلفة من فراخ البط أصغر سنا  من تلك الأنواع ال تم إعادة . 32
م استخدمت في التجربة الأولى, في نهاية الأسبوع, مات فرخان من فراخ البط التي تناولت الطعا
 المعتاد, ومات عشرون فرخا  ممن تغذوا على الديدان.
 
لى ثمة شجرة تفاح ترمي بثمارها إلى الأقفاص التي تحتوي عفي فترة إجراء التجربة الأولى, كان   .33
 في مجموعتي البط. لم يتوقع القائمون على التجربة حدوث ذلك. وقد سقط نفس عدد التفاحات تقريبا  
 كل قفص. هذا النوع من التفاح لا يؤثر على صحة فراخ البط. 
 
لى عول, ماتت جميع فراخ البط التي تغذت جرت إعادة التجربة في سكتلنده. وفي نهاية الأسبوع الأ . 43
 الديدان, و ظلت الفرخ التي تغذت بالطعام المعتاد حية و بصحة جيدة.
رنيخ لكن اكتشف أن الشخص الذي كان يقوم بتّغذيتها بالديدان كان يرش الأشجار الفاكهة بمادة الز 
 ذى على الديدان. ويعتبروقد نقل بعض تلك المادة إلى الإناء المخصص لإطعام الفراخ التي تتغ
 الزرنيخ مادة سامة قاتلة.
 
عروفة قام فريق من الخبراء البيولوجيين بفحص البنية الجسدية والعمليات التي تتم في عشر أنواع م .53
لعثور على من فراخ البط بما فيها الأنواع الثلاثة التي إستخدمت في التجربة. ولم يتمكن الخبراء من ا
 ن الأنواع التي ُأجريت عليها التجربة عدا عن اختلافات في اللون.اختلافات واضحة بي
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 : ظلل هذه الفقرات كما يلي:تذكير
 
 إذا كانت صحيحة, فإن هذه المعلومة تؤيد الأستنتاج. - أ
 إذا كانت صحيحة, فإن هذه المعلومة تخالف الأستنتاج. - ب
 فه.هذه المعلومة لا تؤيد الأستنتاج ولا تخال - ج
 
واء سجرت إعادة التجربة في كندا باستخدام ثلاثة أنواع مختلفة من فراخ البط. و قد ماتت جميعها  . 63
 تلك التي تغذت على الديدان أو التي لم تتغذى عليها.
 
 04يَّ جرت إعادة التجربة في الولايات المتحدة باستخدام ضعف عدد فراخ البط.في نهاية الأسبوع, بق . 73
فرخا   93 فرخا  تغذوا على الطعام المعتاد على قيد الحياة وبصحة جيدة, بينما بقيَّ  44بين  فرخا  من
 فرخا  تغذوا على الديدان على قيد الحياة وبصحة جيدة . 44من بين 
 
فراخ  تبين أنه في فترة إجراء التجربة الأولى كانت ثمة شجرة بلوط كبيرة تلقي بثمارها إلى أقفاص . 83
 تتغذى على الديدان فقط. ولم يعرف أثر هذا النوع من الثمار على صحة فراخ البط.البط التي 
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 يشّرع باحث بفحص صحة التصريح التالي:
 إذا قام أي فرخ بط بأكل دودة ملفوف, فإن الفرخ سيموت خلال ست ساعات.
 
ط قد بلمعدة في سبيل معرفة فيما إذا كان فرخ قام الباحث بتطوير أسلوب دقيق وغير مؤلم ولا ضار لفحص ا
لبط أكل دودة ملفوف خلال الساعات الأثنتي عشرة الماضية. يمكن استخدام هذا الأسلوب مع كل من فراخ ا
 الميتة والحية.
 
  التصريح الوارد أعلاه.في تخطيطه لتجاربه, يحتاج لعمل بعض التنبؤات من 
 
 , إذا كان التصريح صحيحا .تقول التنبؤات بما سيكون صحيحا   -أ 
 ينبغي أن تكون التنبؤات مفيدة في توجيه إجراء تجربة حقيقية. - ب
 
إلى  , تشير هذه الفقرات24إلى  93متذكرا  هاتين القاعدتين الخاصتين بالتنبؤات, أجب على الفقرات من 
 .24التنبؤات السبعة المحتملة التي أدرجت بعد الفقرة 
 
  مرتفعأسئلة للتفكير بصوت 
 
 .ل. من الفقرات ي و ك و ل, أيهم  يعد أفضل التنبؤات؟ سجل أ للفقرة ي و ب للفقرة ك و ج للفقرة 93
 
 . من الفرات ن و س و ع, أيهم يعد أفضل التنبؤات؟ سجل أ للفقرة ن و ب للفقرة س و ج للفقرة ع.04
 
 أسئلة للتفكير بصوت غير مرتفع
 
 م. عد أفضل  التنبؤات؟  سجل أ للفقرة ك و ب للفقرة ل و ج للفقرة. من الفقرات ك و ل و م, أيهم ي14
 
 .. من الفقرات م و ن و س, أيهم يعد أفضل التنبؤات؟ سجل أ للفقرة م و ب للفقرة ن و ج للفقرة س24
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 التنبؤات المحتملة:
ساعات, وإذا جرى فحص المعدة خلال  6خلال خ بط يأكل دودة ملفوف, فإنه سيموت إذا قام أي فر   .ي
ساعة بعد أكل الدودة, ستظهر نتائج فحص المعدة أن الفرخ قد أكل دودة ملفوف واحدة على  21
 الأقل.
 
 ترة.ساعات بعد فترة محددة فإنه لم يأكل أي دودة ملفوف خلال تلك الف 6إذا لم يمت أي فرخ خلال  ك. 
 
خ من بط البلبول لمدة ساعة في مزرعة ملفوف تحتوي على ديدان فرا 6افترض أنه قد جرى وضع  ل. 
ساعات. إذا لم يمت أي من الفراخ خلال تلك  6ملفوف, وجرى بعدها وضعه في قفص نظيف لمدة 
 الفترة, ستظهر نتائج فحص المعدة أن هذه الفراخ لم تأكل أي من ديدان الملفوف.
 
عشر مجموعات مختلفة, و تم إيعاد كافة الفراخ ال 01من إذا جرى انتقاء فرخ بط بري بشكل عشوائي  م. 
ساعات من فترة الأثنتي  6منها لن تموت خلال آخر  ايأساعة, فإن  21يدان الملفوف لمدة عن د
 عشرة ساعة.
 
مجموعات مختلفة, و تم تغذية كل فرخ منها  6اذا جرى انتقاء  فرخ بط بري بشكل عشوائي من  ن. 
 ساعات. 6خ الستة ستموت خلال االفر  بدودة ملفوف, فإن جميع
 
مدة فرخا  جائعا  من فراخ البط أمريكي جرى انتقاؤها بشكل عشوائي ل 21افترض أنه قد جرى اطلاق  س. 
 6ملفوف تحتوي على ديدان ملفوف, وجرى بعدها وضعها في قفص نظيف لمدة للساعة في مزرعة 
ج فحص المعدة ستظهر أن كل فرخ قد أكل مات كل فرخ خلال تلك الفترة, فإن نتائ ساعات. إذا
  دودة ملفوف.
 
فراخ بط أمريكي بصحة جيدة إلى النصف والتي   01إذا جرى تقسيم عشوائي لمجموعة تتكون من  ع. 
دا ربما كانت ستعيش إذا لم تتم تغذيتها بديدان الملفوف, و تمت معاملة كل نصف بنفس الطريقة ع
موت غذيتها بديدان الملفوف, فإن الفراخ التي أكلت الديدان ستفراخ قد جرى ت 5عن أن مجموعة من 
 ساعات ومن المحتمل ألا تموت الفراخ الأخرى. 6خلال 
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صف, مواقف تستدعي تعريفا  ما, من بين التعريفات الثلاثة التي تعقب كل و  64إلى  34تطرح الفقرات من 
 والذي يعطي أفضل المعنى.اختر تعريفا  واحدا  (أ أو ب أو ج) 
 
 أسئلة للتفكير بصوت مرتفع
 
 ",قالت أمه.طارق "إنها سيارة جميلة تلك التي مطورة لديك هناك يا  . 34
يع متعجبا . تلك ليست سيارة مطورة. هل سبق لك رؤية سيارة في معرض لب طارق "سيارة مطورة! قال 
 هل تنتج مصانع السيارات سيارات بدون  من الأنابيب الثقيلة؟ مصنوعة السيارات تتمتع بدعامات
 رفارف؟ بالطبع لا."
 
 بالسيارة المطورة؟"تعنيه بعد ذلك:"ما الذي  طارق تسأل أم 
 
 عن السيارة المطورة ؟ طارق من بين التصريحات التالية, أي الطرق تعد الأفضل لتوضيح فكرة 
 
ف عليها تنتجها مصانع السيارة المطورة هي مركبة صنعت أكثر أجزائها من قطع متعار  -أ 
 السيارات, لكنها قد تفتقد للرفارف و الدعامات الخاصة.
 السيارة المطورة هي مركبة تحتوي على رفارف ولا تحتوي على دعامات مصنوعة من أنبوب. -ب 
 السيارة المطورة هي سيارة اعتيادية تبقى كما خرجت من المصنع وتباع للعامة. -ج 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 343  GNIKNIHT LACITIRC DNA ERUTLUC
 6 noitceS
منذ أن  عليه تغيير . "فهي تشتمل على محرك اعتيادي لم يطرأماياقول تها بالتأكيد سيارة مطورة." "إن . 44
 خرج من خط للتجميع. و هذا وحده يجعلها سيارة مطورة وهذا كل ما يعنينا."
 
 حول السيارة المطورة؟ مايامن بين التصريحات التالية, أي الطرق تعد الأفضل لتوضيح فكرة 
 
ة المطورة هي مركبة صنعت أكثر أجزائها من قطع متعارف عليها أنتجتها مصانع السيار  -أ 
 السيارات,لكنها قد تفتقد للرفرف والدعامات الخاصة.
 . مطورة هي مركبة ذات محرك اعتياديالسيارة ال -ب 
 السيارة المطورة هي حيثما وجدَّ محرك إعتيادي. -ج 
 
 أسئلة للتفكير بصوت غير مرتفع
 
 الذي تفعليه بتلك العجينة؟",سأل والد ماري. "ما . 54
 
ن أبعد  "عجينة! قالت ماري متعجبة."هل سبق لك أن رأيت شيئا  مصنوعا  من القمح جرى خبزه فورا  
 لت ذلك وهي تضع المزيج في الفرن فورا  بعد مزجه. "لذا, فهذه ليستتم مزجه؟ بالطبع لا." قا
 عجينة؟"
 والدها. بالعجينة ؟"سأل تعنيه"ما الذي 
 
 من بين التصريحات التالية أي الطرق تعد الأفضل لتوضيح فكرة ماري حول العجينة؟
 العجينة هي مزيج من الطحين و المكونات الأخرى بما فيها القمح. -أ
 العجينة هي مزيج من الطحين و المكونات الأخرى لا يتم خبزها فورا . -ب 
 الأخرى و التي غالبا  يتم خبزها في الفرن. العجينة هي مزيج من الطحين و المكونات -ج 
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م لك, أليس كذلك؟ إنها لا تسمى عجينة ما ع. "أنت تصنعين الكزين"بالطبع تلك ليست عجينة" قال  . 64
 تستخدم في صنع الكعك."
 
 حول العجينة؟ زينمن بين التصريحات التالية, أي الطرق تعد الأفضل لتوضيح فكرة 
 
مت في ة هي مزيج من الطحين والمكونات الأخرى التي لا يتم خبزها فورا , إلا إذا استخدالعجين –أ 
 صنع الكعك.
 العجينة هي مزيج من الطحين و المكونات الأخرى التي تستخدم في صنع الكعك. –ب 
ذا العجينة هي مزيج من الطحين والمكونات الأخرى التي يتم استخدامها في صنع الكعك, إلا ا –ج 
 ى خبزها فورا .جر 
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 غير مذكور. و الأفتراض ة هوث أحدهم, لكن في كل حالة هنالك افتراضديتح 25إلى  74في الفقرات من 
ر على عبارة عن تصريح يؤخذ كأمر مسلم به. من الخيارات التالية اختر واحدا  (أ أو ب أو ج) والذي يعتب
 غير مذكور. الأغلب هو الأفتراض
 تأمل كل فقرة بحد ذاتها.
 
 أسئلة للتفكير بصوت مرتفع
 
 هو تفسير بسيط, لقد تعرض هؤلاء جّيان: إن تفسير سوء سلوك أطفال هذا اليوم في شلهوبالسيد  . 74
 الأطفال للعقاب الشديد في وقت ما, تلك هي المشكلة.
 
 .ن التصرفو الأطفال الذين تعرضوا للعقاب الشديد يسيئ –أ 
 الأطفال الذين يسيئون التصرف تعرضوا للعقاب الشديد في وقت ما. –ب 
 الأطفال الذين لم يتعرضوا للعقاب الشديد يتصرفون بشكل لائق. –ج 
 
 : يمكن تفسير سلوكهم بإدراك أن معظم هؤلاء الصغار لم يسبق لهم أن عوقبوا.السيدة نصر الله . 84
 
 شكل لائق.الأطفال الذين يعاقبون يتصرفون ب –أ 
 الأطفال الذين يتصرفون بشكل غير لائق لم يسبق لهم أن عوقبوا. –ب 
 الأطفال الذين لم يسبق لهم أن عوقبوا يتصرفون بشكل غير لائق. –ج 
 
 . وهذا سيحل كل الأمور.بتاتا: ما ينبغي علينا فعله هو عدم معاقبتهم السيد نصر الله . 94
 
 يء كانوا قد عوقبوا في وقت ما.يالأطفال الذين يتصرفون بشكل س –أ 
 الأطفال الذين تمت معاقبتهم سيسيئون التصرف. –ب 
 الأطفال الذين يتصرفون بشكل لائق لم يسبق لهم أن عوقبوا. -ج 
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 تذكير: اختر من (أ أو ب أو ج) الفقرة التي تعتبر على الأغلب هي الأفتراض غير المذكور.
 
 فعأسئلة للتفكير بصوت غير مرت
 
 قد أجبروا على العمل يفسر سوء سلوكهم.  جّيان: حقيقة أن أطفال  السيد نصر الله . 05
 
 الأطفال الذين لم يجبروا من قبل على العمل يتصرفون بشكل لائق. –أ 
 الأطفال الذين لا يتصرفون بشكل لائق أجبروا على العمل. –ب 
 ير لائق.الأطفال الذين أجبروا على العمل يتصرفون بشكل غ –ج 
 
 لك.: ما بنبغي علينا فعله هم عدم تشغيلهم. و سيكونون بعدها بخير, أنا أعرف ذالسيدة نصر الله . 15
 
 الأطفال الذين يجبرون على العمل سيسيئون التصرف. -أ 
 الأطفال الذين لا يجبرون على العمل سيتصرفون بشكل لائق. -ب 
 اجبارهم على العمل. الأطفال الذين يتصرفون بشكل لائق لم يتم –ج 
 
 : ينبغي علينا تشغيلهم, فهذا سيعالجهم.شلهوب ةالسيد . 25
 
 الأطفال الذين لا يجبرون على العمل سيسئون التصرف. -أ 
 الأطفال الذين يجبرون على العمل سيتصرفون بشكل لائق. -ب 
 الأطفال الذين يتصرفون بشكل لائق تم إجبارهم على العمل. –ج 
 
 ع أجوبتك.النهاية. راج
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Appendix E: Think-Aloud Protocol Sample Reasoning Mindset Test items 
1. I need to know the reasons why things happen.   
Agree strongly      Agree        Agree a little    Disagree a little    Disagree    Disagree strongly 
 
2. Once I have made my decision, I do not change my mind.  
Agree strongly      Agree        Agree a little    Disagree a little    Disagree    Disagree strongly 
 
3. Most of the time I feel confused.  
Agree strongly      Agree        Agree a little    Disagree a little    Disagree    Disagree strongly 
 
4. Too much education can really mess a person up.  
Agree strongly      Agree        Agree a little    Disagree a little    Disagree    Disagree strongly 
 
5. Only weak-minded people change their minds.  
Agree strongly      Agree        Agree a little    Disagree a little    Disagree    Disagree strongly 
 
6. Like everyone else, I say whatever I need to say to get what I want.  
Agree strongly      Agree        Agree a little    Disagree a little    Disagree    Disagree strongly 
 
7. Facts are facts, no interpretation needed.  
Agree strongly      Agree        Agree a little    Disagree a little    Disagree    Disagree strongly 
 
8. I exaggerate how sure I am of my decisions.  
Agree strongly      Agree        Agree a little    Disagree a little    Disagree    Disagree strongly 
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9. I prefer assignments where I am told exactly what to do and how to do it.  
Agree strongly      Agree        Agree a little    Disagree a little    Disagree    Disagree strongl 
 
10. Every belief should be evaluated.  
Agree strongly      Agree        Agree a little    Disagree a little    Disagree    Disagree strongly 
 
 
 
Printed with the permission of Insight Assessment/Measured Reasons, The California Academic 
Press, © 2017. 
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  .أريد أن أعرف لماذا تحدث الأشياء وكيف تحدث .1
  توافق بشّدةلا     لا توافق  لا توافق بعض الشيء  توافق بعض الشيء    توافق        توافق بشّدة 
 
 لما أتخذ قراري, لا أغير رأيي. .2
 لا توافق بشّدة     لا توافق  لا توافق بعض الشيء  توافق بعض الشيء    توافق        توافق بشّدة 
 
  معظم الأوقات, أشعر مرتبك. .3
 بشّدة لا توافق     لا توافق  لا توافق بعض الشيء  توافق بعض الشيء    توافق        توافق بشّدة 
 
  .)تَْعبَث بالإنسان( ض الشخصو ّقكثرت التعليم ُيمكن أن ي .4
 لا توافق بشّدة     لا توافق  لا توافق بعض الشيء  توافق بعض الشيء    توافق        توافق بشّدة
 
  .عقٌل ضعيف هو الذي يغّير عقله ُ ألديه   .5
 لا توافق بشّدة     لا توافق  الشيءلا توافق بعض   توافق بعض الشيء    توافق        توافق بشّدة
 
  لحصول على ما أريد.ما يتوّجب علي قوله ُبغية امثل الجميع, أقول  .6
 لا توافق بشّدة     لا توافق  لا توافق بعض الشيء  توافق بعض الشيء    توافق        توافق بشّدة
 
  الحقائق هي الحقائق, لا يوجد أي حاجة للتفسير. .7
 لا توافق بشّدة     لا توافق  لا توافق بعض الشيء  توافق بعض الشيء    توافق        توافق بشّدة
 
  أبالغ كيف أنا متأكد من قراري. .8
 لا توافق بشّدة     لا توافق  لا توافق بعض الشيء  توافق بعض الشيء    توافق        توافق بشّدة
 
  أفعله.ُأفضل واجبات حيثُّ ّيقيل لي بالضبط ماذا ُأفعل وكيف  .9
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 لا توافق بشّدة     لا توافق  لا توافق بعض الشيء  توافق بعض الشيء    توافق        توافق بشّدة
 
  يجب التقييم على كل المعتقدات. .01
 لا توافق بشّدة     لا توافق  لا توافق بعض الشيء  توافق بعض الشيء    توافق        توافق بشّدة
 
 cimedacA ainrofilaC ehT ,snosaeR derusaeM/tnemssessA thgisnI fo noissimrep eht htiw detnirP
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Appendix G: Think-Aloud Protocol Script – English and Arabic 
In this study, I am interested in learning about the thoughts you have as you solve questions from 
a critical thinking test.  
 
For this reason, I am going to ask you to think aloud as you work through 34 of the 62 critical 
thinking problems that I will be giving you.  
 
Let me explain what I mean by “think aloud.” It means that I would like you to tell me 
everything you think about as you work through the word problems. When I say tell me 
everything, I really mean every thought you have from the moment you read the problem to the 
end when you have a solution or even if you do not have a solution. Please do not worry about 
planning how to say things or clarifying your thoughts—what I really want is to hear your 
thoughts constantly as you try to solve the problem—uninterrupted and unedited. Again, don't try 
to plan or explain what you say or worry about being grammatically correct. Just act as if you are 
alone and speaking to yourself. 
 
You should start by reading the question out loud. Sometimes you may need time to think quietly 
through something—if so, that’s ok but please tell me what you thought through as soon as 
possible after you are finished. I realize it can feel awkward to think aloud but try to imagine you 
are alone in the room. If you become silent for too long, I will say “keep talking” or “think 
aloud,” as a way to remind you to think aloud. 
 
If you start speaking in a language other than the test language, I will remind you to “speak in 
English.”  
 
It is important that you talk aloud as much as you comfortably can while you are solving the 
problems and that you remember to project your voice. If you start speaking with a low voice or 
talking quietly to yourself, I will say “speak louder.” 
 
Also please know that I am not an expert in this area so I cannot and will not be evaluating your 
thinking—the purpose of the study is to learn about the thoughts you have as you solve the 
problems.  
 
We will have an opportunity to practice but before we get to that, do you understand what I 
would like you to do? Do you have any questions?  
 
We are going to practice thinking aloud with some practice problems:  
 
First, we will read the question out loud together, then answer it as soon as you can.  
 
Are you ready? 
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Practice 1 
 
Question 1: Please name ten foods that you might find in a supermarket. 
 
Did you have any other thoughts as you came up with the answer to this question?  
 
I want you to think those thoughts out loud as they occur to you. Don't explain your thoughts as 
if you are talking to someone else. Just say what you are thinking—even if it doesn't always 
seem grammatical or you're afraid that it won't make sense.  
 
Practice 2 
 
This time, you read the question out loud on your own and then try to think of the answer while 
thinking aloud as soon as you can! Are you ready? 
 
Question 2: What is the sixth letter after the letter C? 
 
Chances are that the letter “I” didn’t immediately occur to you after reading the question. You 
probably had to go through several steps to find the answer. Had you summarized your thinking 
during this question rather than reporting the sequence of actual thoughts aloud, you might have 
said that you found the letter “I” by counting through the alphabet. But this is not what I’d like 
you to do because this misses the actual sequence of thoughts.  
 
When people actually solve this problem out loud, they usually say a sequence of individual 
letters, such as C, then D, E, F, G, and H, before the answer “I.”  
 
Again, this is what I’d like you to do because I am interested in knowing the thoughts you had as 
you answered the question; we wish to have the most accurate, detailed report of thoughts as 
possible, instead of a summary of those thoughts.  
 
Can you recall any other thoughts? Any questions? 
 
We will now begin critical thinking test.  
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Section 8 
 
This final section will be a little different. In the previous sections I have asked that you not 
explain your thinking, but to just talk out loud while you answer the questions.  
 
In this final section you will be asked whether you agree or disagree with certain statements. As 
you answer these 10 questions, I want you to explain to yourself why you agree or disagree with 
the statement. 
 
What I mean is that if your first response is simply that you agree or disagree with a statement, I 
don’t want you to stop with that. I want you then to explain to yourself why you agree or 
disagree. 
 
For example, if the statement were: 
 
“It is important that I show up to appointments on time.”  
 
Don’t just say, I agree or I disagree with the statement. Instead I want you to explain your 
answer.  
 
You might say something like: 
 
“Well, I think it depends on the type of appointment.  I think it is important to show up on time 
to certain events, like a class, but I don’t think it is important to arrive to a party at a specific 
time. I’m guessing that by appointment that this means something formal like a doctor’s 
appointment. So I guess I’d have to say that I somewhat agree. I think it is important to show up 
to official appointments on time, but if it means that I think it is important to show up 
everywhere on time, I wouldn’t agree with that.  I don’t think it is important to show up to a 
party or restaurant at a specific time. So, I’ll put somewhat agree because I generally agree but 
not for everything.” 
 
Do you have any questions?  
 
Let’s start. 
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 كنت بتحل إختبار التفكير الّنقدي. إّلي راودتك لّمابيهمني بها الدراسة إتعلم عن الأفكار 
ؤال س 26من الـ 43ولها الّسبب، بدي أطلب منك أّنك تفّكر على صوت عالي بينما بتجاوب على الأسئلة الـ
 النقدي إلي رح أعطيك ياهون.
فك ّر إّنك تخّبرني كل شي عم بت". بيعني إّنو بحب خّليني إشرح شوي شو بقصد بـ"الّتفكير على صوت عالي
ّسؤال في بينما عم بتحل أسئلة المكتوبة. ولّما قول كل شي فأنا عن جد بقصد كل شي من لحظة ما بتقرا ال
وض ّ ح تلحين ما يصير عندك جواب  أو حّتى لو ما وصلت للحل. وبليز ما يهّمك كيف بّدك ترت ّب الإشيا أو 
بدون -ني حقيقتا هّوي إّني أقدر إسمع أفكارك بشكل مستمر إنتا وعم بتحاول تحل الّسؤالإلي بيهم-أفكارك
ك صحيح إنقطاع أو تعديل. مرة تانية، ما يهّمك كيف ترّتب الإشيا أو تشرح شو بّدك تقول أو إذا كان كلام
 قواعديًّا. حاول إّنك تتّصرف وكأّنك لحالك وإّنك عم تحكي مع حالك.
ك بدون راءة الّسؤال على صوت عالي. ويمكن أحيانا بّدك تعوز شوية وقت لحّتى تفك ّر بقلبش بقأّول شي بل
وإذا ها شي  صار، فما في مشكلة، بس أّول ما تخّلص تفكير خّبرني دغري بشو -صوت ببعض الإشيا
. وإذا غرفةفّكرت. بعرف إّنو ممكن تكون غريبة أّنك تفك ّر على صوت عالي بس حاول تتخّيل إّنك لحالك بال
بأّنك  إنتا بقيت صامت لمّدة طويلة، رح إّلك "كم ّل حكي" أو "فك ّر على صوت عالي". هيدي طريقة لذّكرك
 تفك ّر على صوت عالي.
 وإذا بّلشت تفك ّر بلغة غير اللغة الموجودة بالإختبار، فأنا رح ذّكرك وإّلك "إحكي عربي".
تذّكر تبترتاح وبتقدر بينما بتكون عم بتحل الأسئلة وأّنو  من المهم إّنك تحكي على صوت عالي على أد ما
تحكي بصوت مسموع. وإذا بّلشت تحكي بصوت واطي أو بينك وبين نفسك فأنا رح إّلك "إحكي بصوت 
 أعلى".
فالهدف من -ركوكمان بليز تذّكر إّني أنا منّيي خبير بها المجال وبالتالي أنا ما رح كون عم قي ّم طريقة تفكي
 ّدراسة إّنو إتعّلم عن الأفكار إّلي عندك بينما إنتا عم بتجاوب على الأسئلة.ها ال
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 رح يكون في فرصة لنتمّرن شوي، بس قبل ما كم ّل هل عم تفهم شو عم حاول بقصد أنا أعملو؟ عندك شي
 سؤال؟
 رح من حاول نتمّرن على الّتفكير بصوت عالي بشوّية أسئلة:
 هز؟لى صوت عالي، وبعدين حاول تجاوب على السؤال بأسرع ما بتقدر. جاأّول شي، رح نقرا الّسؤال سوا ع
 التمرين الأّول:
 أنواع أكل ممكن تلاقيها بالسوبرماركت. 01بليز سّمي 
 هل راودتك أفكار تانية بينما كنت عم بتفك ّر بالجواب لها الّسؤال؟
ي مع تشرح هالأفكار وكأّنك عم تحك بّدي منك تفك ّر بها الأفكار إلى راودتك على صوت عالي. وما تحاول
وبلا  حّتى ولو ما كانت لغوّيأ صح أو لو بتخاف إّنو ما تكون مفهومة-شخص تاني. بس قول بشو عم بتفك ّر
 معنى.
 الّتمرين الّتاني:
! هلَّق، إقرا الّسؤال لنفسك على صوت عالي وبعدين حاول تفّكر بالجواب على صوت عالي بأسرع ما فيك
 جاهز؟
 ال الّتاني: شو هوي الحرف الّسادس من بعد الحرف (ت)؟الّسو 
راحل فّكرت ع مالأرجح بإّنو الحرف (ذ) ما إجا على بالك دغري من بعد ما سمعت الّسؤال. والأرجح بأّنك 
ّكرت فيا للجواب. هل لخَّصت أفكارك خلال الّسؤال بدلا من إّنك تحاول تقول ترتيب أفكارك إّلي ف لتوصَّ لت
حب لي، وإذا هيك، يمكن قلت إّنك لقيت الحرف (ذ) لّما عّديت الأبجدية. بس مش هيدا إلي بعلى صوت عا
 إّنك تعملو لأّنو هّشي تحديد  ا بخليك ما تنتبه على الّترتيب إلى مرقو في أفكارك.
 لّما الّناس يحاولو يحّلوا ها الّسؤال على صوت عالي،  هّني عادت ا بعد ّ دو الأحرف حرف حرف، مثلا: ت
 د قبل ما يجاوبوا بالحرف ذ. وبعدين خ ح ج ث
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كنت عم بتجاوب  مّرة تانية، هيدا إلي بحّبك تعملو لأّنو أنا بهّمني أعرف الأفكار إّلي كنت عم بتفّكر فيا لّما
لأفكار على السؤال: بتّمنا إّنو نتوّصل لا أكتر شي دقيق ومفصَّ ل عن أفكارك بدلا من مجّرد تلخيص لها ا
 إلي راودتك.
 فيك تفّكر بأفكار تانية؟ أي سؤال؟
 :8الجزء 
س بهالجزء الأخير حيكون شوي غير. بالأجزاء الأخيرة كنت طلبت منك إّنك ما تشرح أفكارك، ولكن إّنك 
 تحكي على صوت عالي بينما عم بتجاوب على الأسئلة.
 ودة.بها الجزء الأخير بّدك تنسأل إذا كنت بتوافق أو ما بتوافق على الج  َمل الموج
ّنقطة. ولكن إلي بقصدو هوي إّنو إذا كانت إجابتك الأولى بتوافق أو ما بتوافق، فما بّدي منك توق ّف عند هال
 بّدي منك تشرح لنفسك ليش بتوافق أو ما بتوافق.
ق أو ما بوافق مثلا، إذا كانت الجملة: "من المهم إّنو كون بالموعد على الوقت" فما إنتا ما تقول بس: إيه بواف
 على هالجملة. ولكن بّدي منك تشرح ليش جاوبت هيك.
عالوقت  يمكن تقول شي متل: " طيب، أنا بعتقد إّنو هيي بتعتمد على نوع الموعد. بعتقد إّنو من المهم كون 
فك ّر  مبأمور معّينة، متل الّصف، بس ما بعتقد إّنو لازم أوصل ع ش حفلة مثلا على الوقت تحديد  ا. أنا ع
حد ما بوافق. كن مثلا يكون موعد مهم ورسمي متلا زيارة الدكتور. فا بعتقد إّنو لازم قول إّني لإنو الموعد مم
بفّكر إنو  بعتقد إّنو من المهم إذا في موعد رسمي بشي للّدولة بإّنو كون عالموعد، بس إذا القّصة بإنو أنا
م. فأنا بعتقد إّنو لازم كون على الوقت لشي حفلة أو مطعلازم كون عالموعد بكل شغلة، فأنا ما بوافق. ما 
 رح قول إّني نوع ا ما بوافق بشكل عام بس مش على كل شي".
 فهمت شو بقصد؟ عندك شي سؤال؟
 يلا لنبّلش.
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Appendix H: Culture and Critical Thinking Project Codebook 2017  
Developed by William Merrifield 
George Fox University 
 
This codebook is a reference key to understanding the quantitative data collected for the Culture 
and Critical Thinking dissertation project at George Fox University. The data are taken from a 
purposive sample of undergraduate junior and senior students at a Lebanese university. The 28 
Think-Aloud Protocol (TAP) interviews occurred from July 19, 2017 to September 22, 2017.  
 
PNum  1. The order participants sat for the TAP. 
    R. Participants who repeated the test in a second language. 
 
Location  2. The location where participants sat for the TAP session. 
    1. Mehagian 303 
    2. Conte Hall 
    3. Philibossian 206 
 
Pseudonym  3. Names ascribed to participants. 
 
Sex  4.  Sex. 
    1. Male 
    2. Female 
 
Sect  5.  Ethno-religious background. 
    1. Greek Orthodox 
    2. Sunni 
    3. Armenian Orthodox 
    4. Shiite 
    5. Maronite 
    6. Druze 
    7. Armenian Catholic 
 
Class  6.  Participant grade level during the 2017/2018 academic year. 
    1. Junior 
    2. Senior 
 
Major  7. Participant major during the 2017/2018 academic year. 
    1. Psychology 
    2. Computer Science 
    3. Business Administration 
    4. Education 
    5. Social Work 
    6. Biology 
    7. Nutrition Science 
    8. English Language 
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Education  8. Which of the following best describes your nursery to grade 12   
  educational experience? 
    1. I completed all of my education (nursery to grade 12) in Lebanon. 
    2. I completed my high school (grades 9-12) in Lebanon, but did my  
       primary school in a different country. 
    3. I did some of my nursery to grade 12 education in Lebanon and   
      some in a different country but completed at least grades 9-12 in   
      Lebanon. 
 
Date  9. Date when the TAP session took place.  
    1. 7/19/2017 
    2. 7/20/2017 
    3. 7/21/2017 
    4. 7/25/2017 
    5. 7/31/2017 
    6. 8/2/2017 
    7. 8/4/2017 
    8. 8/9/2017 
    9. 8/22/2017 
    10. 9/7/2017 
    11. 9/13/2017 
    12. 9/15/2017 
    13. 9/18/2017 
 
DateR  10. Date when the TAP repeat session took place. 
    1. 9/18/2017 
    2. 9/19/2017 
    3. 9/22/2017 
 
Time  11. Time of the TAP session.  
    1. 9:00 AM 
    2. 11:00 AM 
    3. 11:30 AM 
    4. 12:00 PM 
    5. 12:15 PM 
    6. 1:00 PM 
    7. 1:30 PM 
    8. 2:00 PM 
    9. 3:00 PM 
    10. 4:30 PM 
 
TimeR  12. Time of repeat TAP session 
    1. 9:30 AM 
    2. 11:00 AM 
    3. 1:00 PM 
    4. 2:30 PM 
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Language  13. Language of the CCTT/Sample Reasoning Mindset Assessments. 
    1. Arabic 
    2. English 
 
LanguageR  14. Language of the repeat CCTT/Sample Reasoning Mindset Assessments. 
    1. Arabic 
    2. English 
 
CTClass  15.  I have taken a course/class on critical thinking. 
    1. Yes 
    2. No 
 
CCTTA 1-3  16-18. Think-aloud (TAP) questions 1-3 from Section 1A of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTN 4-5  19-20. Non-TAP questions 4-5 from Section 1A of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTA 6-7  21-22. TAP questions 6-7 from Section 1B of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTN 8-10 23-25. Non-TAP questions 8-10 from Section 1B of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTA 11-15 26-30. TAP questions 11-15 from Section 2 of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTN 16-21 31-36. Non-TAP questions 16-21 from Section 2 of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTA 22-23 37-38. TAP questions 22-23 from Section 3 of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTN 24-25 39-40. Non-TAP questions 24-25 from Section 3 of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
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CCTTA 26-30 41-45. TAP questions 26-30 from Section 4 of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTN 31-38 46-53. Non-TAP questions 31-38 from Section 4 of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTA 39-40 54-55. TAP questions 39-40 from Section 5 of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTN 41-42 56-57. Non-TAP questions 41-42 from Section 5 of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTA 43-44 58-59. TAP questions 43-44 from Section 6 of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTN 45-46 60-61. Non-TAP questions 45-46 from Section 6 of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTA 47-49 62-64. TAP questions 47-49 from Section 7 of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CCTTN 50-52 65-67. Non-TAP questions 50-52 from Section 6 of the CCTT. 
    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
Correct  68. Total number of correct answers for each participant. 
 
PerCorrect  69.  Percentage of correct answers on the CCTT for each participant. 
 
TotScore  70.  Raw Score on the CCTT assessment. 
 
CorHalfWrong 71. Score of total correct minus half of the incorrect answers (CCTT). 
 
CCTTAR/ 1-52 72-123. Scores on repeat assessment taken in the alternate language. 
CCTTNR    0. Incorrect 
    1. Correct 
 
CorrectR  124. Total number of correct answers for each repeat participant. 
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PerCorrectR  125. Percentage of correct answers on the CCTT for each repeat participant. 
 
TotScoreR  126. Raw Score on the CCTT repeat assessment. 
 
CorHalfWrongR 127. Score of total correct minus half of the incorrect answers  
   (Repeat CCTT). 
 
SRMT 1  128. I need to know the reasons why things happen.   
                      فرعأ نأ ديرأثدحت فيكو ءايشلأا ثدحت اذامل. 
    1. Strongly Agree/ ّةدشب قفاوت        
    2. Agree/  قفاوت  
    3. Agree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت     
    4. Disagree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت لا    
    5. Disagree/  قفاوت لا       
    6. Strongly Disagree/  ّةدشب قفاوت لا  
 
SRMT 2  129. Once I have made my decision, I do not change my mind.  
            .ييأر ريغأ لا ,يرارق ذختأ امل 
    1. Strongly Agree/ ّةدشب قفاوت        
    2. Agree/  قفاوت  
    3. Agree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت     
    4. Disagree a little/  يشلا ضعب قفاوت لاء    
    5. Disagree/  قفاوت لا       
    6. Strongly Disagree/  ّةدشب قفاوت لا  
 
SRMT 3  130. Most of the time I feel confused.   
         .كبترم رعشأ ,تاقولأا مظعم 
    1. Strongly Agree/ ّةدشب قفاوت        
    2. Agree/  قفاوت  
    3. Agree a little/   ضعب قفاوتءيشلا     
    4. Disagree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت لا    
    5. Disagree/  قفاوت لا       
    6. Strongly Disagree/  ّةدشب قفاوت لا  
 
SRMT 4  131. Too much education can really mess a person up. 
        صخشلا ضّوقي نأ نكمُي ميلعتلا ترثك(ناسنلإاب ثَبَْعت). 
    1. Strongly Agree/ ّةدشب قفاوت        
    2. Agree/  قفاوت  
    3. Agree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت     
    4. Disagree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت لا    
    5. Disagree/  قفاوت لا       
    6. Strongly Disagree/  ّةدشب قفاوت لا  
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SRMT 5  132. Only weak-minded people change their minds.   
             هيدلأ  ُهلقع رّيغي يذلا وه فيعض ٌلقع. 
    1. Strongly Agree/ ّةدشب قفاوت        
    2. Agree/  قفاوت  
    3. Agree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت     
    4. Disagree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت لا    
    5. Disagree/  قفاوت لا       
    6. Strongly Disagree/  ّةدشب قفاوت لا  
 
SRMT 6  133. Like everyone else, I say whatever I need to say to get what I want.  
      لوقأ ,عيمجلا لثما ةيغُب هلوق يلع بّجوتي امديرأ ام ىلع لوصحل. 
    1. Strongly Agree/ ّةدشب قفاوت        
    2. Agree/  قفاوت  
    3. Agree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت     
    4. Disagree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت لا    
    5. Disagree/  قفاوت لا       
    6. Strongly Disagree/  ّةدشب قفاوت لا  
 
SRMT 7  134. Facts are facts, no interpretation needed.  
            أ دجوي لا ,قئاقحلا يه قئاقحلا.ريسفتلل ةجاح ي 
    1. Strongly Agree/ ّةدشب قفاوت        
    2. Agree/  قفاوت  
    3. Agree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت     
    4. Disagree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت لا    
    5. Disagree/  قفاوت لا       
    6. Strongly Disagree/  ّةدشب قفاوت لا  
 
SRMT 8  135. I exaggerate how sure I am of my decisions. 
                   .يرارق نم دكأتم انأ فيك غلابأ 
    1. Strongly Agree/ ّةدشب قفاوت        
    2. Agree/  قفاوت  
    3. Agree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت     
    4. Disagree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت لا    
    5. Disagree/  قفاوت لا       
    6. Strongly Disagree/  ّةدشب قفاوت لا  
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SRMT 9  136. I prefer assignments where I am told exactly what to do and  
   how to do it.  
        .هلعفأ فيكو لعفُأ اذام طبضلاب يل ليقّي ُّثيح تابجاو لضفُأ 
    1. Strongly Agree/  ّدشب قفاوتة         
    2. Agree/  قفاوت  
    3. Agree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت     
    4. Disagree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت لا    
    5. Disagree/  قفاوت لا       
    6. Strongly Disagree/  ّةدشب قفاوت لا  
 
SRMT 10  137. Every belief should be evaluated.  
                        .تادقتعملا لك ىلع مييقتلا بجي 
    1. Strongly Agree/ ّةدشب قفاوت        
    2. Agree/  قفاوت  
    3. Agree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت     
    4. Disagree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت لا    
    5. Disagree/  قفاوت لا       
    6. Strongly Disagree/   قفاوت لاّةدشب  
 
SRMTR 1-10 138-147. Scores on repeat assessment taken in the alternate language. 
    1. Strongly Agree/ ّةدشب قفاوت        
    2. Agree/  قفاوت  
    3. Agree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت     
    4. Disagree a little/  ءيشلا ضعب قفاوت لا    
    5. Disagree/  قفاوت لا       
    6. Strongly Disagree/  ّةدشب قفاوت لا  
 
CCTTADET 1 148. Mr. Wilstings says that eighteen-year-olds haven’t faced the problems  
   of the world, and that anyone who hasn’t faced these problems should  
   not be able to vote. What he says is correct, but eighteen-year-olds still  
   should be able to vote. They’re mature human beings, aren’t they? 
 
    1. A. Conclusion follows necessarily from the statements given. 
    2. B. Conclusion contradicts the statements given. 
    3. C. Neither follows necessarily nor contradicts the statements given. 
 
CCTTADET 2 149. Furthermore, eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote because   
   anyone who will suffer or gain from a decision made by the voters   
   ought to be permitted to vote. It is clear that eighteen-year-olds will  
   suffer or gain from the decisions of the voters. 
 
    1. A. Conclusion follows necessarily from the statements given. 
    2. B. Conclusion contradicts the statements given. 
    3. C. Neither follows necessarily nor contradicts the statements given. 
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CCTTADET 3 150. Most eighteen-year-olds don’t know the difference between right and  
   wrong. The right to vote should not be possessed by the members of a  
   group if most of them don’t know this difference. It is obvious then that  
   eighteen-year-olds shouldn’t have the right to vote. 
 
    1. A. Conclusion follows necessarily from the statements given. 
    2. B. Conclusion contradicts the statements given. 
    3. C. Neither follows necessarily nor contradicts the statements given. 
 
CCTTNDET 4 151. Many eighteen-year-olds are serving their country. Now there can be no  
   doubt that many people serving their country ought to be allowed the  
   vote. From this you can see that many eighteen-year-olds ought to be  
   allowed to vote. 
 
    1. A. Conclusion follows necessarily from the statements given. 
    2. B. Conclusion contradicts the statements given. 
    3. C. Neither follows necessarily nor contradicts the statements given. 
 
CCTTNDET 5 152. I agree with Mr. Pinder that anyone who will suffer or gain from a   
   decision made by the voters ought to be permitted to vote. And it is true  
   that eighteen-year-olds will suffer or gain from these decisions. But so  
   will ten-year-olds. Therefore, eighteen-year-olds shouldn’t be allowed  
   to vote. 
 
    1. A. Conclusion follows necessarily from the statements given. 
    2. B. Conclusion contradicts the statements given. 
    3. C. Neither follows necessarily nor contradicts the statements given. 
 
CCTTADET 6 153. Mr. Wilstings has said that most foreigners have made positive   
   contributions to our country. This is true. I will also admit that a group  
   is not bad if most of its members do make positive contributions. But  
   don’t be deceived by Mr. Wilstings’ fine-sounding language. Foreigners  
   are a bad group and shouldn’t be admitted. 
 
    1. A. Conclusion follows necessarily from the statements given. 
    2. B. Conclusion contradicts the statements given. 
    3. C. Neither follows necessarily nor contradicts the statements given. 
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CCTTADET 7 154. All of you think it was all right to open our doors to all people from  
   distant lands in the nineteenth century. Any person who thinks it was all  
   right to do so at that time ought also to be in favor of doing so now.   
   Thus, you ought to be in favor of opening our doors now to those from  
   distant lands who are seeking admission to our country. 
 
    1. A. Conclusion follows necessarily from the statements given. 
    2. B. Conclusion contradicts the statements given. 
    3. C. Neither follows necessarily nor contradicts the statements given. 
 
CCTTNDET 8 155. Mr. Wilstings has proposed that we open our doors to all the foreigners  
   who want to enter our beloved country. But foreigners always have   
   made trouble and they always will. Most of them can’t even speak   
   English. Since anybody who makes trouble is bad, it follows that   
   foreigners are bad. 
 
    1. A. Conclusion follows necessarily from the statements given. 
    2. B. Conclusion contradicts the statements given. 
    3. C. Neither follows necessarily nor contradicts the statements given. 
 
CCTTNDET 9 156. You may not know it, but for the past ten years the Communists in our  
   country have been supporting a policy of unrestricted immigration. It is  
   obvious why they support this policy of opening our doors to   
   foreigners. Now I hate to say this, but Mr. Wilstings’ support of this  
   policy leaves us but one conclusion: Mr. Wilstings is a Communist. 
 
    1. A. Conclusion follows necessarily from the statements given. 
    2. B. Conclusion contradicts the statements given. 
    3. C. Neither follows necessarily nor contradicts the statements given. 
 
CCTTNDET 10 157. I’m sorry that Mr. Pinder feels that way about it. Sure, foreigners make  
   trouble and most of them can’t speak English. But even though it’s true  
   that people who make trouble ought not to be admitted, we still ought to  
   admit foreigners to our country. You don’t want to be selfish, do you? 
 
    1. A. Conclusion follows necessarily from the statements given. 
    2. B. Conclusion contradicts the statements given. 
    3. C. Neither follows necessarily nor contradicts the statements given. 
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CCTTADET 11 158. DOBERT: I hear that you and some other crackpots are trying to get  
   Gallton to chlorinate its water supply. You seem to think that this will  
   do some good. There can be no doubt that either we should chlorinate  
   or we shouldn’t. Only a fool would be in favor of chlorinating the   
   water, so we ought not do it. 
 
   ALGAN: You are correct at least in saying that we are trying to get the  
   water chlorinated. 
 
1. A. Dobert is mistakenly assuming that there are only two 
 alternatives. 
2. B. Dobert is using a word in two ways. 
3. C. Dobert is using emotional language that doesn’t help to make his  
         argument reasonable. 
 
CCTTADET 12 159. DOBERT: I guess you know that to put chlorine in the water is to   
   threaten the health of every one of Gallton’s citizens, and that, you’ll  
   admit, is bad. 
  
   ALGAN: What right do you have to say that our health will be   
   threatened? 
 
   DOBERT: “Healthy living” may be defined as living according to   
   nature. Now, we don’t find chlorine added to water in nature. Therefore,  
   everyone’s health would be threatened if chlorine were added. 
 
    1. A. Dobert is using emotional language that doesn’t help to make his  
             argument reasonable. 
    2. B. Dobert’s thinking is in error. 
    3. C. Dobert is using a word in two different ways. 
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CCTTADET 13 160.DOBERT: Furthermore, Gallton’s water is pure already. I know this  
   from the report, which you haven’t seen yet, that will soon be released  
   by the State Water Survey. 
 
   ALGAN: You can’t know that Gallton’s water is pure. The State Water  
   Survey didn’t test all the water that we have available to us. They only  
   took samples. Furthermore, you can’t know that they didn’t make an  
   error in their investigation because there’s always a chance for error in  
   any investigation. Therefore, you could never know that Gallton’s water  
   is pure. 
 
    1. A. Algan is not using “know” in its ordinary sense, yet he is   
     expecting the effect that follows from its being used in the   
     ordinary sense. 
    2. B. Dobert, in using secret evidence, is not being fair, since this   
     evidence is not available to everyone for inspection. 
    3. C. Algan can’t know that an error was made in the investigation. 
 
CCTTADET 14 161.ALGAN: The question boils down to two alternatives. Either we want  
   clean, chlorinated water or we want bad-smelling, disease-ridden water.  
   The citizens of Gallton certainly don’t want bad-smelling, disease-  
   ridden water. What is left but to chlorinate? 
 
    1. A. Algan hasn’t shown that there are only two alternatives. 
    2. B. Algan is using emotional language that doesn’t help to make the  
     argument reasonable. 
    3. C. Algan is using the same word in two ways. 
 
CCTTADET 15 162.DOBERT: Laying aside the question of whether medication is bad or  
   good, wouldn’t you say that you are proposing a plan for medication? 
 
   ALGAN: Not at all. Is killing germs in the water supply the same as  
   treating a disease of the human body? Certainly not. Therefore, my plan  
   cannot be called a plan for medication. 
 
   DOBERT: Oh, but it is medication. Isn’t one of your stated goals the  
   prevention of disease? Medication is the process of trying to restore or  
   preserve health in any manner whatsoever. Whether your plan actually  
   would result in preserving or restoring health doesn’t matter. The point  
   is that you would be trying to do so and thus would be medicating   
   people. 
 
    1. A. There is a serious mistake in the thinking in this part. 
    2. B. Dobert’s conclusion doesn’t necessarily follow from the reasons  
     he gives. 
    3. C. Dobert and Algan are using the same word differently. 
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CCTTNDET 16 163.DOBERT: I understand that you look on this thing as an experiment.  
   I’m sure that the citizens of Gallton don’t want to be guinea pigs in this  
   matter. 
 
   ALGAN: This is a demonstration. Nobody ought to object to a  
   demonstration, since the purpose of a demonstration is not to find out  
   something, but rather to show us something that is already known. An  
   additional value of this demonstration of chlorination is that its purpose  
   is also to test for the long-range effects of chlorination on the human  
   body. This objective of the demonstration is a worthy one. 
 
    1. A. Algan has not shown that knowing the long-range effects of  
     chlorination is a worthy objective. 
    2. B. Algan is using a word in two ways. 
    3. C. There is an error in thinking in this part. 
 
CCTTNDET 17 164.DOBERT: Can you prove that chlorination is useful in making water  
   safe? 
 
   ALGAN: Yes, I can. Devton gets its water from the same place that we  
   do. Three years ago, Devton had nine cases of typhoid fever. Two years  
   ago they started to chlorinate and they had only two cases that year.  
   That’s proof enough.  
 
    1. A. Algan is using the same word in two ways. 
    2. B. That’s not a big enough reduction. If there were no typhoid at all  
     the second year, then Algan would have proven his statement. 
    3. C. One such comparison is not enough to prove such a statement. 
 
CCTTNDET 18 165.DOBERT: In reality, you are proposing to poison our water supply   
   when you propose to put chlorine gas in the water. Chlorine gas has  
   been used in war to kill human beings. It is a deadly poison. Nobody  
   wants to be poisoned. 
 
   ALGAN: But when chlorine is mixed 3 1/2 parts per million, nobody  
   will be hurt at all. 
 
   DOBERT: That’s not the point. You’d still be putting a deadly poison  
   in the water. That’s what it means to poison the water. So anyone   
   drinking the water would necessarily be poisoned. 
    1. A. Algan is missing the point. 
    2. B. Dobert is using the same word in two ways. 
    3. C. Dobert’s thinking is in error. 
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CCTTNDET 19 166.DOBERT: Furthermore, Gallton’s water is safe now.  
 
   ALGAN: That’s not true. Nothing is safe as long as there’s a   
   conceivable chance for something to go wrong. From this it follows that  
   Gallton’s water is not safe.  
 
    1. A. Algan has made the word “safe” useless for communicating  
     information. 
    2. B. Algan hasn’t said what he means by “safe.” 
    3. C. There is a flaw in Algan’s thinking. 
 
CCTTNDET 20 167.DOBERT: The citizens of Gallton will have to make a choice. Either we  
   want absolutely pure water or we should keep our present setup. Now  
   any chemist can tell you that from a practical point of view it is   
   impossible to remove all the impurities from a water supply. So we   
   should leave things the way they are.  
 
    1. A. Dobert hasn’t shown that there are only two alternatives. 
    2. B. Dobert is using the same word in two ways. 
    3. C. The conclusion doesn’t necessarily follow from the reasons   
     given. 
 
CCTTNDET 21 168.DOBERT: To add chlorine is to add a drug to Gallton’s water supply.  
   Obviously, we don’t want our citizens to be drugged every time they  
   take a drink of water. 
 
   ALGAN: What right do you have to say that chlorine is a drug? 
 
   DOBERT: The term “drug” is defined in section 201 (g) of the Federal  
   Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as an article intended for use in the  
   diagnosis, cure, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other   
   animals. Now, since chlorine is intended for use in the prevention of  
   disease, it is a drug.  
 
    1. A. Dobert’s thinking is in error. 
    2. B. Algan should realize that a person has a right to use a word in a  
     special way. The important thing is that there be understanding of  
     what is said. 
    3. C. Dobert is using a word in two different ways. 
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CCTTADET 22 169. A.Cabbage worms are poisonous to ducklings (said by Dr. Kolter). 
    
   B.Six Canvasbacks died during the week of the experiment (said by Dr.  
       Kolter). 
    
   C. Neither statement is more believable. 
 
    1. A. First statement is more believable. 
    2. B. Second statement is more believable. 
    3. C. Neither statement is more believable than the other. 
 
CCTTADET 23 170.A. During the week following the experiment, all of the ill ducklings  
      died.  (From an article in a magazine that can be found on almost   
       every newsstand. The author, a popular international writer, stated   
       that he obtained his information from Drs. Brown and Kolter.) 
 
   B. During the week following the experiment, the rest of the worm-fed  
       ducklings died (from the report written by Drs. Brown and Kolter). 
 
   C.  Neither statement is more believable. 
 
    1. A. First statement is more believable. 
    2. B. Second statement is more believable. 
    3. C. Neither statement is more believable than the other. 
 
CCTTNDET 24 171. A.Six Pintails were healthy at the end of the experiment (said by Dr.  
       Brown). 
 
   B.Four worm-fed ducklings were ill at the end of the experiment (said  
     by Dr. Brown). 
 
   C Neither statement is more believable. 
 
    1. A. First statement is more believable. 
    2. B. Second statement is more believable. 
    3. C. Neither statement is more believable than the other. 
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CCTTNDET 25172. A.Independent laboratory studies have shown conclusively that   
   ducklings sprayed with Wrodane will not be harmed by eating cabbage  
   worms (from an article in a magazine published by a chemical   
   company that makes Wrodane). 
 
 B. No satisfactory way has yet been found to counteract the poisonous  
   effects of cabbage worms on ducklings (from the magazine article   
   mentioned in Item No. 23, which appeared two months after the   
   Wrodane article).  
 
 C.  Neither statement is more believable.  
    1. A. First statement is more believable. 
    2. B. Second statement is more believable. 
    3. C. Neither statement is more believable than the other. 
 
CCTTADET 26 173. The experiment is repeated in Canada with twice as many ducklings.  
   None of the ducklings die. At the end of the week, two of the regular- 
   diet ducklings are ill, and three of the worm-diet ducklings are ill. 
 
    1. A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
    2. B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
    3. C. This information does neither. 
 
CCTTADET 27 174. It is discovered that during the original experiment the regular-fed  
   ducklings had less sunlight than the worm-fed ducklings. It is not   
   known whether or not the difference in amount of sunshine would have  
   an effect on the health of ducklings. 
 
    1. A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
    2. B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
    3. C. This information does neither. 
 
CCTTADET 28 175.A group of well-known Canadian duck breeders report that they   
   discovered long ago that it was dangerous to ducklings to let them run  
   in a cabbage patch. 
 
    1. A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
    2. B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
    3. C. This information does neither. 
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CCTTADET 29 176.It is discovered that both sets of ducklings reached through their cages  
   and drank water from a little ditch that ran past both cages. They drank  
   practically no water out of the pans that were in the cages. The water in  
   the ditch was ordinary water. 
 
    1. A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
    2. B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
    3. C. This information does neither. 
 
CCTTADET 30 177.A similar experiment is performed with young dogs. Another is   
   performed with young turtles. In both cases the results are similar to  
   those of the original duckling experiment. 
 
    1. A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
    2. B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
    3. C. This information does neither. 
 
CCTTNDET 31 178. The experiment is repeated. The results are similar. 
 
    1. A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
    2. B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
    3. C. This information does neither. 
 
CCTTNDET 32 179.The experiment is repeated with three different varieties of ducklings,  
   which are younger than the ones used in the original experiment. At the  
   end of the week, two of the regular-diet ducklings are dead, and twenty  
   of the worm-diet ducklings are dead. 
 
    1. A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
    2. B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
    3. C. This information does neither. 
 
 
CCTTNDET 33 180. At the time of the original experiment, there was an apple tree shedding  
   apples into the cages of both sets of ducklings. The experimenters did  
   not expect this to happen. About the same number of apples fell into  
   each cage. This kind of apple does not affect the health of ducklings. 
 
    1. A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
    2. B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
    3. C. This information does neither. 
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CCTTNDET 34 181.The experiment is repeated in Scotland. At the end of the week, all of  
   the worm-fed ducklings are dead, and all of the regular fed ducklings  
   are alive and healthy. But it is discovered that the man who handled the  
   worms had been spraying fruit trees with arsenic and had carelessly  
   transferred some arsenic to the feeding pan of the worm-fed ducklings.  
   Arsenic is a deadly poison. 
 
    1. A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
    2. B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
    3. C. This information does neither. 
 
CCTTNDET 35 182. A team of expert biologists examines the body structure and processes  
   of ten common varieties of ducklings, including the three used in the  
   experiment. The biologists can find no significant differences among  
   the varieties examined except for coloring. 
 
    1. A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
    2. B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
    3. C. This information does neither. 
 
CCTTNDET 36 183.The experiment is repeated in Canada with three different varieties of  
   ducklings. All of the ducklings die, whether worm-fed or not. 
 
    1. A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
    2. B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
    3. C. This information does neither. 
 
CCTTNDET 37 184.The experiment is repeated in the United States with twice as many  
   ducklings. At the end of the week, 40 of the 44 regular diet ducklings  
   are alive and healthy, and 39 of the 44 worm-fed ducklings are alive  
   and healthy. 
 
    1. A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
    2. B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
    3. C. This information does neither. 
 
CCTTNDET 38 185. It turns out that at the time of the original experiment, a large oak tree  
   was dropping acorns into the cages of the worm-fed ducklings only.  
   The effect of this kind of acorn on the health of ducklings is not known. 
 
    1. A. If true, this information supports the conclusion. 
    2. B. If true, this information goes against the conclusion.  
    3. C. This information does neither. 
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CCTTDET 39 186.Of j, k, and l, which is the best prediction? 
 
1. Mark A for j. 
2. Mark B for k. 
3. Mark C for l.. 
 
CCTTADET 40 187.Of n, o, and p, which is the best prediction? 
 
1. Mark A for n. 
2. Mark B for o. 
3. Mark C for p. 
 
CCTTADET 41 188.Of k, l, and m, which is the best prediction? 
 
1. Mark A for k. 
2. Mark B for l. 
3. Mark C for m. 
 
CCTTNDET 42 189.Of m, n, and o, which is the best prediction? 
 
1. Mark A for m. 
2. Mark B for n. 
3. Mark C for o. 
 
CCTTADET 43 190.“That’s a nice stock car you have there, Bill,” his mother remarked.  
 
   “Stock car!” exclaimed Bill. “That’s no stock car. Did you ever see a  
   car in a dealer’s showroom with bumpers made out of heavy pipe? Do  
   the automobile manufacturers turn out cars with no fenders? Of course  
   not.”  
 
   Bill’s mother then asked, “Just what do you mean by ‘stock car’?”  
 
   Of the following, which is the best way to state Bill’s notion of a stock  
   car?  
 
    1. A. A stock car is an automobile that is, for the most part, made of  
     standard parts put out by automobile manufacturers, but which  
     might have missing fenders and special bumpers. 
    2. B. A stock car is an automobile that has fenders and does not have  
     bumpers made out of pipe. 
    3. C. A stock car is a standard automobile, as turned out by the factory  
     and sold to the public. 
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CCTTADET 44 191.“It certainly is a stock car,” said Joan. “It has an ordinary engine that hasn’t 
 been changed since it came off the assembly line. That alone makes it a 
 stock car and that’s all that matters.” 
 
   Of the following, what is the best way to state Joan’s notion of a stock  
   car?  
 
    1. A. A stock car is an automobile that is, for the most part, made of  
     standard parts put out by automobile manufacturers, but which  
     might have the fenders missing and special bumpers. 
    2. B. A stock car is an automobile with a standard engine. 
    3. C. A stock car is where the engine is standard. 
 
CCTTNDET 45 192.“What are you making with that dough?” asked Mary’s father. 
 
   “Dough!” exclaimed Mary. “Did you ever see anything made with yeast  
   that was baked immediately after it was mixed? Naturally not,” she said  
   as she put the mixture into the oven immediately after mixing it.   
   “Therefore, it’s not dough.” “What do you mean by ‘dough’?” her   
   father asked. 
 
   Of the following, which is the best way to state Mary’s notion of   
   dough?  
 
    1. A. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients, including   
     yeast. 
    2. B. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients, not baked  
     immediately. 
    3. C. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients, often baked in  
     an oven. 
 
CCTTNDET 46 193.“Why, of course that’s dough,” said Jim. “You’re making cookies,   
   aren’t you? It’s not even called dough unless it’s used for cookies.” 
 
   Of the following, which is the best way to state Jim’s notion of dough?  
 
    1. A. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients not baked  
     immediately unless used for cookies. 
    2. B. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients which is used  
     for cookies. 
    3. C. Dough is a mixture of flour and other ingredients, which is used  
     for cookies unless it’s baked immediately. 
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CCTTADET 47 194.MR. ALGAN: The explanation of the misbehavior of Gallton’s present- 
   day crop of youngsters is a simple one. These children have been   
   severely punished at some time or other. That’s the trouble.  
 
    1. A. Children who have been severely punished misbehave. 
    2. B. Children who misbehave have been severely punished at some  
     time. 
    3. C. Children who haven’t been severely punished behave properly. 
 
CCTTADET 48 195. MRS. DOBERT: Their behavior can be explained by realizing that   
   most of these youngsters have never been punished. 
 
    1. A. Children who are punished behave properly. 
    2. B. Children who behave improperly have never been punished. 
    3. C. Children who have never been punished behave improperly. 
 
CCTTADET 49 196. MR. DOBERT: What we should do is never punish them. That would  
   take care of things.  
 
    1. A. Children who behave badly have been punished at some time. 
    2. B. Children who are punished will misbehave. 
    3. C. Children who behave properly have never been punished. 
 
CCTTNDET 50 197. MR. DOBERT: The fact that Gallton’s children have been forced to  
   work explains their misbehavior. 
 
    1. A. Children who have never been forced to work behave properly. 
    2. B. Children who behave improperly have been forced to work. 
    3. C. Children who have been forced to work behave improperly. 
 
CCTTNDET 51 198. MRS. DOBERT: What we should do is not make them work. Then they  
   would be all right. I know it.  
 
    1. A. Children who are forced to work will misbehave. 
    2. B. Children who are not forced to work will behave properly. 
    3. C. Children who behave properly have not been forced to work. 
 
CCTTNDET 52 199.MRS. ALGAN: We ought to make them work. That will cure them.  
 
    1. A. Children who aren’t forced to work will misbehave. 
    2. B. Children who are forced to work will behave properly. 
    3. C. Children who behave properly have been forced to work. 
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CCTTADETR/ 1-52 200-251. Score details on repeat assessment taken in the alternate   
    language. 
 
CCTTNDETR   1. A 
    2. B 
    3. C 
 
TotTime  252. Total time of the TAP session. 
    1. Less than 50 minutes. 
    2. 51-60 minutes. 
    3. 61-70 minutes. 
    4. 71-80 minutes. 
    5. 81-90 minutes. 
    6. 91-100 minutes. 
    7. Over 100 minutes. 
 
TimeCCTT  253. Total time spent on the CCTT. 
    1. Less than 50 minutes. 
    2. 51-55 minutes. 
    3. 56-60 minutes. 
    4. 61-65 minutes. 
    5. 66-70 minutes. 
    6. 71-80 minutes. 
    7. More than 80 minutes. 
 
TimeSRMT  254. Total spent on the Sample Reasoning Mindset Test. 
    1. 0-5 minutes. 
    2. 6-10 minutes. 
    3. 11-15 minutes. 
    4. 16-20 minutes. 
 
AddTime  255. Time spent on breaks, questions, and clarifications. 
    1. 0-5 minutes. 
    2. 6-10 minutes. 
    3. 11-15 minutes. 
   
TotTimeR  256. Total time of the repeat TAP session. 
    1. Less than 50 minutes. 
    2. 51-60 minutes. 
    3. 61-70 minutes. 
    4. 71-80 minutes. 
 
TimeCCTTR 257. Total time spent on the repeat CCTT. 
    1. Less than 50 minutes. 
    2. 51-55 minutes. 
    3. 56-60 minutes. 
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TimeSRMT  258. Total spent on the repeat Sample Reasoning Mindset Test. 
    1. 0-5 minutes. 
    2. 6-10 minutes. 
 
AddTimeR  259. Time spent on breaks, questions, and clarifications in repeat session. 
    1. 0-5 minutes. 
    2. 6-10 minutes. 
 
 
 
